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ABSTRACT
The  focus  of  this  thesis  is  on  the  bilateral  relationship  between  South  Africa  and 
Malaysia. The thesis appropriates ‘critical theory,’ and as a flexible theoretical tool, and, 
as an open-ended, loose frame in order to give voice to the marginalized and voiceless 
from  the  South.  The  thesis  thus  looks  at  the  politico-economic  ties  that  have  been 
developed and brings  into  view the  socio-cultural  relations  that  had  been  established 
between the peoples of the two sovereign nation-states during the apartheid and post-
apartheid eras respectively.  
The basic purpose of this study was fivefold: (a) to contribute to the extant literature that 
concentrates on South Africa’s relations with Malaysia, (b) to examine the relationship at 
political and economic ties in some detail, (c) to demonstrate that apart from the afore-
mentioned  bonds  IR  specialists  should  also  take  into  account  the  socio-cultural 
dimensions of international relations, (d) to bring to light the nation-state’s limitations 
when discussing the role of non-state actors and considering the contributions of other 
factors  such  as  globalization,  and  (e)  to  stimulate  further  research  on  bilateral  and 
multilateral relations in the South – particularly between South Africa and other states in 
Asia and Latin America - that  would assist to better  understand the past,  present and 
perhaps the future.
KEY WORDS: South Africa,  Malaysia,  International  Relations,  Critical  Theory, 
South,  Globalization,  Middle  Power,  Identity,  Community,  Ethnicity,  Culture, 
Religion, Diaspora, Citizenship, Partnership.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION : 
The Opening Passages of the Tale of Two Sovereign Nation-States from the South
1. Introduction
The end of the Cold War, which abruptly ended in 1989, was a defining period in world 
history because it, according to Mayo (2005: 81), signaled ‘a new triumphalism’ that has 
largely been dominated by USA capitalism. Even though Holm & Sorenson (1995: 3) 
responded negatively to the question whether the end of the Cold War produced a ‘new 
world order’, some scholars took the emergence of such an order for granted. In fact, the 
argument  goes that  the end of the Cold War also marked  the  End of History as was 
contended by Francis Fukuyama, but for others the doors of the old order closed and the 
gates  of  ‘the  New  World  Order  ushered  in  new  complexities  into  the  world 
system’  (Morris  2002:  6).  This  order,  however,  brought  into  focus  a  multitude  of 
developments; examples of theses outcomes were: the merging of transnational corporate 
companies such as Mittal Steel buying out rival companies (cf. Mayo 2005: 16-17), the 
creation  of  regional  structures  such  as  the  European  Union  competing  with  similar 
structures in the economic arena (cf.  Keohane 1995: 175), the development  of cross-
border state alliances such as Greenpeace yearning for environmental justice and peace 
(Mayo  2005:  66-67),  the  establishment  of  trans-cultural  links  such  as  GAPENA 
networking with diasporia ethnic communities (Haron 2005: 57-59), and the formation of 
new  nation-states  such  as  Serbia,  Croatia,  and  Bosnia  emerging  out  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia (De Rivero 2001: 20). 
All of these occurrences form part of the process of an ‘uneven’ globalization that Holm 
& Sorenson (1995: 4-7) discussed in their introductory chapter. Mayo (2005: 22) argued 
that  globalization  is  a  process that  has not  benefited  every nation-state  equally  for it 
inherently contains both risks and opportunities (Holm & Sorenson 1995: 5). The process 
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-  in  which  nation-states  are  not  mere  passive  but  active  institutions  -  has  however 
impacted upon and influenced bilateral and multilateral relations that have been (and are 
being) forged between sovereign nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia and 
regional  institutions  such  as  the  Southern  African  Developing  Countries  (SADC)  – 
which,  as  a  matter  of  information,  was  previously  known  as  Southern  African 
Development  Community  (SADCC)  when  it  was  initially  formed  in  1980 -  and  the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in different and diverse ways. 
It was thought, according to De Rivero (2001: 33), that when the Cold War ended that the 
international community was ‘poised on the threshold of a new world order based on 
capitalist democracy and global prosperity.’ De Rivero lamented the fact that this, alas, 
was not to be and it instead evolved into a ‘modern barbarism.’ The new world order 
affirmed  the  intensification  of  the  North’s  -  represented  by  24  nation-states  and 
spearheaded by the USA with the UK along its  side -  stranglehold  over  the South - 
represented by more  than 140 nation-states under the leadership of South Africa and 
Malaysia (in the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM]) - and its unstoppable penetration of 
‘all national sovereignties with their merchandise, services, capital,  technology … and 
patterns  of  consumption’  (ibid  45).  In  the  newly  constructed  international  system in 
which  the  state’s  role  has  been  radically  transformed,  the  industrialized/modernized 
North devised and instituted rules and regulations via the Bretton Woods institutions such 
as  the  World Bank and the International  Monetary Fund that  obliged  the developing 
South ‘to integrate into the global economy … (even though these quasi nation–states 
were and are) unable to withstand the (one-sided) competition’ (De Rivero 2001: 5, 20, 
27; Mayo 2005: 16). 
The North, in other words, preferred ‘an imbalanced’ international state system or – to 
put to it slightly differently – a new world ‘disorder’ that served its interest and dissuaded 
any developing quasi nation-state from seeking alternatives (ibid). The desired system 
thus  promoted  the  North’s  interest  and  affairs  at  the  expense  of  the  South  and as  a 
consequence of this they were challenged by critical theorists whose ideas will be loosely 
employed to  frame the exploration  of this  thesis’  contents  (cf.  Chapter  Two).  As the 
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dominant  group in the international  system, the North set down the rules of the new 
world (dis)order for the new millennium and maintained strict control so that whatever 
takes place in it only serves its interest and not those who choose alternatives. The liberal 
policies that it proposed and implemented for the world had to be strictly adhered to by 
the  South  otherwise  action  in  the  form of  sanctions  and other  disciplinary  measures 
would be imposed. Sovereign nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia from the 
South were thus caught up in this web of international arrangement during this era of 
globalization in which the North intensified its exploitation of the rest of the world (Mayo 
2005:  140).  These nation-states  thus  had to  fall  in  line  with  the  North’s  prescriptive 
measures  by adopting  and implementing  without  question  the  liberal  –  exploitative  - 
(socio-economic) policies and cultural practices.   
Changes, however, did not only occur across Europe at the end of the Cold War; they 
also took place in other parts of the world. South Africa was one of the ‘beneficiaries,’ if 
one may describe it as such, of these transformations. After much international pressure 
throughout  1989 F.W.  De Klerk,  who took over  from P.W.  Botha  and who did  not 
initially  show any commitment  to change (Landsberg 2004: 70),  was forced to bring 
about the required socio-political changes. He increasingly became aware of the fact that 
the ‘total onslaught’ strategy was no more tenable and that the best option was to accept 
the  soft  approach  that  entailed  negotiating  with  the  apartheid  regime’s  ‘enemy’  and 
receiving financial rewards from the international community in general and the North in 
particular. De Klerk’s parliamentary speech on the 2nd of February 1990 – contrary to 
what he wanted people to believe at that time and afterwards - was a clear indication that 
he yielded more to international pressure rather than internal coercion when he informed 
the  public  of  the  significant  changes  that  were  in  the  offing;  the  first  was  Nelson 
Mandela’s release and the second was the liberation movements’ unbanning (ibid 85-88). 
As a result of these unexpected developments, the South Africans and the international 
community  adjusted  themselves  to  the  new  South  African  socio-political  order. 
Subsequently De Klerk led his National Party (NP) to the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA) table and began negotiations in earnest with the ANC under the 
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guidance of Mandela as well as with other political parties (ibid 111, 120). Their intense 
meetings between mid 1991 and early 1993 resulted in the formulation and acceptance of 
the interim Constitution. The agreements and the compromises, as captured in the sunset 
clauses, at these meetings, in turn, opened the path for the South Africans to go to the 
polls  in  April  1994  in  order  to  vote  into  power  their  first  democratically  elected 
government. Throughout these intense meetings, Mandela demonstrated that he had the 
strength  to  lead  the  South  Africans  into  a  new era.  And  by  the  time  Mandela  was 
appointed  as  democratic  South  Africa’s  first  democratically  elected  president,  many 
nation-states queued to establish ties with South Africa. 
Whilst these events were unfolding and impacting on the Southern African region as a 
whole, developments of a different kind were also unfurling in Malaysia. At the end of 
1989 the Malaysians were bruised by the disputes and disagreements within Malaysia’s 
major national party namely the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). These 
internal squabbles, which led to an internal split, created a sense of uncertainty within 
UMNO as well the other parties that made up Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition party as to 
whether  they  would  win  the  1990  elections  (Cheah  2002:  220).  Fortunately  for  Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamed and UMNO Baru – as it came to be called after the break up - the BN 
coalition party scraped through in the 1990 elections and secured a two thirds majority by 
a mere seven seats (Khoo 2001: 322; Cheah 2002: 220). Undaunted by this marginal win 
at  the polls  Mahathir  looked ahead;  since he and the BN were slightly jolted by this 
victory they tried to re-build their confidence by reclaiming the necessary support from 
the Malaysian  populace, who had been deeply affected by the political separation within 
UMNO. And since the National Economic Policy (NEP) that was introduced in the early 
1970s came to an end, Mahathir devised the National Development Program (NDP) that 
spelt out a new national plan for the future to replace it. In February 1991 he presented 
‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’ and he enunciated his Vision 2020 that confidently charted 
a map that would assist Malaysia to become a fully developed nation-state by the year 
2020 (Khoo 2001: 327-331). By the mid 1990s, after Mahathir injected a renewed sense 
of  purpose  and direction,  Malaysia  attained  the  status  of  being  among  the  emerging 
newly  industrialised  countries  (NICs).  The  buoyant  economy,  the  strong  (refreshed) 
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political  leadership  with  Anwar  Ibrahim  having  joined  the  executive  team,  and  the 
modernisation  programme  underway  gave  Malaysia  the  required  self-assurance  and 
conviction that it could cast its sights beyond the ASEAN region. This self-confidence 
thus  drove  Malaysia  to  seek bi-lateral  ties  with  established  and emerging  democratic 
states in SADC. Since changes were in the offing in South Africa, Mahathir considered it 
opportune to pursue bi-lateral relations with the De Klerk regime in 1993.
These historical  episodes,  events  and developments,  which belong to  a more  detailed 
narrative that will be elaborated upon in this thesis, influenced my thinking particularly 
during the time I coordinated the seminar at University of the Western Cape between 
Malaysians and South Africa in April 1993. It, in fact, prompted me to ask a series of 
research  questions  that  concentrated  on  the  relationship  that  was  unfolding  between 
South Africa and Malaysia since that time (see 2.2 Research Questions). These questions 
again raced through my mind when I was a visiting lecturer at the National University of 
Malaysia (UKM) from December 1993 until May 1994. Even though a Memorandum of 
Understanding was eventually signed between UKM and UWC, the MoU and tentative 
agreements  that  were  reached  had  to  be  shelved  because  of  Malaysia’s  economic 
meltdown in 1997 and 1998. Nonetheless, all of these developments stimulated me to 
explore and investigate the ties that evolved between these two nation-states during the 
final decade of the 20th century. 
2. The Thesis’ Purpose Statement:
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between two sovereign nation-
states  from the  South.  It  thus  focuses  on  (a)  South  Africa,  which  represents  a  new, 
inexperienced voice from within the SADC region, and (b) Malaysia, which represents a 
reasonably old, experienced voice from within ASEAN; both states belong to that group 
of states that have been aptly described as ‘middle powers’ because of their standing in 
international  affairs  and  that  belong to  the  ‘South/Third  World.’  The  study therefore 
intends to delve into and explore the relationship - which has simply been defined as ‘the 
way in which two … countries behave towards each other or deal with each other… or 
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the way in which two or more … (countries) are connected’ (Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary 2001: 989) - and wishes to unpack it from two distinct but interrelated angles; 
from one level, it proposes to look at the government-to-government ties and, from the 
other, it plans to assess the people-to-people’s connection. 
Rationale for the ‘purpose statement’
Bearing  in  mind  the  general  ‘purpose  statement’  as  well  as  its  central  concept  that 
underpins the connection between the two sovereign nation-states, I thought it useful to, 
albeit briefly, elaborate on  the rationale behind embarking upon this research project; 
since there are quite a few reasons for pursuing this important research project, I will 
limit myself to a few. Firstly, my concern was why did Malaysia adopt an ‘adversarial’ 
attitude towards South Africa, and what role did it play in the international community 
against South Africa’s status as a sovereign nation-state. I was therefore quite keen to 
study  Malaysia’s  foreign  policy  towards  South  Africa  from 1957  until  the  dramatic 
changes in 1990 (cf. Muda 1996).  Secondly, I was increasingly eager to have a deeper 
insight into the two sovereign nation-states’ bilateral relations by assessing their socio-
political and economic connections and wanting to know to what extent they have carved 
out  important  niches  for  themselves  within  the  international  system. Thirdly,  I  was 
spurred  on  to  explore  the  significant  role  non-state  actors  have  in  the  international 
system;  of  late,  they  have  increasingly  come  under  the  spotlight  because  of  their 
transnational cultural activities that meant not just side-stepping sovereignty but moving 
‘beyond sovereignty’ (cf. Magnusson 1996; Sorenson 2001; Cohen 2003). The personal 
stories of the cultural activists intrigued me and one definite conclusion that I reached 
was that they substantially contributed towards ‘the return of culture and identity in IR 
theory’  –  to  use  Lapid  &  Kratochwil’s  (1996)  title  (cf.  Krause  &  Renwick  1996). 
Fourthly, I felt that since I was dealing with nation-states from the South that it was 
incumbent  that  I  take  a  closer  view of  the  terms  ‘state’  and ‘nation’  respectively  as 
critical concepts. In the process of unpacking these concepts I was pressed to understand 
the process of globalization; a process that has had an immeasurable impact upon nation-
states (Opello & Rosow 2003). And  finally, I could not resist questioning the role of 
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democratic South Africa and Malaysia in the affairs of the South vis-à-vis the North; their 
joint  participant  in  a  number  of  international  forums  such as  NAM, G-77 and  other 
similar bodies drew my interest and eventually forced me to examine the extent of their 
participation and to know to what degree they have made a difference,  if any,  in the 
South-South Cooperation Project in order to advance the cause and perhaps improve the 
quality of life in the South as whole. And since these two nation-states were driven by 
particular visions, it  induced me to undertake a brief comparative study of the ‘Asian 
Renaissance’  and  the  ‘African  Renaissance’  that  their  respective  political  leadership 
advocated during the latter part of the 1990s. 
Research Questions:
Since mention was made of some of the critical questions that I referred to en passant in 
the afore-mentioned paragraphs, I would now like to list them for they assisted me in 
plodding through the various sections of this research project and helped me in achieving 
its main objectives. I, however, started out by asking two fairly general questions. The 
first concerns itself with the question of theory: Which theory would be appropriate to 
assess the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia? And the second relates to 
ontological and empirical concerns: What was the nature of the relations between South 
Africa  and Malaysia  before  and after  the  South  African  democratic  government  was 
installed? 
The questions set the stage for more specific ones such as: What caused Tunku Abdul-
Rahman and Dr. Mahathir Mohamed to adopt an ‘adversarial’ approach towards South 
Africa  for  almost  three  decades?  How did each of  them contribute  towards  isolating 
South Africa in the international arena and how effective were their inputs? In which way 
did Malaysia change its foreign policy agenda towards South Africa? Why did Malaysia 
change its stance in the 1990s and how did it benefit from the diplomatic ties that were 
forged in 1993? Who were the driving forces behind forging diplomatic bonds that exist 
between these two nation-states? Have the SADC and ASEAN - in which South Africa 
and Malaysia are located - also gained from the bi-lateral ties or were they mainly in the 
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interest  of the respective sovereign nation-states? Were these two states prompted by 
their concerns for the South or did they forge connections because of self-interest? Are 
the states the only acceptable political units within the international system? Have the 
identities of these two nation-states change? After having found answers for these, I was 
then prompted to ask: What about non-state actors? 
Do non-state actors not play a critical role in international relations? Have South Africa 
and Malaysia recognised the contributions of non-state actors or cultural activists who 
crisscross their boundaries?  What factors stimulated these actors to make religio-cultural 
and ethnic connections? Does the state consider these variables important when signing 
bilateral or multilateral ties? How have the cultural  activists’ activities impacted upon 
foreign policies of nation-states? Has the nation-states’ sovereignty been compromised 
when cultural  connections were made in this era of globalization? Who benefits from 
these ties? Have South Africa and Malaysia’s foreign policies accommodated the new 
players in the changing international system? In closing, all of these questions fed into 
the research project and helped me to attain one of my objectives and that was to evaluate 
the nature of the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia.
Its Hypothesis:
Before clarifying the thesis’ hypothesis I wish to preface it with three basic assumptions 
that  are  important  to  state  at  this  point.  The  first is  the  ontological  assumption  that 
questions  the  relevancy  and  reality  of  the  proposed  project.  Since  I  come  from  a 
particular religious, ethnic and cultural background, a certain degree of prejudice might 
be reflected in this research – an issue that is in line with critical traditional thinking that 
regards the distinction between the subject and object as one of its essential features (cf. 
Jackson & Sorenson 1999). The main reason for this is that I concentrated upon an area 
that has been under-researched and one that requires the attention of the foreign policy 
practitioners, international relation specialists and a host of other interested stakeholders 
and groups. The second relates to the epistemological assumptions that are embedded in 
the  project.  Once  again  I  undertook  preliminary  studies  reflecting  my interest  in  the 
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region and particularly South Africa’s socio-cultural links with Malaysia. The axiological 
assumptions brings into question the values and biases reflected by me as a researcher. 
And the last issue raises the project’s methodological assumptions; since it is associated 
with the qualitative paradigm its approach is inductive based upon the shaping of factors, 
patterns observed, categories identified, and theories employed for the understanding and 
explaining of the various state actors and non-state actors, namely the cultural activists. 
With these thoughts in mind, I want to very simply state the thesis’ hypothesis.
Malaysia’s behaviour towards South Africa was ‘adversarial’ from 1961 until Mandela 
was  released  in  February  1990.  It  was  firmly  against  South  Africa’s  discriminatory 
policies  towards  its  oppressed  Blacks,  and  clamoured  at  various  forums  for  punitive 
measures  and sanctions  against  the apartheid  state.  And it  only changed its  hard-line 
stance towards South Africa when F.W. De Klerk, who came to power at the end of 1989, 
was pressurised from outside as well as within South Africa to make swift socio-political 
transformations in the beginning of 1990. The internal modifications that were made and 
mentioned earlier  were naturally  welcomed by the international  community including 
Malaysia. And as a consequence of these transformations, the international community 
represented  by states  such  as  Malaysia  steadily  changed their  behaviour  and attitude 
towards the South African regime. 
Malaysia,  unlike a  few other  states  from the Association  of Southeast  Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), patiently bided its time before forging ties with South Africa. During the time 
when  South  Africa’s  bona  fide political  parties  were  rounding  off  their  CODESA 
meetings, Malaysia set up a liaison office in South Africa that laid the foundations for the 
formation of diplomatic and commercial ties in 1993. And when the ANC - with whom 
UMNO had a warm relationship - came into power after the historic democratic elections 
at the end of April 1994, Malaysia intensified its ties through increasingly investing in 
diverse  projects  in  South  Africa.  Although  Malaysia  had  to  re-adjust  its  economic 
structures  after  the  Southeast  Asian  economic  meltdown  during  1997  and  1998,  it 
maintained  its  links  with  South  Africa.  Subsequent  to  this  period,  the  ties  were 
strengthened  and bolstered  through investments  and reciprocal  official  visits  between 
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2002  and  2006;  these  activities  and  events  transformed  relationship  into  a  ‘close 
partnership.’
Its Methodology
During the time I was collecting data for this research project I carefully considered a 
suitable and an applicable theory.  For me this was an important entry point since it’s 
purpose was to assist me in unpacking the nature of the relationship between the two 
contemporary nation-states that have been active in the international system during the 
post-Cold War period on behalf of the South. After searching the relevant literature that 
covered  International  Relation  theories  and  their  interpretations,  I  consciously  chose 
Critical  Theory (CT); in my view I felt that  CT was not only a useful theory and an 
applicable approach to organize and understand the data but one that was fairly flexible in 
terms of its relevance and its application (cf. George 1994; Devetak 1996; Burchill & 
Linklater  2001;  Chapter  Two).  This  theoretical  frame  -  as  well  as  the  variety  of 
questions that I posed - has without doubt impacted upon the outcome of this thesis. 
In any case, during the course of deciding on the theoretical model for the project, I dug 
out primary and secondary sources. I passionately felt that the variety of sources that I 
could lay my hands on would provide me to  adopt  a  fairly  holistic  approach to  this 
important  topic.  As  a  result  of  this  understanding  I  consulted  primary  texts  such  as 
parliamentary  reports,  statements/speeches  and  letters/correspondence.  I  must  confess 
that  I did not exhaust the primary sources as I should have; time was one factor that 
counted  against  a  detailed  scrutiny  of  these  sources,  and  the  other  factors  were  my 
geographical location and the lack of funding to obtain some of the primary sources from 
Malaysia’s archives. Nonetheless, I gathered whatever material I could to write a fairly 
comprehensive  socio-political  overview  of  the  relations  between  these  two  states. 
However, when it comes to the section that dealt with the trade ties between the two 
states in  Chapter Four,  I  eagerly acknowledge that I was treading on shaky grounds 
since I am no economist and nor satisfactorily familiar with issues pertaining to direct 
foreign investments. That said, I tried as best as I could to interpret the available data. 
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Despite this drawback, the interpretation was of a tentative nature and it is definitely open 
for further scrutiny and re-interpretation by specialists.  Some of the primary pieces of 
information were further supported by a few in-depth interviews that I conducted; a point 
that I will return to in a moment. I then also made use of secondary material such as 
academics  papers,  articles,  books  and  newspaper  clips  that  directly  and  indirectly 
reflected  not  only  upon  the  topic  that  was  being  scrutinized  but  also  the  variety  of 
variables that  have been employed to enhance the understanding of the study and the 
issues at hand. I thus scanned these secondary sources for relevant information that were 
extracted, amended, re-constructed, and inserted into the text. 
As stated earlier, I conducted interviews that were crucial to Chapter Five in this thesis. 
I included the stories of three ‘cultural activists’ in order to demonstrate their significance 
within the international system as such. For this particular chapter I relied heavily on 
extensive face-to-face interviews because they essentially revealed how the system of 
international relations has changed because of non-state actors’ inputs, contributions and 
interventions.  These interviews,  as already mentioned,  were further  shored up by the 
extant  correspondence and newspaper clips that  supported their  oral  claims of having 
been involved in transnational activities. One shortcoming of this thesis was that I did not 
interview some of  the  state  representatives  such  as  High Commissioners  or  the First 
Secretaries  that  have been directly involved in strengthening the relationship between 
South Africa and Malaysia and nor did I reach out to CEO’s of corporate companies that 
have made investments in South Africa; if I had done so it would have further enriched 
the contents of the project. In any case, this is perhaps what another researcher should 
consider doing for it would either complement the overall findings of this thesis or take 
issue with some of its conclusions.   
Let me round off by stating that the thesis, despite some of its noticeable shortcomings, 
sees itself as a significant contribution to South – South relations and more specifically to 
the  relationship  between  South  Africa  and  one  of  Southeast  Asia’s  active  – 
unquestionably not a paper - tiger, namely Malaysia. Few have ventured to examine the 
relationship between South Africa and Malaysia in depth. Whilst laudable attempts have 
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been made by scholars such as Janis van der Westhuizen to cover particular dimensions 
of South Africa and Malaysia in publications, the nature of their works was such that they 
were not able to deal with some of the issues that I reported on, discussed, analyzed, and 
interpreted in this thesis. In it I provide a detailed overview of the existential relationship 
that had evolved between these two states over many decades from a variety of angles. At 
this stage it might be prudent to review some of the available literature on the subject and 
illustrate where my contribution fits into the field of IR.
3. Reviewing the Literature
Rapid changes have indeed been witnessed since the very beginning of the 1990s in the 
field  of  international  relations;  many  academic  works  and  journalistic  columns  have 
captured  these  changes.  Some  of  these  published  outputs  demonstrated  how  South 
Africa’s foreign policy and its IR agenda that reflected a particularist apartheid approach 
have  transformed  and shifted  to  one  in  which  it  adopted  a  universalist  IR approach 
towards Asia and other non-traditional states (Bischoff 1998). A coterie of scholars has 
analyzed,  from different  dimensions,  the  types  of  relations  South  Africa  forged with 
selected  states  on the Asian continent  over the past  number  of years;  for example,  a 
sizeable  amount  of literature  has been produced that gave attention to South Africa’s 
relations with countries such as China, Japan and the Koreas. Alas, very little covered its 
relationship with ASEAN in general and Malaysia in particular. In fact, only a paucity of 
material,  which focused on South African – Malaysian relations, exists and it is these 
writings that need to be assessed and evaluated at this point.
 3.1 IR Writings on Asia/Asean:
South African scholars like their counterparts elsewhere shifted their sights to new areas 
of research when socio-political changes were underway in the post-Cold War era. From 
amongst the first few who brought Asia into the academic arena and who ventured to take 
this  road  was  Deon  Geldenhuys,  a  professor  of  Political  Studies  at  Rand  Afrikaans 
University (now University of Johannesburg). In his  South Africa:  from international  
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isolation to reintegration, a conference paper that was subsequently published, he made 
reference to Asia and the Middle East as new areas for research. Mr. L. Evans - in his 
capacity as the Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs - complemented 
the latter’s  paper  when he penned  South African Foreign Policy  and the New World  
Order during 1993; he outlined the changes and challenges which South Africa faced as 
it forged ties with the new world, and he made particular reference to the links with the 
Middle East and Asia. In  Asiaweek, an Asian magazine (18 May 1994), an anonymous 
contributor  wrote  ‘Building  a  Nation:  Asia’s  experience  may  hold  lessons  for  South 
Africa’;  he/she  suggested  that  South  Africans  should  consider  looking  at  Asia  when 
embarking upon their nation building project. This article as well as the general surveys 
sketched  by  Geldenhuys  and  Evans  respectively  provided  a  start  and  an 
acknowledgement that there was a need to forge relations with these neglected regions. 
In the absence of a dedicated Centre/Institute on Southeast Asian Studies in South Africa, 
research projects  continued to follow this generalist  trend by the mid 1990s. Midway 
through South Africa’s first ten years of democracy I came across the works of Marie 
Muller who was a political scientist at the University of South Africa; she had, by then, 
written two related articles. The first appeared in her jointly (with Walter Carlnaes) edited 
work Change and South Africa’s External Relations (1996), and the second titled ‘South 
African Diplomacy and Security Complex’ (1999) - which complemented and updated 
the earlier one. In it she attempted to correct and reinforce the importance of these areas 
by making ample reference to South Africa’s representation in the Muslim world; a large 
chunk of which forms part of Asia. Moreover, Carlsnaes & Muller’s edited work has, to 
some extent, made an effort to also include many of the neglected areas of research. In 
this volume Greg Mills has a chapter entitled ‘South Africa and Asia: New Opportunities, 
Lessons and Dilemmas’ in which he referred to heavily Muslim populated countries such 
as Malaysia and Indonesia and in which he stressed that cultural issues, which caught his 
eye, should also be given due attention when assessing the links that have been forged 
between South Africa and these Asian sovereign nation-states. 
This edited work was succeeded by a number of others; they are: Paul-Henri Bischoff’s 
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useful study, which focused on ‘Democratic South Africa and the Asian Paragon: Issues 
of Foreign Policy orientation,’ appeared in Afrika Spektrum; it gave a broad overview of 
South Africa’s foreign policy towards Asia after 1994. In the course of discussing South 
Africa’s stance he did not neglect to highlight the important trade relation that developed 
between South Africa and Malaysia. At the time when the latter’s contribution appeared, 
two other interesting articles appeared; these were written in French. The one was co-
authored by Jean Coussy & Jerome Lauseig and rhetorically titled ‘La renaissance afro-
asiatique? It basically compared the two continents and went on to discuss the extent to 
which the respective continents have been commercially active in one another’s affairs, 
and it examined issues such as affirmative action and black empowerment. And it also 
addressed  to  what  extent  Asian  states  were  involved  in  supporting  the  liberation 
movements in South Africa and Zimbabwe and the regional connections that existed and 
continue to exist. The other article in the same issue of  Politque Africaine  (Decembre 
1999) was penned by Jerome Lauseig and addressed ‘Quand la Malaysia Inc,  joue la 
carte Sud-Sud en Afrique subsaharienne’. It captured the involvement and expansion of 
Malaysian business companies in Sub-Saharan Africa and made brief reference to the 
business  investments  in  South  Africa.  From within  the  South  African  sector  another 
article appeared; it was essentially an address by the Deputy Governor, Dr. Tim Thabane, 
of  the  South  African  Reserve  Bank.  The  article  basically  assessed  ‘Asia’s  economic 
recovery and its implications for the African Renaissance’ with no specific reference to 
Malaysia; it appeared in the BIS Review (1999). 
These  contributions  were  further  complemented  by  Andre  Snyder’s  ‘Asia-Pacific: 
Weathering the Storm’ in the South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1999/2000; 
in  which  he  (1999:  200)  devoted  only  one  paragraph  to  South  African-Malaysian 
relations. The joint edited work by Monika Glinzler, William Mabene and Greg Mills 
titled  Multilateral  Organizations  in  Asia-Pacific:  Lessons  for  Southern  Africa  (2001) 
consists  of at  least  two articles  that  are  of (minor)  significance  since they dealt  with 
SADC’s relations with APEC: the one is Jacques De Vos’ ‘SA’s Relationship with the 
Asia-Pacific Region,’ and the other is Greg Mills’ ‘Regional Institution-Building in the 
Asia-Pacific and Southern Africa.’ Both Vos and Mills make mention of South Africa’s 
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relationship with Malaysia in passing but does not offer any detailed discussion as one 
would like to have seen. Not long after this work Greg Mills and Garth Shelton produced 
their co-authored work titled  Asia-Pacific and Africa (2003); though these two scholars 
provided comparative understandings of these two regions and discussed the types  of 
relations that presently exist between them, they – perhaps understandably so - avoided 
discussing specific bilateral connections between nation-states from these two continents. 
At the same time when these were published by South African Institute of International 
Affairs (SAIIA), the Africa Institute of South Africa (AI www.ai.org.za) produced Asia’s 
Economic Miracle:  Lessons for NEPAD?,  which was jointly written by Jane Shen & 
Hussein  Solomon  (2003);  the  paper  studied  the  economic  development  in  the  New 
Industrialized Economies in Asia and extracted some basic lessons from these countries 
for  Southern  Africa.  And  P.J.  Botha’s  ‘South  Africa  and  Asia  &  Australia,’  which 
appeared  in  Elizabeth  Sidiropoulos’  edited  work  South  Africa’s  Foreign  Policy  
1994-2004:  Apartheid  Past,  Renaissance  Future (SAIIA  2004)  is  yet  another  that 
underscored the point I made at the outset. The Institute of Global Dialogue (IGD), which 
has  been  circulating  its  informative  analytical  Global  Dialogue  newsletter,  published 
Francis Kornegay’s Pax AfroAsiatica? Revisiting Bandung amid a changing world order 
(2004) occasional paper; this paper basically surveyed the dynamics of African and Asian 
regionalism and essentially attempted to re-conceptualise the new Afro-Asian multilateral 
terrain  without  raising  or  debating  the  bilateral  relations  between  South  Africa  and 
Malaysia as a case study. 
These  specific  contributions  gave  overall  attention  to  the  Asian  region  and  regional 
organizations and not to particular countries. It is however my opinion that instead of 
providing  paint  brush  pictures  of  South  Africa’s  relations  with  regions  or  regional 
structures, a detailed account could have been offered by the researchers/contributors on 
the  relationship  between  South  Africa  and  Asian  countries  such  as  Malaysia;  this 
approach would not only have given a better insight into the nature of the relationship at a 
specific  level  as  compared  to  one  on  a  broader  regional  level  but  also  assisted  in 
encouraging emerging potential scholars and researchers to advance the scholarship in a 
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more intense manner that would be of benefit to the public and private sectors in South 
Africa and Malaysia respectively.
The general intransigence to pursue serious research between South Africa/SADC and 
ASEAN could be attributed to, inter alia, the following: (a) the lack of funding for such 
research, (b) the importance that has been given to China as opposed to the significance 
of ASEAN in the region, and (c) the non-availability of qualified persons who were able 
to  pursue  research  on  ASEAN  and  more  specifically  on  Malaysia.  The  absence  of 
qualified expertise on Asian matters in South Africa, as noted by Alden (2002: 376-377), 
and the lack of research on South Africa/SADC’s relations with ASEAN should act as a 
stimulus for potential individuals and researchers to pursue with vigour. The absence of 
skilled human resources and the lack of research on (Far East, Southwest and Southeast) 
Asia basically signify that the opportunity to explore the relationships and partnerships, 
which exist between South Africa and the many nation-states in Asia, is essentially an 
open terrain.  And finally, if individuals are encouraged to pursue concentrated IR studies 
then I am confident that important lessons for social scientists and other stakeholders in 
South Africa would be learnt. 
3.2 IR Literature on South African-Malaysian Relations:
Despite the highlighted problems in the academia (and NGO sector), the general outlines 
on IR issues have however stimulated some scholars to closely scrutinize the bi-lateral 
relations between South Africa and selected Asian states and also allowed some to study 
specific issues in these states that would be of relevance to South Africa. The first to 
touch on the latter  issue was Professor Gillian Hart, a University of California based 
scholar who is also associated with the University of KwaZulu Natal; she published her 
article  The  NEP and Redistribution  in  Malaysia:  A  Model  for  Post-Apartheid  South  
Africaduring the time when transformation was afoot in South Africa, and when Malaysia 
was being bandied  about  as a  model  that  South Africa could  appropriate  in  order  to 
restructure its economy and bring about racial reconciliation via affirmative action. In the 
light of these developments, Hart undertook a critical study of Malaysia’s NEP and the 
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developments  that  took  place  since  its  implementation.  Hart’s  article  was  somewhat 
complemented by the contribution of the South African Communist Party (SACP) which 
was included in its quarterly journal The African Communist (1995). n SACP’s editorial 
and in an article printed in that issue, it critically responded to the views espoused by 
Minister  Stella  Sigcau,  the  then  Minister  of  Public  Works  in  Nelson  Mandela’s 
government, and other commentators who held the notion that Malaysia was a viable and 
indeed  practical  model  to  follow  in  various  sectors  such  as  racial  reconciliation, 
affirmative action and economic reconstruction. The critical SACP article emphasised the 
weaknesses in the Malaysian model and the need to look at other examples too; one of 
the problems it pointed out was the existence of a viable and strong trade union body that 
would work in the interest  of the indigenous population.  During the time when these 
debates were raging on within confined governmental and NGO circles, Ian Emsley also 
produced  his  monograph  entitled  The  Malaysian  Experience  of  Affirmative  Action:  
Lessons for South Africa (1996); the latter’s text thus added to the debate and tried to 
demonstrate  the strengths and weaknesses of the Malaysian model  with regards to its 
affirmative action policies, and maintained the view that South Africa has much to learn 
from the Malaysian model.
Before elaborating upon the inputs of other South African scholars, it is necessary to give 
attention to the contributions of two Malaysian scholars on this topic. Mention should be 
made of  the  fact  that  Southeast  Asian scholars  in  general  and Malaysian  scholars  in 
particular like the South African social scientists were also guilty of not directing their 
attention to one another’s regions or nation-states prior to the 1990s. Nevertheless, a start 
was made by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, a Malaysian Think Tank, 
in  1988  when  it  published  Shridath  Ramphal’s,  the  then  Secretary  General  of  the 
Commonwealth, The South African Crisis: Why the Bells of Apartheid Tolls for Everyone 
monograph to provide some information about what was taking place in South Africa at 
that time when Mr. P.W. Botha was still at the helm of the affairs of the South African 
apartheid regime. Serious interest by Malaysian scholars was only demonstrated in the 
early 1990s when diplomatic ties were initiated and eventually forged. 
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The two Malaysians who initiated scholarship in the IR arena came from two different 
backgrounds;  the  one,  Juhaidi  Yean Abdullah,  was  a  journalist  and he  wrote  ‘Nkosi 
Sikele  I’Africa:  An Overview of Malay-South Africa Relations  in the Post-Apartheid 
Era.’ This illustrated article appeared in the first issue of the Institute of Strategic Studies 
1995 Malaysian publication Agenda Magazine. And the second was Mohammad Muda, a 
diplomat,  who  wrote  ‘Malaysia-South  Africa  Relations  and  the  Commonwealth, 
1960-1995;’  this  appeared  in  the  1996  October  issue  of  The  Round  Table:  The 
Commonwealth  Journal  of  International  Affairs.Both  articles  provided  some  useful 
insights into the diplomatic and commercial ties that began to develop since Malaysia 
resumed its relationship with South Africa in the early 1990s. On the whole, both Juhaidi 
Yean  Abdullah  and  Mohammad  Muda  offered  very  valuable  overviews  of  the 
connections that existed and continued to exist between these two important sovereign 
states until 1994. Since Juhaidi Yean Abdullah was a seasoned journalist,  I found his 
analysis  to  be  more  simplistic  in  some  instances  when  compared  to  the  text  of 
Mohammad Muda, the trained and informed diplomat.
Moving back to South Africa, I explored ‘Forging International relations at grassroots 
level between the SA Muslims and the Southeast Asians: An Unacknowledged Diplomat’ 
(1996); the article, which has been amended and included in this thesis, approached the 
study of international relations from a cultural  activist’s  perspective and demonstrated 
this cultural activists operated beyond state sovereignty and trans-nationally. During the 
same year when my article appeared Glenda White wrote Grassroots Foreign Policy: A 
Case for Provincial Participation? (1996); in her paper she mentioned the significance of 
the twinning of provinces in South Africa with provinces in other countries. She referred 
to  the  fact  that  Gauteng  twinned  with  one  of  Malaysia’s  key  economically  strong 
provinces, namely Selangor Darul-Ehsan, and that Malaysia had by then made a sizeable 
contribution towards the development of housing in South Africa. Another article, which 
did not address the issue of twinning but learning regional lessons from the other, was the 
one penned by Robert Curry Jr.; he entitled his text ‘A note on ASEAN as a possible 
model for post-Apartheid SADC,’ and it appeared in the Journal of Third World Studies 
13(1): 41-56, Spring 1996.
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One of the most significant articles that first appeared in 1997 and which went through 
two  more  editions  was  that  of  Vishnu Padayachee  and  Imraan  Valodia;  their  article 
concretely depicted the trade relationship between these two states. Their joint article was 
initially titled ‘Malaysian Money: Sustainable Investments?’ and it basically related the 
trends  of  foreign  investment  inflows  into  South  Africa;  and  it  also  recorded  the 
development  of  South-South  cooperation  via  these  investment  packages.  When 
Padayachee  and  Valodia’s  seminal  article  appeared  and  was  subsequently  updated, 
Southall ventured to undertake an interesting comparative study between South Africa 
and Malaysia (1997) with specific reference to the two dominant parties in the respective 
countries,  namely  the  ANC  and  UMNO.  Southall,  whose  article  was  entitled  ‘Party 
Dominance  and  Development:  South  Africa’s  prospects  in  the  light  of  Malaysia’s 
experience,’ argued that since South Africa was in need of rapid economic growth, which 
had been in a decline, it was very much encouraged by the fast growing economies of 
Asia and wanted to imitate the strategies that they adopted and the way they advanced 
their economies. Since South Africa was an emerging economy and a powerful player in 
the Southern African arena it was assumed that it would become Africa’s first ‘Tiger’. 
Southall however pointed out that it was in the experience of Malaysia that there was of 
particular interest because that country had earned itself a reputation for combining rapid 
growth  with  a  racial  redistribution  of  wealth.  Greg  Mills  then  followed  with  his 
‘Malaysia’s Economic Crisis: A Comparative Perspective’, which appeared in the South 
African Yearbook of International  Affairs  (1999). Mills  sketched a background to the 
Malaysian crisis  before looking at  the economic recovery plan,  political  and regional 
environments. He concluded with lessons for South Africans that could be drawn from 
the crisis. In 2000 Fanie Cloete’s HSRC publication titled At Full Speed the Tiger Cubs 
Stumbled: Lessons from Southeast Asia about Sustainable Public Service Delivery.  The 
study,  which  focused  upon  ‘good  governance,’  ‘service  delivery,’  and  sustainable 
capacity in the region, set aside chapter 4 to discuss the Malaysian model; it essentially 
highlighted the strength and pitfalls in each of the mentioned areas. 
These  studies  and  assessments  coincided  with  Janis  van  der  Westhuizen’s  important 
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research outputs at the turn of 2000. It should be stated that van der Westhuizen has been 
the only South African scholar who has made some serious inputs on South African – 
Malaysian relations to date. He pursued a comparative study between aspects of South 
African  and  Malaysian  social  life  with  respect  to  the  issue  of  governance  and 
globalisation;  he  titled  his  chapter:  ‘Comparative  Responses  to  the  Challenges  of 
Governance and Globalization: Malaysia and South Africa’ (2001). The ideas contained 
in this article emerged out of a more extensive and detailed study that he pursued and 
subsequently published under the title Adapting to Globalization: Malaysia, South Africa 
and the Challenges of Ethnic Redistribution of Growth  (Praeger 2002); as a matter of 
information,  the publication  is  a  revised version of  his  doctoral  dissertation  that  was 
completed at the University of Dalhousie in Halifax, Canada. The study identified both 
Malaysia  and South Africa as ‘Competition States’ and it illustrated how both states’ 
elites, namely the Afrikaner (in the case of South Africa) and the Malay (in the case of 
Malaysia), ‘in the precocious Keynesian regimes’ managed their transformations towards 
the mentioned ‘competition state.’ The work thus compared these two elite groups by 
applying  the  ‘ethnic  redistribution  with  growth’  model,  and  showed  how  these 
nationalists pursued the model until the 1970s and when changes in international political 
economic system took effect from the mid-1970s onwards these developments effectively 
forestalled the emulation of ‘ethnic redistribution of growth.’ And this naturally resulted 
in a divergence in the 1980s and beyond. Apart from van der Westhuizen’s critical and 
stimulating  comparative  study of specific  issues  between Malaysia  and South Africa, 
there has been no other study that followed up on his work.
Subsequent to van der Westhuizen’s comparative study, Eric Germain, a French scholar 
who is attached to the Paris based EHESS, presented a paper ‘Religion and Ethnicity in 
South  Africa  and  Malaysia:  Some  Preliminary  Comparisons’  at  UKM’s  Third 
International  Malay Studies  Conference  during  2001;  from the  paper’s  title  it  clearly 
indicated  that  it  was  essentially  another  comparative  study.  Even  though  the  debate 
regarding appropriating Malaysia as a model has come to a close, it was interesting to 
read the editorial of  The Financial Mail  (February 2002) that addressed the issue; the 
editorial argued in favour of looking at Malaysia as a model but with a critical eye. 
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Returning  to  the  Malaysian  scene,  Hamidin  Abdul  Hamid,  the  Malaysian  historian, 
produced  a  valuable  socio-historical  work  entitled  Malaysia  –  Africa  Relations:  
Searching for Common Goals (2003). Although the work did not give specific attention 
to Malaysia’s ties with South Africa it did so by using Africa as a backdrop and within 
that  context made ample reference to South Africa.  Based upon his research interest, 
Hamidin was able to comment on the historical links that existed between the South(ern) 
Africa and Southeast Asia regions and outline the contemporary relationship that exist 
between Malaysia and South Africa in his chapter entitled ‘We Go a long way back: An 
Overview of  Malaysia  –  South  Africa  Relations’  (2007).  Apart  from this  Malaysian 
scholar’s historical inputs, there have been other Malaysian scholars such as Wan Hashim 
Wan Teh, Hanapi Dollah and Abdul Aziz Mohd Zin who contributed in the socio-cultural 
and religious arena in Bahasa Melayu. One example from their writings will suffice to 
illustrate the types of topics that they handled. Dr. Zin studied the missionary activities in 
the greater Cape Town area and identified the different players that have been involved in 
these  activities;  he  titled  his  article  ‘Institusi  Dakwah di  Cape  Town,  Afrika  Selatan 
Kajian  Tentang  Program  Dakwah  Masakini’  and  this  appeared  in  Jurnal  Usuluddin  
(Disember 1999). Although studies such as this might appear peripheral to international 
relations arena, it demonstrates that if cross-cultural studies and inter-disciplinary studies 
take off then researchers in IR can also benefit from these particular projects. 
The  above review of  the  available  literature  on  South  African  –  Malaysian  relations 
clearly demonstrated that there are still glaring gaps that IR specialists and others need to 
fulfil.  The lack of research on the subject allowed me to prod a significant arena and 
contribute in a fairly substantial manner; this was done with the hope that it will stimulate 
others  to  either  add  to  the  existing  body  of  literature  on  South  African-Malaysian 
relations or perhaps look at other Southeast Asian states and undertake a similar study. 
There is little doubt that the field of study is fairly open and lots of work needs to be done 
to adequately fill the gaps in international relations. Despite this thesis’ shortcomings, I 
contend  that  its  significance  and  importance  cannot  be  ignored  in  South  African 
scholarship.  Whilst  it  has  benefited  from the  comparative  research  contributions  and 
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significant articles penned by some of the earlier mentioned South African and Malaysian 
scholars, it built and expanded upon some of their inputs by exploring and covering a 
variety of dimensions. Since this has been the case, the thesis hopes to stimulate further 
research on South Africa’s ties  with Malaysia  in particular  and on Southeast  Asia  in 
general. The thesis should therefore be of interest to a variety of scholars such as foreign 
policy makers, international relations specialists, sociologists, religionists as well as those 
who are fascinated with the role of non-state actors in the ever-changing international 
system. With these remarks, let me first give an outline of the thesis and then turn to the 
next crucial chapter in which I intend to make use of a theoretical framework that will 
assist  to  reflect  upon  and  understand  the  Federation  of  Malay(si)a  and  (the 
Union/Republic) of South Africa relationship from the 1950s until 2005.
4. The Thesis’ Outline:
The thesis has been divided into three parts and seven chapters. Part One consists of two 
chapters. Chapter One provides a general introduction to and rationale for the thesis and 
thereafter offers a critical review of the relevant literature that gave attention to South 
Africa’s relationship with Asian states in general and Malaysia in particular.  Chapter 
Two goes on a theoretical excursion and presents an account of CT. The chapter brings 
into purview a story telling framework that helps to narrate the relationship between these 
two sovereign nation-states and also assists in telling how the stories of non-state actors 
have been contributing towards international relations. And the chapter also discusses the 
concept of ‘identity’ as another conceptual tool that aids in the understanding of South 
Africa’s relationship with Malaysia. 
Part Two features three inter-related chapters.  Chapter Three takes us on an in-depth 
study of the relationship that existed between the (Union/Republic of) South Africa and 
the Federation of Malay(si)a from the 1950s until 1990. Before giving a fair amount of 
attention  to  Malaysian  foreign  policy  approach  towards  apartheid  South  Africa  as 
expressed by the positions adopted by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
respectively, the chapter critically assesses the twin concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ as a 
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crucial conceptual tools that impacts upon the identities of and relationships between the 
two states. Chapter Four takes a closer examination of how the relationship evolved and 
developed between the two sovereign states; it begins by conceptualizing the notion of 
‘middle  power’  in  order  to  comprehend  contemporary  the  developments  inside  and 
outside these two nation-states as well as within the constructed international system. The 
chapter traces, in some detail, the diplomatic ties that had gradually been forged in the 
early 1990s and rounds off with an analysis of the close partnership that had been crafted 
by 2005. In addition, it weaved into the chapter a detailed discussion of the commercial 
connections that both states mutually pursued over a period of ten years from 1993 until 
2003.  Chapter  Five records  and  analyses  the  stories  of  three  non-state  actors  –  a 
voluntary refugee and two cultural activists - who played a critical and indeed important 
role  in  forging  socio-cultural  ties  at  the  ‘downstairs’  –  to  use  Vale’s  metaphor  -  or 
grassroots level in international relations. This chapter thus deals with a dimension in IR 
that  had  generally  been  disregarded  and  neglected,  and  it  is  an  area  which  critical 
scholars have expressed their concerns about in the ensuing debates.  
Part  Three,  which  contains  two chapters,  brings  the  thesis  to  a  close.  Chapter  Six 
rounds up the project by firstly illustrating how these two nation states have been deeply 
involved in the South-South Cooperation project,  and secondly examining,  explaining 
and comparing their respective visions, namely the Asian Renaissance and the African 
Renaissance,  that have been the driving forces behind their  commitment  to the afore-
mentioned  project  as  well  as  to  the  advancement  of  their  respective  nation-states. 
Chapter Seven draws together the overall research findings by offering insights into the 
nature  of  the  respective  nation-states’  identities  that  they reflect  in  the contemporary 
international  state  system.  The  thesis  finally  ends  with  a  list  of  Appendices and  an 
extensive Bibliography.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Identifying and Constructing a Theoretical Framework: 
Towards Understanding 
South African-Malaysian Relations
1. Introduction:
Some of the literature reviewed in the previous chapter gave a fair insight into and an 
adequate overview of diverse aspects of South African – Malaysian Relations. Not all of 
these  published  pieces  made use of  theories  or  appropriated  paradigms to  justify  the 
authors’ arguments and points that they raised. It is assumed that if the authors employed 
a  particular  paradigm  or  invoked  a  tentative  theory  it  would  have  restricted  their 
reflections on the theme or topic under discussion in such manner that suggested a one-
dimensional interpretation instead of allowing a multi-layered interpretation. However, 
among the list of scholarly contributions such as those written by Southall (1997) and van 
der Westhuizen (2002) theories form an important preface to the contents of the text. 
These scholars chose relevant theories (and suitable paradigms) that helped them in their 
critical  comparative  studies  and  which  assisted  to  yield  meaningful  and  reasonable 
interpretations and understandings. 
The theories and paradigms that they used shaped the way they interpreted the issues that 
they carefully scrutinized and critically reflected upon. Burchill (1996: 13) clarified the 
rationale for making use of theories when he said that 'one aim of studying a wide variety 
of IR theories is to make international politics more intelligible and better understood' 
and  he  went  on stating  that  it  is  '...  to  make  better  sense  of  institutions,  events  and 
processes which exist in the contemporary world.' And as far as he was concerned 'at 
times  the  theories  will  involve  testing  hypotheses,  proposing  causal  explanations, 
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describing  events  and  explaining  general  trends  and  phenomena,  with  the  aim  of 
constructing a plausible image of the world.' Cox (1992: 133) also added his voice on the 
relevant status of theory when he made the point that ‘(t)heory follows reality.  It also 
precedes and shapes reality.’
2. Significance of Theory & Paradigm:
Theory,  according to Burchill  (1996: 2), is purely an intellectual inquiry that seeks to 
offer explanatory accounts of IR; or to put it slightly differently,  it  'is nothing but (a) 
systematic reflection on phenomena, (that is) designed to explain them and to show how 
they are related to each other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely 
random items in an incoherent universe' (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996: 5). The last two 
mentioned scholars further pointed out that the theory is there to (a) guide research, (b) 
provide a basis for explanation, and (c) lead to a predictive capability, and that it gives a 
sense of purpose and direction. Jabri (2000: 290) posited the view that theory is 'a way of 
making things intelligible' and that it is also 'a set of limited propositions designed to 
connect  and  interpret  organized  facts.'  In  Burchill's  (1996:  8)  review  of  the  various 
theories,  he listed a variety of definitions that were extracted from the works of their 
advocates. Neuman (1998: 2) cautioned that 'theories are not borne out by events in the 
Third World,' and according to Chan (1994:237), 'IR theory lacked nuance when viewing 
the Third World or even non-Western members of the developed world.'  And Ayoob 
(1998: 32) emphasized that theories have been prisoners of time and space that capture 
approximate  reality  and that  possess  the  power  and ability  to  discuss,  examine,  and 
predict the behaviour of their subjects.
Although there was a spate of IR theories that were worked out, IR scholars like many 
others in the social sciences also opted to go for paradigms, which may be regarded as 
epistemological models, that were given prominence by Thomas Kuhn's influential 1962 
work,  The Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions  (Neufeld  2001:  130).  Reusse  (2002:  5) 
made reference to Kuhn who described a paradigm as follows: '  ...  (it)  is at the start 
largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples'. He 
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went  further  by  referring  to  Aurois  (1995)  who  rationalized  why  there  has  been  a 
disruption in theory formulation in developmental studies and the emergence of a number 
of paradigms as a better alternative to grasp the nature of the debates and issues. Whilst 
some scholars do not make a clear distinction between theory and paradigm, there were 
apparent shifts in the use of paradigms instead of theories in academic circles; since the 
concept ‘theory’ was earlier defined and explained, the following broad definition of the 
term ‘paradigm’ will  assist in shedding added light on the distinction between the two 
concepts: Paradigm is basically a shared understanding and a manner of approaching a 
relationship or a problem in international relations, and it is used by scholars and students 
in the social sciences as a fundamental way of knowing how the state and non-state actors 
in the world operate and manage worldly affairs in the international system (Steans & 
Pettiford 2001: 212). Kegley & Wittkopf (1997: 17) footnoted their understanding of the 
concept  when they stated that  the word 'paradigm'  is  commonly used to  describe the 
dominant way of looking at a particular subject such as IR. They added that a paradigm 
can be employed to compare the present (of South Africa) with the past (of South Africa) 
or one state (i.e. South Africa) with another (Malaysia) and it is also used to determine 
what issues in the changing global world are perceived to be most important. Burchill 
(1996: 11), who also invoked Kuhn, stated that 'a dominant paradigm is primarily a frame 
of assumptions dialectically conceived and consensually recognized as the cumulative 
wisdom of the discipline at any specific time in its evolution.'
From the afore-mentioned scholarly observations and definitions of these two concepts, it 
may be concluded that theories and paradigms are significant tools that complement one 
another when applied to various types of studies. These two terms help to unpack the 
nature of the ties that had been forged, developed, nurtured and sustained among nation-
states as is the case between South Africa and Malaysia, and they also offer deep insights 
into  the  meaningfulness  of  relationships  and  partnerships  among  nation-states.  Since 
social scientists in general and IR scholars in particular have painstakingly demonstrated 
the relevancy and appropriateness  of the employment  of theories  and paradigms in  a 
sound and stimulating manner,  I,  as a social  science researcher,  opted to follow their 
footsteps  by  appropriating  theories  and  paradigms  that  would  help  to  gain  a  fair 
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understanding of the rationale  behind the relationship that has been reignited in 1993 
between South Africa and Malaysia as well as the nature of the existing partnership.
At this juncture it may be instructive to state that there have been other contemporary IR 
scholars that have questioned and debated whether theory comes before practice or vice 
versa. Whilst scholars such as Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996: 22-23) have tried to pursue 
a  neutral  stand  where  both  the  theorist  and  the  practitioner  have  valid  grounds  for 
accepting theory before practice or practice before theory, there have been a coterie of 
critical theorists such as Steven Chan (2001) who favoured the latter. He and others who 
share these thoughts have substantiated reasons for arguing along these lines. Whilst I am 
inclined to accept this notion as valid, it is not my concern to delve into the pros and cons 
of its validity except to be fully cognizant of these theoretical  concerns within the IR 
arena. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: the first is to outline the philosophy of a key 
theory that has constantly been invoked and applied loosely throughout this thesis, and 
the second is to briefly introduce crucial concepts that are relevant to the contents of this 
thesis;  they  have  been  appropriated  and  tailored  to  fit  within  the  broad  theoretical 
framework that would help gain a general and perhaps a deeper understanding and insight 
into the relationship that has developed between South Africa and Malaysia over the past 
few years. But before identifying the theory that will be used as a basis for supporting the 
contents of this thesis, a few short paragraphs are devoted to the state of IR theory during 
the contemporary period in order to contextualize the theory that has been appropriated 
for  this  research.  This  will,  however,  be  briefly  addressed  with  the  hope  of  not 
oversimplifying the state of IR during the 20th century.
3. A Synopsis of IR Theory:
International  Relations  (IR),  which  became  an  academic  discipline  in  1919  in  the 
aftermath of World War I,  has been a discipline that  has been in a constant  state  of 
theoretical flux, and this has led scholars such as Chan and Mandaville (2000) to describe 
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it as a 'crude discipline.' From the very inception of IR and for much of the 20th century, 
Neuman (1998: 13) pointed out that mainstream IR theory such as Idealism, Realism, 
Neo-Realism,  and Liberalism was and is  still  essentially  Eurocentric  theory.  Most  of 
which had, however, been manufactured in and exported from the USA (cf. Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff  1996:  11;  Paolini  1997:  34)  and  because  of  these  developments,  Tickner 
(2003: 297) preferred to describe the USA theorists as the gatekeepers of IR and which 
has ultimately resulted in an 'Amerocentric representation of global politics.' 
When it was developed in the early 1900s it was molded and shaped along the notion that 
the  state  was  and  remained  the  sole  actor  in  the  world  of  politics  and  international 
relations. The sovereignty of the state was paramount and as such all socio-political and 
economic  affairs  are  connected  to  the  state  and  in  the  hands  of  its  leadership  who 
represents the state and its citizens; in other words, actors such as the president or prime 
minister of a state were the secondary actors whilst the state was viewed as the primary 
actor.  As time moved on towards the 1960s and beyond there were many critical  IR 
scholars  who began  to  question  the  dogmatic  view of  the  classical  IR scholars  who 
considered the state as sacrosanct and a non-negotiable political entity.  These scholars 
forcefully argued that whilst the nation-state might  have been identified by earlier  IR 
classical  scholars  as  the  only  actor,  there  are  new  actors  such  as  Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Non-State Actors 
(NSAs) that play a greater role in international affairs. And because of this, they will 
have to forfeit  that special  position and allow space for the other actors to take their 
rightful place next to the state as key political players in the IR arena. Examples of TNCs 
and  NGOs  abound:  Coca  Cola  (www.cocacola.com)  and  MacDonalds 
(www.mcdonalds.com) belong to those TNCs that have spread their tentacles to almost 
all corners of the world, and Amnesty International (AI www.ai.org) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO www.wto.org)  are NGOs that have made their mark in the IR arena 
and have thus become significant players in global affairs. 
And as a consequence of the interventions of many of these transnational institutions, 
their concrete contributions have in some cases overshadowed the position of the nation-
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state and forced the governments of these nation-states to accept them as important (and 
equal) international political players. When Strange (1996: 199) undertook a survey of 
world affairs, she proved that the state's position as a political actor has weakened as a 
result of the integration of national economies into a single global market economy. She 
thus concluded that we come across 'a ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of 
authority' because when business dealings are executed or commercial ties forged then 
these are either with the government of a state, a TNC such as Barclays, or with a social 
movement such as Jubilee 2000; from this random selection of institutions, we deal with 
a variety of persons who represent their specific institution.
The impact of the TNCs and NGOs gave rise to the eventual emergence of IR scholars 
who proposed alternative theories such as Liberalism and Structuralism (George 1994; 
Jackson & Sorenson 1999; Burchill et al 2001; Steams & Pettiford 2001) that interpreted 
world events and developments very differently from their colleagues who still held on to 
the idealist and realist notions of the sovereignty of the state as espoused by the classical 
theorists. A synopsis of the theoretical developments over the many decades during the 
20th century will provide an insight into the types of theories that have been proposed, 
debated,  discussed  and  applied.  IR scholars  have  however  classified  them into  three 
broad  'debates'.  The  one  group  is  referred  to  as  the  First  Debate  theories,  namely 
‘Idealism’  and  ‘Realism’  during  the  1940s  and  1950s  (cf.  Swatuk  1991;  Quirk  & 
Vigneswaran 2005). This was naturally succeeded by the Second Debate theories which 
centered around the confrontations and conflicts between ‘history’ and ‘science’ and that 
took place during the 1960s and into the1970s (cf. Knorr & Rosenau 1969). And since 
the  1980s,  the  Third  Debate  came  to  life;  this  debate  has  been  characterized  as  the 
‘discipline defining’ debate because of the variety of concerns raised by theorists such as 
Holsti, Kauppi, Little, Cox and an array of others (cf. Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1995). 
According to Neufeld (1995), three contending paradigms that describe the present state 
of IR have been proposed; they are ‘realism,’ ‘pluralism,’ and ‘structuralism.’ According 
to this proposition, Realists appropriate the ‘billiard-ball’ model, which reflect the view 
how states intermittently collide. Pluralists deal with the ‘cob-web’ relationships where 
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there  is  constant  crisscrossing  of  activities,  and  Structuralists  face  a  ‘multi-legged 
octopus’ sucking up the wealth from the peripheries ‘to feed’ the centre. Whilst these 
may be viewed as complementary paradigms, there are however contradictory categories 
that are accommodated by these theoretical schools. Among these are (a) actors (states), 
(b)  dynamics  (primary  force,  complex  social  movements,  economics),  (c)  dependent 
variables  (IR explaining what states do and identifying the major events),  (d) subject 
boundaries (state centric and world society),  and (e) specific concepts (deterrence and 
alliance, ethnicity and interdependence, dependence and exploitation) (cf. Neufeld 1995: 
48-49).  On  the  one  hand,  the  Third  Debate  brought  to  a  close  all  the  traditionally 
mainstream theories within the IR discipline, and on the other, it sparked off a string of 
new and vibrant debates that fired up the discussions from various dimensions. These 
debates  were,  in  fact,  affected  and  influenced  by  theoretical  models  that  have  been 
devised,  advocated and applied in fields such as literature and linguistics etc.  In fact, 
many  contemporary  IR  scholars  have  responded  critically  towards  the  mainstream 
theories  arguing  that  most  of  these  theories  ignore  cultural  varieties  and  are 
'suspect' (Neuman 1998: 6). Another shortcoming, according to Ayoob (1998: 32), was 
that  they  '...  do  not  concern  themselves  with  the  behaviour  of  the  large  majority  of 
members of the international system.' 
Figure 2.1:
Stages of IR Theory
 Traditional 
Theories: pre-
1980s
 Non-Traditional 
Theories: post-
1980s
Liberalism
Realism
Idealism
Green TheoryGreen Theory
Feminist TheoryFeminist Theory
PostmodernismPostmodernism
Critical TheoryCritical Theory
45
                                                                          
Beyond the Third Debate,  which Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 59-61) described as the 
Fourth Debate, there emerged a number of very vibrant and challenging theories. All of 
these theories have prised open new debates and discussions that critically questioned the 
ontological and epistemological foundations of the mainstream theories. The advocates of 
these theories have interrogated the philosophical foundations of the earlier theories to 
demonstrate how inadequate they were to comprehend the nature of the contemporary 
society  and  state.  And  since  the  classical  theories  failed  to  provide  any  satisfactory 
answers to the developments in the international system, the new coined and proposed 
theories could provide some positive responses. The theories that entered the IR arena 
were: Critical Theory, Postmodernism, Post-Colonial Theory, Feminist Theory and the 
Green  Theory.  With  the  invasion  of  these  theories,  the  IR  discipline  provided  new 
understandings and insights into IR. Figure 2.1 above gives a synopsis of some of the 
different theories that have been operating throughout the 20th Century.
In mapping out a theoretical framework for this thesis, which draws upon, at least, one 
particular theory, I am consciously mindful of Holsti's (1990: 12) desideratum when he 
said that the researcher/scholar should be ‘employing concepts, categories and typologies 
that  foster  rather  than  hinder  comparative  analysis’  and  when  Halliday  (1995:  745) 
intoned that 'the philosophy of the social sciences' should always be kept in mind for 
theory to avoid the pitfalls.  More importantly I  take heed of Burchill's  (1996: 14-15) 
remarks when he discussed the constitutive international theory, which is different from 
the explanatory international theory; he noted that generally every scholar comes to IR 
with preconceptions, experiences and beliefs which affect the way the person understands 
the subject.  In other words, the scholar comes with his/her historical  baggage such as 
language,  culture,  religion,  ethnicity and ideology and thus frames  his/her  study with 
these factors impinging upon his/her interpretation. 
These remarks are crucial when reflecting upon the relationship between South Africa 
and Malaysia from the standpoint of the observer who comes from a specific - or for that 
matter any - community within the broad-based South African society and someone who 
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belongs  to  a  particular  religio-cultural  group  within  that  society.  Based  upon  these 
observations,  the  thesis  is  thus  a  reflection  of  my  cognitive  interests  and  normative 
assumptions. And since - reformulating using Edward Said's (1984) words - 'no writing is 
neutral or innocent', I have adopted a bias in terms of my choice of theories, variables and 
indeed interpretations. Let me now turn our attention towards the theory that has been 
appropriated for and applied throughout this thesis.
4.  A Relevant Theory and Relating Tales:
Scholars of IR have critically questioned the relevance of many of the traditional theories 
such as Realism and Liberalism in relation to the developments that have taken place by 
the end of the 20th Century, particularly after the end of the Cold War. And with the 
onset  and  intrusion  of  globalization,  some  of  these  scholars  proposed  alternative 
theoretical  models  as  new strategies  of interpretation.  These theories  became popular 
because  of  their  philosophical  roots  and  interpretation  of  contemporary  political  and 
economic  affairs.  One  from  among  the  set  of  non-mainstream  and  unconventional 
theories listed in Figure 2.1 above is the concern of this section, namely Critical Theory 
(hereafter  CT).  It  may  be  argued  that  CT created  opportunities  and  space  for  other 
theories to be entertained by the IR specialists;  this may be attributed to the way CT 
emerged and developed (Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 233-235). 
The uniqueness of this theory lies in the fact that it opened up doors for the voiceless to 
be heard and the marginalized to be counted in on an equal basis and also have their say 
in world affairs (cf. Wyn Jones 2001). And since a coterie of IR scholars have identified 
themselves with issues that have been given scant attention by the traditional IR schools, 
CT  as  well  as  its  relatives  (Postmodernism,  Feminism  and  the  like)  was  a  fairly 
successful theoretical framework for these scholars; it was successful in that – to borrow 
Robert Cox’s words – ‘critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about 
an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions which, 
intended or unintended, sustain the existing world’ (quoted by Eckersley 2004: 30). CT is 
not  just  a  practically  oriented theory that  investigates  and untangles  issues  through a 
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series of strategic actions. It is a theory that is applied in order to transcend unreflective 
understanding, to uncover structures of domination,  and to work in the interest of the 
silenced and marginalized  communities  from the South -  popularly referred to  as the 
Third World. And since most nation-states from the South have been voiceless, it is to 
South Africa and Malaysia - two sovereign nation-states from within the South - that will 
be this thesis’ subject matter.
4.1 Critical Theory:
According to George (1994), Rengger (2001) and Devetak (2001), the roots of CT are 
found  within  the  period  of  Enlightenment,  and  they  are  specifically  located  in  the 
philosophical  works  and  epistemological  writings  of  W.V.  Quine,  Ludwig 
Wittengenstein,  Jurgen  Habermas  and  Michael  Foucault.  Prior  to  these  scholars' 
invaluable contributions towards the critical debates that ensued and remained influential, 
the name of Karl  Marx continued to loom large since he was the one who critically 
evaluated the nature of the socio-economic system in Western Europe and went on to 
demonstrate the inequalities and injustices that it yielded (cf. Marx's Das Kapital). In the 
light  of  Marx's  numerous  studies  he  had  hoped  that  capitalism  as  a  system  would 
eventually reach a crisis point and come to an abrupt end. Although this was not to be, it 
was  the  critical  theorists  such  as  Theodor  Adorno  and  Max  Horkheimer  within  the 
Frankfurt School who began to evaluate the reasons for the capitalist system's robustness 
and resilience despite the economic depression in the 1930s. They realized and concluded 
that the system was propped up by many other social structures such as the educational 
institutions and the mass media and that there was little that could be done to halt the 
capitalist system from forging ahead. 
In Horkheimer’s writings he distinguished between CT and traditional theory. Since he 
critically assessed the traditional theoretical schools and went on to propose an alternative 
route, he and his colleagues, who also made critical inputs on the subject, were associated 
with  the  Frankfurt  School  of  critical  theorists.  (Steans  &  Pettiford  2001:  108-109; 
Rengger  2001:  94-96).  These  scholars  saw  that  CT  had  the  potential  to  critically 
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investigate  theory  itself;  a  task  which  traditional  theory  was  incapable  of  doing.  CT 
possessed the capacity to raise,  inter alia,  the following questions:  for whom has the 
theory been formulated? What does it serve? Why has it been constructed? And how has 
it been employed? (Rengger 2001: 94). All of these interconnected questions assisted the 
critical theorists to comprehend the operations of international politics and international 
relations  better  and  they  generally  did  not  accept  the  traditional  limitations  on 
explanations and thus never took for granted phenomena such as contemporary world 
politics as given (Hutchings 2001: 79-80).
Even though these scholars’ line of thinking was 'that social progress was not dependent 
upon the scientific  discovery and application of universal  laws but on concrete social 
practice  associated  with  critical  reflection  on  dominant  knowledge/power 
relations' (George 1994: 151), they became somewhat disillusioned and pessimistic with 
the workers who were themselves divided and whose 'revolutionary spirit' had waned. In 
the course of these critical theorists' assessments and writings about the capitalist system, 
they became extremely 'sensitive to multiple oppression (that was) inherent in capitalism,' 
and were thus looking for other ways of addressing these issues in order to bring about a 
meaningful change. Related to searching for alternatives a string of questions that was 
subsequently raised in the light of the gross inequalities which existed in different parts of 
the world was: 'How can critical theorists develop a conception of a fair and just society?, 
Who  will  be  the  agents  of  radical  change?  And  what  does  it  really  mean  to  be 
emancipated or have freedom? (ibid 110). These questions formed part of a set of ideas 
that stimulated the subsequent generation of critical theorists in the Frankfurt School led 
by  Habermas  to  shift  their  focus  from  the  workers'  struggle  to  the  cultural  arena. 
Habermas was the one who basically set the 'emancipatory project' on course and pointed 
out that the earlier critical theorists in the school 'misunderstood the emancipatory task in 
seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in all spheres' (ibid 153). He thus 
injected a renewed spirit into the school and gave it a new lease of life that went beyond 
the CT of the earlier masters in the Frankfurt School.
CT tackled and challenged the fundamental  philosophy of the traditional  theories and 
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existing world order (Hutchings 2001: 87; Duvall & Varadarajan 2003: 81). The critical 
theorists’ critique of the realists’ stance such as, for example, taking for granted the state 
as the only political unit within the international system was not left unchallenged. The 
realists’ assumptions ought to be questioned and debated, they insisted and argued. And 
as far as they were concerned, their decisive deliberations on the issue would be better 
accounted for in rethinking the rationale for this significant position. CT thus brought a 
more refreshing method of assessing developments within the IR discipline in particular 
and the process of modernity in general. This theory ventured to prise open new ways of 
comprehending  contemporary  changes  in  the  field  of  IR and thus  offered  alternative 
theoretical  views to what had traditionally been disseminated by idealists and realists. 
Robert Cox, one of the advocates of this theory, expressed the view that ‘(c)ritical theory 
is conscious of its own relativity but through this consciousness can achieve a broader 
time perspective and become less relative’. Hoogvelt (1997: 12), from whom this quote 
was taken, attempted to further explain what Cox actually meant by this statement; she 
opined that within the arena of CT ‘… the task of theorizing can never be finished in an 
enclosed  system  but  must  continually  begin  anew,  beginning  not with  abstract 
conceptions  but  a  description  of  historical  experience,  ferreting  out  the  emerging 
contradictions between changing material conditions and associated social forces on the 
one hand, and the vested interests or overhangs from past institutions and ideologies on 
the other.’ 
According  Jackson  & Sorenson  (1999:  233),  Cox  made  a  clear  distinction  between 
problem-solving  knowledge  and  emancipatory  knowledge.  He  argued  that  ‘problem-
solving knowledge’ suggested a prejudicial position towards the international status quo 
which is based on inequality of power and excluded many communities. As far as Cox’s 
position  was  concerned,  this  type  of  knowledge  was  basically  conservative  in 
construction and this being the case it will not be able assist in the progress of humanity 
nor in their  emancipation.  Linklater  (1996: 281) captured some of Cox’s thoughts by 
stating that ‘(p)roblem-solving knowledge is geared to making the international system 
function  more  smoothly  on  the  understanding  that  fundamental  change  is  either 
impossible or improbable. Critical-theoretical knowledge searches for evidence of change 
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on assumption that present structures are unlikely to be reproduced indefinitely.’ 
Critical theorists therefore came to the rescue via the process of deconstruction and, in 
effect,  replace  ‘problem-solving  knowledge’  with  a  radically  reconstructed  form  of 
knowledge – as part of the democratic impulse (Neufeld 2001: 130) -   that sought to 
advance  the position of  humanity through ‘the emancipatory project’  (Rengger  2000: 
143-172); a project, which Rengger (2001: 96) cautioned, also possessed a ‘dark side’ 
and one that critical  theorists will have to confront if they wish to ‘make good on its 
emancipatory project.’ Although Rengger (2000: 158-156; 2001: 102-106) went on to 
demonstrate the project’s shortcomings, I will not reiterate his remarks except to say that 
they should be kept in mind when pursuing it.
This emancipatory project, being an essential part CT, thus effectively gave space to the 
silenced and marginalized voices that belonged to the world described and categorized as 
the 'underdeveloped states' or ‘developing states’ (George 1994: 141; Low 2004). In fact, 
Jackson (1996: 215),  who based himself  on Linklater’s  ideas,  captured the idea quite 
succinctly when he said that ‘(c)ritical theory takes notice of ‘the other’ which could be 
any social category whose members suffer from exclusion at the hands of the insider.’ 
However, in order for CT to offer an alternative as a user-friendly and relevant theory, it 
was  largely  informed  by  the  traditions  of  hermeneutics  and  ideologiekritik  (Devetak 
2001: 163), and much of which has been appeared in Habermas' Knowledge and Human 
Interests  (1972) in which he stressed his ‘theory of communicative action’  (Linklater 
1996: 284; Jones 2001: 17-18). Embedded in this work and other writings of Habermas, 
Halliday  (1994:  53)  recognized  three  forms  of  knowledge;  these  three  are  positivist, 
hermeneutic and critical and have been captured in Figure 2.2 below.  
Linklater (1996: 281), drawing upon the work of Ashley,  has however listed the three 
interests that had been expressed by Habermas; they were: 
 The  technical  interest  in  understanding  how to  extend  control  over  nature  & 
society;
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 The  practical  interest  in  understanding  how  to  create  &  maintain  orderly 
communities; and
 The  emancipatory  interest  in  identifying  &  eradicating  unnecessary  social 
confinements & constraints.
Figure 2.2
According to George's (1994: 154-155) and Devetak’s (2001: 164) observations,  it was 
the mentioned text that catapulted Habermasian themes into IR. Seans & Pettiford (2001: 
112-121) detected six sets of significant themes that cropped up in the agenda of critical 
theorists;  they  were  'State  and  Power,'  'Institutions  and  World  Order,'  'Identity  and 
Community,'  and  'Inequality  and  Injustice,'  'Conflict  and  Violence'  and  'Peace  and 
Security.' Brief attention will only be given to two sets from the list since these directly 
impact upon the contents of this research project. The first set of themes, namely 'state 
and power,' consists of two loaded, yet important, concepts in IR theory and practice. 
Going back to early IR theoretical literature, the sovereign nation-state was and remained 
the only political actor in the eyes of the Idealists, Realists, Neo-Realists and Liberalists 
who deliberately ignored the fact  that  the state was not a purely European invention; 
Habermas and
His Theory of Knowledge
Critical Hermeneutic
Positivist
Three Forms
Of
Knowledge
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similar systems existed in slightly different forms and in another world order between 
900 and 1500 in Africa and Asia. And because of this traditionally dogmatic perception, 
the critical theorists de-linked the concept of the 'state as actor' and placed it alongside 
other groups of politico-economic actors whose acts have also affected and influenced IR 
in both the political and economic spheres. 
They thus argued that the state as a political entity developed alongside the economic 
system and it  therefore  does not  make any sense to force them into distinct  areas  of 
activities when they should be viewed as 'two sides of the same coin.' And they further 
advocated the idea that the state should not be regarded as the basic unit of analysis in IR 
and that it is imperative to grasp and understand the historical nature of the state and the 
state system. In this regard the critical theorists posed some of the following questions 
that helped to inform them about forms of socio-political and economic organizations: 
What is the state? Why did it take on a dominant role? How does it contribute to the 
world order? In which way do all  the political  actors make substantial  input towards 
human emancipation? And who holds the power to bring about the changes globally? The 
latter question brings into the discussion the second problematic concept, namely 'power;' 
a  concept  that  has  been  given  significant  focus  in  the  critical  tradition  (Jackson  & 
Sorenson 1999: 233; Sorenson 2004: 14-15).
In the literature on political science and in other disciplines, the definition for 'power' 
abounds. Hill (2003: 129) highlighted the fact that power is ‘a foundational concept in 
political science and a central pillar in international relations.’ Kegley & Wittkopf (2001: 
378) made reference to a few scholars’ conceptualization of power; they stated that most 
of these scholars operate from the traditional assumption that power gives the state the 
ability: (a) to promote and protect national interests, (b) to win in bargaining situations, 
and (c) to shape the rules governing the international system. Couched differently, they 
accepted  the  notion  that  power  is  a  political  phenomenon  that  revolved  around  the 
capacity of one state to persuade another to do what it  otherwise would not. In other 
words, the one who has the most power is the one that is in control. For example, South 
Africa's position in relation to its immediate sovereign neighbors demonstrate that it is 
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the  major  power  in  the  region  and  thus  generally  'win  in  bargaining  positions'  and 
persuade  a  neighbor  such  as  Lesotho  to  act  in  a  way  it  otherwise  would  not  (cf. 
Landsberg 2004: 164-165; Wulf 2005: 90-91). The same argument may be applied to 
Malaysia in relation to Singapore in the case of the 'water problem.' Nevertheless, based 
within the state system, one could gather from the afore-mentioned interpretations that 
power is essentially 'politics.' 
And since power is essentially or is inextricably tied to politics, the state exercises its will 
through the amount of power it has, and this power is usually supported by other state 
structures, namely the economic and military institutions. When comparing South Africa 
with other countries in the SADC region it is not difficult to identify where South Africa 
stands in relation to all of them and the same can be said about Malaysia in the ASEAN. 
In each case, their power is assessed according to their economic standing in the region, 
the political position in relation to their neighbors and their military might within their 
geo-strategic  areas.  However,  the  power  that  these  states  possess  is  normally 
disseminated through ideas and beliefs in their respective states, which legitimizes the 
existing order. The critical theorists were thus concerned with the nature of power and 
power relations that exist among the social groups; for example, the power of the merger 
between  Petronas  and  Engen  over  local  communities  who  are  dependent  upon  the 
employment that these joint ventures generate in South Africa and Malaysia respectively 
or the power of business over the mining communities (South Africa) and rubber industry 
communities (Malaysia). This brings us to the second set of concepts, namely ‘identity’ 
and ‘community.’
Although the special attention will be given to the concept of ‘identity’ towards the end 
of this chapter and that of ‘community’ in a subsequent chapter, at this point it is a useful 
exercise  to explore the concepts according to the insight of the critical  theorists.  The 
critical theorists did not only challenge the position and identity of the state, which they 
argued has the potential to transcend the logic of the state system reflected by realism 
(Hutchings  2001:  82),  as  the  main  political  actor  within  the  IR arena,  but  they  also 
questioned the powers it  exercised in adopting an exclusive approach by demarcating 
54
                                                                          
borders – marked out by the disappearance of authors (Neocleous [2003: 123] referred to 
Denis  Wood)  -  within  which  it  distinguished  and  decided  who  should  or  could  be 
‘citizens’ and who should or could be ‘non-citizens,’ or for that matter ‘nationalists’ as 
opposed to ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ (ibid 109-110). It basically identified who belonged to 
the  ‘us’  and  who  formed  part  of  the  ‘other.’  In  other  words,  the  identity  of  the 
communities  and  societies,  who  reside  within  the  state  borders,  has  been  defined 
according to the rules and regulations stipulated within ‘the political order of modernity’; 
an order in which the citizen is protected by a set of rights (ibid 108). These identity 
markers, namely ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ and ‘nationalist’ and ‘foreigner,’ have been 
viewed within the CT school as highly problematic and indeed contentious because the 
rights for the citizen can only be achieved via the political form of the nation-state. And 
this thus begged the question: ‘if rights are granted to citizens of states, what happens to 
those with no states?’ or phrased differently ‘what happens to those who belong to no 
territory or are stateless? (ibid 109). Critical theorists thus proffered the notion that these 
issues  should  be  judiciously  assessed  and,  in  the  process,  they  be  displaced  and 
alternatives offered in their place. The work by Mark Neocleous entitled  Imagining the 
State  (2003) and that of Seyla Benhabib entitled  The Rights of Others (2004) devote a 
substantial number of pages to this debate and offer significant insights into it. 
For the critical theorists, whose main objective was and remains human emancipation, the 
state's borders and its regulation pose as a threat to the 'emancipation project' in that it 
restricts the individual and community's movements and development. It decides who it 
wishes to recognize as a citizen and who it wants to classify as an alien or foreigner. 
These acts are all problematic and no 'emancipation project' will be able to achieve its 
objectives  if  these  rules  are  strictly  applied  and  enforced;  in  fact,  if  these  rules  are 
enforced they may inevitably cause the nation-state’s citizens to rebel and overthrow the 
government which would effectively become ‘illegitimate.’ At the heart of the critical 
theorists'  argument  is  a desire for the governments  or those in power to  work in  the 
interest of the societies that they control and manage, and as an extension of this desire is 
the  concern  for  basic  'human  rights'  for  all.  The  fundamental  concern  of  the  critical 
theorists is the leveling of the playing fields by bringing about justice and doing away 
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with all forms of inequality.
Taking our guide from Habermas  and (later)  Foucault,  CT aimed at  resuscitating  the 
critical  faculty,  and  it  'is  committed  to  extending  the  rational,  just  and  democratic 
organization  of  political  life  beyond  the  level  of  the  state  to  the  whole  of 
humanity' (Devetak 2001: 163). According to George (1994: 153), Habermas insisted that 
CT undertakes an ‘emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental 
reason in all spheres.’ The fundamental issue, George continued (1994: 154), was for CT 
‘to  reconnect  (rational)  knowledge to human interests,’  and ‘to regenerate  the critical 
potential of modernity in terms of an ideologically unhindered, communicatory process.’ 
In this regard Linklater (1996: 284-295) elaborated upon the notion of ‘discourse ethics’ 
as  a  key  method  of  communication  that  had  been  advocated  by  critical  theorists. 
‘Discourse  ethics,’  he  (1996:  295)  stated,  ‘encourages  open  dialogue  between  the 
diversity of moral views and facilitates the expansion of the range of moral and political 
points of view.’ ‘Open dialogue,’ he continued, ‘is a check against domination inherent in 
some claims about cultural difference’ (also see Linklater 2001). I suppose when making 
this point Linklater was conscious of the racial conditions, ethnic differences and cultural 
constructions that were prevalent in apartheid South Africa as well as in other countries 
where open and critical dialogue was stifled rather than encouraged and promoted. 
In sum, critical theorists such as Linklater did not dismiss the theoretical standpoints of 
the realists but preferred to argue against the three basic postulates of positivism. They 
adopted this approach as a means of demonstrating that concepts and issues are not fixed 
and given but open to interpretation. The three postulates that Linklater critically assessed 
were: (a) an objective external reality, (b) the subject/object distinction, and (c) value-free 
social science (Linklater 1996: 279-281; Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 232; Rengger 2000: 
152; Rengger 2001: 97; Neufeld 2001: 130-131). As far as these scholars were concerned 
the  ‘social  world  is  a  construction  of  time  and  place’  and  this  implies  that  ‘the 
international system is a specific construction of the most powerful states.’ Based upon 
these observations, they further claimed that since world politics are also constructed, the 
distinction between subject (the analyst) and object (the focus of analysis) is marginal. 
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They further  averred  that  knowledge,  which  is  produced  by the  analyst,  contains  an 
inherent bias because of the analyst’s social perspectives and interpretations. According 
to Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 233), they also expressed the view that all IR theories, 
which have been proffered by different theorists, openly display a position that clearly 
demonstrates their bias. In support of their view they made reference to Robert Cox’s 
famous quote: ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Murphy 2001: 70 – 
his emphasis). 
It is this oft-quoted statement of Cox that has prompted me to appropriate CT as a helpful 
and meaningful theoretical tool to not only to investigate the relationship between two 
nation states from the South that have been marginalized but to, in a way, re-write aspects 
or parts of international relations from ‘the point of view of the interests and aspirations 
of the impoverished South’ (ibid). In addition, it also intends to write into the narrative 
through providing adequate space to the voices of NGOs and NSAs who have generally 
been overlooked and silenced as significant IR actors. And since Cox (1992: 132-157) 
resurrected and critically  interrogated the sociological  ideas  of Ibn Khaldun, an early 
North African Muslim scholar and theorist that has been silenced but not eclipsed by 
medieval and modern contributions on world order, Ibn Khaldun’s ideas on the ‘body 
politic’  (i.e.  the  state  and the  society/nation)  will  also  be given  attention  in  the next 
chapter as part of a detailed discussion that deals with the conceptualization of the state, 
the nation and the nation-state. Before relating the earlier mentioned complimentary IR 
narratives of the nation-states and the NSAs, I wish, at this juncture, (a) to demonstrate 
the connection between CT and the ‘art of telling stories’ and (b) to use this art form in 
order to chronicle the bilateral relationship between two nation-states from the South as 
well as to profile the biographies of the NSAs who have made interesting contributions 
towards IR in their respective regions and their nation-states. 
  
4.2 Critical Theory through the ‘Art of ‘Story Telling’:
Before I make the connection between CT and the ‘story telling’ process, I have to briefly 
clarify  one specific  concept  and that  is  ‘narratology,’  which is  simply understood as 
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‘story telling.’ A narrative, according to Dudley (1982: 103), is defined as ‘a discourse 
wherein a teller relates an event containing both actions and agents’ and it is composed of 
a speaker, speech events, agents and narrated events (cf. Manfred 2003: N3.1.1). The 
latter (2003: N1.2) couched the definition as follows: ‘a narrative has a story based on an 
action caused and experienced by characters, and a narrator who tells it.’ 
In  line  with  the  afore-mentioned  definitions  as  well  as  with  the  understanding  of 
‘narratology’ or ‘story telling’, Bleiker (2001: 37-66) – in his chapter entitled ‘Forget IR 
Theory’  -  categorically  stated  ‘… IR appears  as  nothing  but  a  set  of  narratives  that 
provide us with meaning and coherence…’ He continued and opined that  ‘… stories 
provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity’ and that ‘… (s)tate stories 
also exclude, for they seek to repress or delegitimise other stories and practice of identity 
…’  Bleiker  aptly  captured  the  idea  of  stories  or  narratives  in  his  chapter  and  this 
influenced us to view the notion of narratives as a useful way of discussing the contents 
of this thesis. In fact, the work of Stone-Mediatore (2003) bears this out when she argued 
very fervently in favour of appropriating story-telling as a  method of making known 
information  that  are  relevant  but  hidden,  important  but  marginalized,  crucial  but 
deliberately cast aside as non-events and unimportant. 
The idea in this section is not to regurgitate the thoughts on CT, which was adequately 
addressed by the respective scholarly works of George (1994), Devetak (2001) and Jones 
(2001), and outlined, explained and summarized in the section above. The intention of 
this section is quite plain, and that is to connect CT to the process of story telling. Chan 
and Mandaville (2001: 4-5), who described IR as a ‘crude discipline’, made a strong case 
for the employment of stories in IR. They posed the question: What can be done with 
stories in the interest of IR? And in response stated that ‘if stories are the metaphors that 
disguise  events  … is  it  the  role  of  IR to  disentangle  them … or  is  it  to  be  merely 
fascinated by them, seeing the world as a site in multiple truth?’ They also referred to 
Hidemi Suganami’s chapter in their edited volume, who used the ‘research assessment 
exercise’  cycle  and  viewed  stories  as  an  important  tool  when  trying  to  explain  and 
understand IR. ‘How do stories work?’ was the fundamental methodological question that 
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he successfully explored. They pointed out that ‘a story, which is undefined, expresses 
the interests of any ‘epistemic community’,  and as a consequence, every story – from 
wherever it originates – is treated as having some value.’ And since this is the case it has 
essential political scientific benefit and because it ‘confers an equality upon stories both 
east and west’ (Chan & Mandaville 2001: 6).
In the introductory essay Chan and Mandaville also made reference to Roland Bleiker’s – 
the co-editor  of the work -  critical  concerns on the same subject.  Bleiker  (2001:  37) 
publicly  challenged  IR  representatives  who  espoused  mainstream  thoughts  when  he 
scripted an article titled ‘Forget IR Theory’. He felt the need to challenge their hegemony 
over international relations’ debates since they viewed themselves as the gatekeepers and 
the ones who decide what theory should be allowed in and which one should be left out; a 
stance  that  is  very  much  contra  the  critical  tradition.  According  to  Bleiker,  these 
gatekeepers  argued  against  the  use  of  ‘stories’  in  order  to  understand  IR,  and  they 
basically opined that stories are not part of IR scholarship. Bleiker thus considered this 
attitude to be foolhardy because when we observe the trends and developments in IR, ‘it 
appears nothing but a set of narratives that provide us with meaning and coherence.’ And 
he continued his argument by making reference to the way IR scholars portrayed and 
reflected  upon the  state,  the  locus  classicus  of  IR;  they not  only dealt  with it  as  an 
institution but also related it via a series of stories and narratives. Another scholar, who 
also employed the story as her point of departure and whose arguments fall in line with 
that of Bleiker, is Shari Stone-Mediatore (2003).
Stone-Mediatore’s book sought ways to ‘engage productively narratives of marginalized 
peoples’ experience. She argued that the received theoretical discourses are inadequate 
and turned to experienced oriented-writing to communicate their struggle, and that these 
theories ‘… do not investigate the role of narrative in political (and IR) thinking nor do 
they theorize a way to confront stories critically… we … interpret our world in terms of 
stories,  but we lack the theoretical  apparatus to  do so in  a reflective  and responsible 
manner’ (Stone-Mediatore 2003: 2, 4). And earlier in the introduction she (ibid 2) also 
made the point that ‘when we dismiss stories of experience as ideological constructions, 
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we not  only undermine  authority  of  many marginalized  voices  but  also overlook the 
importance of experience to critical theory.’ As far as she is concerned individuals’ daily 
experiences that are captured and contained in stories can inform and empower CT, and 
in the process the stories’ epistemological values are affirmed; this is exactly what this 
thesis intends to do when it narrates the stories of cultural activists such as Mr. Ismail 
Petersen  and  others  in  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  respectively.  Stone-Mediatore’s 
arguments as well those of Chan et al and their team of contributors have made a strong 
case for the use of stories in  political  studies and IR. Stone-Mediatore,  who invoked 
Hannah Arendt, based her work on essays that were penned by individuals that had made 
a qualitative difference in their respective communities and nation-states.
In this thesis, I firstly narrate the social histories of the two states by briefly reflecting 
upon their earlier connections and comparing the two from 1948 onwards; this is then 
followed  by  narrating  the  relationship  that  had  been  forged  between  since  1990. 
Alongside  the  stories  of  these  two  nation-states,  it  will  also  be  zooming  in  on 
marginalized narratives; narratives of individuals who operated outside the ambit of the 
governmental  circles  to  make  international  connections  for  no  financial  gain.  These 
individuals, who may be described as non-state actors or cultural activists, have made 
inputs over more than a half decade and they are clear examples of how the picture of the 
discipline of IR has changed because of their contributions. It should be borne in mind 
that these individuals had no political profile or clout or affiliation and nor did any of 
them possess any politician ambitions to aspire to work with the government to attain 
some personal objectives. An important lesson however is the fact that their life stories 
demonstrate ‘how experience informs political (and IR) thinking through the medium of 
narrative because we generally encounter,  discuss, and invoke experience in narrative 
form’ (Stone- Mediatore 2003: 5). 
And one of the crucial themes that invariably crop up in these narratives as well as the 
story of  the  state  is  the  notion  of  ‘identity;’  a  concept  that  is  also of  relevance  and 
importance to the contents of this thesis. In fact, when Wyn Jones (2001: 17) compared 
Horkheimer’s  paradigm of  production  to  Habermas’  paradigm of  communication,  he 
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made  the  point  that  whilst  Horkheimer’s  paradigm  concentrated  on  ‘redistributory 
struggles’  and Harbermas’  paradigm was concerned with ‘community’  and ‘identity.’ 
Since this was the case, let me address and unpack ‘identity’ as a significant concept.
4.3 Identity: A Crucial Concept for Critical Theorists in IR
Traditional  IR  scholarship  has  somehow  overlooked  a  few  significant  concepts  and 
variables that have had a direct bearing on developments within world politics and the IR 
arena. Even though they were sidelined at earlier stages in IR development, contemporary 
non-traditional IR scholars have brought these concepts into the general purview since 
they have come to play key roles in understanding contemporary IR developments (cf. 
Lapidus & Kratochwil 1997; Vandersluis 2000). The specially selected concept, which is 
discussed  in  this  section,  is  strongly  connected  to  all  the  others  mentioned  issues 
discussed  in  different  sections  of  this  thesis.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  notion  of 
‘identity’  has,  during the closing stages of  the 20th century,  impacted  heavily  on IR 
affairs  in general  and in the lives of nation-states such as South Africa and Malaysia 
particular that form part of the developing world of states which are struggling to survive 
in the globally competitive world (Clapham 2000: 45). This section thus undertakes to 
interrogate the concept of ‘identity;’ a fairly significant concept in that it brings to the 
fore the very nature of the South African and Malaysian identities through the political 
process  of  nation  building  as  well  as  other  important  socio-economic  processes  and 
international relations developments within and beyond these sovereign nation-states.    
The question of identity as a variable has been and remains an ambiguous one because it 
implies both uniqueness and sameness. But apart from the ambiguity it expresses, it is 
important because, as Gilroy (1997: 301) said: ‘we live in a world where identity matters’ 
not only as a concept but also as a contested terrain of contemporary socio-political life. 
He  further  elaborated  stating  that  it  ‘provides  a  way  of  understanding  the  interplay 
between our subjective experience of the world and the cultural and historical set-up in 
which that fragile subjectivity is formed.’ And in the process of providing this type of 
understanding, identity also harnesses an exceptional plurality of meanings, which – as 
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mentioned  moments  ago  -  is  much  about  difference  or  uniqueness  as  about  shared 
belonging or sameness, and marks out the divisions and sub-sets in our social lives. His 
views concurred with those of Zalewski & Enloe (1995: 282-283) who argued that the 
concept  is  multi-layered  in  that  ‘identity  determines  how  you  are  treated,  what  is 
expected of you, what you expect of yourself …. Whether you will be seen as an enemy 
or (as) a friend.’  The multi-facet nature of identity and more particularly identity politics 
force us to explore groups that have been politically privileged such as state decision 
makers who are in turn influenced by the facets of their personal identities. For example, 
in apartheid South Africa it was usually the White, Afrikaner, male who made decisions 
on behalf of the state and the society that it manages and at no stage could an African 
female find herself in that position; however, in contemporary democratic South Africa 
the situation has radically changed where its Deputy President – Ms. Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka,  for  example,  is  an  African  female.  Similar  examples  are  also  observed  in 
Malaysia  where the Minister of International Trade and Industries has been under the 
leadership of a Malay female, namely Dato Seri Rafidah Azizan, for many years.
Returning to Hall (1997), the two questions that need a response: ‘Who are we’ and ‘what 
have we become’ – Burgess (2002: 10) phrased the questions slightly differently when he 
asked: ‘Who are you’ and ‘Who are you now’ - assist us to fully appreciate the debates 
that have been, on many occasions, raging around the issue of identity. In fact, many of 
these have been at the heart of racial conflicts as was the case throughout apartheid South 
Africa and on occasions in Malaysia. What this all boils down to is that a person holds a 
multiplicity of identities; these identities are employed to assist in directing behaviour 
depending on the  circumstances  in  which the person finds  him/herself.  For  example, 
when Mahathir Mohamed was the Prime Minister of Malaysia, he was the leader of a 
nation, a medical doctor, a husband, a father, a Muslim, and a Malay (cf. Rajendran 1993; 
Khoo 2001);  and in the case of Thabo Mbeki,  he is the President of South Africa at 
present, a husband, a brother, a Christian (?), a Xhosa and a key member of the African 
Union as South Africa’s representative (cf. Gumede 2005). Each of the concepts reflects 
a particular identity and a special status that each of the two holds in their respective 
62
                                                                          
situations. However, since Mahathir’s retirement from political  life, he no more holds 
that  prestigious  position  as  Prime  Minister  of  Malaysia  but  is  still  revered  by  the 
Malaysians as the ‘Father of Vision 2020’ who modernized Malaysia. And Mbeki, who 
has  retained  his  position  as  President  for  a  second  term,  is  known for  his  ‘African 
Renaissance’ project and for being the key drivers behind the NEPAD programme on the 
African continent and for consolidating the democracy project in South Africa. 
Based upon these observations, it is noted that everyone including those who hold the 
highest offices in their respective countries construct networks of related concepts known 
as schemas in which each of them are associated (Burgess 2002: 11). In a similar fashion 
the identity  of  individuals,  communities  and states  are  constructed.  As the individual 
moves  from one  position  to  another  and  into  the  upper  echelons  of  society,  he/she 
encounters experiences on a variety of levels, namely the individual and social levels, and 
in the process learn more about ‘who they were’ and ‘who they are’ at that point in time. 
And as  a  result  of  these  social  interactions,  according  to  Burgess  (ibid),  individuals 
construct three different types of schemas – see Figure 2.3 below - about themselves: at 
the primary level a personal identity, at the secondary level a relational identity, and at 
the last level a social identity. 
Figure 2.3
Levels of Identity
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Burgess  then  points  out  when  taking  into  account  the  individual’s  upbringing  and 
participation in different stations of social life that no matter how the individual defines 
him/herself, social identity forms an integral part of that individual’s personal identity. 
And this in effect means that the individual is not just a member of a social group but also 
of a community,  a society and a nation; and this in turn implies that the individual is 
emotionally  connected  to  a  specific  socio-political  group.  And  when  the  individual 
interacts  with  members  of  his/her  social  group,  the  individual’s  identity  becomes 
depersonalized,  and  a  social  identity  automatically  replaces  it  because  he/she  sees 
him/herself as part of a desirable social group that shares similar values and aspirations, 
and the individual is thus influenced by them and also by the environment in which he 
finds himself.  When reflecting upon the position of Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein in 
this thesis, many of the ideas that Burgess expounded on in terms of identity applies to 
him.
Burgess appropriated the social identity theory as espoused by Henri Tajfel, the French 
psychologist,  in  order  to  have a  deeper  and indeed better  understanding  of  the  post-
apartheid  South  African  society  that  has  been  deeply  traumatized  by  years  of  racial 
discrimination and social hardships. Grounded in numerous observations social identity 
theory research, according to Burgess (ibid 17), suggests special reasons for considering 
its effects in South Africa (and perhaps Malaysia); one of these, he mentioned, was that 
the  contact  made  by  members  of  one  group  (i.e.  whites  in  South  Africa/Malays  in 
Malaysia)  with  another  (i.e.  blacks  in  South  Africa/Chinese  in  Malaysia)  reduced 
negative perceptions, prejudicial attitudes, stereotyping and other undesirable outcomes. 
South Africans and Malaysians share a common feeling regarding social group identity 
and that is: it is a sensitive issue; however, it has been more so in the case of South Africa 
where racial discrimination was ‘legally’ constructed and instituted and which privileged 
the one social group (i.e. the whites) over another (i.e. the blacks [Africans, Coloureds 
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and Indians]). In the case of Malay Peninsula and the surrounding areas, the Malays were 
always in a subordinate position within the British colonial system; the latter privileged 
the Chinese and Indians, whose forebears were brought to the region as labourers by the 
colonial  powers.  Subsequent  to  the  departure  of  the  British,  the  Malays  introduced 
legislation such as affirmative action as a strategy to counter the Chinese and Indians’ 
control and influence. In response the off-spring of these communities, who were born 
and reared in Malaysia, challenged the strategies that had been implemented more than 
three decades ago and desired a fundamental change in the legal system and attitudes so 
that they can truly feel that they form part and parcel of the Bangsa Malaysia (i.e. Malay 
race) and not be discriminated against. Mahathir, being as pragmatic as ever, obliged by 
opening up the UMNO – the governing ruling party in Malaysia  -  to the non-Malay 
bumiputras and included Bangsa Malaysia as a crucial cog in realizing Vision 2020 (Reid 
2004:  18).  This  act  of  the  Malaysian  Prime Minister  minimized  the tension between 
ethnic and civic nationalism, and forced these diasporic Indian and Chinese communities 
to view ‘who is a Malay?’ differently in a new context in the 1990s. 
In the context of what took place in Malaysia since it became independent in 1957, and 
what transpired in South Africa throughout the era of apartheid and more so during the 
post-apartheid  period,  the  issue  of  identity,  namely  ‘who is  a  Malay’  or  ‘who is  an 
African’, has been repeatedly raised by individuals and groups whose positions have been 
threatened within their particular societies or within the geographical boundaries where 
they were born and bred.  In his capacity as South Africa’s deputy president in 1996, 
Thabo Mbeki ventured to define who is an African when he delivered his passionate 
speech  ‘I  am an  African.’  In  a  similar  vain,  Mahathir  Mohamed,  the  former  Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, expressed his candid opinion about who the Malays were in his 
significant publication titled The Malay Dilemma (1970), and in subsequent writings he 
continued to comment upon the Malay identity (cf. Reid 2004: 18); the last significant 
input  on this  concept  was when he was on an official  visit  as  the Prime Minister  of 
Malaysia to South Africa during August 1995. 
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Academics and cultural activists in South Africa and Malaysia mulled over the notions of 
both  politicians  and  critically  discussed  much  of  what  they  wrote.  However,  these 
concepts were not only debated within the confined borders of these two nation-states; 
they were also re-visited by other African and Asian leadership in other parts of Africa 
and Southeast  Asia, namely Singapore,  Brunei and Indonesia as well  as the diasporic 
communities living in Sri Lanka, South Africa, Madagascar, Philippines and elsewhere 
(cf. Barnard 2004). Although there existed diverse opinions on the concepts, there seem 
to have been a common understanding of the essence of these two concepts within their 
specific regions towards the end of the 20th Century. The mere fact that societies have 
been carved up and were boxed into nation-states   -   which  was in essence socially 
constructing and engineering national identities - by their former colonialists during the 
specific periods, it forced social science scholars to handle the issue of multiple identities 
(ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious) in a delicate and sensitive way. 
This  is  clearly  illustrated  when reflecting  upon the  position  of  South Africa’s  ‘Cape 
Malays’ who seemed to have preferred during the late apartheid era (beyond the 1980s) - 
instead of this  ethnic  identity,  which has been viewed as a  colonial  invention -  their 
‘religious identity’ (i.e. as Cape Muslims); it was considered a more convenient – if not a 
more appropriate, better suited and perhaps a neutral - label than the ‘ethnic identity’ that 
have been fraught with problems, and one that was constructed and employed by the 
apartheid regime for their own political objectives (cf. Jeppie 1996). The circumstances 
in Malaysia was and is, however, very different; but even though this has been the case, 
Yamashita (2003: 8), Vickers (2004: 28) and Shamsul (2004: 137) cogently argued along 
the lines that the ‘Malay’ identity was one of the ‘invented traditions’ by the British. Be 
that as it may, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia clearly defined what was meant by 
the concept ‘Malay’. But despite this, it continued to be an issue of debate vis-à-vis the 
other racial groups that exist within the geographically demarcated (and disputed) borders 
of Malaysia (cf. Kahn 2006).  
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It  might  be  further  illustrated  in  a  slightly  different  way  when  we  undertake  a 
comparative perspective of how the ethnic/racial identity was accepted by the Malaysians 
and Cape Malays in their respective regions (cf. Haron 2005). Hall’s (1997) exposé of 
cultural identity fits in neatly with the discussion that tackles and interrogates the Malay 
identity, which is not just a cultural identity – as has already been established - but also a 
religious one in the case of the Cape Malays and a religio-political one in the case of 
Malaysia’s Malays. If one compares the two, then one will observe the similarities and 
differences  of  which  Hall  so  eloquently  spoke  about.  The  former  Malaysian  Prime 
Minister’s, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, speech in August 1995 in South Africa in which he 
outlined the Malay identity can be used as one example of how the ‘cultural identity’ was 
conceptualized and applied within the Malaysian society. With this framework in mind, 
along with the various ingredients, the role of non-state actors such as cultural activists in 
South Africa and elsewhere should be borne in mind and will be addressed in Chapter 
Five.
Bringing this chapter to a close, the general  agreement  is that  identity is not a fixed, 
closed  or  an  unchanging  variable,  and  that  it  has  always  been  part  of  a  process  of 
formation  and construction.  And the  acceptance  of  a  multiplicity  of  identities  in  the 
contemporary societies such as those in South Africa and Malaysia respectively – and as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4 - is indicative of the fact that identity construction has always 
been in the making. And since this is so, the South African nation building – and as was 
the case with nation-building process in Malaysia over many decades - has been dynamic 
and will continue to demonstrate its dynamism for the foreseeable future. That said, the 
concept of identity is at the heart of socio-political identity structures, religious identity 
interpretations,  and cultural  identity analyses  (Jacquin-Berdal et  al  2002: 5).  This has 
been so particularly during this contemporary era of globalization where contradictions 
about  identity  formation  abound  and  where  the  relationship  between  the  state  and 
different identities has been and continues to be a complex and, in some instances, self-
contradictory. Mayall & Vandersluis (2000: 1) cautioned that when an attempt is made to 
fathom the relationship and processes of identity formation then one should be wary of 
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the fact that they are by nature tentative and indeed contestable.
Figure 2.4:
5. Closing Remarks
The fairly detailed theoretical framework as well as the conceptualization of ‘identity’ 
addressed  in  different  sections  of  this  chapter  acts  as  an  important  backdrop  to  the 
important discussions that are to follow regarding the special partnership that has been 
developed between South Africa and Malaysia. Both South Africa and Malaysia have 
been viewed for many years as part of the developing world that is located in the South. 
However,  since  they  have  never  remained  passive  nation-states  in  the  South,  some 
scholars have re-classified their position in world affairs as potential or emerging ‘middle 
powers’; a concept that will  be addressed and explored later in the thesis (Cox 1996; 
Nossal & Stubbs 1997; Vale 1997; Cilliers 1999; Schoeman 2000; Hamill & Lee 2001; 
Taylor 2001; van der Westhuizen 2003; Spence 2004; Pfister 2005). This has thus placed 
great pressure on the shoulders of the South African and Malaysian political leadership - 
as well as their respective civil societies - in that their countries have been identified as 
key states from within the ranks of the South. This has been so for a number of reasons: 
(a) they have played pro-active roles in world events, (b) they have been in sync with 
neo-liberal  world affairs,  and (c)  they have generally  conformed to  the standards  set 
down by the neo-liberal world bodies such as IMF and the World Bank.
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And  despite  the  difficulties  that  they  have  encountered  along  the  way  to  transform 
themselves and having been conscious of their shortcomings as nation-states they have, 
for example, modernized their industries and infrastructure to compete with other major 
world players. They have hooked up and complied with the global economic system even 
though their economies were and are somewhat smaller in size; they have worked hard to 
demonstrate  that  they  have  transformed  their  socio-political  identities  from  being 
backward,  lazy  nation-states  to  ones  that  are  forward  looking,  progressive  in  their 
thinking, liberal in their practice and open to change in the interest of their respective 
national  communities  and regional  societies  as  well  as  the global  society;  and,  more 
importantly, they have reflected via their special narratives that they fully identified with 
the plight of the poverty-stricken, downtrodden, isolated and marginalized nation-states 
and  communities  in  various  parts  of  the  world.  These  character  traits,  which  are  in 
conformity  with  those  that  are  approved  and  supported  in  the  critical  tradition,  thus 
placed  them  in  a  special  category  of  nation-states  that  have  been  given  special 
recognition  by  world  societies  residing  in  the  South  (and  the  North)  for  their 
contributions. 
The approach, which has been used, applied and expressed via the story telling method 
throughout  this  thesis,  is  indeed  an  appropriately  critical  theory  that  would  assist  in 
exploring the relationship that existed between South Africa and Malaysia prior to the 
former  transforming  itself  into a  democracy,  and a  relationship  that  had been  forged 
during South Africa’s  democratic  era.  Since the theory’s  key objective  is  to  free the 
silenced and marginalized voices and reinforce their own authentic identities, it has been 
used to do just that. Both democratic South Africa and Malaysia belong to the South, a 
region  that  has  been  marginalized  and  indeed  silenced  by  the  global  structures  and 
institutions  that  have  been  dominated  by  hegemonic,  powerful  forces  of  the  North 
represented by states such as the USA. The thesis thus relates the stories of how these 
two states from the South forged a partnership and how they struggled, during the final 
decade of the 20th century, to represent themselves and their fellow strugglers from the 
South - the voiceless and marginalized – at international fora and platforms to fight the 
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dominant groups from the North.  
However, since the socio-political  tales of the two states differ from one another and 
since they created an interesting story line through the identities they reflected and the 
relationship they forged at  the respective political  and cultural  levels  during the final 
decade of the 20th century and beyond, their stories have been recorded and analyzed in 
the following chapters to demonstrate how they have made a significant contribution to 
the IR as a whole. With these remarks, I wish to move on and narrate the narratives of 
these two (emerging) ‘middle power’ nation-states that have carved out interesting niches 
for themselves among different nation-states in the international system. Here I intend to 
record their stories, compare and analyze their positions vis-à-vis one another.  Before 
moving in that direction, I first want to discuss in the chapter that follows the relationship 
and  attitudes  that  these  two  sovereign  nation-states  adopted  towards  one  another 
throughout the Cold War era. 
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CHAPTER THREE
South Africa and Malaysia: 
Telling the Tales of Two Sovereign Nation-States (circa 1948-1990)
1. Introduction:
The apartheid state of South Africa was classified as a pariah state alongside that of Israel 
[in Southwest Asia] and Taiwan [in Far East Asia] in the 1980s (Vale 1977a; Geldenhuys 
1990; Mills 1994). It was conferred this status by the international community because of 
South Africa’s  inhumane internal  policies  towards  its  oppressed masses.  International 
bodies  such  Non-Aligned  Movement  and  many  members  of  the  Commonwealth 
condemned  South  Africa  for  its  domestic  policies.  These  bodies  and  members  were 
eventually able to persuade the UN General Assembly to declare South Africa’s internal 
policies as ‘a crime against humanity’, and to intensify sanctions against it by literally 
isolating  and  shunning  it.  South  Africa’s  international  status  in  the  eyes  of  the 
international community took a nosedive and it was forced to reposition itself within the 
international system and simultaneously reformulate its foreign policies to accommodate 
new changes. Among the countries that kept diplomatic connections and trade ties with 
this  pariah  state  were  the  USA,  Britain  and  a  few  European  states.  And  with  its 
restructured foreign policy it lured states from Asia to enter into its socio-political and 
commercial domain. Apart from Japan, which had links and had been toeing the British 
line (cf. Skidmore 2003; Alden 2002), Hong Kong and Taiwan joined these coterie of 
sanction  busting  states  without  due  consideration  to  the  conditions  of  the  oppressed 
masses (Moorsom 1989; Barber & Barratt 1990; Love 2005; Pfister 2005). As a result of 
South Africa’s status as a nation-state that espoused apartheid doctrines, its sovereignty 
was very much curtailed and constrained by the UN’s firm stand against apartheid. This 
situation  favoured  the  African  National  Congress  (ANC),  South  Africa’s  largest 
liberation movement, in many ways. 
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The ANC’s international profile gradually increased within the circles of the international 
community. A number of socialist and communist states fully recognised its position as 
the legitimate  representative  of the oppressed masses  and thus allowed it  to open up 
offices (cf. Thomas 1995). The significant political position that the ANC charted out for 
itself  and  the  international  recognition  that  it  was  accorded  by  the  international 
community to establish its unique profile resulted in it far outstripping the profile that the 
apartheid  regime had in the  1980s.  In its  capacity  as  the representative  of  the South 
African  oppressed  communities,  it  lobbied  on  their  behalf  for  support  from  the 
international community at different forums (Vale 1977; Vale 1994; Thomas 1995). In 
this  sense,  it  may  be  argued  that  while  the  ANC’s  foreign  policy  and  international 
relations were very much in line with the South African oppressed masses’ wishes, the 
apartheid state’s foreign policy was divorced from the South African society (Schrire & 
Silke 1997: 14; Vale 1994: 80). And it may further be contended that the apartheid state’s 
international relations agenda was partially moulded and shaped by the UN’s imposed 
sanctions as well  as South Africa’s revised foreign policy in order to strike ties with 
island-states  such  as  Taiwan  and  Hong Kong.  This  was  indeed  a  significant  foreign 
policy shift by South Africa since its traditional trading partners were North America, 
Britain and Western European states. It is assumed that if the UN sanctions had not been 
in force many countries would have forged ties with the apartheid regime (Pfister 2005). 
Nonetheless, the pragmatic, self-centred approach adopted by the apartheid regime also 
provided South Africa the opportunity to demonstrate  its  internal  sovereign rights by 
conveniently reformulating its racial policies in order to recognize the citizens from Japan 
- as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong - as honorary ‘whites.’ 
When the apartheid government underwent a leadership change at the close of the 1980s, 
which  coincided  with  the  end of  the  Cold  War,  efforts  were  made  from within  and 
outside South Africa to apply as much pressure on the government in order to gradually 
bring  about  meaningful  transformation  and  amend  its  tarnished  international  profile. 
Under Mr. F. W. De Klerk’s stewardship internal and external policies were gradually in 
the process of being revised and altered (Pfister 2005: 125-130). One of the first things 
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that  his  government  did at  the beginning of the 1990s was to release of Mr.  Nelson 
Mandela from prison, and to lift the ban on the liberation movements. In the eyes of the 
international community, this was the most tangible evidence that the apartheid regime 
under De Klerk’s leadership was prepared to bring about the necessary socio-political 
changes. The international community was, however, not prepared to lift sanctions after 
these apparently noble gestures, and applied extra pressure on the apartheid regime to 
deliver substantial changes that would satisfy the world community and particularly the 
South Africans who suffered oppression over the many decades. 
This chapter sets itself the task of describing the socio-political relationship that existed 
between these two nation-states before South Africa became a democracy. It does so by 
charting out, in some detail, the stance the Federation of Malaysia adopted towards the 
Republic of (Apartheid) South Africa from the time before its independence in 1957 until 
the end of the Cold War in 1989/1990. The chapter provides an important backdrop for 
the one that follows, and thus critically analyses - from empirical sources - a relationship 
that shifted from Malaysia’s peripheral support for the ANC into one that developed into 
a strong bond. But before relating this significant socio-political narrative - one which 
changed from an ‘antagonistic’ and ‘adversarial’ position from the late 1950s to one that 
may  be  described  as  a  ‘friendly’  relationship  by  1992  when  diplomatic  ties  were 
cemented, it is incumbent to construct a conceptual framework within which to assess 
and  comprehend  this  relationship.  This  framework  is  intimately  connected  to  the 
conceptualization of the conjoined term ‘nation-state’ that was underpinned by another 
critical  concept,  namely  ‘sovereignty’  which  was  an  European  creation;  the  latter 
construct,  which was fully realized after  World War II  and throughout  the Cold War 
period  and  one  that  was  transformed  in  the  post-Cold  War  and  post-modern  period 
(Denham & Lombardi 1996), will not be dealt with in this thesis. This chapter attempts to 
scrutinize  and analyse  the  conjoined  term with  most  examples  extracted  from South 
Africa and Malaysia; the two nation-states that are the main focus of this thesis. It begins 
by de-linking the two respective interconnected concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ before 
analysing  them separately;  immediately  thereafter  it  discusses  the  two concepts  as  a 
conjoined term.
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2. Conceptualizing the ‘State’ and the ‘Nation’
Political  pundits  agree that the nation-state  is a modern construct;  a construction that 
historically emerged out of the Westphalian system and one which gradually evolved 
through a socially engineered process over many years (Sorenson 2004: 10-12). Amidst 
this evolutionary process and construction, the two terms - namely ‘state’ and ‘nation’ - 
have  commonly  been  used  as  interchangeable  terms  in  IR  and  which  have  led  to 
confusing assumptions and conclusions. In the light of these confusing assumptions, it 
would perhaps be best to treat the two terms separately and demonstrate the different 
meanings that each possess. Related to this point, it might be mentioned at this juncture 
that Ernest Gellner (quoted by Withey-Vandiver 2001: 1591) contended that the ‘state’ 
was formed without the assistance of the ‘nation’ and the ‘nation’ came into existence 
without  the  state’s  blessing.  Camilleri  & Falk (1992:  27)  reinforced  Gellner’s  theory 
when they stated that ‘… states and nations have seldom evolved simultaneously… in 
some cases the nation, understood as national and cultural consciousness, preceded the 
state (e.g. in Germany), in others the reverse sequence applied (e.g. in France).’ 
However,  when  the  two  are  coupled  together,  they  reflect  a  special  meaning  in  the 
international system within which the modern state operates as a significant political unit. 
In their combined format the term ‘nation-state,’ according to Kegley & Wittkopf (1997: 
40), implies ‘a convergence between territorial states and the psychological identification 
of  people  within  them which  is  relatively  rare,  as  there  are  few  independent  states 
comprised of a single nationality.’  Nagan & Hammer (2004: 109) proposed a definition 
that contains four essential characteristics that traditional international law requires from 
a state; according to them a state is required to:
• Control a territorial base with determinable boundaries;
• Control  a  population  connected  by  solidarity,  loyalty,  and  primary  notions  of 
group affiliation and identity;
• Control internal power and competencies; and
• Appoint  a  controlling  power  to  represent  the  state/territorially  organized  body 
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politic  in  the  international  environment  (cf.  Bornemann  2001:  14967;  Storey 
2001: 23; Sorenson 2004: 15).
When taking into account Gellner’s contention, which advanced the view that the state 
evolved  independently  of  the  nation  and the  nation  separately  from the  state,  it  was 
acknowledged  that  as  the  two  evolved  over  time  and  in  space  they  slowly  became 
interconnected.  And  as  result  of  this  interconnection  and  close  association  with  one 
another,  the impression that it  gave was that they were tied to one another, and as a 
consequence the terms were either used interchangeably or coupled together in the form 
of ‘nation-state’ (Morris 1998: 42). Even though views have been expressed that favour 
the de-linking of the ‘state’ from ‘nation,’ a general consensus seems to prevail that they 
remain  coupled.  Support  for  this  may  be  gathered  from Gelber’s  (1997:  1-32)  first 
chapter of his work entitled ‘The growth of the nation-state.’ In this section, each of these 
terms – beginning with the ‘state’ - is separately defined and explained before coupling 
the two and linking them to the concept of sovereignty.
Figure 3.1
State & Nation: A Symbiotic 
Relationship
NATIONSTATE
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2.1 State:
There are indeed a variety of factors that gave rise to the origin of the state, which ‘has no 
physical existence … but is … a real entity’ (Cox 1992: 133). The factors that gave rise 
to its existence will not be regurgitated here (Storey 2001: 22-23; van Niekerk 2001: 41). 
The term has been derived from Latin stare, which meant ‘to stand,’ and status and one 
that conveyed the idea of ‘a type of condition.’ Van Niekerk explained that in its original 
form the concept implied a fixed position or an unaltered condition. A number of theories 
have emerged that try to demonstrate how the concept evolved (Storey 2001: 23-29). For 
Storey, a political geographer, states are special entities that are comprised of the four 
essential  features;  all  of  which  have  been  alluded  to  by  Nagan  &  Hammer  list  of 
characteristics recorded earlier. For Bornemann (2001: 14965) the state simply meant ‘a 
form of polity that links people and territory in societies, and thereby demarcates itself 
from other states’ or worded differently, according to van Niekerk (2001: 41), it refers to 
‘a group of people inhabiting a specific territory and living under a common legal and 
political authority.’ The latter also added that the state may also be defined as ‘a structure 
that has the legal right to make rules that are binding over a given population within a 
given territory,’ and he made reference to Chazan et al who defined it as ‘the organised 
aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance.’ 
Since the state, which Sorenson (2004: 15 – his emphasis) described as a  unitary and 
coherent actor, as an institution has undergone a mutation, different types of states have 
also been identified. According to van Niekerk (2001: 44-48) there were, among others, 
the feudal state, the absolutist state, the city state, and the contemporary state or modern 
state.  Sorenson  (2001:  74),  however,  concentrated  mainly  upon  the  contemporary 
international system and thus pinpointed to three types of states; they are the modern 
state,  the  post-colonial  state  and  the  post-modern  state  (also  see  Shaw 2000a:  213). 
Nagan & Hammer (2004: 131-135) provided yet another list; their one was distinct from 
the list provided by van Niekerk. They identified states within the international political 
system that were responsible for misusing and abusing the notion of sovereignty. In their 
detailed study, they classified states into twelve types and they are, among others, the 
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Failed State,  the Anarchic State,  the Genocidal State,  the Homicidal State,  the Rogue 
State,  and  the  Kleptocratic  State.  Apart  from these  types,  Root  (2001:  14978-14983) 
further divided the contemporary modern state into two broad categories, namely ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ states; thereafter he discussed how the one set differed from the other. 
Tivey (1981: 3), who made reference to Quentin Skinner in his introductory essay, stated 
that the modern idea of ‘state’, which was ‘a form of public power separate from both the 
ruler  and  the  ruled  and  constituting  the  supreme  political  authority  within  a  certain 
defined territory,’ was absent from earlier usages; this is borne out by the types of states 
highlighted by van Niekerk as well as those listed by Nagan & Hammer. Tivey reasoned 
that  the  central  conception  of  the  modern  state  is  that  of  an  ‘independent  political 
apparatus,’  which  is  operated  by  an  authoritative  government  that  can  change  or  be 
replaced. And the legitimacy of the modern state is based upon the notion of the consent 
of  its  own citizens  to  rule  and on the recognition  by other  states  (Bornemann  2001: 
14968).  Shaw  (2000a:  185)  made  similar  points  regarding  the  modern  state  and 
underlined  the  fact  that  ‘sovereignty  has  been  seen  by  international  relations  as 
conditioned by anarchical relations between separate sovereignties.’ 
Be that as it may, Camilleri & Falk (1992: 24) highlighted the multifunctional nature of 
the modern state, which, they argued, was underestimated by Hinsley. They asserted that 
the modern state has played an instrumental role in the accumulation of capital and the 
development of the national markets in a very fundamental way. And they (ibid 24-25) 
specified two functions in which the modern state pivotally engaged itself; in the first 
case it asserted ‘its primacy in the control of geographic space, thereby reinforcing the 
territorial  conception  of  community’  and  in  the  second  ‘its  territorial  function  was 
inextricably  linked  with  its  economic  function.’  The  modern  sovereign  state,  they 
maintained,  developed  ‘an  intricate  system  of  legal  rights  and  emerging  political 
guarantees for the maintenance of property relations….’ 
For Sorenson (2001: 78) ‘(t)he modern state is, in ideal-typical terms,  a nation-state.’ 
Both  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  and  the  Federation  of  Malaysia  are  fairly  well-
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established sovereign nation-states. And as a result of their healthy status within world 
rankings, they have been categorised as two contemporary medium size nation-states that 
fulfil most – if not all - of the modern state’s criteria such as good governance, stable rule 
of law, and the protection of private property.  In both states successful elections have 
been held over the past few years, and both have been fully recognized and respected for 
the role they have been and are still  playing in world affairs as ‘middle powers’ – a 
phrase that shall be discussed in the next chapter. The political leadership of both states 
has  demonstrated  their  commitment  to  transform  and  modernize  their  respective 
developmental states and, at the same time, channel their efforts to change and advance 
the cause of the people of the weak nation-states from the South.
Coming back to the conceptualization of the ‘state,’ Tivey established the fact that the 
idea of sovereignty, which was a single authority both for making laws and with force to 
sustain them within a defined territory, accompanied the emergence of the modern state. 
Nevertheless, the term ‘state’ has been defined as ‘a legal entity that enjoys a permanent 
population, a well-defined territory, and a government capable of exercising sovereignty.’ 
Ray (1995: 168) referred to a slightly different definition forwarded by Leache & Said 
who stated  that  the state  is  ‘a  kind  of  political  organization,  or  a  government  which 
exercises supreme authority over a defined territory.’ When taking a glimpse at either the 
South African or Malaysian government, it shows that the governments of the respective 
states hold and exercise sole sovereign authority over their respective territories under 
their  jurisdiction as well  as over the people (i.e. the nation) under their  management. 
However, since the international system has recognized the presence of other actors such 
as  non-governmental  organizations  and  transnational  corporations  that  also  wield  a 
certain  degree of authority within the system and among nations, the governments  of 
these two states as well as all other states have been forced to acknowledge and respect 
the role they play and the contributions they make towards the transformation of the 
nation  in  particular  and the changes  in the international  socio-economic  and political 
system in general.
78
                                                                          
2.2 The Nation:
Earlier reference was made to Gellner’s contention that the nation emerged without the 
blessings of the state. Since this was the case, one may wish to ask: how did the nation 
then  come  about?  Storey  (2001:  52-56)  mentioned  a  few  theories  that  attempted  to 
respond to this question and Albert & Brock (2001: 43) boldly stated that ‘nations were 
invented to strengthen the states as well as to create states.’ Nonetheless, the answer is 
found in Gellner’s Nation and Nationalism referred to by Withey-Vandiver (2001: 1090). 
She made the point that Gellner contended that ‘nation are born from nationalism;’ for 
nationalism is ‘the crystallization of new units…’ and a term that was so aptly described 
by Conor Cruise O’Brian as ‘a conglomerate  of emotions’ (Gelber 1997: 109; Storey 
2001: 52). Gellner also posited the view, according to Anderson (1983: 15) and Withey-
Vandiver (2001: 1090), that nationalism, a distinctly modern phenomenon, ‘is not the 
awakening  of  nations  to  self-consciousness:  it  invents nations  where  they  do  not 
exist’ [Anderson’s emphasis] (cf. Orridge 1981: 41-52; Storey 2001: 55). This view was 
supported  by  Frognier  (2001:  10295)  who  called  attention  to  the  modernists  who 
expressed the view that ‘the rise of the nation can only be understood as the product of 
state action, and more particularly, according to the hypothesis of Gellner, as a result of 
the nationalist action of its elites.’
Ray (1995: 168) quoted Walker Connor who ventured to define the nation as ‘a group of 
people whose members believe they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group to share 
such a myth of common descent.’ Ray (ibid 176) made a significant point regarding the 
evolution of the concept; he stated that the idea that the ‘nation by definition refers to 
ethnic  or  racial  ties  is  not  inevitable,  immutable,  or  logically  necessary’  for  it  had 
developed and evolved over time. And he continued by stating that ‘the idea of nation as 
it came out of the American and French Revolutions was considerably more synonymous 
with state.’ He highlighted this fact by mentioning that during the era of the mentioned 
revolutions the concept of nation was defined by ‘the work, and the frontiers of the state’ 
and that nation, in this sense of the word, ‘stressed the equality of all citizens rather than 
the need to discriminate between (people) on the basis of culture or language.’ Ray went 
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on to quote Hinsley who argued that the theorists of nationalism ‘insisted that a nation 
rests on cultural,  ethnic, and linguistic uniformity and distinctiveness, and came to be 
defined  only  in  cultural,  ethnic  and  linguistic  terms.’  The  latter  definition  was 
appropriated by subsequent scholars such as Kegley & Wittkopf (1996: 40) who defined 
nation  as  ‘a  collection  of  people  who,  on  the  basis  of  ethnic,  linguistic,  or  cultural 
affinity, perceive themselves to be members of the same group.’ 
A slightly different understanding of the concept ‘nation’ was articulated by Anderson in 
his celebrated work Imagined Communities(1983). For him nationality or nation-ness as 
well  as  nationalism are  cultural  artefacts  (Anderson 1983:  13)  and  the  nation  ‘is  an 
imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’ 
He advocated the notion that the nation is imagined because its members:
• will only meet small section of the entire population;
• are restricted and limited as a result of physical boundaries;
• act as a community because it provides a deep sense of comradeship; and
• wish to be sovereign because the nation was born when Enlightenment was in the 
process of destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained dynastic realm, and 
they dreamt of being free in a sovereign state (ibid 15-16; Shaw 2000a: 50-51; 
Storey 2001: 55; Withey-Vandiver 2001: 1091).
The definitions provided a fair understanding of the concept; however, they may not be 
easily  applicable  to  each  and  every  state  in  the  international  system.  This  may  be 
attributed to the heterogeneous nature of some of the communities that make up these 
nations (eg. former USSR), and also to those communities seeking self-determination in 
some  states  (eg.  the  Palestinians  and  Kurds).  Nevertheless,  the  definitions  offer  an 
inventory  of  criteria  that  make  up a  ‘nation;’  an  inventory  that  may change.  This  is 
partially based on the observation of Morris (1998: 235) who cautioned that the concept 
of the nation changes with time like that of the state. This point is germane when looking 
at the South African and Malaysian societies respectively. 
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Prior to the April 1994 democratic elections the South African state was an apartheid 
state; a state that was illegitimate in the eyes of the vast majority of the oppressed South 
African population who was not given any recognition as rightful citizens. The issue of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy of authorities in power was brought to the fore by Halliday 
(1994: 82) when he posed the question of ‘how far (does) the state represent the nation?’ 
In the case of apartheid South Africa, the oppressed population never consented to the 
rule of the white, racist minority government and thus rejected it as their representative. 
And, in turn, the illegitimate regime enforced its own rules by excluding all of those it 
oppressed  as  part  of  its  own  invented  and  constructed  apartheid  nation  and  also 
consciously choosing not to give the oppressed masses any form of recognition except on 
its own terms. The racist regime engineered its own ‘imagined political community’ and 
thus  contrived  a  nation  that  was  anchored  in  a  system of  racial  discrimination.  The 
apartheid regime only considered the whites (and those whom they regarded as ‘honorary 
whites’ [eg. the Japanese]) as part of the South African nation; the rest of the population 
was classified as second class citizens  with much fewer rights  and less opportunities 
within the South African territory and in its economy. 
The  South  African  apartheid  regime  exercised  what  may  be  called  ‘a  racist  national 
sovereignty’ as opposed to ‘non-racist popular sovereignty.’ And it relished its sovereign 
racist position because it was given external recognition and indeed legitimacy by the UN 
members  (including  those  who  opposed  its  domestic  policies).  It  was,  in  fact,  this 
juridical recognition by the international community that gave the apartheid regime the 
powers and the authority to exercise its internal racist sovereignty towards its oppressed 
masses  and  its  external  racist  sovereignty  towards  its  neighbours  without  immediate 
impunity.  Measures to apply sanctions were, however, only introduced sometime after 
the racist state implemented its system of discrimination with the tacit approval of major 
states  such  as  the  USA  and  UK.  Inayatullah  (1996)  argued  that  the  recognition  of 
sovereignty is incumbent but not a sufficient condition for realizing it because it ignored 
economic inequalities as well as, one may add, that of social injustice in the case of South 
Africa  and  in  most  of  the  South  (cf.  Biersteker  &  Weber  1996:  15).  The  situation 
radically changed after the first democratic elections took place in April 1994.
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Since  then  the  South  African  society  slowly  evolved  and  transformed  into  a 
representative  democratic  nation  and taking  on  a  new identity  as  encapsulated  in  its 
unique liberal Constitution; this transformed state was one in which everyone was given 
full  recognition as members of the South African democratic society.  The democratic 
government had to deconstruct its apartheid identity through the institutionalization of 
various structures and via a process of reconstruction particularly the legal system that it 
inherited  from  the  racist  regime.  The  purpose  for  this  reconstruction  was  basically 
twofold: on the one hand, it had to first wrench ‘racial sovereignty’ from its the racist 
structures within which it was deeply embedded and then sanitize it from any form of 
racial  contamination  before  passing  it  into  the  hands  of  the  people  where  ‘popular 
sovereignty’ resided; and on the other, it had to legally accommodate the diverse ethnic, 
linguistic, religious and cultural identities that inhabited the South African territory. 
The  contemporary  South  African  nation  and  Malaysian  nation  may  be  described  as 
nations  that  are  composed  of  multi-cultural,  multi-ethnic,  multi-lingual  and  multi-
religious communities. And in both states the respective governments faced and continue 
to  face  major  difficulties  in  bringing  about  social  cohesion  in  order  to  maintain  and 
manage a strong nation. Both governments thus formed and set-up viable structures to 
cope with social transformation, and, more importantly, to help towards nation-building 
in order to avoid any form of disintegration or break-up. Malaysia has for more than five 
decades been juggling with the sensitive process of nation-building (Verma 2004), and 
the young South African democracy only started with this process a little more than a 
decade ago (Lodge 2002; Le Pere & van Nieuwkerk 1997). With regards to the nation-
building  process  Cooper  (2003:  73)  pessimistically  commented  that  it  is  ‘a  long and 
difficult task: it is by no means certain that any of the recent attempts are going to be 
successful.’
Since  the  socio-political  histories  of  both  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  provide  ample 
evidence of the racial conflicts and inequalities that have plagued their respective nations, 
their governments have worked hard to reduce the racial conflicts and, at the same time, 
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strove towards minimising the inequalities, which are among the very difficult tasks in 
nation-building.  Although there might  have  been relative  success  with regards  to  the 
latter, it has been and will remain a gigantic task and challenge for the foreseeable future 
because of the rise in unemployment, spread of poverty and a few other socio-economic 
factors that have exacerbated the situation. And, in fact, the trend of globalization has 
also added yet another dimension to the process. That aside, the point that this section 
stressed  was  that  (a)  the  nation  remains  an  integral  part  of  the  territory  and  thus 
interconnected  to  the  state,  and  that  (b)  national  sovereignty  is  fused  with  state 
sovereignty  (in  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  respectively).  And  it  is  because  of  this 
interconnectedness that scholars in the social sciences have generally employed ‘nation-
state’, which was aptly described by Cooper (2003: 22) as the engine of modernization, 
as a practical and meaningful term. It is to this conjoined term that I now wish to briefly 
discuss. 
2.3 Nation-State
The definitions recorded above of the two terms, on the one hand, clearly demonstrate 
how  they  differed  from  one  another  and,  on  the  other,  show  how  closely  they  are 
connected to one another. Morris (1998: 42) alluded to the fact that ‘the word “nation” is 
often used more or less equivalently with “state” …’ and he then expressed the view that 
whilst the two are clearly connected the relations are complex and difficult to unravel. 
Sorenson (2001: 78) captured the relationship between the two in the following way: ‘the 
contemporary understanding of what a nation is assumes a basic identity between state 
(as government) and nation (as people within a territory). That identity signifies a specific 
understanding of the relationship between state and society; the state is an expression of 
the nation, representing it and catering for its basic social needs: security, freedom, order, 
justice and welfare.’ In a subsequent publication, Sorenson (ibid 12) clarified the notion 
of the nation-state further. He said that ‘(a) modern state is a nation-state in the sense that 
the population shares the characteristics of citizenship (common rights and obligations 
towards  the  state)  and  nationhood  (the  cultural-historical  ideas  of  an  imagined 
community).’ ‘A nation-state,’ he continued, ‘in this sense is not necessarily based on a 
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homogenous ethno-national group of people. Very few modern states are nation-states in 
this more narrow sense.’  
Tivey (1981: 69-70) explained the relationship differently; he argued that the state, which 
is an abstract entity and one that has been described in mechanical terms, needs to be 
enabled and operated. For this to happen, it was tied to the nation (i.e. the people who 
populate the defined territory). Gelber (1997: 3) couched his thoughts on the relationship 
between nation and state as follows: ‘the idea about sovereignty of the people clearly 
depends upon deciding who and what belongs to ‘the people’ and who does not.  It is 
here that the idea of the nation becomes cemented to that of the modern state.’ Along 
similar lines, Opello & Rosow (2004: 191) stated that ‘… nationalism re-formed the state 
as it  had appeared in Europe and transformed the world of colonial  empires  into the 
present global grid of sovereign nation-states.’
Table 3.1 (Sources: Sorenson 2001: 82-83 and 2004: 14)
The modern  nation-state  had a  number  of  functions  that  distinguished it  from earlier 
forms of the state. According to Camilleri & Falk (1992: 24-31),  they are, inter alia, (a) 
territorial function, (b) economic function, (c) legitimation function and (d) stabilizing 
function.  Their  analysis  of  the  various  functions  generally  ties  in  with  the  views 
The Modern Nation-State
A segregated national economy, self-sustained in the 
sense that it compromises the main sectors needed 
for its reproduction. The major part of economic 
activity takes place at home.
ECONOMY
A people within a territory making up a community of 
citizens (with political, social and economic rights) 
and a community of sentiments based on linguistic, 
cultural and historical bonds. Nationhood involves a 
high level of cohesion, binding a nation & state 
together
NATIONHOOD
A centralised system of democratic rule, based on a 
set of administrative, policing & military organizations, 
sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force, all within a defined 
territory
GOVERNMENT
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expressed by Sorenson with regards to the components of the modern nation-state. He 
identified  three  inter-connected  components  and  these  are  captured  in  the  Table  3.1 
above;  I  will,  however,  not  elaborate  upon  them  since  Sorenson  offered  a  self-
explanatory  column  that  explains  each  of  the  components.  In  his  discussion  on  the 
‘changes  in  statehood’  Sorenson (2001:  83-91)  went  on  to  compare  and explain  the 
modern nation state’s characteristics with those of the postcolonial and postmodern states 
respectively (cf. Cooper 2003: 50-54). 
In closing the discussion on the nation-state, Tivey (1981: 70) aptly described the close 
connection between the two as a symbiotic relationship; he stated that ‘the symbiosis of 
nation and state is a mind/body relationship – a ghost in a machine.’ And he (ibid 3), in 
fact, opined that ‘the rise of the nation-state is … (intimately connected to) … the story of 
the rise of sovereignty’ (cf. Figure 3.2 below). Morris (1998: 40) concurred with this for 
he  stated  that  the  concept  of  the  modern  state  developed  along  with  the  concept  of 
sovereignty and in support for his opinion he invoked Thomas Hobbes who had identified 
sovereignty with the  monarch  in  his  famous  Leviathan,  and he seemed to  have been 
oblivious  that  Ibn  Khaldun  also  made  similar  remarks  in  his  Al-Muqaddima:  An 
Introduction to History (The Prolegomena). 
Since Ibn Khaldun’s name has been dropped at this point, it is quite helpful before finally 
rounding off my discussion and observations regarding the contestable term ‘nation-state’ 
to bring into the discussion this scholar’s views. As far as Cox (1992) was concerned he 
identified Ibn Khaldun as one of the most significant North African theorists on ‘world 
order’ and expresses the view that this scholar made important comments on the ‘body 
politic,’  namely  the  state  and  society.  At  this  point  I  wish  to  expand  more  on  Ibn 
Khaldun’s thoughts since they relate to the notions of the state and the society/nation 
respectively and will also be of great interest to scholars who mooted the Critical Theory 
tradition.
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Figure 3.2
2.4 Ibn Khaldun’s conceptualization of the ‘body politic’ (i.e. The State & 
the Nation):
In a provocative piece by Ahmed (2002: 24), he posed a series of questions in relation to 
Ibn Khaldun whose ideas he also explored and applied to the contemporary period: Who 
is he? Another ‘terrorist’? Any links to Usama bin Laden? The questions were raised 
because the contemporary scholarly audience have overlooked and indeed marginalized 
this significant scholar’s works that were produced from within the Muslim heartlands 
during the medieval period. Be that as it may, who was Ibn Khaldun and what was the 
main  thrust  of  his  famous  work  Al-Muqaddima:  An  Introduction  to  History (The 
Prolegomena) that was translated by Franz Rosenthal in three volumes in the 1950s and 
subsequently abridged into one volume by N.J. Dawood in 1969. Since all the works that 
gave attention to his work sketched his biography, I will only provide a synopsis.
Ibn Khaldun of Tunis lived during a period of transition – or at a turning point in history 
(Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625) – and travelled extensively across North Africa and Spain. 
After intimate participation in social affairs and close observation of the developments, 
he  withdrew from social  life  and  this  seclusion  culminated  in  the  completion  of  Al-
Muqaddima, which was the introduction to his world history, namely Kitab ul-‘Ibar, in 
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1377.  This  three  volume  historical  work  sociologically  captured  the  events  that  he 
personally witnessed and based upon these events he arrived at significant intellectual 
observations that have much relevance for the contemporary era;  hence the variety of 
social scientific studies including IR scholars such as Cox (1992) and Ahmed (2002) that 
focused upon this significant work. Cox (1992: 147), for example,  suggested that Ibn 
Khaldun provided ‘a point of access to the understanding of Islamic civilization’ and he 
enabled us ‘to examine how a differently constituted mind confronted similar problems to 
those we now face and what factors shaped his understanding of and response to these 
problems,’ and Katsiaficas (1997) demonstrated how ‘Ibn Khaldun: (should be viewed 
as) A Dialectical Philosopher for the New Millennium.’ 
The ideas that Ibn Khaldun shared and the opinions that he advocated led scholars such 
as Pasha (1997: 58) to aptly describe Ibn Khaldun as a ‘theoretical synthesiser whose 
ideas violate established boundaries of modern social science.’ The reason for describing 
him as such was because he was appropriated by almost everyone in the social scientific 
field. Tainter (qtd by Adem 2004: 577) who considered Ibn Khaldun to be the originator 
of ‘conflict theory’ was supported by Pasha (1997: 59) who viewed him as a theorist of 
transformation.  According  to  Fakhry  (1983:  324)  Ibn  Khaldun’s  most  significant 
contributions were his extensive remarks on and criticisms of Greco-Arab philosophy and 
the formulation of the first and last major philosophy of history of Islam. Fakhry (ibid 
328) stressed that Ibn Khaldun’s theory of history and of civilization is acknowledged 
with little doubt to be ‘his major claim to a position of pre-eminence in the history of 
philosophical  ideas in Islam.’  Even though he has not been recognised as part of the 
traditional  mainstream  Muslim  philosophical  circles,  his  systematic  codification  and 
analysis of the relevant data placed him above them all.
In his Prolegomena he cogently argued that the historical process be viewed as ‘cyclical 
patterns  of  history’  due  to  the  interaction  of  the  nomads  and  townspeople  whose 
ecologies and economies were different from one another (Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625; 
Cox 1992: 151). Ibn Khaldun systematically set out his ideas to establish a critical study 
of  history  upon  a  solid  foundation  of  geographic,  political  and  cultural  knowledge 
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(Fakhry 1983: 329). And Ibn Khaldun steered clear of the traditional way of listing and 
explaining in a chronological fashion the historical events and he went on to treat history 
as a science geared towards comprehending the different forms of culture (Pasha 1997: 
59).  In  his  work  he  blended  the  genetic  method,  which  yielded  an  understanding  of 
culture via different phases of development, with the analytical method, which helped to 
comprehend the various  dimensions  of  culture  (ibid).  Ibn Khaldun thus  provided the 
student of history with the necessary criteria to discern between true and false historical 
records in a demonstrative and infallible manner (Fakhry 1983: 329). And as a result of 
his profound insights and rich experience, he developed an exciting new discipline ‘Ilmu 
al-‘umran (the science of civilization), which dealt with the totality of human existence 
and ‘functions to illuminate  the science of good governance’ (Ahmed 2002: 29);  this 
discipline  was rooted in  the Aristotelian  maxim that  the  homo sapiens ‘is  a  political 
animal by nature’ and, for him, reason was the distinguishing mark of the homo sapiens 
(ibid; Pasha 1997: 58; Adem 2004: 575). Ibn Khaldun did, however, not only adopt the 
deductive method of reasoning as was observed by Pasha (1997: 59), but he also weaved 
this method into the inductive method when he penned the ‘science of civilization.’ Ibn 
Khaldun’s adoption of both the inductive method and the deductive method set him apart 
from Hobbes who chose the latter only (Adem 2004: 574). 
Ibn Khaldun’s persuasive and lucid way of reasoning and his  depth of understanding 
regarding the nature of the state and society induced Issawi & Leaman (1998: 624) to 
conclude that he stood out and was in a category of his own. They (ibid) reasoned that his 
attitude towards the study of social  phenomena was ‘suffused with a spirit which has 
caused several commentators to call him the founder of sociology.’ A central concern for 
Ibn Khaldun, according to Pasha (1997: 60), was the tripartite relationship between the 
rise of civilization, economic prosperity and social disintegration; an issue that has also 
been  raised  by  critical  social  scientists.  And  Pasha  further  commented  that  for  Ibn 
Khaldun  human  society  was  the  collective  product  of  three  basic  elements,  namely 
reason, social reproduction and social cohesion, and that ‘(b)oth nature and nurture must 
coalesce  to  ensure  the  existence  and  development  of  society.’  Since  he  based  his 
examination of society on the cyclical interaction between the nomadic community and 
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the sedentary urban dwellers, he made certain crucial observations: The nomadic culture 
was one of blood relations under patriarchal leadership/authority and a community who 
was generally satisfied with minimum of material necessities and who enjoyed relative 
economic equality;  these nomads enjoyed a more natural mode of life and inclined to 
natural  goodness.  Compared  to  the  latter,  blood  relations  thinned  out  in  the  urban 
dwelling or sedentary society, and that this kind of society was based upon ‘a division of 
labour’  arrangement  that  cultivated  the  arts  and  crafts.  These  specialised  activities 
culminated in and led to the creation of social wealth that was, in turn, rooted in the 
system of mutual  co-operation.  In the process of accumulating wealth via mutual  co-
operation the sedentary society tended to become corrupt and indulged in vice and as a 
consequence invited invaders who, when settled, went through the same cycle of stimulus 
and response (Fakhry 1983: 330-331; Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625).  
Co-operation  buttressed  by  a  sense  of  ‘asabiyyah (tribal  solidarity  [Fakhry  1983: 
329]/group  feeling  [Rosenthal  1987:  566]/  form  of  intersubjectivity  [Cox  1992: 
153]/social  cohesiveness  [Pasha  1997:  61-62]/ethnic  nationalism  [Adem 2004:  574]), 
which – for Cox (1992: 153) was ‘the creative component in this critical phase of human 
development’ and for Ahmed (2002: 30) was ‘the core of social organization’ - led to the 
formation of the state. ‘Hence, the state is the natural outcome of co-operation, (and) not 
anarchy’  and in order for the society to survive and subsist  it  must  take a state form 
(Pasha 1997: 60). IR scholars such as Pasha (ibid) and Cox (1992: 148) agreed that the 
state was the focal point of Ibn Khaldun’s analysis which is the form that civilized culture 
must take. In fact, according to Issawi & Leaman (1998: 626), Ibn Khaldun dismissed the 
views of political theorists such as Al-Farabi (d. 950) who espoused the notion that the 
rational government was based upon an ideal prophetic law (cf. Cox 1992: 153). 
Ibn Khaldun was a realist and a practical oriented scholar who saw no point in employing 
idealistic theories that had no relation to the existential political life. Ibn Khaldun, in fact, 
argued that Al-Farabi and others, who concurred with his views, basically overlooked the 
historical realities of political power for they ignored the fact that the ‘royal authority’ in 
charge was often maintained by force or rooted in the traditional system of ‘asabiyyah 
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and this has resulted in the formation of a rational form of government. This implied that 
the laws by which the authority ruled were purely rational as opposed to the prophetic 
authority who governed according to divine decree (Fakhry 1983: 329). 
The non-prophetic ‘royal authority’ depended heavily upon the system of ‘asabiyyah – 
the non-value free organizing principle of society - as well as on the principles of rational 
and  religious  justice  in  order  to  consolidate  his(/her)  political  power.  And  since  the 
authority also acted as God’s vice-regent on earth, according to Islamic theology (Ahmed 
2002: 25), he(/she – invariably a ‘he’) thus finds him(/her)self  in a divinely favoured 
position.  Adem  (2004:  576)  argued  that  the  royal  element  in  Ibn  Khaldun’s  theory 
injected the idea of the divine right of kings which was also ‘to become a popular theme 
during the 17th century among the post-enlightenment European philosophers who had 
come forward in defence of the notion of an absolute state.’ Nevertheless, as soon as the 
(royal)  authority begins to misuse his(/her)  position and indulges in practices such as 
using the public treasury for his(/her) own gains then the good and favourable conditions 
gradually disappear giving way to corruption and this eventually leads to internal civil 
strife causing the state to decline and slide into anarchy (ibid 331; Cox 1992: 153). When 
this phase is reached the authority in charge is expected to abdicate in order to allow a 
more capable individual to take over the state’s reigns otherwise the state will be in a 
chaotic state; a condition that is not approved at all by Islamic theology. In fact, Muslim 
theologians advocate the view that to avoid anarchy it is best to accept the rule of a tyrant 
so that a semblance of social order can be maintained.  
For Ibn Khaldun, the rise of the state and its decline were not dependent upon individual 
human  action  and  nor  on  the  efforts  of  prominent  persons  in  history  but  upon  ‘the 
collective human action in history’ (Pasha 1997: 60; Cox 1992: 152; Katsiaficas 1997); a 
point that is indeed relevant within the critical tradition. Mention should, however, also 
be made of the fact that Ibn Khaldun was well aware of the role economic and climatic 
factors played in the lives of societies and states (Cox 1992: 152-153; Ahmed 2002: 26). 
In any event, the process of the decline lasts approximately three – and not four as stated 
by Ahmed (2002: 30) - generations of 40 years each or cumulatively: about 120 years 
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(Issawi & Leaman 1998: 625). Fakhry (1983: 331) described the different generations as 
follows:
 The first generation: it is marked by frugality of the nomadic life and the ardor of 
the spirit  of solidarity holding them together and moving them to share in the 
authority of the monarch;
 The  second  generation:  it  is  characterised  by  the  weakening  of  that  spirit,  in 
consequence of the transition to a civilized mode of life, and the unwillingness to 
share in the monarchical authority; and
 The  third  generation:  it  is  symbolized  by  the  complete  loss  of  the  spirit  of 
solidarity and with it the loss of the militant spirit which was the fortification of 
the state.
Table 3.2 
When the last signs come to the fore then, for Ibn Khaldun, the ‘death of the state is 
immanent’ and it is finally and timely sealed by God’s decree. And to conclude this tour 
of Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts on society and states, I wish to reiterate that the basis of Ibn 
Khaldun’s critique of philosophy, according to Issawi & Leaman (1998: 626), was his 
close identification with the notion of the state; and, according to his valuable insights, 
each  and  every  state  experienced  five  phases  in  their  evolutionary  path:  the 
establishment, consolidation, prosperity, complacency and decline (Pasha 1997: 60). The 
91
Ibn Khaldun and The State’s 
5 Stages of Growth & Decay
Authority squanders public treasury in 
gratification of his personal pleasures and 
those of his cronies 
Dissolution
Authority and subjects endeavour to 
continue that traditions and institutions of 
ancestors
Pacification
Privileges of authority increase: levy 
taxes, accumulate wealth, construct 
buildings, compete with other authorities
Exploitation
Authority resorts to the gradual monopoly 
of political power, Tribal bonds between 
authority and subjects weakened & his 
dependence on foreign elements intensify
Tyranny
Authority established on a solid 
democratic base of popular power
Consolidation
                                                                          
table above captures Fakhry’s (1983: 331-332) list and explanations extracted from the 
Prolegomena.
The conceptualisation of the state and society by Ibn Khaldun as described and discussed 
above demonstrate that even though some of his ideas have been eclipsed by modern 
scholarship, his views are generally still valid and indeed applicable to the contemporary 
circumstances. It is thus not surprising to find that the social scientists referred to and 
quoted  here  have  given  him  the  necessary  recognition  and  have  been  able  to  draw 
insightful comparisons. Refer in particular to Adem’s 2004 published paper that made 
ample comparisons between Ibn Khaldun and other Western scholars such as John Locke 
(cf.  Alatas  2006:  786-787).  They found similarities  and differences  in  Ibn Khaldun’s 
intellectual output and their analysis led them to conclude that that he stood out in terms 
of  his  contributions  for  many  centuries.  With  this  fairly  in  depth  discussion  of  Ibn 
Khaldun’s views and overall treatment of the state, the nation and the nation-state, its best 
to recollect the stories of the two nation-states, namely South Africa and Malaysia. 
3. South Africa and Malaysia: Recollecting Stories of their past
It  will  indeed  be  a  well-nigh  impossible  task  to  record  in  detail  all  the  events  that 
occurred  in  South  Africa  and Malaysia  respectively  over  four  decades,  and  this  will 
indeed be beyond the scope of this chapter. Since there is a definite need to sketch some 
of the salient features that stood out in their respective socio-political histories, an attempt 
will  be  made  to  provide  a  fair  description  of  the  respective  states  in  a  comparative 
manner; a descriptive process that is not a straight forward and easy task. The year 1948 
has been chosen as the appropriate  starting point for the descriptive and comparative 
study; this is a year that witnessed important developments in both countries as well as 
significant events in other parts of the world; one such event was the formation of the UN 
and the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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3.1 Describing and Comparing the Two States circa 1948-1990:
3.1.1 The Early Years: 1940s – 1960
The year 1948 marked a significant change in the socio-political developments in South 
Africa as well as in Malaysia. In South Africa the Nationalist Party, a party that was fully 
supported by the white Afrikaners who espoused ideology of Apartheid, wrested political 
power from the United Party when it defeated the latter in the all white 1948 elections. 
The  Nationalist  Party  enforced  an  authoritarian  system  that  was  far  worse  than  the 
segregationist policies, which were implemented by the earlier white governments. The 
elections took place against the background of black mass action against the government 
and the formation of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944, 
which  came  under  the  collective  leadership  of  individuals  such  as  Nelson  Mandela, 
Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu. 
When D.F. Malan was appointed the Union of South Africa’s Prime Minister in 1948, he 
also held the external affairs’ portfolio. In his position as the chief bureaucrat,  Malan 
advocated  his  ‘African  Charter.’  This  Charter  contained  five  aims;  they  were  to  (a) 
preserve it for Africans, (b) ensure that its developments were on Western (European) 
Christian lines, (c) protect it from Asian domination, (d) keep out the Communists, and 
(e)  make it  non-militarized  zone (Olivier  1977:  128;  Barber  & Barratt  1990:  35-37). 
Through these aims Malan envisaged the construction of a relationship with the rest of 
the  continent  based  on  the  Union’s  terms;  this  notion  is  partially  embedded  in  his 
statement  that  ‘We  are  part  of  Africa…and  our  actions  in  South  Africa  are  largely 
influenced  by  what  takes  place  in  the  rest  of  Africa.’  And one  of  the  aims  that  he 
deliberately  inserted,  i.e.  to  protect  Africa  from Asian  domination,  was  probably  in 
response to India’s 1946 decision to vote against South Africa’s discriminatory policies at 
the UN.  It could however be assumed that this aim was not meant to include Asians such 
as the Japanese and Malayans with whom South Africa enjoyed commercial connections 
at that juncture.
Whilst the struggle under the ANC and other groups against white rule in South Africa 
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continued relentlessly during the 1940s and beyond, the Malayans continued to challenge 
the  British  rulers  –  before  and soon after  British  rule  was  briefly  interrupted  by the 
Japanese  invasion  and  occupation  between  December  1941  and  August  1945  -  who 
restructured the whole of Malaya into a crown colony called the Malayan Union (MU) in 
1946.  The United Malays  National  Organization  (UMNO),  the  Malay party  that  was 
formed around the ethno-nationalist idea in 1946 and led by Onn ibn Ja’afar, rejected the 
MU project and forced the British to replace it in 1948 with the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement ‘in which the centrality of Malayness was explicitly expressed’ (Reid 2004: 
17-18; Cheah 2002: 2-3; Verma 2004: 27-29); the Federation, according to Reid, was 
designed to be a state constructed around a core ethnie with the defining identity being 
Bangsa Melayu.  This development  is clear evidence that the question of identity was 
critical for the indigenous population of the Federation; it was an issue that was at the 
heart of the Federation’s ethnic communities. 
In  the  same  year  when  the  Federation  came  into  being,  there  was  communist-led 
insurrection that prompted the British to impose the Malayan State of Emergency, which 
remained in effect until 1960. The Federation, which was worked out together by the 
British  officials,  UMNO,  and  the  Malay  Rulers,  laid  the  foundations  for  a  modern 
administration, citizenship and the future basis for the construction of nationhood. During 
the process of negotiations and as the British were slowly relinquishing its colonial rule, 
they compelled UMNO nationalists to work out a formula of inter-racial co-operation, 
unity and harmony among all the racial groups (Cheah 2002: 2). And as a result of these 
efforts,  the two non-Malay political  parties,  namely the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), found common grounds with UMNO; 
and as a coalition, they (together) won the emerging nascent state’s first general elections 
in 1955. The coalition drafted the First Five Year Plan (1956-1960)in order to create the 
infrastructure and slowly transform the economy of the emerging nation state (Cheah 
2002: 83). 
When returning to the South Africa scene, the blacks were under constant discrimination, 
and  the  notion  of  nationhood  that  they  yearned  for  remained  a  far-fetched  and  an 
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unreachable ideal. The blacks were further impeded by an array of repressive legislation 
and policies that was devised by the Apartheid government. The first two Acts that came 
into effect were the Group Areas Act, which rigidified the racial division of land, and the 
Population Registration Act, which classified all ‘citizens’ by race, in 1950. By the time 
the pass laws, which effectively restricted the movement of the oppressed communities 
across the country particularly the Africans and Indians, were enforced in 1952, the mass 
mobilized Defiance Campaign got under way to apply pressure on the Apartheid regime. 
Even though thousands were arrested,  the increased unity that  was forged among the 
various  resistance  groups  during  the  Defiance  Campaign  gave  rise  to  the  Congress 
Alliance. And as a consequence of these developments, the Congress Alliance led by the 
ANC – and which became known as the Congress of the People - on the 26th of June 
1955  in  Kliptown  (Soweto)  produced,  issued  and  signed  the  ‘Freedom  Charter’ 
document; the Freedom Charter was based on the principles of human rights and non-
racialism (cf. Lodge 1990). In reaction to this mass meeting,  the apartheid authorities 
arrested 156 leaders during 1957 – the year when Malaya was granted its independence - 
and charged them with high treason; they were however acquitted in 1961. 
By 1959 the apartheid government was led by Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who succeeded 
Advocate  J.C.  Strijdom  in  1958,  and  Robert  Sobukwe,  who  broke  away  from  the 
Congress Alliance, founded the Pan African Congress (PAC) that pursued the African 
philosophy of ‘Africa for the Africans.’ The PAC adopted a more radical approach by 
confronting the apartheid system. One of the first acts of the PAC that challenged the 
apartheid system head-on was the passive anti-pass campaign; this took place on the 21st 
of March 1960 in Sharpeville. The apartheid security forces reacted heavy-handedly by 
killing 69 unarmed protesters and wounding hundreds of others. As a result the ‘State of 
Emergency’ came into effect and this meant that the regime implemented a ‘detention 
without  trial’  policy;  and  it  also  declared  the  ANC,  PAC  and  other  resistance 
organizations  as illegal,  and this  declaration thus forced these organizations  and their 
leaders such as Oliver Tambo into exile. Other leaders such as Nelson Mandela, who 
tried to evade the apartheid authorities, were eventually caught, tried, and imprisoned on 
Robben Island (cf. Motlhabe 1984; Lodge 1990).
95
                                                                          
During the time when the oppressed communities increased their resistance against the 
apartheid  authorities,  the  Malays  were  granted  their  independence  based  upon  the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement signed by the British officials, the Malay Rulers, and 
UMNO. On the 31st of August 1957 Malaya was born as an independent, sovereign state 
-  with  a  Federation  of  11  states  -  under  its  respected  leader,  Tunku  Abdul-Rahman 
(hereafter Tunku); as a sovereign state it subsequently joined the ranks of a number of 
other states such as South Africa to become a member of the UN and the Commonwealth. 
As a sovereign state, it adopted a pro-Western policy, anti-communist position and a free-
market economic system that welcomed foreign direct investments. Despite its new found 
status  as  a  sovereign  nation-state  and  its  acceptance  as  a  member  of  international 
organizations,  the Federation was grappling with a number of pertinent  issues,  which 
were major hurdles left behind by their former colonial occupier. 
One of the immediate challenges was that of nation-building; how does a nation go about 
re-building  itself  where  there  existed  wide-spread  discrimination  against  the  Malays? 
And how does a nation restructure the society without marginalizing and harming the 
‘immigrant’ communities or becoming xenophobic? What are the elements that make up 
a citizen? Who qualifies as a citizen? Can an immigrant’s son or daughter who had been 
born on Federation soil take up citizenship? (cf. Verma 2004). These questions were also 
of concern to those who critically engaged with political scientists and others regarding 
those  that  have  been  marginalized  and  isolated  within  their  own  states.  The  critical 
scholars who discoursed about these issues expressed the desire to include rather than 
exclude the muzzled voices of the marginalized groups. Whilst it was understandable that 
the majority of the society in the Federation was discriminated against through the British 
divide-and-rule  policy,  scholars  critically  argued  that  it  does  not  give  this  former 
marginalized community the right to discriminate, marginalize and isolate others such as 
the Chinese and Indians that were born and brought up within the Federation. 
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3.1.2 The Decade of  Consolidation of the Federation & the Apartheid State: 
1960 – 1970
 All  of these inter-related questions and issues were of major concern to the UMNO 
Alliance in particular and to the society of Malaya in general. Nation building in Malaya - 
and since 1963 Malaysia – was a difficult task because those Chinese and Indians who 
were born in Malaya/Malaysia had the right to be considered as lawful citizens; however, 
those who were not born within the geographical boundaries of the Federation after a 
specific date had to be repatriated back to his/her country of birth. It was however not an 
easy  task  to  implement  these  policies;  much  thought  had  to  be  given  as  to  how to 
implement the policies without being unduly unjust and discriminatory.  Whilst Verma 
(2004:  34-36) suggested that  there  were two phases within which the nation-building 
project was shaped, one may divide the last phase into two and also add a third; the first 
was between the time of independence until the May 1969 race riots, the second was 
from 1970 until 1991 when Vision 2020 was formulated, and the third was from 1991 to 
the present. See Figure 3.3 below: 
Figure 3.3:
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In  the  process  of  assessing  the  Malaysian  scenario,  one  finds  that  similar  issues  of 
concern were dealt with when the new democracy of South Africa came into existence 
after historic 1994 elections; the evolving non-racial South African society, which was 
subsequently dubbed by Rev. Desmond Tutu as ‘The Rainbow Nation,’ was part of an 
important  and crucial  nation – building project  (cf.  Baines 1998; Ramutsindela  2001: 
31-34; Schrire 2005: 264-274).
In the case of South Africa, throughout the apartheid era the issue of nationhood and 
citizenship was not a clear  cut one.  Both institutions were tied to the white  regime’s 
philosophy of apartheid, which was based upon the exclusion of blacks in general and 
Africans in particular from being bona fide citizens and identifying fully with the South 
African nation; the regime, for example, devised special plans that would accommodate 
groups such as the Coloureds and the Indians within the political system. And it also later 
restructured the South African landscape according to the Bantu Homelands Act of 1970, 
by pushing the different African ethnic groups into separate and ostensibly ‘sovereign’ 
homelands known as Bantustans (Hoffman 1997: 14; Storey 2001: 128). The Transkei 
was the first ‘to accept nominal independence’ in 1976. The apartheid authorities thus not 
only defined nationhood and citizenship for the blacks but also firmly imposed it upon 
them; their policy of discrimination clearly defined ‘the citizen’ as someone who is white 
as opposed to someone who is black. The apartheid regime constructed social identities 
that suited its racial policies and that were in line with the apartheid philosophy that it 
espoused;  in  essence,  the  regime  constructed  an  apartheid  identity.  Even though this 
identity  was  rejected  by the  oppressed  masses  -  the  majority  of  whom expressed  an 
African value system that was rooted in the concept of ubuntu, they were forced to adopt 
and adapt to a white dominated socio-political system that was enforced upon them. 
During the first half of the 20th century the Union of South Africa embarked on a nation 
building project, which was rooted in racism and one that laid the foundations for the 
white Afrikaner nationalists to further entrench and socially engineer. These nationalists 
were fully aware of the fact that the power that they possessed and manipulated were 
tacitly approved by the former  European – Dutch and British -  colonial  powers with 
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whom  they  shared  similar  ideals  and  values.  They  thus  espoused  values  that  were 
embedded  in  an  European  philosophy  that  relished  in  holding  onto  and  maintaining 
power within the hands of whites and promote political values that enhanced their status 
at the expense of the Africans and others in the South. It is indeed against such power 
relations and hegemonic structures that critical  theorists were weary of and spoke out 
against. Even though these scholars only came onto the IR scene in the late 20th century 
and despite their  warnings to the populations from the South/Third World against the 
powers exercised by the North/First World, they seemed to have been a little too late in 
saving the South from the hegemonic forces of the North; after all the North, which was 
and is still made up of a conglomerate of Western nation-states, crafted the international 
political system in such a way that it served and continues to serve the needs of the North 
at the expense of the ‘developing’ colonized populations. 
Nonetheless, the social engineering process and construction pursued by the Afrikaner 
nationalists throughout the early 20th century obviously incensed the Africans who were 
deliberately excluded from the Union’s power structures. And as a consequence of this, 
the  Africans  created  a  socio-political  platform  for  themselves,  namely  African 
nationalism,  to  counter  the  white  Afrikaner  hegemonic  structures.  Since  then  the 
Africans, who were represented by the ANC (est. 1912), pursued an uphill battle for their 
basic freedom. The ANC leadership realised that though they were numerically strong, 
they were powerless politically and thus could not sway the power structures in their 
favour; they were basically up against their former colonial powers as well as the Union’s 
white administrators. 
By the time the Nationalist Party won the white elections in the Union during 1948, the 
party entrenched its powers and relentlessly pursued its divide-and-rule policy in the form 
of apartheid. The chief architect of this ideology was Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who also 
conceptualized ‘the theory of multi-nationalism.’ Since the powers were in the hands of 
Verwoerd  and  his  apartheid  conquistadors,  the  ANC  stood  no  chance  in  grabbing 
political  power  because  it  remained  weak  and  also  did  not  have  the  support  of  the 
Western nation-states from the North who still scorned the Africans and their liberation 
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movements.  Even though the ANC was aware of its  politically weak position,  it  still 
sought the assistance of the Western powers; some of whom only tried to appease the 
hearts  of  the  ANC’s  leadership  for  they  knew that  the  Union administrators  and  the 
apartheid regime worked in their political and economic interests. Since the ANC realised 
that  they  were  not  reaching  any  of  their  planned  goals  by  the  time  the  Afrikaner 
nationalists came to power, they changed their political strategies when they drafted the 
Freedom Charter in 1955 and gradually adopted a more militant and aggressive attitude 
towards the apartheid regime by the end of the 1950s. The ANC - (and PAC [est. 1959]) - 
radically changed its  political  position by taking up arms against  the white  Afrikaner 
nationalist government as soon as it was banned and it – and the PAC - was forced to go 
into exile soon after the massacres of  the 21st of March 1960. As a liberation movement, 
the ANC (and the PAC) depended upon the UN, NAM, the Commonwealth and other 
bodies for moral and financial support (cf. Thomas 1995).
Both  South  Africa  and  Malaya  had  been  members  of  the  British  Commonwealth; 
however, since the British had large investments in South Africa, which was under the 
tutelage of its white Afrikaners, they persisted in favouring and supporting the apartheid 
regime against  the black oppressed masses that  remained powerless and marginalised. 
Although  the  Malays(ian  population),  on  the  whole,  were  fully  informed  about  the 
discrimination that was widespread in South Africa at that time, they were acutely aware 
of what discrimination meant since they suffered under the British rule who had curry-
favoured the immigrant workers and their off-spring, namely the Chinese and Indians. In 
both South Africa and Malaya discrimination was the order of the day during the first 
half of the 20th century, but this changed in Malaya in the interest of the Malays after the 
Second World War when the British realized that they had to relinquish power and hand 
it over to the Malay nationalists. In the case of South Africa, the British had lost power, 
decades before the Second World War, to the Afrikaners who stubbornly expressed the 
notion,  which  was  based  on  an  erroneous  Biblical  interpretation,  that  they  were  the 
chosen community who had the legal right to take over the land that their forebears had 
fought  for  (against  the  British  [and  blacks])  and  to  rule  over  the  blacks  who,  they 
considered, were an uncultured and uncivilized lot of people!
100
                                                                          
Returning to the early 1960s, South Africa strategically held an all white referendum; the 
positive outcome of this referendum gave the South African apartheid government under 
Verwoerd the right to abandon its status as a ‘Union’ and to form a ‘Republic’.  This 
resulted in the change of its identity and status on the 31st of May 1961; new symbols 
such as the flag and anthem of the apartheid republic were thus introduced and a new 
identity was forged under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism. By then the Republic of 
South Africa had to reapply for continued membership of the Commonwealth; in the end 
apartheid  South  Africa  could  not  withstand  the  pressure  from  the  international 
community to bring to an end to its desired apartheid policies, it automatically withdrew 
its  application  to  remain  a  member.  South  Africa’s  status  as  a  ‘republic’  within  the 
international system did not mean much to the black oppressed masses because they were 
not enjoying nor benefiting from any of the socio-economic and political powers. In fact, 
black labour was exploited and served the interest not only of the apartheid regime but 
also the conglomerates such as Anglo-American; a conglomerate that had been heavily 
involved in the mining and other industries and one that gained much from the available 
cheap labour from within apartheid South Africa and the neighbouring emerging states. 
So, for the blacks in apartheid South Africa in particular and the region in general any 
form of human emancipation during these decades was a pipe-dream. 
The realists - as opposed to the critical theorists - considered the republic a legitimate 
political player in the international system and apartheid South Africa’s sovereignty to 
rule over the people within – and outside (i.e. South West Africans) - its borders to be 
respected  and  tolerated.  This  hypocritical  position,  which  was  of  course  the  official 
stance of the Western nation-states,  persisted for decades  and it  was one that  critical 
theorists was bound to attack since realists seemed to overlook the inhumane policies that 
had been adopted by the apartheid republic. When Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966, 
Advocate John Balthazar Vorster, who was the Minister of Justice in Verwoerd’s cabinet, 
took over the reins as Prime Minister. Vorster’s iron-fisted approach further entrenched 
the  apartheid  ideology.  He  and  his  apartheid  cabinet  continued  to  devise  laws  and 
legislation that would secure the rule of the white Afrikaner nation; together they directed 
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South Africa’s foreign policy and international relations in Africa. Apartheid’s foreign 
policy was then characterised by Dialogue, Secret Diplomacy and Détente (Pfister 2005: 
39). The 1960s in South Africa was generally described as ‘a decade of overwhelming 
(state) repression;’ for it was one in which restricted any form of internal resistance and 
one that forced the ANC and the PAC to take up armed struggle outside the apartheid 
republic’s borders. 
The armed struggle implied that these liberation movements were politically helpless and 
indeed powerless within apartheid South Africa’s borders, and that the only way for them 
to gain political power in South Africa was to solicit international support for their just 
military struggle. With hindsight the ANC and PAC were, unfortunately, caught up in the 
political  power  game  that  was  played  out  by  the  capitalist  states  represented  by  the 
Western  powers  particularly  the  USA  and  the  communist  states  represented  by  the 
communist  block  especially  by  the  USSR.  Both  groups  targeted  and  supported 
organizations and movements in the South that would assist in expanding their spheres of 
influence and as a result many of these organizations were used as pawns in the world 
chess game between the super powers throughout the Cold War era.
The  South  African  struggle  was  indeed  different  from the  ‘racial’  struggle  that  was 
experienced in the Federation in the 1960s. Verma (2004: 34) argued that the struggle in 
the Federation during the colonial period was of an ethno-cultural  nature and this has 
since changed to a political-cultural one in Malaysia. The Federation under Tunku Abdul 
Rahman was slowly changing. In 1961 – the same year when NAM was established - the 
Federation  experienced  a  name  change;  it  was  renamed  the  Federation  of  Malaysia. 
Thereafter it sought to expand the nation; it succeeded when the peoples of Borneo and 
Singapore  agreed  to  enter  the  Federation  and  this  came  to  fruition  on  the  16th of 
September  1963 (Hill  & Lian 1995: 55-59).  The inclusion of these two geographical 
regions was significant in that it gave the Federation greater political clout and leverage 
in the Southeast Asian region. This was quite evident when the Federation came into 
conflict  with its neighbour, the Indonesians, regarding territory and the issue of being 
pro-western in its approach to regional issues; this was known as the Konfrontasi period 
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(1963-1966) (Joseph 2005: 93). Fortunately the period did not continue for many years 
and it came to an end with Soekarno being replaced with Soeharto who cultivated a more 
open and friendly relationship with the Federation. It was during this period when Dr. 
Mahathir  Mohamed  (hereafter  Mahathir)  entered  the  political  arena  as  member  of 
UMNO. By 1965 Singapore seceded from the Federation; a development that was not 
welcomed by Tunku but something that he expected and an outcome that he had to accept 
(Hill & Lian 1995: 60-61; Milne & Mauzy 1999: 19). 
Despite this political set back Tunku continued to work at harmonising the relationship 
among the nations of the region; this effort resulted in the formation of ASEAN in 1967. 
In the domestic  arena Tunku had to handle the ‘racial’  problems that were gradually 
brewing; this came to a head on the 13th of May 1969. The race riots deeply affected all 
the Federation’s citizens and occupied the minds of the social theorists at that time. One 
assumes that the ‘problem solving theory’ of positivists as explicated by critical scholars 
such  as  Robert  Cox  would  not  have  provided  the  necessary  solutions  to  the  racial 
problems experienced by the peoples of the Federation of Malaysia. However, although 
the Federation was able to contain the riots, it reflected that the issue could not be wished 
away  since  the  economic  power  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  minority  Chinese 
Malaysians  and  that  a  radical  solution  had  to  be  sought  to  emancipate  the  Malay 
Malaysians from this economic stranglehold. 
Soon after the racial riots Mahathir was the first to openly criticize Tunku for being out of 
touch with the opinions of the Malays and for having been too weak and powerless to 
deal  with  the  dominant  Chinese  and  Indian  communities,  who  continued  to  play  a 
dominant and powerful role in the economy of the country (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 22). 
The issue of power, a key concept in CT, was therefore at the heart of the racial tensions 
that existed throughout the 1960s and it demonstrated that the Malays were not satisfied 
at  all  with  the  economic  status  quo  since  they  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  Chinese 
Malaysians who held economic power. Thus a solution had to be sought to resolve the 
racial conflicts, on the one hand, and to deal with the economic concerns, on the other. 
Mahathir therefore vehemently argued that Tunku was not in the position to find a lasting 
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solution to  the existing  problems.  And since then,  Tunku,  who only relinquished the 
Prime Minister’s post by June 1971, effectively lost his political power to rule. A few 
months  after  the riots,  the political  power in effect  shifted to his  deputy,  Tun Abdul 
Razak Hussein (hereafter Tun Razak), who became the de facto ruler. 
3.1.3 The Decade of Facing Internal and External Challenges: 1970 - 1980
The 13th of May 1969 race riots in Malaysia forced the government to impose a National 
State of Emergency  (until 1971) to contain and stop the violence that deeply scarred the 
Federation’s society on the 14th of May and in a sense jolted its identity as a nation. 
Although  the  Yang  Di-Pertuan  Agong  (King)  suspended  the  Parliament  and  the 
Constitution the same day, a cabinet was sworn in with Tunku as the Prime Minister on 
the 20th of May. The actual political power was, since then, in the hands of his deputy, 
Tun Abdul Razak Hussein. The latter was appointed by the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong as 
the Director of Operations to deal with any unrest and violence (Hng 2004: 97-98). The 
riots  were essentially about the racial  imbalances that  existed in the civil  service and 
many of the other sectors. Too many non-Malays, the Malay Malaysians argued, were in 
the key and powerful posts, and they averred that the non-Malays dominated all sectors 
of  the  society.  And  in  response  to  the  slow  transformation  on  the  part  of  Tunku’s 
government  to  address  these  inequalities,  the  Malays  revolted  and  demanded  social 
equality. In accordance with this and other demands the government had to act fast to set 
things right. 
It  was  thus  able  to  cobble  together  and  implement  in  1971  the  National  Economic 
Programme (NEP), a programme which had an indelible impact upon the society with the 
basic aim of rectifying the racial inequalities through socio-political and economic means 
(cf. Hart 1996; Eyre 1997: 129-134). One assumes that a programme such as this would 
have  been  approved  by  the  critical  tradition  for  it  was  a  strategy  that  intended  to 
emancipate the majority of disadvantage Malays. Nevertheless, the NEP was essentially a 
nation-building initiative that aimed at restructuring the society in favour of the Malays 
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(Hng 2004: 97), who had been discriminated against by the British and continued to be in 
a disadvantaged position throughout Tunku’s reign as Prime Minister. Its introduction 
was a departure from the socio-economic policies of the past. 
An important  outcome of the NEP was the formation of a  Malay business class that 
would drive the economic transformation. The NEP gave the Malays the chance to obtain 
their licenses, granted them lucrative government contracts and compelled the banks to 
provide them with the necessary credit. The eventual outcome of this strategy led to an 
affirmative action process in which Malay owned businesses slowly expanded and the 
Malay business group gradually increased (Crouch 1992: 29-30). The opportunities that 
were granted to the Malays unfortunately led to a certain degree of corruption or what has 
been termed ‘cronyism’ that negatively affected and impacted on UMNO’s management 
of the Federation of Malay(si)a. It is this type of strategy that was harmful to Malaysia’s 
democracy and an issue that  needed attention  in order to stave off  any open conflict 
among the racial groups or between the different economic classes.
It  was  at  this  crucial  time in  the Federation’s  fragile  history that  Mahathir,  who had 
written a stinging letter - mentioned earlier - to Tunku Abdul Rahman, wrote The Malay 
Dilemma (Singapore: Times Books reprint 1995). The essential ideas that are contained 
in the NEP are said to have been extracted from the book, even though the government 
decided to ban the book because it was a potent text that had the potential  to further 
instigate  the racial  conflict  (Khoo Kay Jin 1992: 49).  Since this  was the case,  a few 
questions may be raised: why did Mahathir write the text, what were its contents, and in 
which did it impact upon the Malay mind at that time? A brief summary of its salient 
aspects will be helpful in order to understand the Malay mind, and it should also not be 
forgotten that Mahathir was expelled from UMNO’s Executive Committee and he was 
thus inactive in the party’s political projects.  In this significant work he suggested ways 
of how the Malays should become rehabilitated. He delved into their past to investigate 
the reasons for Malay backwardness; he attributed their position to hereditary traits, old-
age  social  practices,  environmental  factors,  colonial  policies,  incompetent  Malay 
leaderships, Chinese resourcefulness and Chinese dominance in the economic arena (cf. 
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Yao 2004; Milne & Mauzy 1999: 162-163; Cheah 2002: 202). Mahathir offered a road 
map for the Malays  to shift  gear  and work towards advancing their  cause instead of 
remaining incompetent and unskilled; he wanted the Malays to emancipate themselves 
through the available power structures that have been created and constructed.
 
When  turning  to  South  Africa  at  the  turn  of  the  new decade,  Vorster  increased  his 
repressive measures. Despite the stranglehold that the state had over the oppressed black 
communities, they were not deterred and pursued ways and means of countering the state; 
they for example, organized strikes and protests in tertiary institutions and at factories. It 
was during these trying times that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) came onto 
the scene.  BCM infused in the old and young blacks a spirit  of  confidence and self-
reliance, and it implanted a black consciousness philosophy that permeated the thinking 
of  many  of  the  blacks  throughout  the  1970s.  The  key  ideologue  who  inspired  that 
generation was Steve Biko; his writings such as I Write What I Like contained the basic 
philosophy of the BCM. Biko’s killing at the hands of the apartheid security forces in 
1977 provided further impetus for his and that of BCM to spread and remain influential 
for quite a few years (cf. Motlhabe 1984). 
Amidst the emergence of the BCM and its impact, the 1976 Soweto protests erupted on 
the 16th of June against the enforcement of the Afrikaans language in the state schools in 
the predominantly African townships where English and the indigenous languages were 
the languages in use. The state clamped down in a vicious way but this did not bring the 
protests to a halt; the protests spread like wild fire across the country and affected most of 
the schools as well as the tertiary institutions that were located in the cities and towns. 
The protests,  it  may be argued, was a form of emancipation in which they gradually 
gained social power and challenged the apartheid state whenever the opportunities arose. 
Nonetheless, 1976 marked the start of a sustained anti-Apartheid stand. And alongside 
these developments, the state continued, via the process of ethnographic engineering, to 
impose  its  Bantustan  project  by  creating  ‘homelands’  –  and,  in  a  sense,  offering  its 
peculiar  meaning to ‘sovereignty’  - for each of the African ‘tribal’ communities, who 
made up the majority of the black population. The apartheid state’s resurrection of new 
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identities in the form of tribal structures resulted in the creation of ‘homelands’ in rural 
reserves that were ‘degraded by overpopulation and soil erosion.’ The first ‘independent 
homeland’ that was created in 1976 was the ‘Transkei.’ This area was earmarked for the 
Xhosa-speaking Africans;  and other  tribes,  who spoke different  indigenous languages 
such as Zulu and Venda, were given their pieces of land in the years that followed. By the 
year  1978 Vorster  decided  to  retire  and  in  his  place  Mr.  P.W.  Botha,  who was  the 
Minister of Defence in Vorster’s cabinet, was voted into political power by the whites. 
Botha embarked on an external policy that came to be known as the ‘Total Onslaught 
Strategy’ policy (cf. Schrire & Silke 1997: 5; Crawford 1995; Pfister 2005: 104-105); this 
policy  was  therefore  further  employed  to  embed  Botha’s  political  powers  and  the 
apartheid value system. The policy, which was initiated in 1978 and followed through 
into the 1980s,  was consciously engineered  by the apartheid  regime to transgress the 
sovereignty of its neighbours. The apartheid regime, for example, overpowered the Front 
Line  states  through  military  incursions,  and  subsequently  subjugated  these  states 
economically and it funded South African rebel groups such as Renamo in Mozambique 
that would work solely in its interest. 
A different story was unfolding in the Federation in the 1970s. Mid 1971 saw the veteran 
politician, Tunku, vacate his seat for his deputy, Tun Razak. He had a short reign but was 
able to accomplish a fair amount. He was known for having had a hand in: the drafting 
and the implementation  of  the NEP, the formation  of  an enlarged ruling coalition  of 
political parties – replacing the Alliance Party with Barisan Nasional (BN) in 1974, the 
construction of the infrastructure, and the opening up new avenues in foreign policy with 
an emphasis on laying the foundations for Malaysia’s support for the South (Milne & 
Mauzy 1999: 24-28; Cheah 2002: 123). In fact, Tun Razak was the one who took a lead 
in regional détente and also adopted a non-aligned stance. In the region, he proposed the 
neutralization  of  Southeast  Asia,  namely  a  Zone  of  Peace,  Freedom  and  Neutrality 
(ZOPFAN); this proposal was accepted by all in the region including the superpowers. 
Tun Razak passed away on the 14th of January 1976, and the following day Tun Hussein 
Onn took over as Prime Minisiter. The latter, according all reports, had no intentions of 
sitting in the hot seat; it was somehow forced onto him. 
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Government corruption was the very first issue that Tun Hussein Onn had to tackle when 
he stepped into office. How he was going to handle this and other issues were going to 
define his premiership. Dato Haron Idriss was one of the ‘old guard’ of UMNO members 
who was found guilty by the court for corruption. Since Dato Haron was a fairly popular 
UMNO member and leader, the youth was in favour of him being considered the premier. 
This thus meant that Tun Onn had to face two rival groups within UMNO; those who 
supported and accepted his position as the premier and those who favoured Dato Idriss. 
Although the internal UMNO conflict was not resolved by the end of Tun Onn’s tenure in 
1981,  he  had been  able  to  maintain  his  control  of  the  Federation  as  the  premier.  In 
addition to the corruption that he faced and dealt with, he had to challenge the communist 
insurgents, the secession of Sabah and the outbreak of riots in Kelantan. On the whole, 
Tun Onn’s tenure was short but the most resistant to change; according to Cheah (2002: 
159-160), Tun Onn on the whole succeeded in maintaining political stability and racial 
harmony. At this point it may be stated that Malaysia was still very much ‘a developing 
state;’ a state that was still moulding its identity, pursuing its nation-building project and 
one that was gradually stabilizing its economy and carving out an political image in the 
region.
3.1.4 The Decade of Botha’s Exit and Mahathir’s Entrance: 1980 – 1990:
Botha’s  Total  Strategy policy  might  appear  to  have  been  successful  but  failures  and 
blunders were inevitable; these occurred along the way. The same can be reported on the 
domestic front where he and his apartheid cabinet drafted a new constitution and went to 
establish the 1983 Tricameral Parliament  that  kept the Africans out and reined in the 
respective Coloured and Indian communities. This experiment, which was used as a ploy 
to  further  divide  the  oppressed  communities,  was  totally  rejected  by  the  blacks.  In 
response, they formed the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was umbrella body for 
a variety of civic organizations that were totally opposed to the apartheid system as well 
as  other  anti-apartheid  structures,  and  it  was  a  structure  that  adopted  a  non-
collaborationist strategy to fight the system (Schrire & Silke 1997: 6-7). The UDF was 
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given further support with the formation the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU); these unions alongside 
the UDF - as well as numerous  anti-apartheid lobby groups in Europe and elsewhere 
-strengthened  and  reinforced  the  apartheid  opposition  groups  and  applied  formidable 
pressure  on  the  apartheid  government  from  all  sides.  These  new  power  structures 
undoubtedly boosted the confidence of the blacks who felt that they were in a position in 
the coming years to take the political power from the apartheid regime and emancipate 
themselves.
Since Botha underestimated the strength of these extra-parliamentary organizations, he 
decided to form the State Security Council, which he of course headed, to oversee the 
states  of  emergency  that  was  imposed  and  to  implement  ‘a  comprehensive  counter-
insurgency strategy to combat the insurrectionary spirit’ that was on the rise in different 
parts of South Africa. The legitimate insurrection, which was coordinated through mass 
mobilization  in  the urban and rural  areas,  was further bolstered by the sanctions and 
boycotts that were enforced by the UN (Lovelace 2005: 132). In fact, the anti-apartheid 
representations abroad were able to convince the UN and many other international bodies 
that apartheid was ‘a crime against humanity.’ This, to some extent, helped to persuade 
members of the international community particularly those countries that continued to 
have ties with South Africa to reconsider their diplomatic and economic relations with an 
apartheid  state  that  acted  inhumanely  towards  the  majority  of  its  peoples.  In  the 
meanwhile the external pressure increased and Botha began to negotiate with Mandela, 
whilst the latter was still incarcerated, to find solutions to the unending insurrection. This 
action clearly indicated that the power that the white Afrikaners possessed through sheer 
military might was slowly whittling away and that they had to seek other methods of 
dealing with the ongoing political problems. In 1989 F.W. De Klerk, who had served in 
Botha’s  cabinet,  succeeded  Botha  as  South  Africa’s  last  apartheid  president  and  he 
continued with the negotiations  with Mandela amidst  an international  ‘Free Mandela’ 
campaign. De Klerk was compelled to review the socio-political situation in which he 
found himself as president; for, by then, the ANC had also been regularly communicating 
with a variety of organizations including Afrikaner nationalists in order to seek ways of 
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how the apartheid system could be brought down. The strains weighed heavy upon De 
Klerk, who for all intents and purposes, chose an option that worked in the favour of all 
groups. He lifted the banning that was imposed on the liberation movements since the 
beginning of the 1960s and also freed Mandela from prison in February 1990.
The  situation  in  Malaysia  was  unlike  that  of  South  Africa.  UMNO,  which  was  the 
dominant  party  that  coalesced  with  others  to  form the  BN,  was  affected  by  internal 
divisions.  This could be attributed to the earlier  two premiers’  inability to effectively 
resolve the problems and mend the rifts.  Mahathir,  who had been Tun Onn’s deputy, 
became the Prime Minister in 1981 and wished Datuk Musa Hitam, his long time friend 
and fellow UMNO member, to become deputy Prime Minister and deputy president of 
UMNO. This wish was challenged by Tengku Razaleigh in 1981 and 1984 respectively. 
Even though Datuk Musa won, the splits remained, and, by then, Anwar Ibrahim had 
joined  the  ranks  of  UMNO  in  1982  (Crouch  1992:  30-32).  During  Mahathir’s  first 
number of years in office he demonstrated a liberal-minded and foresighted leader. Since 
he realized the significance of the process of modernization and the positive aspects of 
globalization, he embarked on an industrialisation drive to revamp the economy and this 
was largely inspired by what happened in countries such as Japan and Korea. And for this 
reason  he  introduced  and  stressed  the  ‘Look  East’  policy.  In  general  Malaysia 
experienced economic growth in the early 1980s; however, it went through a brief period 
of recession during 1985. 
During this period he adopted and gradually introduced his ‘Islamization’ policy, which 
was not – and understandably so - favourably looked upon in many quarters (Hng 2004: 
138-144). The policy of ‘Islamization,’ although clearly defined by Mahathir,  was not 
well  comprehended  by Malaysia’s  minority  communities,  who had already expressed 
their  misgivings about the NEP, and now had to contend with new policies that used 
religion as a tool for (apparent)  discrimination.  Mahathir defended his position in the 
basis that the majority of Malaysia’s citizens were Muslims and that the policy does not 
intend  to  discriminate  or  marginalize  the  minority  non-Muslim  citizens.  During  this 
period,  whilst  defending  these  new  policies  Mahathir’s  leadership  was  seriously 
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challenged  in  1987 by Tengku Razaleigh  and Datuk Musa;  the  latter  two tried  their 
utmost to use the democratic machinery to bring him down. The end result was that they 
instead of Mahathir were defeated; and since Mahathir was triumphant, he led Malaysia 
into the final decade of the 20th century. Milne & Mauzy (1999: 29-30) identified three 
contests of power in Mahathir’s first decade as premier: (a) limiting the power of the 
Agong and traditional rulers, (b) control of UMNO, and (c) challenging the judiciary (see 
Figure 3.4 below). Challenges such as these seemed to have been among the factors that 
caused him to change from a relatively liberalist position to a more authoritarian ruler in 
handling state affairs internally and externally (also cf. Verma 2004). 
Figure 3.4:
As an authoritarian, he was able to keep close control over the party and policies, and he 
was able to restrict any form of opposition within the party; this character-trait did not go 
down well with critical thinkers because authoritarian rulers not only stifle open debates 
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but muzzle marginal and critical voices. Even though Mahathir brought about important 
and laudable changes within the state and ones that steadily paved the way for Malaysia 
to transform itself into a ‘middle power,’ the manner in which he dealt with opposition 
groups within  his  party such as Anwar Ibrahim’s  dismissal  and treatment  in the  late 
1990s led scholars  to  critically question the nature of his  power,  the intention  of his 
actions  and  the  impact  of  his  rule.  Mahathir’s  methods  and  actions  undermined  the 
democratic state in which the freedom of expression and action supposed to guaranteed 
and not taken away.
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3.2 ‘South Africa’ in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy (circa 1957-1990):
In the section above an attempt was made to compare internal and external developments 
that occurred in South Africa and Malaysia respectively. This section intends to zoom in 
specifically on Malaysia’s foreign policy towards South Africa. However, South Africa’s 
location should be viewed within the broader parameters of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
that  is  reflected  in  Table  3.3  below.  Johan Saravanamuttu,  a  specialist  on Malaysian 
affairs,  (qtd  by  Zakaria  Hj.  Ahmad  1990:  125)  identified  four  distinct  phases;  his 
contribution  has  been  slightly  adapted,  and  two more  have  been  added  in  the  Table 
below:
Table 3.3:
Malaysia’s foreign policy swung from facing certain ‘dilemmas of independence’ during 
Tunku’s premiership  to  ‘consolidating  its  expansionary policies’  that  began to  unfold 
towards the end of Mahathir’s first decade in office. Amidst the sweeping foreign policy 
changes  that  the  Federation  experienced,  Malaysia  like  all  other  nation-states  gave 
priority to the enhancement of relations with its neighbours (Badawi 1997: 287); this was 
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particularly so after ASEAN was created in 1967. Malaysia’s harmonious relationship 
was  always  fundamental  and  crucial  for  its  own  survival  and  continued  progress 
(Muzaffar  2001:  147).  Despite  the  hiccups  in  its  bilateral  relations  with  some  of  its 
neighbours  and  the  other  ASEAN  members,  it  tried  to  diffuse  conflict  through 
negotiations (Joseph 2005: 90). And it also depended upon the political leadership that 
helped to steer the process of negotiations ahead. Tunku and Mahathir, who had their fair 
share of experiences in this regard, demonstrated their leadership skills in handling the 
conflicts  that  they  found  themselves  in;  they  were  the  main  political  actors  and  the 
individuals  who were  the  decision  makers  and indeed the  agents  of  change  (cf.  Hill 
2003).
Since ASEAN was one of the primary considerations in Malaysia’s foreign policy, it also 
reflected on issues distant from its shores. It, for example, was deeply interested with the 
crisis  in  Palestine  and  the  situation  in  apartheid  South  Africa.  Although  these  two 
particular places did not dominate Malaysia’s foreign policy agenda, they featured on its 
agenda because of the human rights abuses that were meted out against the oppressed 
people in both areas by the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Israel respectively. For 
example, South Africa’s domestic policies, which discriminated against the majority of 
the black people in the country, had a direct bearing on the way the apartheid government 
perceived  and related to the respective international  communities  in Africa and Asia. 
Nevertheless, since South Africa pursued this inhumane policy Tunku and Mahathir took 
the lead by using Malaysia’s foreign policy as an instrument – along with other nation 
states - to persuade and bring an end South Africa’s failed apartheid experiment. 
The section, which follows, undertakes an assessment and an evaluation of the extent to 
which the political leadership of Malaysia used South Africa as an important case to not 
only increase its international profile in the eyes of the developing nations but to also 
stem the  tide  of  human  rights  abuses  in  that  country.  During Tunku and Mahathir’s 
respective  terms  of  office,  South Africa  featured  prominently  on their  foreign  affairs 
agenda.  And it is to their  important international  relations stories that  this thesis  now 
turns.
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3.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Narrative against Apartheid, circa 1957–1970:
As soon as Malaya gained its independence in 1957, Tunku steered his nation into the 
international arena and formulated responses to various developments. Malaya became a 
significant member in the Commonwealth; this was only after it was given permission by 
the highest decision making committee to become a member. In this regard, South Africa, 
which was one of the senior member countries of the Commonwealth, was amongst the 
handful of members that had the privilege of deciding which states should be granted 
membership. According to Mohamed Muda (1996: 429), South Africa seemed to have 
been  hesitant  in  approving  Malaya’s  application  to  become  a  member  of  the 
Commonwealth  soon after  it  gained independence; and, according to Muda, the same 
attitude  was  adopted  towards  Malaya  when it  forwarded its  application  to  become a 
member of the UN. The rationale for South Africa’s ambiguous role towards Malaya was 
attributed to the fact that the latter  proposed to extend an invitation to South Africa’s 
Cape  Malays  to  attend  the  Merdeka  (Independence)  Day  celebration  on  the  31st of 
August 1957 in Kuala Lumpur (Adam 2004: 285). 
Mr.  Ismail  Petersen,  whose story is  narrated  in  Chapter  Five,  was  the  one who was 
invited  to  the  Independence  Celebrations  (cf.  Haron  1996);  unfortunately,  due  to 
disagreements  among  this  small  South  African  ethnic  community  and  the  objections 
expressed by the Cape Town based Muslim Progressive Society (est. 1950-1980?) the 
invitation extended to Mr. Petersen was reluctantly withdrawn. Individuals such as Mr. 
Petersen,  as a matter  of information,  were among the very many who suffered at the 
hands of South Africa’s discriminatory policies and who were hindered from travelling to 
countries such as Malaya to forge socio-religious and cultural links with their – to use Dr. 
Hussaynmia’s  phrase  (1987)  -  ‘lost  cousins.’  Even  though  Mr.  Petersen  was  very 
disappointed at the outcome, it did not deter him from relentlessly pursuing his interest in 
creating connections with his distant and ‘lost cousins.’ 
That story aside and returning to Tunku’s story, it was observed that Tunku did not take 
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umbrage against South Africa’s diabolical role for its hesitancy in approving Malaya’s 
membership at the outset, he however made good use of the opportunities that came his 
way when he participated in the Commonwealth gatherings and other international fora; 
it was at these gatherings and forums that Tunku diplomatically aired his opinions against 
South Africa’s policies.
Tunku and his Indonesian counterpart,  namely President Soeharto with whom he had 
been at loggerheads regarding regional issues (cf. Chinyang Liow 2005: 93), were among 
the most vociferous voices against apartheid at the Commonwealth and UN meetings. 
Tunku was part of a group of international leaders who spearheaded ‘a discussion on 
South  Africa’s  racial  policies  at  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers’  Conference  in 
1960’  (Mohamed  Muda  1996:  424).  The  latter  argued  that  Tunku’s  opposition  to 
apartheid  was  in  line  with  the  notion  that  the  Commonwealth  should  be  seen  as  a 
multiracial forum. And it was also in consonance with Malaya’s policy which stated that: 
‘whenever human rights are violated … we always make our stand firm and clear … we 
never  made  any  distinction  whenever  there  is  violation  of  human  rights’  (Malaya 
Parliamentary Debates 21 April 1960 col. 251). Prior to this he also used the UN fora to 
attack  the  apartheid  policies  and,  in  fact,  co-sponsored  a  number  of  UN Resolutions 
related to these policies. Within Malaya itself, the different political parties were in full 
agreement with the government’s stance towards South Africa. 
The Manifesto of the Alliance, which represented the three ethnic political parties, clearly 
expressed that  ‘the Alliance is  determined to uphold the UN Charter,  which calls  for 
respect for human rights and contains freedom for all without distinction of race. The 
policy  of  the  South  African  government  in  this  respect  must  be  condemned.’  The 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Malaya not only issued a strongly worded manifesto 
but also gave a directive as to what should be done in the light of South Africa’s adamant 
stand; the manifesto stated that ‘it  is sheer hypocrisy for pronouncements to be made 
about  the  Commonwealth  being  a  brotherhood  of  nations  when  the  South  African 
government continues to heap indignities on the coloured people of the world … as an 
immediate measure we will demand that economic sanctions be declared on South Africa 
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and an embargo be placed on the import  of all  goods from South Africa.’  The 1959 
declaration  of  the  manifesto,  which  was  made  when  Malaya  and  South  Africa  had 
ongoing trade links, should be read in conjunction with the trade figures between South 
Africa and Malaya; for example, in 1958 Malaya imported goods worth $19.6 m, whilst 
South Africa exported $47.2 m – an amount of more than double that of Malaya. The 
Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC) was amongst the many NGOs that came out 
endorsing the imposition of sanctions and boycotting South African goods. In December 
of  1959  the  MTUC,  without  any  hesitation,  fully  supported  the  International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions to boycott South African products. The Strait Times 
cautioned MTUC and others that in adopting such a stand would cause the Malayans to 
suffer financially more than the South African apartheid regime. Despite the position of 
PPP and the firm stand of MTUC, the government of the Federation under Tunku was 
conscious of the consequences of such an action and thus did not immediately implement 
sanctions as had been mooted and supported by the swelling anti-apartheid groups. This 
is borne out by Dato Ismail’s, the then Minister of External Affairs, public position on the 
issue; he indicated that the Malayans’ unilateral action will not affect and impact upon 
the South African government and that it is the UN that should lead the way.
A firmer position was taken by the Malayan government when the world witnessed the 
tragic Sharpeville massacre that took place on the 21st of March 1960. Nations of the 
world reacted unanimously in condemning the apartheid regime’s dastardly deeds and 
demands were made by representatives from the continents of Africa and Asia to take a 
more decisive action against  South Africa.  The stand adopted by most  of the nations 
resulted  in  a  more  concerted  effort  from  amongst  those  who  co-sponsored  the  UN 
Resolutions against Apartheid. Tunku thus dispatched a letter on the 25th of March 1961 
to then British Prime Minister; the latter tried to persuade Tunku not to raise the issue at 
the Commonwealth May 1961 meeting and, in support, of his argument, invoked the non-
interference doctrine. Since Tunku could not get joy from the Britain’s lukewarm and 
nonchalant response, he, at least, received overwhelming support from all the political 
parties in the Federation particularly from the Alliance. The Alliance showed their full 
support by giving him a mandate to raise it at the Commonwealth meeting. Tunku, armed 
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with the unanimously passed and mildly worded Dewan Rakyat resolution, left to attend 
the meeting on the 3rd of May 1961 (Mohamad Muda 1996: 426). 
At the Commonwealth meeting Tunku was given the honour of addressing the heads of 
state and to the dismay of Harold Wilson, who was one of the leading members of the 
British parliament and who had strongly suggested that a different position be adopted, 
unexpectedly raised the situation in South Africa. In response, an informal meeting was 
arranged between Mr.  Louw, South  Africa’s  Minister  of  External  Affairs,  and a  few 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in order to trash out the issues that had been brought out 
at the meeting.  Even though the hastily organized informal meeting was held nothing 
came out of it and it was concluded that the British government under Harold Wilson’s 
influence was able to suppress the issue. Tunku was indeed upset with this immoral stand 
by  the  British  and  some  of  his  colleagues  in  the  Commonwealth  Prime  Ministers’ 
meeting.  And  in  reaction  to  their  intransigent  stand  and  indifference  to  what  was 
happening in South Africa, Tunku publicized his stand in defiance of the outcome of the 
informal  meeting.  What  this  political  narrative  demonstrated  was  that  the  British  in 
particular were not at all concerned with the welfare of the oppressed communities in 
apartheid  South  Africa  and  that  they  were  more  interested  in  not  jeopardising  their 
commercial  interests.  Although  the  British’s  hypocrisy  was  quite  conspicuous,  the 
representatives from the South did not have the political clout and nor the will within the 
international  system to force the Western nation-states to observe and support  human 
rights in troubled nation-states.
Even though Tunku’s public stance did not mean that he would stand in the way of the 
UN if it decided not to expel South Africa, he nevertheless felt that it was his moral duty 
to take a firm stand against South Africa’s immoral laws and also demonstrate to his 
colleagues  in  the  Commonwealth  that  they  should  not  ignore  the  plight  of  apartheid 
South Africa’s masses who were discriminated against by the minority white apartheid 
regime.  Tunku further  incensed the apartheid  regime when he invited  South Africa’s 
small  ‘Cape Malay’  community to migrate  to Malaya  and take up citizenship,  if  and 
when they desire to do so (cf.  Muslim News  December 1960). The gesture shown by 
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Tunku was indeed noble, but little did he realize that most of the ‘Cape Malays’ had no 
interest in taking up the invitation. The reasons for this are based on three facts: the first 
is that the ‘Cape Malays’ were a heterogeneous group who traced their origins to  inter 
alia the  eastern  part  of  India  and the  Indonesian  archipelago  (cf.  Bradlow & Cairns 
1978), and as a result of their genealogical roots did not seriously consider Malaya as 
their  ‘motherland;’  the  second  is  that  most  of  the  families,  who  belonged  to  this 
community, adapted to the socio-political circumstances even though they – along with 
their fellow oppressed - abhorred and rejected the way they were treated by the white 
minority regime; and the third is that they saw themselves first and foremost as ‘citizens’ 
of South Africa - even though the government of the day treated them as second class 
citizens – and were therefore not prepared to exchange their citizenship for another even 
if it was freely offered. Since this was the case, the invitation was taken up by a few 
‘Cape Malay’ families whose fascinating story will be told in Chapter Five. 
Pressure  slowly  mounted  against  South  Africa’s  policies  after  the  March  1960 
Sharpeville massacre. Tunku persisted in applying sustained pressure without forcing the 
international bodies to expel South Africa. South Africa was pushed into a corner and, as 
expected, rebutted by highlighting the fact that many Commonwealth countries practiced 
discrimination  too.  The  South  African  government  made  direct  reference  to  Malaya, 
which  implemented  discriminatory  policies  against  its  fellow  citizens,  i.e.  the  non-
Malays; this below-the-belt posture was however not enough to secure its membership in 
the  Commonwealth  and  the  UN.  In  the  end,  the  apartheid  regime  under  Verwoerd 
decided  to  voluntarily  withdraw  on  from  the  Commonwealth;  however,  it  was 
automatically  expelled  from  the  UN  agencies.  Despite  its  expulsion  from  the  UN 
structures, it still kept diplomatic and trading ties with nation-states that derived valuable 
economic benefits. Unsurprisingly, Britain and France, the former colonial powers, along 
with Japan were among those who did not sever diplomatic ties and thus continued to 
enjoy the diplomatic  and commercial  connections  with the apartheid  state.  This  once 
again reinforced the view that the international system as it was constructed by the North 
worked in  its  interest  and not  in the interest  of the Afro-Asian block that  formed an 
integral part of the South/Third World.
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Most of those in the Afro-Asian bloc took a bold stand by cutting off diplomatic links and 
trade ties (cf. Haron 1997: 6-7); Malaya was among this group. Sharma (1969: 273) was 
critical  of Western powers that  had to be persuaded to support the Afro-Asian bloc’s 
quest for South Africa’s expulsion. He applauded those countries (of which Malaya was 
an active member) that were involved the drafting of the resolution against South Africa; 
this was with special reference to the Five-Power Asian states’ (Ceylon, Malaya, India, 
Indonesia and Afghanistan) draft resolution (ibid 279-281). Sharma was critical of those 
in  the  Afro-Asian  bloc  who  abstained  from  supporting  the  resolution.  Nevertheless, 
Malaya imposed a complete boycott of South African products and severed all ties. The 
decision was, of course, in line with the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1761(XVII) 
of  the  6th of  November  1962.  Malaya  also  participated  and  co-sponsored  another 
resolution that demanded total economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, 
and it  fully endorsed the UN General  Assembly Resolution 1978(XVII) of 1963 that 
sought to find ways and means of providing relief and assistance to all persecuted South 
Africans. 
The  Federation  of  Malaya,  which  was  re-named  the  Federation  of  Malaysia  after 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation in 1963 - the same year when the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed,  demonstrated its  sincere and firm 
stand by making a small contribution in this direction in contributing $5,000.00 towards 
bringing about substantial changes in South Africa. But despite the commitment shown 
by the Federation of Malaysia  and members  of the Afro-Asian bloc,  apartheid  South 
Africa steadily powered ahead into the 1960s with its inhumane and dreadful policies. 
Malaysia  and  many  Afro-Asian  states  observed  the  Gleneagles  Agreement,  which 
discouraged any sporting ties with South Africa, as well as all other forms of sanctions. 
There were, regrettably, Afro-Asian states such as Japan, Taiwan, and Malawi that broke 
the sanctions and deliberately ignored the plight of the oppressed. Fortunately, none of 
the founding members of ASEAN, a regional organization founded in 1967, was part of 
the sanction busters group of states; states that financially benefited from and which were 
given preferential treatment by the South African apartheid government. 
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Tunku was indeed the prime force behind the Federation’s successful regionalism such as 
the formation of ASEAN and international role such as his stand against apartheid. It was 
however unfortunate that he seemed to have lost sight at what was taking shape on the 
home front where ‘racial’ confrontations were brewing and resulted in the 13th of May 
1969 race riots. Even though this event cost him his premiership of the Federation, he 
only relinquished it by mid 1971. Tunku handed over the reins to Tun Razak, his deputy 
who became well known for introducing the affirmative action project under the NEP 
(Hng  2004:  97).  Whilst  Tunku’s  immediate  successors  –  Tun  Razak  (from 23rd of 
September 1970 until his death on 16th of January 1976) and Tun Hussein Onn (from the 
15th of January 1976 until January 1981) - did not divert from Malaysia’s anti-Apartheid 
policy, they did not give much attention as to what was happening in the Republic of 
South Africa because they were forced to  deal  with a  number  of internal  issues and 
regional  developments.  One  specific  example  that  showed  the  Malaysians  were 
somewhat affected by the internal developments was when a special committee in the UN 
ratified certain policies against South Africa after the 1976 uprisings in Soweto. 
When Mahathir  came to power in 1981, he made his mark from the very outset as a 
statesman that had to be reckoned with internally and externally; on the internal front he 
was  concerned  with  the  question  of  Malay  identity  and  the  process  of  Malaysia’s 
modernization,  and  on  the  external  front  he  stressed  Malaysia’s  Islamic  identity  and 
demonstrated his unstinting support for the communities from the South/Third World (cf. 
Hng 2004: 135-141). In the light of his dynamic, charismatic leadership and his support 
for  the  communities  of  the  South,  he  threw  all  his  weight  behind  the  liberation 
movement(s) in South Africa from the moment he stepped into office. The first few years 
of the 1980s, he was involved with his deputy in directing foreign policy, and towards the 
end of the decade he took over that  responsibility and thus became the chief foreign 
policy architect (Nair 1997: 87) In the section hereafter an attempt will be made to record 
Mahathir’s fascinating story and important contribution.
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3.2.2 Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Story: Showing support for the ANC, circa 
         1981-1990:
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership style differed from that of his predecessors in many 
ways. This could be attributed to his charismatic character and the way he demonstrated 
his leadership qualities. For a more insightful understanding of his style of leadership, the 
works of Adam, Khoo and Rajendran as well as others may be consulted. Mahathir had 
by then become Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister, and ‘his accession to power … has 
meant  that  the  locus  of  foreign  policy  decision-making  has  effectively  shifted  from 
Wisma Putra  to  the  Prime Minister’s  office’  (Zakaria  Hj  Ahmad 1990:  127).  In  this 
powerful  position  and  being  pragmatic,  innovative  decision-maker,  Mahathir  literally 
moved the foreign policy project from its traditional moorings to a pro-active one, which 
engaged its partners; it was a foreign policy that marketed Malaysia as a destination for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and where healthy trading could freely take place, and 
one  which  brought  into  sharp  focus  South-South  linkages.  Mahathir,  in  effect, 
progressively worked towards developing Malaysia into a ‘middle power.’ Among the 
list  of  issues  that  cluttered  Mahathir’s  busy agenda was the anti-Apartheid  cause;  he 
followed through this cause with great passion because he saw that the communities of 
the South were hamstrung by obstinate  governments  such as the apartheid  regime in 
South Africa that were given all the financial and moral support by the nation-states of 
the North.
He was thus an ardent supporter of sanctions against South Africa, and he was in the 
vanguard actively carving out a vibrant foreign policy for Malaysia and leading the way 
on behalf of the Southeast Asians. Mahathir led Malaysia from the front and by example 
and as a consequence his international profile as a campaigner for human emancipation 
from the  hegemonic  forces  of  the  North  steadily  increased.  When  Mahathir  became 
Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, he adopted a hard stance towards South Africa and 
those who tacitly supported its inhumane domestic discriminatory policies (cf. Mohamed 
Muda 1996; Hamidin 1995). One of the clear signs of his commitment  was when he 
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consciously  decided  as  Malaysia’s  Prime  Minister  to  absent  himself  from  the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Melbourne and New Delhi 
respectively;  the former was held in 1981 and the latter in 1983. He accused the rich 
members of the Commonwealth of dragging their feet when it came to taking action and 
applying sanctions against South Africa and its apartheid policies. This stand, in addition 
to  others,  tangibly reflected  that  Mahathir  was  committed  to  South affairs  and South 
Africa  was  thus  an  important  state  to  target  since  it  violated  and transgressed  many 
international laws and defied UN sanctions. Whilst it assisted in building his international 
profile, it did not endear him to the major international players, namely the USA, UK and 
other Western states that continued to maintain trade ties with the pariah state.
When Mahathir attended CHOGM, which took place in Nassau during 1985, he took the 
opportunity of lambasting the policies in South Africa and blamed the First World states 
for their lack of support and decision making in South Africa. At the meeting, Mahathir 
pleaded for tougher economic sanctions and reiterated his stand at CHOGM that took 
place in Vancouver and Kuala Lumpur in 1987 and 1989 respectively.  Apartheid was 
placed  high  on  CHOGM’s  agenda  at  Mahathir’s  insistence.  This  was  intensified  as 
Mahathir’s respect steadily grew within the Commonwealth camps, particularly those in 
the Afro-Asian bloc. Mahathir was appointed with eight others to be part of a specially 
selected  Commonwealth  Committee  that  would  attend  to  South  African  affairs  (cf. 
Landsberg 2004: 82). It was this position that granted him the unique chance in May 
1990 to have a face-to-face meeting with Nelson Mandela at Abuja, Nigeria, soon after 
Mandela’s release in February.  Mandela requested that the sanctions be kept in place 
until sufficient evidence emerged that the De Klerk regime had made substantial progress 
in their  negotiations.  Mahathir  concurred with this  view and only reacted and moved 
when Mandela gave the green light to have the sanctions lifted.
Returning  to  the  CHOGM  that  was  hosted  by  Malaysia  in  Kuala  Lumpur  in  1989, 
Mahathir took advantage of being on home turf, and being the host nation it drafted a 
strongly worded statement against South Africa. By then Mahathir had convinced many 
Commonwealth  members  of  the  need  to  take  decisive  action  and  oversee  its 
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implementation. As heads of states, they agreed ‘that the only justification for sanctions 
against  South  Africa  was  the  pressure  they  created  for  fundamental  political  change. 
Their purpose was not punitive but to abolish apartheid (and) by bringing Pretoria to the 
negotiating  table  and  keeping  it  there  until  that  change  was  irreversibly 
secured’ (Abdullah 1995: 71). Malaysia was sensitive to the acts of violence that intended 
to destabilize the democratic forces in and outside South Africa. The heads voiced their 
opinions condemning South Africa’s regime in appropriating public funds for clandestine 
activities  undertaken  by  ‘third  forces’  in  order  to  neutralize  the  democratic  forces 
represented by the UDF and its external allies, the ANC. Malaysia provided assistance in 
the form of IDAF; this aid package offered legal assistance to South African political 
prisoners, their families and dependents (ibid 92). This gesture by Malaysia was further 
evidence of its concern with what was happening in South Africa; it thus endeared the 
ANC towards the Malaysian authorities in general and Mahathir in particular.
Way back in 1979 Malaysia introduced the Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) to 
provide the necessary assistance to countries in the South. It thus used TCP to channel 
funds through to give technical assistance to the ANC. And since Malaysia had become 
an active of NAM member, Malaysia pledged $2 m to the Africa Fund; a fund that was 
established by Malaysia and other stakeholders. The monies that it pledged was allocated 
for  training  assistance  in  management,  administration,  communication,  health  care, 
transport, land and agricultural development (Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1990: 23[2]: 50). 
The aid was basically intended for the liberation movements and the Frontline States. The 
Africa  Fund  Committee  (AFC)  adopted  a  programme  of  action  at  its  January  1987 
meeting  that  was  held  in  New  Delhi;  Malaysia  fully  endorsed  the  programme  and 
remained committed to it because this was in harmony with the mandate expressed at the 
8th NAM meeting in Harare.  Malaysia  for the first  time participated in the 6th AFC 
meeting that took place on the 17th May 1990.
To  summarise,  at  many  of  the  fora  such  as  the  UN  General  Assembly,  the 
Commonwealth  gatherings,  and  NAM  meetings,  which  Mahathir  addressed  and 
participated in, he pleaded for a tougher action against the South African regime. For 
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example, at the September 1989 meeting of NAM, Malaysia formed part of a 10 country 
anti-apartheid  committee  to  place  apartheid  on  the  UN  Security  Council’s  agenda 
(Landsberg 2004:  83).  He always  adopted a  critical  attitude  and was among the few 
leaders from among the long list of developing countries which were consistent in their 
criticisms against South Africa’s racial policies (ibid 22, 41 & 82); the rationale for his 
hard and firm stance was that he was fully conscious of the plight of South Africa’s 
oppressed people, and he was also aware of the fickle-minded position that was displayed 
by western powers such as Germany, UK and the USA that foul-mouthed the apartheid 
regime at open fora but continued to enjoy trade relations with South Africa without them 
being duly censured (cf. Danaher 1989; Freeman 1989). Malaysia’s position vis-à-vis the 
apartheid regime was crystal clear, and it was its steadfast, unwavering stand that led to 
the formation of a sound relationship between Malaysia and post-apartheid democratic 
South Africa from the mid 1990s.
4. Closing Remarks 
The chapter, which gave attention to the relations between the Federation of Malay(si)a 
and the Union/Republic of South Africa from 1948 until 1990, was constructed within the 
framework of conceptualizing and explaining the twin concepts captured in the conjoined 
term ‘nation-state.’ The nation-state has been an instrumental player in the world system 
and one that was exploited by the South African apartheid regime since the Nationalist 
Party  came  into  power  in  1948,  and  one  that  has  been  used  by  the  Federation  of 
Malay(si)a  to  demonstrate  its  independence  and equality  in  the  eyes  of  international 
community.  The  chapter,  however,  not  only  depended  upon  European  scholars’ 
conception of these two terms but also took in to account the views of Ibn Khaldun, the 
north African scholar who made an indelible intellectual contribution, on the subject. 
After having charted out a conceptual framework, the chapter first provided a descriptive 
and comparative overview between South Africa and Malaysia. Thereafter it offered an 
analysis of the position of ‘South Africa’ within Malaysia’s foreign policy between 1957 
- when the Federation gained independence - and 1990 - when internal changes in South 
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Africa  became  concretely  visible.  This  comparative  historical  narrative  demonstrated 
how these two sovereign nation-states shifted positions from being trade partners and 
members of the Commonwealth in the late 1950s to being adversaries from the beginning 
of the 1960s until the end of the 1980s. The adversarial position was adopted by Malaysia 
because of the South African regime’s obstinacy in defending, justifying and maintaining 
its internal apartheid policies, which was only subsequently described by the UN as ‘a 
crime against humanity’  act that the regime devised and forcefully implemented. This 
chapter  thus acts  as an important  backdrop to a  more  detailed discussion in the next 
chapter regarding the socio-political and economic relations that have been forged and 
developed from 1990 onwards.
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CHAPTER FOUR
South Africa and Malaysia: 
Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period
 (circa 1990-2005)
1. Introduction
The  description  and  comparison  between  the  two  sovereign  nation-states  in  Chapter 
Three demonstrated that even though both have had unique experiences, there have been 
(few)  commonalities  and  (more)  differences  in  the  way  the  respective  governments 
responded to the socio-political developments that took place over the four decades. The 
Malaysian government, which was initially voted in through the Alliance, showed that it 
had to  adapt  itself  to new situations  in  the years  that  followed.  Like  all  other  major 
parties, it was bogged down in internal strife and conflict that split the party into two 
camps. But amidst this difficult exercise of settling internal disputes, it also had to handle 
the affairs of the society particularly that of nation-building with extra-care. It tried its 
best to avoid at all costs the events of May 1969 and thus charted out a unique path in the 
1970s and beyond by introducing policies that assisted in transforming the Malays and at 
the  same  time,  to  some  extent,  satisfy  the  non-Malay  communities.  The  Malaysian 
government,  which  has  been  sensitive  to  the  racial  tensions  that  existed,  has  thus 
generally  been  successful  in  monitoring  and  containing  any  possible  racial  conflict 
through its BN structures. Since Malaysia acted sensitively towards its domestic issues, it 
acted in a similar fashion on the international front. This was clearly demonstrated in the 
stories  of  Tunku  and  Mahathir;  the  latter  was  vehemently  opposed  to  all  forms  of 
inhumane treatment of the blacks in South Africa and therefore used much his energies to 
direct himself and his government against apartheid. For critical theorists any form of 
opposition and protest against discrimination is crucial in order to bring about meaningful 
transformation. Thus when Mahathir lambasted the developed states that perpetuated and 
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tacitly  supported the discrimination  policies  in  South Africa  through their  policies  of 
liberalisation and modernisation, his ideas reflected the view taken by critical theorists.  
Whilst Malaysia was accused of discrimination and also of human rights abuses at some 
points  in  its  social  history and may be guilty  of  some of  these acts  (Eldridge  2002: 
90-111; Verma 2002: 167-206), it  did not practice a divide-and-rule policy nor did it 
discriminate  against  the  non-Malay  communities  as  had  occurred  in  South  Africa; 
however,  some  dissenters  openly  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Malaysian  state 
continued to display features of an ‘apartheid’ state (cf. Anon 2002). Nevertheless, the 
divide-and-rule and discrimination were the core character traits of the apartheid regime, 
and its white community enjoyed all the benefits at the expense of the majority oppressed 
blacks. Since the white South African government’s ideas and practices were grounded in 
an  apartheid  philosophy and a  distorted  Christian  world-view,  its  foreign  policy  and 
international relations activities were moulded around them. These policies grounded to 
an abrupt halt when the apartheid government, via external and internal pressure - and not 
out of goodwill as some might wish to argue - did a right-about-turn in lifting the ban on 
the South African liberation movements and freeing Mandela. This move also implied 
that it had to make a radical change in its foreign policy towards its neighbours in SADC 
– prior to 1993 it was still  referred to as SADCC - in particular and the international 
communities at large.
The previous chapter thus acted as an important canvas for the discussion and analyses 
that will be undertaken in the present chapter. This chapter devotes itself solely to the 
socio-political and economic relationship that has evolved and developed between South 
Africa since 1990 until 2005. It may be argued that the current phase in the relationship 
between these two states would not have reached a level of a fairly ‘close partnership’ if 
the earlier  developments in their social history did not take place; of course, this is a 
highly debatable issue but in the light of the factors that have thus far shaped the events 
and  outcomes,  the  argument  cannot  be  otherwise.  Their  relationship  should  also  be 
viewed  against  the  backdrop  of  the  ongoing  twin  processes  of  globalization  and 
regionalization.  These  processes  have  impacted  upon the  nature  of  South  Africa  and 
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Malaysia’s bilateral and their multilateral relations in their respective regions. 
These  processes,  particularly  that  of  globalization,  have  given  rise  to  an  uneven 
development  of  world  affairs  and  the  creation  four  distinct  worlds,  namely  the  First 
World,  Second World,  Third World,  and Fourth World,  towards the end of  the 20th 
century (Toye  1993:  21-31;  Cardoso 1993:  156; Castells  1993:  21-22 & 35-39).  The 
approximately 180 states that exist across this globe have been slotted into their specific 
categories  by  the  North/First  World’s  social  scientists  that  have  been  schooled  and 
entrenched in their  Eurocentric  philosophies.  They and their  categories  represent  ‘the 
victory of a ‘new rationality’  of the technological  revolution wedded to decentralized 
forms of management and decision-making’ (Cardoso 1993: 155). 
It is indeed these divisions and categorizations that critical theorists have rejected; they, 
as already observed, argued against any form of discrimination and thus proposed the 
human emancipatory project that would allow for radical changes to do away with all 
forms of injustice and bring about relative equality, and a project that would help towards 
the process of emancipation and eventual freedom for the South/Third World and perhaps 
lifting it out of its South/Third World status. However, for the South states to gain their 
distance  from dependence  and  relative  independence,  they  will  have  to  implement  a 
deliberative democracy in which civil society should be able to exercise its rights and air 
its views against and in the favour of the state via the public sphere. Habermas’ claim, 
according to Eckersley (2004: 178), that the political will-formation should be bounded 
to the national community is problematic because he overemphasised the boundaries of 
the nation-states; and because of holding onto this view, he, in effect, underestimated the 
vibrant public sphere and the democratic opinion of civil society that can move beyond 
‘the  territorially  bounded  national  community  of  citizens’  and  be  transnationalized 
through  multilateral  cooperative  projects  and  arrangements.  And  by  transnational 
Eckersley (2004: 197) meant ‘both including the nation and going beyond the nation’ and 
it at no stage meant the nation’s displacement. 
She made the point that though Habermas argued along these lines he was not fixated by 
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the idea of the nation-state and that he advocated that ‘the connection between citizens in 
modern  multicultural  polities  should  no  longer  be  based  on  ethnicity  but  rather 
‘constitutional patriotism’ or a shared commitment to democratic procedures that enable 
abstract, legally mediated social integration’ (ibid 177 & her emphasis). And she (ibid 
178) added that Habermas’ constitutional state is of the virtuous kind in that ‘it can open 
itself  internally to a range of different cultural  and social  identities by welcoming all 
citizens to participate equally in the civic nation.’ If this is so, I would like to ask whether 
the present South African state, or for that matter the Federation of Malaysia, is a state 
that has welcomed all its citizens to participate equally in the civic nation. Compared to 
the apartheid era, the response in the new democracy has been positive. Whilst this is 
laudable, the questions that critical theorists would, however, wish to pose are: Do South 
Africa  and  Malaysia’s  citizens  demonstrate  ‘constitutional  patriotism’?  If  not,  does 
racism/ethnicity still wield a great deal of influence at the expense of being patriotic? 
What about the status South Africa’s African refugees and what about Malaysia’s illegal 
Southeast Asian workers? Are they not permitted to participate in the activities of the 
civic nation on an equal basis? If not, then why not?  Even though these problematic 
questions will have to be left unanswered for now, they will have to be responded to 
sometime in the near future.
Coming back to South Africa and Malaysia, it was noted that both states, despite their 
vibrant democracies and relatively healthy socio-economic systems, have generally been 
classified by the First World members as Third World developing states. In the light of 
the socio-political and economic changes in both states, they have become locked into the 
new world of management and decision-making since the 1990s; and as a result of their 
respective internal transformations and international contributions, they have been placed 
in yet another devised set of categories by international relations theorists. This time they 
have been identified as emerging ‘middle powers’; a status that distinguishes them from 
the  ‘super  powers’  and  ‘small  powers’  (see  Table  4.1  below).  The  middle  powers, 
however, are a set of states that  have moved beyond the ‘Third World’ status on the 
continuum but have not as yet,  according to these theorists and the gatekeepers of the 
First World club, graduated from the ‘Third World’ stage and nor have they reached the 
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‘First World’ stage. Who decides who fits into this new category? But more importantly 
what  does  ‘middle  power’  exactly  mean?  These  questions  I  intend  to  respond to  by 
defining and unpacking the concept, and it will however be conceptualized alongside the 
notion of ‘partnership.’   
2. Middle Powers and Partnership - Unpacking two conceptual tools:
South Africa and Malaysia reconnected to pursue diplomatic links and trade ties after an 
absence  of  approximately  30  years.  This  reconnection  meant  a  great  deal  to  the 
Malaysian  government  under  Mahathir  and  the  ANC under  Nelson Mandela  because 
when the Federation of Malaya  government  under Tunku in the early 1960s took the 
decision  to  sever  trade  ties  with  apartheid  South  Africa,  it  negatively  affected  the 
Federation’s  economy,  and indirectly  impacted  upon the society that  experienced job 
losses and other  negative  social  developments.  These types  of  decisions  softened the 
leadership of the liberation movements such as the ANC towards governments such as 
that of the Federation of Malaya (then) /Federation of Malaysia (now). In addition, these 
movements also showed much respect to the feisty Malaysian political leadership that 
persisted in adopting an anti-Apartheid stand amidst all the odds stacked against it. 
Based  upon  these  commitments  for  social  change  in  the  South,  South  Africa’s  new 
political leadership under Nelson Mandela, who reflected similar sentiments, was bound 
to pursue strong bilateral relations with nation-states such as Malaysia; and it did so with 
a burning desire to bring about a ‘close partnership’ that would not only benefit both 
states but also the regions that they represent. Before telling the tale of the evolution of 
this  ‘close  partnership’  and  also  addressing  their  status  as  ‘middle  powers’  in  the 
contemporary socio-political  scene,  it  will  be necessary to  first  unpack the respective 
concepts  that  underpin  their  relationship  and place  them in  a  different  socio-political 
category in the world order.
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2.1 Middle Powers
A fair amount of discussion has taken place in scholarly circles regarding how and which 
countries  should be classified as ‘middle  powers.’  According some of these scholars, 
South Africa and Malaysia seem to fit the list of criteria that have been identified as the 
main ingredients that make up a ‘middle power.’ Let us first address the concept and then 
identify the ingredients before assessing whether the two mentioned states fit the bill.
In Cooper’s (1997: 1) introductory essay of his edited work he argued that whilst the 
primary powers still  have an important  role  in this  rapidly changing world,  there  are 
secondary powers that have and are performing significant socio-political functions in the 
world order, without wanting to eclipse the position of the primary powers, in different 
ways than the manner it had been done in the past. These secondary powers have been 
grouped  under  the  category  of  ‘middle  powers;’  the  term  Cooper  (ibid)  suggests  is 
problematic  ‘both  in  terms  of  conceptual  clarity  and  operational  coherence….’  The 
middle  powers  are  a  group  of  states  such  as  Canada,  Sweden,  Australia,  and  The 
Netherlands,  according to Cooper (1997: 3 qtd Gareth Evans),  that  have pooled their 
resources and ploughed them into areas that have been and are able to generate returns 
worth having instead of trying to cover all areas. Various sets of measurable criteria - or 
behavioural tests (Cox 1996: 252) - are used to rank these groups of states; and based 
upon  these  they  are  distinguished  from  others,  namely  the  super  powers  and  small 
powers, because of their different capabilities (ibid 244, 252). Hamill & Lee (2001: 34) 
revealed  that  each  country’s  position  is  determined  by  aggregating  various  critical 
indicators of economic, military and strategic factors. They further argued that whilst it 
has  been  easy  to  differentiate  the  middle  powers  from  the  super  powers  using  the 
mentioned criteria, it has not been that simple to do so when wanting to tell them apart 
from small powers; a category that, I assume, critical theorists will not easily accept nor 
entertain since it further entrench the North-South divide along different lines. 
Defining ‘middle powers’ has not been an easy task as is shown by Schoeman’s (2000) 
study; he identified three aspects that help earmark a ‘middle power’ state. The first is the 
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position that middle powers hold are in relation to the great/major powers, and that their 
position points to a specific location within the broad state system based on the notion 
that there is a hierarchy of states. The second is that their size and rank, which were 
determined by the international system, placed them in an international division of labour 
and also offered  them the  opportunity  to  exercise  their  influence  in  the  international 
system.  And the third – here he makes  reference to  Robert  Cox -  is  that  the middle 
powers are closely connected to the international organization as a process (Cox 1996: 
243);  in  other  words  the  middle  power  state  supports  the  process  of  international 
organization because of its interest in maintaining a stable political system and orderly 
environment  via  legislating  international  law  (ibid).  The  middle  power  is,  in  effect, 
actively  involved  in  international  activities  to  secure  peace,  promote  security,  ensure 
global responsibility, resolve conflicts, bring an end to human rights abuses, and establish 
democracy. In Cox’s (1996: 244) informed opinion ‘… a commitment to orderliness and 
security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system 
are the critical elements for fulfilment of the middle power role.’ 
Schoeman (2000) distinguished between middle powers and emerging middle powers. 
These groups of states, namely Brazil and India, are in their own ways dominant regional 
powers, and also play different roles in the international system. They basically carry out 
the task of peace-maker in the region or try and broker peace in other parts of the world 
where the super powers have failed; for example, South Africa was requested to intervene 
and act as peace broker in Haiti, Kosovo, Palestine, East Timor, Burundi, and Sudan. The 
emerging middle powers’ functions differ slightly from the first wave of ‘middle powers’ 
that were generally subordinate to the super powers.
Hamill  & Lee  (2001:  35)  made  reference  to  Cooper,  Higgott  & Nossal’s  Relocating  
Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order  (Vancouver 1993) 
who made use of behavioural criteria, which posits the view that ‘to be included in the 
category of middle powers, countries have to act as middle powers.’ The common strand 
that connects these three forms is the diplomatic skill, which has been employed by them, 
in  the  service  of  foreign  policy  initiatives,  building  coalitions,  establish  formal 
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institutions, and work towards international peace and stability; the three forms that have 
been singled out were (a) catalysts, (b) facilitators, and (c) managers. 
When taking into account  the mentioned forms in conjunction with the aspects  listed 
prior  to  that  then  it  is  not  difficult  to  classify  South Africa  and Malaysia  as  middle 
powers.  With  respect  to  the  former,  Hamill  &  Lee  (2001:  37)  argued  that  it  is  an 
intermediary developed country, which has enough economic capabilities as well as the 
necessary military means to be ranked as a middle  power state.  Van der Westhuizen 
(1998: 436) had earlier posited the view that South Africa was an economic power house 
compared  to  its  neighbours  and  thus  automatically  found itself  in  the  middle  power 
category. The studies of Hamill & Lee and Van der Westhuizen were further supported 
by the views of other scholars such as Taylor (2001), Barber (2004) and Spence (2004). 
Table 4.1:
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Power Structures in 
International State System
Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Cameroon, 
Liberia, Senegal. Swaziland
Small Powers
Sweden, Netherlands, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, India, 
Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia
Middle Powers
USASuper Powers
Selected CountriesType
                                                                          
Nossal  &  Stubbs  (1997:  147),  however,  raised  the  critical  question:  ‘Mahathir’s 
Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?’ In response they demonstrated that Malaysia, 
which had a steady but sustained growth rate since the 1980s, did not – at the time of 
their  evaluation - achieve this  status even though Malaysia - under Mahathir’s  strong 
leadership such as championing the cause of the South and speaking out against the West 
– gained a high international profile in the view of the international community. When 
one takes into account the forms that Hamill & Lee mentioned then there is little doubt 
that Malaysia qualifies. A few examples will suffice to prove that it qualified to be ranked 
as a middle power state: (a) Malaysia has been intimately involved in building formal 
regional institutions such as ASEAN, (b) it initiated the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC),  and (c) it  has been instrumental  participating with other countries  in  peace-
keeping efforts in parts of Africa and elsewhere. 
In  any  case,  both  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  have  proven  to  possess  the  necessary 
qualifications, resources and capacity in being ranked as middle powers. Both countries 
have been guided by strong leaders and have proven their ability to steer their states into 
the international arena and face the diverse challenges. They might have been at variance 
with other middle powers such as Norway or Sweden when it came to applying their 
diplomatic skills,  but this should however not in any way disqualify them from being 
placed in this category. A fair amount of evidence exists that suggests both states have 
succeeded well in pursuing diplomatic and bilateral relations with states in different parts 
of the world. This they have been able to do through the formation of partnerships; a 
process  that  has  become  widespread  in  the  international  political  system  where 
governments  have  been  striving  to  stimulate  economic  growth and bring  about,  to  a 
certain extent, social equality and, to some degree, national autonomy – if that is ever 
possible – in the contemporary circumstances. ‘Partnerships’ have also been stressed by 
regional structures such as the African Union (AU) and ASEAN in their bid to promote 
trade and commerce with other regional partners.
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                         2.2 Partnership
The Asian-African Summit, which was held in Jakarta on the 22nd and 23rd of April 
2005 and which  was jointly  sponsored by South Africa  and Indonesia,  formulated  a 
strategic  partnership between Asia and Africa in order  to promote  cooperation in  the 
fields  of  economy,  investment,  technology   and  human  resources  development.  The 
crucial word used at this summit as well as other gatherings prior to this summit was 
‘partnership’;  what  does  the  word  mean  and  what  are  the  implications  when  it  is 
employed within these circles? The concept has been used as a way of advancing the 
interest  of  all  parties  involved  in  the  partnership.  A  helpful  point  to  start  is  a 
commonplace  source,  namely  the  Oxford  Advance  Learner’s  Dictionary  of  Current  
English (2001: 850); it offered the following meanings: (a) the state of being a partner in 
a business, (b) a relationship between two people, organizations, etc. and (c) a business 
owned by two or more persons who share the profits. A close look at these dictionary 
meanings reflected that each of them is interconnected. The last mentioned implies that 
the owners who own the business have a pure business relationship in which they have 
agreed upon the way the business should be managed and how the profits and losses 
should be shared.
Shifting from the dictionary understanding of the concept to another proffered by a New 
Straits  Times’  columnist,  John  K.S.  (2002:  11),  will  bring  out  a  slightly  different 
interpretation of the concept. He expanded on the notion of ‘partnership’ in his article 
entitled ‘Adopting Smart Partnership Ideals.’ John argued that the mode of partnership is 
premised upon two variables: (a) mutual respect for one another, and (b) trust to jointly 
take a risk and reward sharing. From this it is understood that all parties share equally and 
that they have a common goal and where both ‘act’ towards profit sharing; in others both 
win  through  the  process  of  action.  John  further  made  the  point  that  real  and  smart 
partnerships ‘must ensure that all parties in a venture experience a win.’ He referred to 
the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) that was initiated and promoted by Mahathir 
as a way of contributing towards South-South dialogue and cooperation. The LID forum 
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sought  to  develop  and  promote  a  smart  partnership  philosophy  of  ‘Prosper  Thy 
Neighbour;’  a philosophy that is somewhat  embedded within the religious philosophy 
that Mahathir espoused and followed as well as the ideas of Confucius that permeated the 
Asian continent. The relationship in this partnership is thus viewed as being one where 
there is mutual trust, respect and openness; within this type of partnership there is ample 
opportunity for dialogue, cooperation and collaboration in all spheres. This explanation 
links up with what Axelrod (2004: 9) had to say about the concept.  He stated that ‘a 
working definition of partnership is a collaborative relationship between entities to work 
towards shared objectives through mutually agreed division of labor.’ 
Another  dimension  of  the  notion  of  partnership  has  been  explained  by  a  group  of 
researchers who worked on the crime prevention project in South Africa. The National 
Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) requested that guidelines be worked out that would 
assist everyone in South Africa in fighting crime and which has become endemic in many 
parts of South Africa. The team (Nel et al 2000) produced a manual in which they viewed 
‘partnership’ as a key concept that would help stem the criminal tide and minimize its 
effects  on  different  levels  and  in  various  sectors.  Even  though  the  ideas  expressed 
regarding this concept have been confined to crime prevention, I am of the view that the 
concept, which they neatly unpacked and explained,  could be usefully appropriated in 
other areas such as International Relations. Nel et al (2000: 27) stated that ‘partnerships 
are a way of using the resources and skills in a community (and government) in such a 
way that all partners benefit….’ Partners, they argued (2000: 28), are not short-cut to 
obtain quick (financial)  rewards. By partnership is  meant  bringing groups together to 
participate  in  discussing  about  potential  business  projects,  consulting  one  another 
regularly, setting up the relevant structures, and balancing the competing interests. In this 
regard, Axelrod (2004: 9) highlighted the fact that ‘a partnership is not a gift … (but) 
aims to take advantage of what the recipient,  as well  as the donor (i.e.  the investing 
state/company), can bring to the relationship,’ and this would include local expertise and 
better understanding of the needs and priorities. And this further connects with the view 
expressed by Ingram (2004: xiv)  when he referred to Douglas North who stated that 
partnership should be viewed ‘as an instrument to build the institutional capacity that is 
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needed to improve economic performance.’ 
In the light of these definitions and explanations, one of the key principles of a smart, 
close and,  indeed,  strategic  partnership is  that  it  should be well  thought through, and 
should be considered as more important than who initiated the project or partnership. 
Within an open and trusting environment and a well planned partnership the individuals 
or  companies  that  enter  into  partnership  must  (a)  share  information,  (b)  coordinate 
activities, (c) identify,  (d) set priorities and (e) be accountable and transparent. In order 
for  these ingredients  to  flow smoothly within a  business  project,  a qualified  (foreign 
affairs) manager should be appointed; someone who is able to provide crucial leadership 
and who has a good understanding not only of the business but also of numerous other 
variables such as the cultural practices of the (foreign) companies that form part of the 
partnership. The pro-active foreign affairs manager should possess a vision and a plan of 
action that would advance the interest of all the partners involved, and he/she should be 
able to stimulate an interest in the project and have the skills that would easily access 
decision makers such as the foreign affairs ministry or the presidency. 
Habib & Selinyane  (2004: 56) cautioned those who entered into a  partnership not to 
romanticise it, and Kuseni (2004: 180) argued that for the state to move forward, business 
is a strategic ally of government in the creation of wealth. Since this is the case when 
reviewing the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia, the process of partnership 
or partnering becomes an important factor in achieving the common goals of both nation-
states.  He  added  that  their  interaction  within  the  global  economy  requires  sound 
partnerships. It is therefore assumed that when South Africa and Malaysia resumed their 
trade ties, and forged diplomatic bonds in 1993, they envisioned establishing and forming 
a worthy partnership in which both nation states would mutually benefit. In concluding 
the discussion on this concept, I wish to appropriate and adapt the ideas of Botchwey 
(2004: 101-102) who spoke about ‘giving partnership an operational meaning.’ In forging 
an effective partnership between, for example, a Malaysian company and South Africa, it 
should include the following components:
138
                                                                          
• Country (eg. South Africa) ownership of the agenda. This is broadly defined as 
leadership  by  the  recipient  country  (i.e.  South  Africa)  in  setting  the  agenda, 
mobilizing  and  coordinating  support  for  it,  and  sustaining  it  through  the 
intellectual and political commitment of the (South African) government and the 
broad  support  of  stakeholders,  based  upon  their  participation  in  the  policy 
making process and understanding the key objectives of the investment/project; 
• Support  by  the  (Malaysian)  investor  company  of  the  national  development 
agenda through an adaptation of their programs and administrative procedures to 
the recipient country’s (i.e. South Africa’s) national strategy and local conditions. 
This should be achieved through a consultative process, preferably conducted in 
the recipient country (South Africa); and
• A rationalization of the (Malaysian) investment programs and projects within the 
overall  framework of the (South African) national agenda, a harmonization of 
(the Malaysian) investor administrative procedures to ease pressure on country 
(i.e. South Africa’s) capacity.
The  conceptualization  of  ‘middle  powers’  and  ‘partnership’  in  the  afore-mentioned 
paragraphs and sections assist to frame the subsequent discussion that gives attention to 
the bilateral relations that developed between South Africa and Malaysia, two sovereign 
nation-states from the South. The conceptualization of these two terms helps to provide a 
fair  overview and a  better  understanding  of  the  South  Africa  and Malaysia’s  middle 
power status, on the one hand, and they also aid one in assessing and reflecting, on the 
other, upon the nature of the close partnership that has developed between South Africa 
and Malaysia since the beginning of the 1990s. Figure 4.1 below is an attempt to capture 
the  relationship  between  these  two  states  after  1994.  Whilst  it  might  be  well-nigh 
impossible to identify,  record and analyse most - if not all – of the activities that had 
taken place between these two states since official diplomatic ties were resumed in 1993 
until the end of 2005, an attempt will be made to, at least, demonstrate to what extent the 
socio-political ties developed and to what degree the commercial connections between 
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the two states transformed and changed their relations into a fairly close partnership. The 
following section thus first concentrates on the socio-political  bonds, and it thereafter 
discusses the commercial connections.
Figure 4.1
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3. South Africa and Malaysia’s Socio-Political Bonds:
            3.1 Their Partnership in the Making: The Tale of Cementing South – South 
      Connections
In identifying and analysing the partnership that has developed between South Africa and 
Malaysia,  the  following  section  wishes  to  review  the  respective  countries’  foreign 
policies; policies that have remained crucial issues in the critical tradition. Since these 
policies  did  not  emerge  within  a  vacuum,  but  alongside  socio-political  developments 
within the respective states, this  section of the chapter intends to make reference and 
record (some of) these developments. The purpose is to show how the domestic issues 
had  a  direct  and  indirect  bearing  and impact  on the respective  states’  foreign affairs 
decision making processes. The figure below provides a crude synopsis of South Africa’s 
foreign policy phases; this was adapted from Muller’s study (1999).
Figure 4.2:
3.2 Re-Connecting: from informal support to diplomatic ties
The  De  Klerk  regime’s  decision  to  lift  the  ban  on  the  South  African  liberation 
movements, free Nelson Mandela and terminate its nuclear deterrent program during the 
month  of  February  1990  was  a  welcome  move.  Externally,  the  pressure  had  been 
enormous  from the  side  of  the  external  actors  towards  South  Africa’s  political  and 
economic policies (Love 2005: 181). In order to understand the latter’s policies towards 
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South Africa during the pre-1994 period, Landsberg (2004: 12-13) pinpointed to three 
concurrent  dimensions:  (a)  a  political  transition  from apartheid  to  democracy,  (b)  an 
economic transition from a closed, white-dominated economy, to a gradually globalising, 
more open economy which increasingly strove for black participation, and (c) a military 
transition from resistance and armed struggle to democratic peace under democratic rule. 
As a result of these events, the National Party (NP) under De Klerk’s leadership and the 
ANC were forced to negotiate. The NP, the ANC under Mandela and a number of other 
bona fide stakeholders participated in the CODESA negotiations, which involved a fair 
amount  of  compromises;  these  negotiations  were  part  of  an  important  constitutional 
process that eventually produced the 1993 interim Constitution (Deegan 1999: 16-17); 
this  interim Constitution  contained a  few basic  values  such as ‘the rule  of  law,’  and 
‘freedom and equality’ that underpinned it and was thus able to take the South African 
society into a new era. 
During the  time when the  negotiations  were underway,  members  of  the  international 
community were spurred on by these socio-political developments in South Africa. Many 
showed an interest to forge links at various levels; some initiated diplomatic ties whilst 
others, being more circumspect, decided to wait for an official signal from the ANC to 
enter into a relationship with South Africa since they were aware that the UN sanctions 
were still firmly in place. Internally, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
was  also  gradually  being  overhauled  in  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  changing 
international environment. With its slow shift in foreign policy it set up in March 1992 a 
Multilateral Affairs division, which accommodated space for countries from Asia (Muller 
1999: 597). According to Landsberg (2004: 88), the De Klerk regime formulated three 
clear foreign policy strategies:
• Bringing to an end South Africa’s international ostracism and reintegrating it into 
the international community;
• Persuading the international community to end sanctions and support a liberal, 
free-market economic dispensation; and 
• Securing international backing for the NP’s goal of a consociational democratic 
dispensation in which (white) minorities would enjoy a veto right over decision 
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making in a majoritarian system.
Evans (1993: 4), the then Director-General of Foreign Affairs under Minister Pik Botha, 
shared his thoughts on the DFA; he showed how DFA positioned itself to adapt to the 
new situation  and how it  anticipated  significant  links  with  countries  in  Asia  and the 
Middle  East  (Pfister  2005:  125-130).  In  attempting  to  define  South  Africa’s  Foreign 
Policy in the new climate, Evans (1993: 8) acknowledged that it should be a continuous, 
dynamic process and promote the country’s vital interests. It is indeed ironic for someone 
who had been part of an apartheid foreign affairs outfit to suddenly come up with a list of 
factors such as ‘South Africa is part of the African continent, (that is) a reality which 
creates  a  whole series  of practical  interests,  needs,  common problems,  etc’  and ‘The 
South African government needs to be conscious of the major social and human problems 
of society’ that would provide parameters for South Africa’s policy determination (ibid 
9-10). He admitted that under the De Klerk’s regime since 1990 certain countries were 
targeted;  for example  in  Asia,  on the one level,  missions  were opened in  Singapore, 
Thailand, South Korea, and China and, on the other, channels of dialogue were created 
with  countries  such  as  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  Pakistan  and  India.  This  concretely 
demonstrated that De Klerk and his ilk thought they could steal a march on the ANC 
before  it  was  able  to  establish  a  democratic  government  (Pfister  2005:  130-139).  De 
Klerk was, it may be assumed, also aware that the ANC had ‘a distinctive international 
personality which enjoyed extensive legitimacy and enjoyed larger space in world affairs 
than did the South African state’ (Vale 1994: 80). There is no doubt that the apartheid 
South Africa under De Klerk’s leadership worked tirelessly at improving its international 
relations profile – part of what Evans (1993: 12-13) called the ‘image building’ process, 
and also opening up opportunities for its white dominated businesses to benefit before 
anyone else from South Africa would.
Turning our focus to Malaysia during the first three years of the 1990s, one witnesses 
some significant internal and external developments. Based on mere speculation, Hassan 
(1992:  29)  posits  the  notion  that  the  1990s  would  mark  the  watershed  decade  for 
Malaysia.  This  speculative  opinion  was  grounded  in  his  interpretation  of  Malaysia’s 
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ambitious  Vision  2020 plan  that  would  transform the  country  into  a  fully  developed 
country by the year 2020. Prior to peeping into this significant document, let me quickly 
record a few other developments before the document was issued.
Mahathir had been victorious in the late 1980s elections and he was able to continue his 
reign as Prime Minister into the 1990s. When the changes took place in South Africa, he 
adopted  a  cautious  approach  and  bided  his  time  until  the  circumstances  were  more 
favourable. Since he gained credibility within the ANC leadership and rank-and-file for 
his  tough  stand  against  apartheid  throughout  the  1980s,  he  was  in  constant 
communication  with the leadership.  In May 1990, when Nelson Mandela  was on his 
travels to Nigeria, Mahathir, as a member of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign 
Ministers  on  Southern  Africa  (CCFMSA),  met  Mr.  Mandela  in  person  in  Abuja. 
Subsequent  to  this  meeting  a  trip  was  planned  to  visit  a  few Asian  states  including 
Malaysia. In the meanwhile, the De Klerk regime was also hoping to lure Malaysia into 
allowing a mission to be set up; however, Mahathir was not willing to budge on this and 
not until after the ANC officially gave him permission. What this stance implied was that 
the  ANC was also  flexing  it  muscles  in  the  international  arena  to  compete  with  the 
‘reformist’  apartheid government  led by De Klerk.  Malaysia  was among the few that 
were not prepared to ‘break’ the sanctions that were still in place; its neighbours, namely 
Thailand and Singapore, saw the opportunity and allowed South African missions to be 
established  and  they  reciprocated  likewise.  As  already  noted,  Malaysia  threaded 
cautiously  and  showed  concern  not  to  fall  out  of  favour  with  the  ANC,  the  major 
stakeholder with whom the Barisan Nasional (BN) had strong links. A month or more 
before  Mandela  was  to  visit  Malaysia  the  BN,  which  fought  one of  its  most  crucial 
battles, was victorious at the polls and this placed Mahathir and his party in an extremely 
strong position. 
On the 3rd of November 1990 the BN hosted a dinner for Mandela when he came on visit 
as ANC’s deputy president. Mahathir’s speech reflected the joy the Malaysians shared 
with Mandela and the black South Africans. Whilst he lauded the transformations that 
were  taking  place,  he  reminded  the  audience  that  this  was  partly  because  of  the 
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international communities’ pressure on the apartheid regime under De Klerk. Mahathir 
promised Mandela that Malaysia will continue to apply the pressure until apartheid has 
been completely dismantled and requested that other states also adopt a similar attitude. 
He also declared that he was not in agreement with those Western states that were willing 
to reward De Klerk for the changes that the latter initiated, and as a CCFMSA member 
Malaysia continued to monitor the developments in South Africa. He also argued that 
democracy should not be taken for granted but should be nurtured and protected; this is 
indeed ironical since he flouted some of the basic democratic principles when he adopted 
a more authoritarian position during the final years as Malaysia’s Prime Minister. After 
consultation  with  the  ANC  during  Mandela’s  November  1990  visit  to  Malaysia  (cf. 
Mahathir  Speech  1990;  Makaruddin  2000),  which  had  been  experiencing  a  buoyant 
economy during that time, the Malaysian government approved the idea of building a 
working relationship with all the South African stakeholders at the socio-political  and 
cultural levels, and it pledged to support the ANC financially when it prepared itself for 
the polls in the future. 
When 1991 ushered in the BN announced the replacement of the NEP with the National 
Development  Policy/Plan  (NDP).  Its  announcement  and  introduction  was  indeed  a 
significant event in the Malaysians’ social history.  Many had expected the NEP to be 
scrapped with a new policy; one that would not ‘discriminate’ against the non-Malays. 
The NDP, according to Milne & Mauzy (1999: 74-75), has been more accommodating to 
the non-Bumiputras than the NEP and this thus tapered the tension among the ethnic 
groups. The new policy has also positively contributed to the alleviation of poverty in 
Malaysia. Although these were significant developments, they were and are, however, 
not enough since the ideal is to effectively bring an end to poverty and obliterate the 
tension that exist within the Malaysian society. 
Nonetheless, soon after the introduction of the NDP, Dr. Mahathir presented his speech 
entitled  Malaysia: The Way Forward  in which he had a vision of a  Bangsa Malaysia 
(Malaysia Nation) by the year 2020. This came to be referred to as  Malaysia’s Vision 
2020 document; a plan that was different from the NDP but one which complemented it. 
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It was meant to inspire and assist the Malaysians in transforming themselves in both the 
economic and social sectors into a ‘fully developed’ society. In his formulation of this 
document, Derichs (2001: 194) argued that Mahathir Mohamed and Anwar Ibrahim, his 
deputy as from December 1992 after he defeated Ghafar Baba in an UMNO contest, were 
fully aware of the impact of globalization in trade and industry,  and they decided that 
globalization should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a danger for Malaysia to 
promote  progress  and modernize.  And one of  the outcomes  of  this  decision was the 
Multimedia Super Corridor. 
Mahathir identified the variety of challenges, one of these being establishing ‘a united 
Malaysian  nation  with  a  sense  of  common  and  shared  destiny’  and  another  being 
‘fostering  and developing  a  mature  democratic  society’  (Milne  & Mauzy 1999:  165; 
Cheah 2002: 65-66). Hassan (1992: 29) argued that Vision 2020 encompassed Malaysia’s 
key domestic goals and aspirations for the following two decades. And he stated that the 
‘national unity’ has been ‘the overriding objective of all national policies,’ and that it has 
been the single most important challenge confronting the nation in its quest to become a 
fully  developed  country  by  the  year  2020.  Nation-building  thus  continued  to  be  of 
continuous concern for the Malaysian government and its multiracial society;  the non-
Malays were indeed satisfied with the Vision’s formulation because it counted them in 
and saw them as an integral  part  of Malaysia.  This was indeed a departure from the 
previous  policy  which  favoured  the  Malays  and  the  affirmative  action  project  that 
intended  to  rectify  the  imbalances  (also  cf.  Nazaruddin  Hj.  Mohd  Jali  et  al  2003: 
314-315); developments that were welcomed by political pundits and other observers. As 
far  as  Malaysia’s  ‘new  thinking’  in  foreign  policy  goes,  Nathan  (1995:  226-227) 
highlighted the fact that it ‘rests firmly on the assumption of a stable, Malay-led, multi-
ethnic Malaysia that is broadly capable of satisfying national aspirations across a wide 
spectrum of competing demands and interests.’ This document has not only inspired the 
Malaysians as a society to look towards the future, but it also gave other international 
communities the opportunity to adopt and adapt the document to suite their needs. Two 
examples from SADC member states will suffice; the one is Malawi’s Vision 2020 and 
the other is Botswana’s Vision 2016.
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Coming back to South Africa – Malaysia relations, one noted that after a long wait, the 
Malaysians eventually set  up a liaison office in Johannesburg during 1992; it  was an 
office  that  was  to  pursue  some  basic  field  work  in  order  to  suss  out  the  existing 
opportunities for potential Malaysian investors and corporations before formal diplomatic 
ties could be cemented. The office was a life-line between the Malaysian government and 
the office of the ANC, and, by then, a direct line of communication had been established 
between  Dr.  Mahathir  and  Mr.  Mandela  in  order  to  keep  tabs  on  the  internal 
developments and progress and also to provide the technical assistance to the ANC when 
necessary. The Malaysian liaison office fast tracked trade relations after sanctions were 
lifted, and along with the Malaysian Airlines company supervised the first MAS flight 
from Kuala Lumpur to Johannesburg during October 1992. 
Towards the end of 1993 the influential  Foreign Affairs  journal  published Mandela’s 
‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’ paper; in this particular paper Mandela stressed that 
human rights was going to be one of the key principles that would underpin democratic 
South Africa’s foreign policy (Venter 1997: 78; Suttner 1997: 300). This was indeed the 
case when the ANC and later Mandela, as the president of the new democratic state, got 
involved in the Nigerian affair (see later). Nevertheless, the ANC indicated in September 
1993 that an attempt was already underway to revamp the foreign affairs; this, however, 
seems to have begun only after certain technical changes had taken place (Muller 1997: 
63). More-or-less at the time Mandela and the ANC were busy preparing for their future 
role  in  the  new  South  Africa,  the  Malaysian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  gave  the 
Malaysian Federation of National Writers’  Union (GAPENA) under the leadership of 
Tan  Sri  Professor  Drs  Ismail  Hussein  from  the  National  University  of  Malaysia 
permission  to  travel  with  a  contingent  of  about  50  academics  and non-academics  to 
participate in seminar that was held at the University of the Western Cape during April; 
this was the first formal cultural links that was made between Malaysia and South Africa 
bearing in mind that Malaysia had lifted the people-to-people sanction at the end of 1991 
in  accordance  with  the  Harare  Declaration  of  Commonwealth  Heads  of  State  in 
Zimbabwe (cf. Haron 2005: 54-55). And by the 25th of September Malaysia lifted all the 
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sanctions and on the 8th of November 1993 it established formal diplomatic ties with 
South Africa; its High Commission subsequently replaced the one that was located in 
Harare to represent Malaysia in the region. South Africa reciprocated when it established 
an Embassy on the 17th of January 1994; this Embassy was eventually transformed into a 
High Commission when South Africa formally re-joined the Commonwealth (Mills 1997: 
192). When returning to November 1990, Dr. Mahathir had, by then, pledged Malaysia’s 
moral and financial support to the ANC. And it fulfilled this promise when UMNO gave 
the ANC financial support to prepare for the historic 1994 April elections. 
3.3 Being Connected: From diplomatic ties to a sustained relationship
The formation  of  diplomatic  ties  between the two states  at  the  end of  1993 and the 
beginning  of  1994  demonstrated  that  both  states  were  deeply  committed  to  pursue 
bilateral relations; one avenue to concretize this was through developing strong trade and 
commercial connections. Even though the bilateral relations were particularly reflected 
during the early years at the state-to-state level, interest was also expressed at the people-
to-peoples level in the sizeable Cape Malay community; the earlier mentioned example of 
GAPENA’s  visit  was  one  such  case.  Another  example  was  when Riedewaan  Isaacs, 
Abdul Gamiet Flax and Mohamed Hussein Bux, three ‘self-appointed’ members of the 
community, created the South African Malay Chamber of Business (SAMCB) and went 
on a fact finding ‘Mission to Malaysia’ with the hope of striking business partnerships 
with counterparts in Malaysia. Although the visit, which took place between the 3rd and 
the 11th of February 1994, was considered successful by the three man delegation, there 
is  no  tangible  evidence  that  suggests  that  they  were  able  to  make  inroads  into  the 
Malaysian business sector. One reason for this was that the business culture was very 
different from that practiced among the Cape Malays, and the other was that the Cape 
Malays  could not compete with the types  of businesses owned by the Malays  or the 
Bumiputra in Malaysia; they did not possess the necessary finances and nor did they have 
any financial backing. In addition, they also did not have the specific business skills, and 
may generally be described as opportunists who tried their luck during a period when 
Malay businesspersons from Malaysia  demonstrated a fair amount of empathy for the 
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Cape Malays and were prepared to pursue joint ventures. Very few of these joint ventures 
- as far as could be ascertained – took off as planned, and many others grinded to a halt 
because  the  Malaysians  realised  that  the  Cape  Malay  partners  did  not  possess  the 
necessary business clout, financial support and the required skills.
 
During the month of March 1994 the Malaysian government agreed to bestow the Tun 
Abdul Razak International Award on Mr. Nelson Mandela,  who was then the ANC’s 
president,  for  being  in  the  vanguard  of  fighting  against  apartheid;  the award was,  in 
effect,  only  accepted  on  the  10th of  August  1994,  a  few months  after  Mr.  Mandela 
became the president of South Africa. When Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first 
president of the new democratic South Africa on the 10th of May 1994, Malaysia was 
amongst the many governmental representatives from various parts of the Asian world 
who attended the auspicious occasion. In fact, soon after the elections Mahathir made a 
one day private visit to congratulate Mr. Mandela on his appointment. The presence of 
these states and the personal initiatives that were made by statesmen such as Mahathir 
were clear indications that they came to celebrate with all South Africans this unique 
historical event in which some of them indirectly contributed. It was also a reflection of 
the change of attitude in the world towards South Africa and it’s newly elected GNU. 
In the socio-cultural  arena  mention  should be made of  the  fact  that  Dato Najib  Tun 
Razak, (then) Malaysia’s Minister of Defence and presently the Deputy Prime Minisiter, 
represented  Malaysia  at  a  significant  cultural  event  in  Cape  Town.  This  event  was 
organized  by  South  Africa’s  ‘Cape  Malays’  and  it  celebrated  the  Muslims  300 year 
presence on South African soil (cf. Ward 1996; Jeppie 1996). Although this was a one-off 
event, it created opportunities for representatives from the Muslim community to pursue 
cultural  relations with Malaysia  via the good offices of the Minister of Defence. In a 
related sphere - by the end of 1994 - Malaysia welcomed many South African students to 
be trained in areas such as Information Technology and engineering. In the process many 
MoUs  were  signed  between  South  Africa’s  Ministry  of  Education  and  academic 
institutions  in  Malaysia.  This  was  thus  in  addition  to  the  increasing  number  of 
investments  that  Malaysian  business  persons  have  been  making  in  various  sectors  in 
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South Africa between 1993 and 1996 (cf. Padayachee & Valodia 2000). 
After the 1994 elections the South African society was slowly transformed via a process 
of ingenious social engineering - on the part of the new democratic government as well as 
other players – to overcome its past.  One such social  construction was the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (cf. Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 1999; James & De 
Vijfer 1999; Haron 2002). Even though it never fully succeeded to bring the perpetrators 
to book for the heinous crimes that they committed throughout the apartheid era, it was a 
strategic mechanism and institution that assisted to help South Africans to deal with their 
past and work towards nation-building (cf. Baines 1998). This structure as well as others 
such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which was subsequently 
replaced by Growth, Economic and Redistribution Program (GEAR), was an attempt to 
bring about significant changes in the society internally. However, on the external plain, 
South Africa was the new democratic kid on the bloc; one that was the most sought after 
state on the African continent  with which to have bilateral  and multilateral  ties since 
Mandela’s inauguration. This had also partly to do with Mr. Mandela’s status in the eyes 
of the international community. South Africa was basically under the spell of ‘Madiba’s 
magic.’  Whilst  it  is acknowledged that Mandela was the key political  figure in South 
African  international  affairs,  it  cannot  be  denied  South  Africa’s  mineral  and  other 
resources  as  well  as  a  strong  infrastructure  caught  the  eye  of  many  politicians  and 
business persons from many parts of the world. Their interest to forge ties with South 
Africa was not for mere political objectives but more importantly for economic purposes. 
Whilst the formation of relations with more than a 160 countries was a plus at the time, it 
was  also  a  minus  in  that  South Africa’s  DFA was still  stuck  in  the  past  with white 
decision makers of the apartheid regime still calling the shots (Kornegay & Landsberg 
2000: 33) and, it may be assumed, ANC members with years of experience in IR were, 
for a while, left out in the cold instead of being brought on board. One example that 
comes to mind is the position that was Mr. ‘Rusty’ Evans’ - a hard-line apartheid foreign 
affairs fellow; the latter retained his position as the Director-General of the DFA for quite 
a while after South Africa became a democracy. The DFA made no effort to have him 
150
                                                                          
replaced  during  those  crucial  years  of  transformation  (Muller  1997:  64).  That  aside, 
foreign policy making was – at that time - a muddled affair and one that might have 
appeared new but was indeed old and stagnant. In fact, Venter (1997: 77) observed that 
there was lack of a coherent policy framework and the absence of a  White Paper on 
Foreign Policy has resulted in an eclectic approach. He made reference to Nkuhlu (1995) 
who stated that the DFA could afford to construct  a ‘rainbow (foreign) policy’  for it 
could be everything to everyone. 
The GNU’s aspirations, according to Cilliers (1999:55), have been partly attributed to a 
foreign policy that ‘reflected the values explicit  in the constitutional settlement’.  Vale 
(1994: 81) described the foreign policy status aptly when he said that ‘South Africa’s 
‘new’ foreign policy suffers from a crisis of multiple identities.’ This identity crisis spilt 
over into other sectors of the government (as well as the South African society) and there 
was an urgent need to attend to its affairs. It, indeed, took a while for the new South 
Africa to break loose from the apartheid foreign policy ghost, which was essentially an 
elitist,  non-transparent  structure.  It  was  inevitable  that  South  African’s  DFA  under 
Madiba’s  leadership  consciously  planned to  reconstruct  its  ties  with  the  international 
community particularly those that were ignored by the apartheid regime that had favoured 
its relationship with the Western world. Whilst it maintained and did not reduce links 
with the Western states (Muller 1997: 59), it gradually shifted to begin a relationship with 
many African, Latin American and Asian states; Malaysia being amongst the many.
Returning to the relationship that has been strengthening year after year between South 
Africa and Malaysia since 1992, it was not surprising that Malaysia reflected an interest 
in  most  of  South  Africa’s  good  quality  products.  Since  Malaysia  was  an  emerging 
‘middle power’ state with a strong economy, stable society and an influential leadership, 
it demonstrated special interest in some of South Africa’s high quality defence material. 
South Africa along with many other arms producers was invited by Malaysia to exhibit 
its  defence equipment  at  the Langkawi Arms Fair  (cf.  Juhaidi Yean Abdullah 1995). 
Malaysia was keen on purchasing the Rooivalk helicopters that South Africa produced. 
On an official visit in January 1995 Mr. Joe Modise, the then South African Minister of 
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Defence, went to finalize some of the Defence agreements that were processed between 
the two states. Perhaps a question needs to be raised with regards to such agreements: 
why is Malaysia so keen on beefing up its military when there is dire need to reduce arms 
trade? And why is South Africa persisting in increasing arms trade with African and 
Asian states? For those critical of realism, the ‘arms trade’ would be considered one of 
the  problematic  issues  in  the  contemporary  international  system  because  instead  of 
reducing  conflict  ‘middle  power’  states  such  as  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  are 
contributing to it – directly or indirectly; and through their actions in manufacturing and 
acquiring arms they maintain an imbalance rather than bringing about a balance within 
the international system. Nonetheless, it is not the intention to find or proffer answers for 
these and other related questions; they should, however, be posed to reflect critically on 
how these two nation-states view themselves within the international system in the years 
and decades to come. 
During July 1995 Mahathir initiated the Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) smart 
partnership  project  which  dedicated  itself  to  South–South  cooperation.  And Malaysia 
considered South Africa as one of the most important states from the developing world in 
this partnership, and it thus extended an open invitation to the South African government 
to be at all the planned LID gatherings. The first LID meeting took place before South 
Africa appointed its first High Commissioner to Malaysia, namely Ms. M. Mohale. And 
by  August  1995  Mahathir  paid  an  official  visit  to  South  Africa  in  order  to  sign 
agreements and deepen the relationship that had already been cemented. Mahathir spoke 
about  the long association  that  existed  between the two countries  at  a  special  dinner 
hosted by the then second GNU Deputy President of South Africa, Mr. F.W. De Klerk. 
In his speech the Malaysian Prime Minister noted that the volumes of trade increased 
soon after the links had been forged between the two states in 1993. And he was upbeat 
about  the  joint  low-cost  housing  project  that  Malaysians  and  South  Africans  have 
embarked upon in Gauteng (Jesudasan 1996: 212), and reminded De Klerk that he was 
fully aware of the RDP in which Malaysia had similar experiences. Mahathir extended an 
invitation  to  participate  in  ventures  that  result  in  a  win-win  situation  and  a  shared 
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prosperity. He commended the South Africans for being able to overcome the hardships 
of the past through the process of reconciliation (cf. Mahathir Speech 1995). 
In  a  speech  to  the  South  African  business  community  in  Cape  Town  Mahathir 
emphasised ‘the vote of confidence’ that Malaysia’s business community has shown in 
the future prospects in South Africa. He commented on the strong bilateral relations that 
have developed between the two countries based upon the growing trade activities. In the 
trade sector he also pointed out the types of products that Malaysians would be interested 
in as part of enhancing the links between the two states (cf. Mahathir Speech 1995a). 
Mahathir’s speech fingered all the positive developments that his country was involved in 
and the positive outcomes taking place in South Africa that he was able to see from a 
distance.  In this  speech there appeared to have been no room for negative or critical 
comments. It is assumed that at such gatherings there is no room for critical comments of 
any kind for  they are  basically  unsuitable  or  inappropriate.  Since Malaysia  has  been 
involved in partnerships with many other nation-states, one would like Mahathir to have, 
at  least,  cautioned  the  business  community  of  the  pitfalls  in  doing  business  in  one 
another’s  countries  and  to  have  advised  them  to  create  early  warning  systems  and 
mechanisms that would assist in avoiding possible failures in business ventures; alas, this 
was not  to  be.  In fact,  if  Mahathir  had highlighted  the negative  aspects  vis-à-vis  the 
positive dimensions it would have provided a list of helpful hints to the potential business 
partners as to how they should work towards strengthening the emerging bilateral links. It 
would  also  have  shown  to  what  extent  the  political  leadership  was  prepared  to 
acknowledge  their  own  pitfalls  in  the  interest  of  having  firm  bilateral  relations  and 
forging a close partnership.
Subsequent to Mahathir’s official visit, Mr. Yahaya Ahmed, the Chairperson of Proton – 
Malaysia’s  foremost  car  company,  led a delegation of 250 business persons to  South 
Africa to scout for investment opportunities.  Soon after  this significant visit,  one was 
forced  ask:  What  has  happened  after  this  prominent  visit?  Did  all  members  of  this 
business delegation invest immediately after their departure? Why have only a handful of 
Malaysians decided to take the risk of investing in South Africa? In order to respond to 
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these questions, many factors should be taken into account. Two factors that played a 
critical role in venturing to pursue business may be cited: the first is that the business 
cultural  practices  are  not  the  same  in  the  two  countries  and  the  second  is  that  the 
economic status of the two states was also somewhat different. And since this delegation 
was led by Proton’s chairperson, it is quite interesting to have observed that it took more 
than a decade for Proton to finally enter the South African market; as a matter of fact, it 
officially found a foothold into the car market  after  a fair  amount  of negotiations  by 
August 2005 – more than ten years after the chairperson’s visit! Why did it take this 
company such a long time to open up offices in South Africa? With hindsight one can, on 
the one hand, attribute this to the economic meltdown in Southeast Asia in general and 
Malaysia in particular, and, on the other, one may ascribe this to status of the car market 
in South Africa as well wanting to build a sound partnership between Malaysians and 
South Africans through these specific investments and projects.
Since South Africa’s GNU restructured its position within the international arena, it had 
to carefully review its IR agenda and its foreign policy behaviour. One hard lesson South 
Africa learnt during the first year of the democracy was not to assume a principled role in 
trying  to  resolve  regional  and  continental  issues.  One  specific  example  was  when 
Mandela failed in his intervention efforts to resolve the Ken Saro-Wiwa affair in Nigeria. 
Mandela responded by requesting Nigeria to be suspended by the Commonwealth as a 
method of  punishing  President  Abacha’s  actions.  This  caused a  stir  within  the OAU 
crowd who basically did not support and heed Mandela’s call. He thus had to make an 
about turn on this issue; as fate would have it, President Abacha died and he was replaced 
by Mr. Obasanjo with whom Mandela forged a sound relationship. In fact, Mandela was 
also severely criticized for not having been in close contact with representatives of the 
Nigerian civil society in order to have found a reasonable solution to the issue (Henwood 
1996: 260-262; Venter 1997: 91-95; Landsberg 2004: 176-178). This and other failed 
interventions  by  South  Africa,  noted  by  Venter  (1997:  88-91),  Landsberg  (2004: 
163-165) and others, in its neighbourhood (Lesotho) and in other parts of the continent 
(Angola) led Maxi Schoeman (quoted in Naidu 2004: 218) to appropriately observe that 
South Africa struggled (in the first few years) to be accepted in the African circles as a 
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viable  leader  because  its  foreign  policy;  a  policy  that  was  embedded  in  ‘liberal 
democratic values,’ which were basically associated with the West, and this was thus 
perceived  to  be  contrary  to  the  ‘African  way’  of  doing  things.  And  these  negative 
developments led some to question South Africa’s status as an emerging middle power 
that has the capacity and ability to play the role as ‘peace maker.’ Nevertheless, it is for 
this very reason that Mbeki worked towards reversing this negative perception when he 
gave his famous ‘I am an African’ speech on the 8th of May 1996 and charted out a 
vision in the form of an ‘African Renaissance’ strategy (see Chapter Six).
These  negative  developments  were  in  a  sense  a  wake  up  call  to  the  South  African 
government;  these developments pushed the DFA under the leadership of Mr. Alfred 
Nzo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to not only restructure the directorates within DFA 
by mid 1995 (Muller 59-60), but more importantly to prepare and issue an important 
discussion foreign policy document that would rid itself from its apartheid legacy and 
guide it into the future. The 1996  South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document 
(FPDD),  which  should  be  read  alongside  other  DFA  policy documents  such  as 
Transformation Document: Core Business of the DFA  and  National External Security  
Strategy: Draft input to the Growth and Development Strategy (NESS), was prepared and 
written  at  a  critical  juncture  during South Africa’s  first  few years  of  democracy;  the 
document not only radically shifted away from the apartheid approach to international 
relations but reformulated its policies on foreign affairs matters and IR issues in order to 
make itself relevant in the contemporary global world. NESS, according to Landsberg 
(2004: 189), promoted a significant external strategy when it identified partnership as a 
key vehicle in building a regional and global environment of peace and stability. South 
Africa stood out as an excellent example of a country that was able to shift from a ‘pariah 
state’ position to ‘good world citizen’ being prepared to contribute to regional and global 
peace. And as an important member of the ‘global south’ it would - in the interest of the 
latter - engage with the industrialised North to bring about social equality and reverse the 
uneven  development  brought  about  by  the  process  of  globalization  (cf.  Poku  2001: 
17-20). In this  regard,  the South African government  seriously considered the FPDD, 
which accentuated and identified the following issues (Landsberg 2004: 180):
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• The globalization of the world economy; 
• The growing importance of multilateralism; 
• Enhancing regional and continental cooperation;
• The electronics revolution and information superhighway;
• The growing – no diminishing - gap between the North and the South;
• The growing complexity of technological issues;
• The focus of good governance, human rights and democracy; and
• The redefinition  of  international  security  to  encompass  greater  dimensions  of 
human security.
These  crucial  issues  affected  South  Africa’s  socio-economic  and  political  position 
directly,  and  it  was  thus  viewed  as  major  areas  of  concern.  In  addition  to  these 
developments the interim Constitution also gave parliament a more active role in foreign 
policy  formulation.  And  as  a  result  of  the  Constitutional  support,  the  Parliamentary 
Portfolio  Committee on Foreign Affairs  was established (cf. Henwood 1996:246;  van 
Wyk 1997: 192-194).
Towards the end of March 1996 the first significant ‘Asian Tigers and African Lions 
Business Conference’  was organized in Johannesburg by Dr.  Denis Worrall’s  Omega 
Investment Research unit; at this conference Mr. Thabo Mbeki, the then Deputy President 
of South Africa, gave the opening address on the 26th of March in which he reflected on 
the transition in South Africa and the desire to follow the example of the Asian tigers in 
achieving ‘high rates of growth on a sustained basis.’ He highlighted what measures were 
being taken by the South African government to open up opportunities for the economy 
to grow. Mr. Mbeki emphasised the emerging relationship between Asia and Africa and 
the need for South-South cooperation and reminded the delegates of their position within 
NAM (Mbeki  Speech  1996a).  Mr.  Mbeki’s  speech like  Mahathir’s  earlier  mentioned 
diplomatic discourse was positive; it was upbeat about the relationship between the two 
regions/continents and was optimistic about the transformation that was taking place in 
South Africa. No negative or critical  remarks were entertained for, it  appears, that he 
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wanted the potential Asian tigers businesses that were attending the conference to view 
South Africa in a positive light and as a viable economic destination. Mbeki should have 
cautiously  advised  the  participants  about  the  strengths  and  the  weaknesses  of  South 
Africa and guided them as to how they should try to overcome the obstacles that they 
might face during South Africa’s transformation process and in doing business. In fact, 
from a  critical  perspective  stressing  the  shortcomings  of  the  evolving  socio-political 
process in South Africa would have provided the potential investors with a more realistic 
picture of the way things were developing in South Africa. This realistic and tangible 
presentation  of  the  economic  status  in  South  Africa  would  perhaps  have  helped  the 
potential Asian tigers to have taken the risk of prudently injecting their foreign direct 
investment  into  the  country  without  expecting  immediate  financial  kick-backs  and 
turnovers. Maybe one should not expect too much from diplomats and politicians who, in 
their flowery speeches, wish to ‘sell’ their state as ‘possible product’ without taking into 
account  the  inherent  shortcomings  that  also  need  to  be  highlighted  for  the  potential 
partner.
It is indeed quite coincidental that during the month of May 1996 that Anwar Ibrahim, 
Malaysia’s deputy Prime Minister and Mbeki, South Africa’s second deputy president, 
addressed audiences in their respective regions on the Asian and African Renaissance; 
issues  that  will  be  given  separate  attention  later  in  one  of  the  following  chapters. 
Nevertheless, one of the spin-offs of conferences such as the one recorded earlier was the 
formation of the first South Africa – Malaysia Forum that further cemented the relations 
between South Africa and Malaysia. Concrete evidence of the ongoing ties that was being 
forged was when Petronas, Malaysia’s petroleum company, invested 30% in Engen, the 
South  African  petroleum  company.  And  this  was  further  bolstered  when  Malaysia’s 
Minister of Defence, Sayed Hamid Albar, came on an official visit to South Africa in 
order to sign an MoU on military cooperation between the two states during November 
1996. 
By 1996 Mahathir, who was still in the Malaysian driving seat, was shown and given a 
great  deal  of  respect  by the  Malaysians  and by the  peoples  from the  South.  He,  for 
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example, demonstrated his ant-Zionist stance and spoke out against the atrocities of the 
Israelis against the Palestinians. The PLO under Yassar Arafat had been on good terms 
with the Malaysian government and had on a few occasions visited Kuala Lumpur. It was 
also during 1996 that he adopted an Islamization posture with regards to transformation 
and this  meant  that  Mahathir  challenged  PAS,  the  opposition  party  and the  one  that 
remains dominant in Kelantan as the representative of Islamic leadership in Malaysia. In 
fact, PAS and Dar Al-Arqam, a Muslim organization that was subsequently banned by 
Mahathir for its ideas and practices (Mohamad 2002: 210), challenged UMNO’s religious 
legitimacy for quite some time (Jesudasan 1996: 2002). He thus created structures such as 
PERKIM  that  advanced  the  Islamic  cause  in  Malaysia  (Camroux  1996:  856-863). 
Although  Mahathir  has  not  sought  for  the  formation  of  an  Islamic  state,  he  tried  to 
portray  a  modern  Islam;  an  Islam that  was  vibrant  and  that  could  accommodate  all 
perspectives and communities of diverse backgrounds. He took this road as opposed to 
the road taken by PAS; a party that has been bent on wanting to establish an Islamic state 
in Malaysia (cf. Martinez 2001a). 
In the international arena during early March of 1997, which coincided with the ANC’s 
‘Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa’s Foreign Policy’ that was circulated 
for discussion and whilst the debate of Islamization was raging on within the Malaysian 
civil society, Mr. Mandela led a strong delegation of 105 persons on an official visit to 
Malaysia. At the state banquet on the 7th of March, Mr. Mandela praised the Malaysians 
for  their  commitment  towards  Africa  as  a  whole  and South  Africa  in  particular  and 
admired the country for its sense of purpose as embodied in its Vision 2020 (cf. Nathan 
1996; Derichs 2001) that was launched by Mahathir in 1991. And during this important 
visit he also delivered a lengthy speech to the South Africa – Malaysia Forum on the 8th 
of March; in his speech, he was cheerful when he reported that Telekom-Malaysia and 
SBC  Communications  succeeded  in  their  bid  for  a  30%  stake  in  South  Africa’s 
Telecommunications Corporation (cf. Burrows 1997: 103). 
On this  positive  note,  Mr.  Mandela  was hopeful  that  this  agreement  consummated  a 
strong and firm phase in the relations between the two states. Mandela (1997a) expressed 
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the view that  it  constituted ‘a platform for greater things to come’,  and he conveyed 
optimism when he stated that since the delegation’s arrival in Malaysia ‘we have felt the 
pulse of this partnership-in-the-making’. On the same day he also gave a speech at the 
launch of the Malaysia – South Africa Business Council; he was extremely glad that this 
council was formed for it was yet another sign that the business communities in both 
countries  were  serious  about  enhancing  the  trade  ties  and  commercial  connections 
between South Africa and Malaysia. He also observed that it was ‘a valuable avenue for 
tapping  experience  and skills,  and  a  window on new and exciting  opportunities’  (cf. 
Mandela Speech 1997b). Since Mandela gave these important speeches I am somewhat 
compelled  to  ask:  what  was  the  nature  of  the  ‘partnership-in-the-making’?  At  that 
juncture it was gradually blossoming into a close partnership with the hope of developing 
into a strategic partnership. Regrettably the number of Malaysian investors did not swell 
into large numbers - as might have been expected - between 1993 and 1997. Padayachee 
and  Vahed (2000),  who concretely  showed that  Malaysian  direct  investments  slowly 
trickled into South Africa,  argued that these financial  indicators could not be used as 
proof that a strategic partnership had been forged or was in the making. In fact, there was 
a concern that even though the political  leadership was fairly optimistic,  the business 
community demonstrated a degree of hesitancy in taking investment risks. And since the 
potential businesses were still dragging their feet to make decisions and take the risks, it 
was  going  to  take  a  long  while  before  the  relationship  between  South  Africa  and 
Malaysia transforms itself into ‘a strategic partnership.’ 
These issues are also related to the observations Mandela made in his second speech. 
When  reviewing  his  comments  on  tapping  experiences  and  skills  within  the  South 
African society,  it has been noted that no genuine effort has been made by the South 
African business community to tap and train local/national (disadvantaged) talent to help 
strengthen the emerging business projects and partnerships; and if it had been so then we 
would  have  seen  a  substantial  contribution  in  the  commercial  arena.  Mandela  in  his 
address  also  spoke  about  the  investments  and ties  benefiting  the  poor.  Unfortunately 
more than ten years has passed and South Africa as well as Malaysia has fallen short of 
some of their noble goals such as eradicating poverty. For example, the Orang Asli as 
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well as poorer states (i.e. provinces) such as Kelantan in Malaysia have not reaped from 
the economic profits and nor have the poor disadvantaged communities in South Africa’s 
urban and rural areas receive the necessary financial injections as expected. Ten years 
have passed and nothing substantial has reached the tables of the poor whose numbers 
have  increased  in  South  Africa.  Many black  graduates  –  potential  entrepreneurs  that 
Mandela alluded in his talk - are jobless and this has added to the numbers that have 
remained unemployed since before South Africa became a democracy.  It is conditions 
such as these that coerce critical theorists to question the intention of the political leaders 
of these nation-states and question whether international relations will ever be written 
from  ‘the  point  of  view  of  the  interests  and  aspirations  of  the  impoverished 
South’ (Murphy 2001: 70).
Nonetheless, the culmination of Mandela and the delegation’s official trip resulted in him 
signing  the  47th trade  agreement  between  the  two  countries.  Later  that  year 
representatives of the two states also signed other trade agreements as well as shipping 
agreements and Malaysia approached South Africa on the possibility of concluding inter  
alia Technical  and Scientific  agreements.  And after  Mahathir  participated  in  the first 
Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID), which emerged out of LID, he passed 
through South Africa where he was conferred the Cape of Good Hope award for his role 
in international affairs and for having given unstinting support to South Africa; this took 
place on the 7th of May.
By mid 1997 the Asian tigers experienced an economic meltdown and this negatively 
affected the investments that  these countries made in different parts of the world; the 
crises continued into 1998 (cf. Kunis 1998; 161-175; Chin 1998: 183-189; Setboonsarng 
1998: 18-36). Some of the Malaysian companies that  invested in South Africa had to 
wind down their investment plans and others had to slowly withdraw in order to save 
themselves  from bankruptcy (cf. Mills  1998: 365-371).  South African companies  that 
opened  up  offices  and  branches  in  Malaysia  were  naturally  also  affected  and  were 
obliged to make alternative plans. But despite these set-backs and whatever was left of 
the relationship between South Africa and Malaysia in the aftermath of this event, the 
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(weakened) economic ties between these two states persisted.  
3.4 Consolidating Connections: Laying Foundations for a Partnership
During the early part of 1998 Mr. Mbeki delivered his well known African Renaissance 
speech which echoed similar ideas embedded in the Asian Renaissance speech that was 
made by the former deputy prime minister  of Malaysia,  namely Dato Anwar Ibrahim 
(1996) and those made by Dr. Mahathir (cf. Makaruddin 2000; also see Chapter Six the 
section on ‘Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance’). When Mills (1999: 391) 
published his article ‘Malaysian Economic Crisis: A Comparative Perspective,’ he quoted 
a few lines from Anwar Ibrahim’s speech and illustrated how similar they were to those 
echoed  by  Mbeki.  The  African  Renaissance  speech,  which  invigorated  some  debate 
within South African academic circles, was welcomed in some - and not all - quarters on 
the African continent. Nevertheless, it stimulated pockets of Africans to reconsider their 
position within world affairs. Mbeki’s thoughts on this theme were also similar in content 
to those delivered by Mahathir when the latter spoke about and elaborated upon ‘Asian 
Values.’ Mbeki highlighted African values, which were and remain rooted in the concept 
of Ubuntu(i.e. humaneness). 
When the 12th Non-Aligned Movement  meeting  was organized  and hosted  by South 
Africa between the 29th of August and the 3rd of September of 1998, South Africa took 
over the chair and thus demonstrated its ability to lead NAM members into the years that 
followed.  It  was  within  NAM that  both  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  found  an  added 
avenue via which they continued to show warmth and friendship towards one another. 
And  this  was  given  added  weight  when  Mr.  Mbeki  visited  Malaysia  during  mid 
September to be at the Commonwealth Games and at the same time pay a visit to the 
Malaysian government that was publicly celebrating its ‘Malaysian Identity’ and using 
‘sport’ as an instrument of foreign policy (cf. van der Westhuizen 2004: 1285-1288). 
The recession and economic slump continued into 1998 and this meant that Malaysia had 
to brace itself for the coming years. As it was trying to manage the crisis, Mahathir used 
the opportunity to criticize the international media for the negative reporting of Malaysia, 
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accused  the  USA  of  meddling  in  Malaysian  affairs,  and  question  IMF’s  tough 
prescriptions (Felker 1999: 43-54; Funston 2000: 167). Whilst his tough stand against 
these institutions might be considered understandable in the light of the crisis and the 
speculations regarding the cause of the crisis, it came as a shock to the Malaysian nation 
when  Mahathir  consciously  decided  to  sack  his  well-liked,  popular  deputy,  Anwar 
Ibrahim on the 2nd of September 1998. Funston (2000) titled his article ‘Malaysia: A 
Fateful September’ to capture the mood of that particular month. Prior to this – at the 
UMNO general assembly of June 1998 - a booklet entitled  Fifty Reasons why Anwar 
cannot be Prime Minister  was circulated to its almost 2000 members and this caused a 
rift within the party; those who fully endorsed Ibrahim’s candidacy for the post as Prime 
Minister  questioned the purpose of the text  and in reaction raised corruption charges 
against  government as well as the nepotistic behaviour by government officials (Case 
1999: 2-6; Verma 2004: 147-148; Funston 2000: 170-171; Eldridge 2002: 108-110). 
Anwar Ibrahim’s  sacking  and his  subsequent  incarceration  was indeed a  blow to  the 
image of Malaysia  for he was seen – at that  time - as the most obvious successor to 
Mahathir.  Milne  &  Mauzy  (1999:  156)  identified  three  key  reasons  for  Mahathir’s 
actions:  (a)  Ibrahim’s  conservative  economic  policies,  (b)  signs  of  militancy  and 
aggressiveness  displayed  within  Ibrahim’s  wide  spread  support  group particularly  the 
UMNO youth and (c) the perception that Ibrahim had weakened due to the character 
attacks against him. These authors (1999: 156-157) demonstrated how Mahathir used his 
executive powers to slowly elbow Ibrahim out of office as Deputy Prime Minister. In 
fact, this acrimonious event tangibly demonstrated that Mahathir’s actions was that of an 
authoritarian who disregarded the rule of law and employed unsavoury tactics to get rid 
of anyone that opposed him. Mahathir did not give any credence to the ‘emancipatory 
project’ when he exercised his executive powers and nor did he take cognizance of the 
oppositional voices that echoed far and wide across Malaysia. 
Apart from the Ibrahim episode, Khoo (2000: 170-175) recorded other developments that 
added to the crisis. The one was the question of reformasi, a social movement that was 
proposed by Ibrahim and which demanded justice and reform; and the other was the 
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emergence of Barisan Alternatif, a coalition of opposition parties including KeADILan 
(sic) – party led by Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Aziza (Mohamad 2001: 212; Verma 2004: 118). 
These  two  groups  posed  a  threat  to  UMNO’s,  which  prepared  itself  for  the  general 
elections  in  November  1999,  hegemonic  position.  Verma  (2004:  118)  submitted  by 
stating that the Ibrahim affair was a critical one in Malaysia’s political history because it 
raised questions about (a) the rule of law, (b) the independence of the judiciary, and (c) 
the professionalism of the police force. Mohamad (2001: 211) captured the situation quite 
well when she stated that ‘the Anwar crisis, which began as a contest over leadership in 
the party, culminated in the manifestation of a dislocation in Malay identity politics.’ She 
then clarified what was meant by this identity crisis and how it played itself out during 
the year of Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest and the years thereafter.
On the issue of  Ibrahim’s  arrest  and subsequent  incarceration,  there  was a deafening 
silence from the side of Mandela’s government as far as could be ascertained. Why the 
silence,  one  may  wish  to  ask,  when  South  Africa  upheld  ‘human  rights’  and  was 
generally in the forefront against arrests such as this; one where there was no tangible 
proof  of  the  allegations  that  were  made  by  Mahathir  and  his  support  group  against 
Ibrahim. It is quite ironic that Mandela did not keep silent in the Ken Saro-Wiwa case 
and even went so far as to request some form of sanction against the Abacha regime. 
Perhaps Mandela realized that he had burnt his fingers in the latter case and thus chose 
not to say a word and nor in any way interfere in Malaysia’s internal affairs. But is also 
reflected that there was a cosy and friendly relationship that existed between Mandela 
and Mahathir and that overshadowed any other development. I assume Mandela was not 
keen to rock the Malaysian boat that found itself in the choppy Malaysian straits at that 
time. The incident said much for South African and Malaysian relations and does bring 
into the open South Africa’s stand on Malaysia’s position with regards to human rights 
issues  such  as  the  Ibrahim case  in  particular  and human  rights  in  Southeast  Asia  in 
general (cf. Eldridge 2002). For those critical of realism, this was and remained a grave 
matter  that  needed  immediate  attention  by  members  of  the  world  communities; 
unfortunately, the governments were mute but some NGOs – as expected – voiced their 
concerns. Be that as it may, let me return and continue to narrate the unfolding Malaysian 
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story.
By June 1999, when Ahmad Badawi was appointed as Mahathir’s deputy after months of 
speculation (Felker 2000: 49), the South African government appointed honorary consuls 
in  the  states  of  Penang  and  Sarawak  respectively,  and  in  August,  the  then  Deputy 
President of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma attended the 4th LID meeting, which took 
place months after the 3rd SAID meeting in Zimbabwe. And in October South Africa 
sent representatives to participate in the Asia-Africa Business Forum that was held in 
Kuala Lumpur. During November 1999, just after the Malaysian election took place and 
when it was announced that the BN was victorious, members of the Northern Province 
legislature and other stakeholders from the province paid an official visit to Malaysia and 
on the 15th November; a special gathering was held to meet the delegates. This meeting 
was  jointly  organized  under  the  auspices  of  the  South  African  High  Commission, 
MSABC, Asian Strategy Leadership Institute and the National Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry Malaysia. The visit was significant in that it was one of the first official 
visits to Malaysia after the 1997 and 1998 Asian crises and it laid the grounds for the 
coming of other official delegations to Malaysia. 
Malaysia was still reeling after the Ibrahim debacle, and Mahathir had to contend with 
numerous protests led by Ibrahim’s supporters. Mahathir however kept these protests in 
check. On the regional front, the relationship between Malaysia and ASEAN was not at 
all pleasant, and Mahathir chose not to attend the November 1999 Summit that took place 
in Manila (cf. Felker 2000). The basic reason was that he was busy securing his position 
at home and preparing for the elections; an election that he was not very confident of 
because of the Ibrahim affair.  Fortunately for him and UMNO, he was re-elected into 
power. It should be stated that by then many speculated that he would step down but 
because of his resilience and despite the growing internal opposition, he managed to hold 
on to  power for  a few more  years.  After  the elections,  he regained  his  energies  and 
strength and re-directed his energies in championing the course of the South. He thus 
graced the LID meeting where he addressed heads of state and captains of the industries 
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as  well  as  the  G-15 meeting  in  Cairo.  He also  presented  the  EAEC proposal  at  the 
ASEAN Summit of 2000. And he, yet again, took a swipe at the hegemonic role of the 
West during the era of globalization (Martinez 2001: 199). 
Between the 15th and the 22nd of April in 2000, the same month when the South African 
Chapter  for African Renaissance was established in  Pretoria,  the Deputy Minister  for 
Finance, Expenditure and Economic Affairs in the Free State province led a delegation to 
Malaysia. During that visit the then – now Deputy President - Minister of Minerals and 
Energy,  Ms.  Phumizile  Mlambo-Ngcuka,  gave  a  special  address  on  the  ‘Investment 
opportunities in the Mining Industry’ on the 20th of April. And on the 23rd and 24th of 
May South  African  representatives  attended  the  Asia-Africa  Forum that  was  held  in 
Kuala Lumpur under the theme: ‘Joining Hands for Strengthening Partnerships.’ During 
this period the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre (AAITPC) was 
formally established in Kuala Lumpur after continuous consultation since 1993; the main 
purpose of this centre, which is under UN management, was to build linkages in the form 
of investments, trade and technology transfer from Asia to Africa. The centre is located 
within  a  framework  of  South-South  Cooperation  and  aimed  to  assist  business 
communities  and  institutional  partners  on  both  continents  to  identify  business 
opportunities and create ‘a mutually beneficial win-win situation.’ This was followed by 
the SAID meeting that was initiated by Malaysia during the month of August 2000 in 
Maputo.  On the 6th of September,  Mr.  Popo Molefe,  the premier  of the North West 
Province, delivered on behalf of his delegation an address in Kuala Lumpur to attract 
investments to his province. Soon after this event, Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza was appointed as 
the new South African High Commissioner to Malaysia during October 2000. According 
Funston (2001: 205), Malaysians have been searching for new opportunities to invest in 
Africa since it has been viewed as an acceptable model for the South. Their search may 
be attributed to an accelerated economic growth at 8%, which marked the levels achieved 
before the 1997 economic crisis, in 2000 (ibid 200). 
Whilst Malaysia was enjoying this positive economic performance, the cultural activities 
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continued  between  South  Africa  and  Malaysia.  Since  the  ‘Cape  Malay’  community 
shared historical links with the Southeast Asians, the community also shared religious 
and cultural  connections. These connections have been nurtured through organizations 
such as GAPENA and other religio-cultural groups. In the light of these ties, the Selangor 
Council  of  Welfare  and  Social  Development  organized  the  Cape  Malay  Charitable 
Concert  on the 23rd of June 2001 in Shah Alam to inform the Malaysians  about the 
cultural practices that are still being kept alive in South Africa. During this period the Dr. 
Nortier’s Rooibos Museum (NRM), which was established in 2000, decided to create a 
small  permanent  ‘Cape Malay’  display within NRM structure  to  share and show the 
Malaysians what ‘Cape Malay’  culture  was like in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Although the charitable concert and the latter display were at no stage dragged into an 
identity debate, some South African scholars such as Shamil Jeppie have been and remain 
opposed to the use of the term ‘Cape Malay’ and preferred the use of ‘Cape Muslims.’ 
Whilst I am inclined to accept this view, the employment of the latter term is not that 
simple either. In any event, reflexive theorists have generally viewed the issue of identity 
as problematic and contentious; and in essence it is an issue that is not easily resolvable 
and one that will continue to engage the minds of social scientists. As a matter of fact, I 
tried to briefly touch on the question of ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ when I conceptualized 
‘identity’ as one of the contested IR variables in Chapter Two.
Moving back to the story of consolidating the connections, the SAID meeting that took 
place on the 20th of August 2001 in Kampala, Uganda, discussed regional issues as well 
as  the  agenda  for  the  Afro-Asia  Dialogue  conference  that  was  to  take  place  in 
Johannesburg  between the  17th and 19th of  February 2002.  Soon after  the  Kampala 
gathering,  in early September  2001, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,  the South African 
Minister  of  Foreign Affairs,  met  with her  Malaysian  counterpart  to  discuss  issues  of 
mutual  concern and to establish a joint  Ministerial  Commission.  And on the 23rd of 
October 2001 the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was launched in 
Abuja, Nigeria (cf. Bond 2002; Herbst & Mills 2003; Kotze & Steyn 2003; Hughes 2004; 
Nkuhlu 2005). 
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3.5 Expanding Connections: Towards ‘A Strategic Partnership’?
During the first quarter of 2002 the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided a 
draft  document  to  South  Africa  on the  joint  Ministerial  Commission;  it  included the 
signing  of  MoUs in  Sport  and  Recreation  and other  fields.  And,  by then,  the  South 
Africa’s  DFA had  decided  to  appoint  Dr.  Abraham Nkomo  to  replace  Ms.  Lindiwe 
Mabuza as South Africa’s third High Commissioner to Malaysia on the 22nd of March. 
Subsequent to these diplomatic events, the inaugural summit of the African Union (AU) 
was held during July 2002 in Durban; the AU effectively replaced the OAU according to 
the Constitutive Act of the AU. The radical restructuring of this age old organization into 
a brand new outfit, namely the AU, implied that it also amended some of the old and set 
fresh goals that it hoped to achieve within years ahead. One of the primary aims of the 
AU  was  ‘to  promote  peace,  security  and  stability  on  the  continent.’  NEPAD  was 
constructed as a significant policy initiative and development strategy to address the aims 
that the AU desired and still desires to realise (Malcomson 2004: 11-12). The African 
Renaissance concept popularised by Mbeki provided a philosophical foundation for this 
important  and  crucial  policy  initiative  (Melber  2004:  90).  NEPAD, which  ‘blends  in 
nicely into the neo-liberal mainstream of globalisation’ and is in line with South Africa’s 
economic  strategy (ibid  94),  essentially  seeks  (a)  to  promote  accelerated  growth  and 
sustainable development on the African continents, (b) to eradicate widespread poverty, 
and (c) to halt Africa’s marginalisation in the globalisation process (Kotze & Steyn 2003: 
10).  The chief  architect  and driving  force behind this  particular  initiative  was Thabo 
Mbeki, the president of South Africa and the then chairperson of the AU. And in his 
capacity as chair of the AU, he promoted the objectives of NEPAD at all the regional and 
international  gatherings  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  the  Africans  are  serious  about 
solving  their  own  problems  (the  African  way?).  In  order  for  Africa  to  meet  its 
development  challenges,  Mbeki  and  other  continental  leaders  driving  NEPAD  have 
emphasised ‘the necessity of collective responsibility’  (Melber 2004: 92); a method of 
doing things in line with the African value system that has been espoused by some of the 
African political leadership. 
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Since  Mbeki  took  it  upon  himself  and  encouraged  his  colleagues  in  his  cabinet  to 
promote this policy initiative, NEPAD as the name suggest – a new partnership – has 
been used to attract partners from the North such as the USA as well as those from the 
South  such  as  Malaysia  to  assist  through  striking  partnerships  in  the  process  of  fast 
tracking  Africa’s  development.  In  this  regard,  Mr.  Jacob Zuma,  the  (former)  Deputy 
President  of  South  Africa,  discussed  the  policy  initiative  at  the  5th LID meeting  in 
November 2002. And on the 5th of November 2002 Mbeki was granted the opportunity 
via the good offices of the Malaysian government to attend and address the 8th ASEAN 
Summit in Phnom Penn, Cambodia (Henwood & Vickers 2003: 330). This was indeed an 
important  meeting for it  was the first  time that an African leader  addressed ASEAN. 
Mbeki addressed ASEAN in his capacity as the AU chairperson and at the end ASEAN 
leaders unanimously agreed to organize a special ASEAN-NEPAD conference with the 
purpose  of  wanting  to  know how the  partnerships  will  be built  between the  African 
leaders/countries and potential donor countries from ASEAN (Landsberg 2004: 196). As 
far as one could ascertain, nothing substantial developed out of this meeting.
When 2003 ushered in South Africa officially handed over NAM leadership to Malaysia 
during February at the 13th NAM summit in Kuala Lumpur. By August of that year Mr. 
Zuma  was  invited  by  the  Malaysian  World  Peace  Federation  to  participate  in  its 
conference and to also be involved in a Statesmen Roundtable discussion prior to the 
conference.  Mr.  Zuma’s  visit  also  paved  the  way  for  Mr.  Mbeki’s  official  visit  to 
Malaysia during the first week of September 2003. Before reflecting on this important 
visit, a quick comment on Malaysia’s position during 2003 will be in place. According to 
Ganesan’s (2004) scholarly observations, Malaysia’s economy was buoyant and it was 
generally stable and in a fairly strong position. Throughout the year speculation was rife 
as regards Mahathir’s successor; even though Ahmad Badawi – being the deputy - was 
touted for the post, there was no clear indication from Mahathir on this subject during the 
early part of the year. However, by the end of October 2003, Mahathir finally resigned 
and handed over the ‘hot seat’ to Ahmad Badawi. The latter continued to steer Malaysia 
into  2004  whilst  Malaysia  was  enjoying  economic  growth  and  stability.  Malaysia, 
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moreover, occupied itself throughout 2003 (and 2004) with the formulation of policies 
and the pursuance of the NDP in an aggressive way. 
The earlier mentioned visit by Mbeki to Malaysia was a significant one in that it was the 
first visit in his capacity as South Africa’s president. At the formal meeting bilateral talks 
ensued,  agreements  were  signed  and  an  MoU  was  put  in  place  to  set  up  a  joint 
commission  between the  two countries.  The  two leaders  also discussed other  mutual 
cooperative projects and engaged in a debate North-South relations. In Mr. Mbeki’s reply 
to  the  toast  by  His  Majesty,  Yang  di-Pertuan  Agong,  on  the  2nd of  September  he 
expressed his thanks on behalf of the South African government and the South African 
people for Malaysia’s support against apartheid and he paid special tribute to Mahathir’s 
unstinting efforts in forging a close partnership that existed between South Africa and 
Malaysia since the two former statesmen (i.e. Mandela and Mahathir) struck a cordial and 
brotherly  relationship.  Mr.  Mbeki  also  stated  that  South  Africa  has  gained  from 
Malaysia’s Bumiputra  programme when it  designed and finalized its  Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) project. In addition to these remarks, he touched upon the role the 
two  states  can  play  in  transforming  the  UN,  NAM,  the  Commonwealth  and  similar 
international  institutions  for  the  benefit  of  all  in  the  South  via  the  AU and ASEAN 
structures (Mbeki Speech 2003).
The outcome of the Malaysian elections on 21st March 2004 secured the BN a solid 
victory and this meant that Badawi - or Pak Lah as he is popularly known in the socio-
political circles - was given the necessary support and motivation by the Malaysians to 
lead them. And in April Mbeki began his second term after the South Africans voted the 
ANC back into power. During April Badawi introduced the ‘National Integrity Plan’ to 
root out corruption; this plan as well as a few others lined up helped Badawi to create his 
own identity,  though he made himself vulnerable to criticisms from party members as 
well as from the former Prime Minster, Dr. Mahathir. Whilst he pushed for greater ethnic 
tolerance through dialogue, he also demonstrated a certain degree of transparency after 
ordering the release of Anwar Ibrahim during September  2004. On the internal  front, 
Badawi  continued  to  be  critical  of  USA’s  invasion  of  Iraq  and  its  policy  towards 
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Palestine.  And  under  his  leadership  he  warmed  up  to  his  ASEAN  buddies,  namely 
Singapore  and  Indonesia.  Malaysia,  according  to  Welsh  (2005),  was  ‘fostering  quiet 
cooperation’; a strategy that is not the same as the ‘quiet diplomacy’ adopted by South 
Africa towards its neighbour, Zimbabwe.
An important official South African visit took place between the 23rd and 24th of June 
2005 and it was led by Dr. Dlamini-Zuma (Speech 2005), the South African Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, to Malaysia to bring into fruition the First South Africa – Malaysia Joint 
Ministerial Commission meeting that was planned during Mr. Mbeki’s official visit in 
2003.  In her speech she emphasised the ‘solid foundations’ on which the two countries’ 
relations have been built and reflected briefly on some of the events that had taken place 
over the many years. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma reinforced the view that their ‘… countries share 
common sentiments regarding many international issues and we talk the same language 
when it comes to … the importance of South-South cooperation or the imperatives for 
developing countries to participate in the global political  and economic system on an 
equitable  basis.’  And  she  expressed  her  unstinting  support  for  Malaysia’s  efforts  to 
advance  the  ‘Agenda  of  the  South’  as  well  as  her  unqualified  support  for  regional 
cooperation via the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership ‘Plan of Action’ that was 
adopted  in  Jakarta  in  Indonesia.  Dr.  Dlamini-Zuma  also  thanked  the  Malaysians  for 
giving  their  support  to  the  AU and  NEPAD.  Dr.  Dlamini-Zuma’s  passionate  speech 
tangibly underscored the relationship and partnership that had been formed between the 
two states. She, for example, mentioned that the two countries have concluded ‘a total of 
five  official  agreements  and  two  Memoranda  of  Understanding  in  areas  of  mutual 
interest…’ and that many others were being concluded and negotiated. The questions that 
come to mind are: What do these agreements in real terms mean?  In which way have 
they  been  concluded  in  the  interest  of  their  respective  societies  and  have  these 
agreements  also taken into account  the needs of their  fellow member states from the 
South? When would the person in the rural area or the disadvantaged sector in South 
Africa and Malaysia be able to see the tangible results of these agreements? For social 
scientists these and other related questions need responses for they will assist in changing 
the images of their communities; particularly when these communities are able to see and 
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experience  what  bilateral  relations  actually  mean  and  how  they  affect  communal 
relationships in reality. 
Dr.  Dlamini-Zuma’s  significant  meeting  laid  the  foundations  for  Dato  Seri  Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi’s first important official state visit in his capacity as Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister on the 26th and 27th of July 2005 to South Africa. Mr. Badawi’s delegation 
consisted of 5 cabinet ministers, a parliamentary secretary, 7 members of the federal and 
state legislators, senior government officials and a number of persons from the Malaysian 
business community. In Mr. Badawi’s 2005 speech he thanked Mr. Mbeki for the official 
invitation and expressed his delight to have been able to be in South Africa. He was 
optimistic about the close partnership that had – until then - been forged between the two 
nation-states and was of the firm opinion that the Malaysians consider the ‘…relations 
with South Africa as pivotal and strategic.’ After he briefly reflected upon the historical 
ties that existed between the two countries and the anti-apartheid stand Malaysia took 
since its independence in 1957. Mr Badawi reiterated that Malaysia was determined ‘to 
further  elevate  Malaysia-South  Africa  relations…  to  cooperate  to  undertake  specific 
ventures  and  establish  various  programmes  to  enrich  the  tapestry  of  Malaysia-South 
Africa ties.’  And he also recognised the nature of the partnership that  had up to that 
moment been established between the two states in trade, commerce and technology; he, 
however, re-emphasised the need for the relationship to be transformed into ‘a strategic 
partnership.’ Badawi made the point that he viewed the relationship to be ‘pivotal and 
strategic’ but also added that there was much room to expand and deepen it in areas that 
need further exploration via sharing information and devising strategies in order to face 
the variety of international challenges in different spheres. 
And Mr. Badawi acknowledged that both states share much in common; both, he stated, 
were against any form of unilateralism and the use of force. He strongly suggested that 
both states should work closely so that the international system is made conducive to 
economic and social development, and to pursue the idea of promoting dialogue between 
cultures and civilizations. The question that comes to mind is: how far has the two states’ 
close relationship succeeded in forcing the international system particularly those from 
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the  North  to  make  the  environment  conducive  for  socio-economic  development  and 
pursue  meaningful  dialogue  without  it  resulting  in  realizing  Huntington’s  ‘clash  of 
civilizations’ thesis? Nevertheless, towards the close of his speech, he aired his views 
against  terrorism  and  the  adoption  of  a  multilateral  approach  when  finding  and 
identifying its real causes. He ended off by making reference to Malaysia’s position as 
chair of a number of significant world bodies, namely NAM, OIC and the ASEAN, and 
the efforts it has made to bring an end to the Palestinian crises and to also give special 
attention to the empowerment of women and bringing about gender equality and equity; 
issues that critical theorists fully support and endorse. He expressed his desire to have a 
close working relationship with South Africa on all of these and other matters that would 
‘advance the interests and concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement.’ 
The lengthy and detailed speech, which Badawi gave on his visit as Malaysia’s prime 
minister, brought to the fore a number of critical questions that assist in understanding the 
relationship that had been ongoing for more than ten years during the post-apartheid era: 
To what  extent  have South Africa and Malaysia  reflected  ‘good governance’  in their 
respective regions? Compared to many other states in their midst, they seemed to have 
faired quite well. Have their governments adopted a critical attitude towards themselves 
to monitor whether they are upholding and sticking to the ideals of democracy? It seems 
that whilst this might have generally been the case, there have been occasions when they 
have fallen short of these ideals  by remaining uncritical  towards developments within 
their  governments  and the parties they represent.  Have the governments  of these two 
states not been affected by the rapid rise in white collar crimes and particularly cronyism? 
Unfortunately, corruption has been on the increase and members of the ruling parties in 
both states have been guilty of practicing cronyism; a fact that cannot be wished away but 
one that  needs  to be weeded out before the whole government  becomes tainted  with 
malpractices and corruption. In South Africa the Shabir Sheik case and in Malaysia the 
Dato Shamsuddin case are two specific examples. These few questions and responses 
provide some idea of the nature of the relationship between the two states. Badawi’s plea 
that both accept the relationship to be a strategic one demonstrated that there was a desire 
to deepen the links at almost each and every level. 
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4. South Africa and Malaysia’s Trade Ties:
           4.1 Commercial Connections: Demonstrating a Solid Partnership
Among the many issues that had been mentioned in the respective speeches of Mbeki and 
Badawi during their official visits were those of mutual trade and investments. And since 
the commercial connections between South Africa and Malaysia have developed into a 
fairly strong one – despite the financial hiccups that occurred along the way - over the 
years  since  diplomatic  ties  were  forged,  a  detail  discussion  regarding  these  ties 
demonstrate the nature of the economic partnership that developed.
Both South Africa and Malaysia have been described by specialists on economics such as 
Jones (2002) and Alavi (2004) to possess ‘open economies.’  According to Mohr (2002), 
from the 1980s onwards South Africa’s international trade and financial relations were 
liberalized. Malaysia compared to South Africa had a head start in this regard when it 
designed and adopted the National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 that worked towards 
similar goals (Osman-Rani 1990: 204-226); this program thus set Malaysia on course to 
implement a liberalization strategy that assisted in opening up its economy. Since both 
these states pursued this strategy and found themselves in sync with the world economy 
supported by the industrialized nations, these two states became significant players in 
their specific regional economic systems. 
South  Africa  is  a  crucial  cog  in  SADC  and  Malaysia  a  significant  structure  within 
ASEAN. This  section  attempts  to  interpret  the trade  figures  that  both  countries  have 
published on their respective websites; however, much of the updated information was 
taken from the Malaysian site. The main objective of this brief but tentative study is to 
demonstrate the trade trends in the respective import and export sectors of the two states. 
Another objective is to obtain an overall view of the nature of the trade relations that 
exists between these two states since they resumed diplomatic links in 1993 and began to 
initiate  trade  agreements  soon  thereafter.  Before  embarking  upon  this,  it  is  perhaps 
necessary to address albeit briefly South Africa’s position vis-à-vis that of Malaysia as 
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regards international trade from 1994 onwards; the discussion is, moreover, prefaced by a 
few theoretical considerations.
4.2 Explaining Commercial Connections:
States such as South Africa and Malaysia have spent a significant  amount of time to 
review their economic status within the world trade and investment system. The main 
purpose for undertaking this activity was to address a key variable within all national 
economic  policies,  namely  economic  growth.  Economists  basically  argue  that  this 
variable needed to be maximized in order to measure the change in the goods’ volume as 
well as the gross domestic product (GDP) or services produced by the country concerned. 
The maximization process would then, in turn, enlarge the country’s consumption basket, 
create  job  opportunities  and,  as  a  result,  ‘yield  disposable  income  for  consumption 
purposes’ (Rangasamy 2001).  
Thus for countries such as South Africa and Malaysia to move ahead in the economic 
arena, they had to accept the contemporary macroeconomic policy that gave emphasis to 
inter  alia foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and  international  trade  (IT).  FDI,  which 
basically denotes ‘the export of productive, non-loan capital from one country to another’ 
(Milios & Harvey 1999: 365),  has been considered crucial for a number of reasons; it 
was seen as a vehicle  to:  (a)  stimulate  the economy,  (b) create  job opportunities,  (c) 
provide the means for increasing domestic production, (d)  facilitate and encourage the 
transfer  of  the  required  skills  & relevant  technology,  and  (e)  create  space  for  trade 
deficits  (on  the  current  account)  (cf.  Grubel  1988;  Rangasamy  2001;  Rasiah  2003). 
Inextricably tied to FDIs is international trade (IT). According to Fairchild (1997: 772), 
the theories of IT can be categorized into two distinct categories; the one explains trade in 
‘standardized  production’  and the other  discussed trade in ‘differentiated  production’. 
Within  the  latter  category,  numerous  other  theories  have  emerged;  they  are:  (a) 
overlapping demand theory, (b) productive life-cycle theory and (c) economies of scale 
theory.  These  three  theories  have  thus  provided  a  significant  understanding  of  the 
operations of the open market system in the contemporary world; a more technical and 
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detailed  understanding  of  IT  can  be  gauged  from  John  Chipman’s  (1988:  922-955) 
lengthy article entitled ‘International Trade’. 
Setting these theoretical terms and concerns aside, it is important to take into account the 
fact that IT has become an area of concentration because of the nature of the open market 
system.  A system that  evolved  and encouraged trade  that  would benefit  all  countries 
involved in commercial  activities of various kinds. International trade therefore offers 
two  states  such  as  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  the  chance  to  export  and  import  raw 
materials as well as manufactured or consumer goods that are needed by the consumers 
of the respective states; this would provide employment opportunities for their respective 
citizens  and  more  importantly  result  in  export  revenues  that  would  allow  for  the 
purchasing of import  goods or material.  Since the trade liberalization model has been 
accepted  as common practice  in  the contemporary world,  South Africa  and Malaysia 
have followed this model - despite its inherent faults – because of (somewhat unstoppable 
internal and) external factors such as the process of globalization (Bouare 2001: 35-37); 
however, many of these factors have been devised by significant world players such as 
the World Bank and IMF and who have also imposed them on the ‘global village;’ and 
any state not abiding by the rules and regulations are immediately penalized in different 
ways so that they fall in line with the contemporary requirements stipulated by the afore-
mentioned institutions as well as other world bodies. One specific example in SADC is 
South Africa’s northern neighbour, Zimbabwe that owes the IMF millions of dollars and 
was given in August 2005 a six months reprieve to pay the balance owed.
4.3 South Africa’s Economic Position vis-à-vis Malaysia
Months before South Africans  went to the polls  to  participate  in the first  democratic 
elections in April 1994, many countries such as Malaysia that formed part of the non-
traditional economic market took a proactive position to establish diplomatic ties with the 
emerging democratic state; this state was in the process of casting off its apartheid past 
through  the  elections  and  other  structures  and  at  the  same  time  adopted  the 
macroeconomic policy plans that were operative in the developed states and that have 
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been accepted by the new industrialized countries (NICs) such as Malaysia. Since South 
Africa was known to be rich in minerals and other resources, it was understood to be a 
potential exciting economic market; a market that was bound to not only open up, but one 
that would become active in IT and one that would permit FDI to flow back in. This was 
indeed the case when the elections took place and when the GNU was put in place under 
the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the then president of the ANC. 
By the time the GNU came into power,  it  had to  deal with an economy that  was in 
decline because of a number of factors such as the drop in the gold price, the weakening 
of the currency, the stifling domestic market, and the rate of unemployment (Bond 2001; 
Jones  2002).  The  GNU embarked  upon a  Reconstruction  and  Development  Program 
(RDP), which was a broad-based social and economic development strategy (Lester et al 
2000); this strategy fell in line with the macroeconomic policy plans. Unfortunately, since 
the  RDP was unsuccessful  as  a  strategic  mechanism it  was  shelved  and in  its  place 
another  was  devised;  this  was  the  Growth,  Economic  and  Redistribution  program, 
popularly referred to as GEAR (Lester et al 2000; Taylor 2001). GEAR, like the RDP, 
was described as ‘statements of ideals’ and it was to work along one basic principle and 
that was ‘fiscal discipline’ (Rangasamy 2001: 123); GEAR’s goals were to: (a) achieve 
high  rates  of  economic  growth,  (b)  expand the  private  sector,  (c)  improve  output  of 
employment,  (d) attain  fiscal  reform,  (e)  encourage  trade and investment,  (f)  recover 
investments,  (g)  work  towards  redistribution,  (h)  overcome poverty,  and  (i)  raise  the 
basic  living  conditions.  Even  though  GEAR  has  been  critically  assessed  by  some 
economists (Lester et al 2000: 256; Bond 2001: 85-86; Maasdorp 2002: 20), it has been 
partially  successful  since  structures  were  implemented  to  monitor  and  check  its 
implementation process. Bond (2001) pointed out that in addition to GEAR’s failure to 
deliver there were also other factors at play that negatively affected the South African 
economic status; these were the FDI and trade inflows, the domestic dimension of the 
problem such as the reliance of mineral exports and domestic (and foreign) indebtedness. 
When turning to Malaysia and comparing its status to that of democratic South Africa in 
terms  of  economic  reforms,  a  slightly  different  story  has  been  told  by  economic 
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historians. According to Rasiah (2003), Malaysia belonged with Thailand and Indonesia 
to the second-tier Southeast Asian newly industrializing countries known as SEANIC – 
the first-tier nations are Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea; they became 
known as Asia’s Newly Industrialized Economies. Malaysia, which is the leader of the 
pact  and  which  has  been  described  by  Athukoral  (2003:  118)  to  be  ‘an  urbanized 
economy,’ has generally been richly endowed with resources. These resources Malaysia 
used in its interest and subsequently recorded a substantial manufacturing growth since 
the 1970s. This, in turn, has led to a rapid export growth. Rasiah (2003: 19) observed that 
SEANIC adopted a liberal export-oriented policy and their growth was associated with 
market-friendly  policies  (cf.  Ariff  & Khalid  2003;  Rasiah  2005).  These  three  states, 
which  adhered  to  the  macroeconomic  fundamentals  within  a  market  friendly 
environment,  became  major  exporters  of  primary  commodities;  in  the  process  they 
secured sustained investments and savings, and they also provided high corporate shares. 
Their main objective was to achieve macroeconomic stability during the earlier stages of 
their rapid growth. Malaysia and its neighbouring states expanded their economies and 
also  diversified  their  commodities  (Rasiah  2003:  22-25).  Malaysia,  which  was  given 
impetus in the 1970s through the formation and implementation of the NEP and in the 
1990s by the NDP, remained the leader of this group for quite a while. 
When South Africa was welcomed back by the international  community in  the early 
1990s,  it  immediately  set  its  sights  on  improving  the  economy  by  devising  earlier 
mentioned strategies such as the RDP and GEAR; these were however not on par with 
the types  of policies  and strategies  that  Malaysia  had been implemented between the 
1970s  and  1990s.  Nevertheless,  South  Africa  learnt  its  lessons  of  how  to  address 
important areas of interest within its growing economy; one of these was IT. Maasdorp 
(2002: 16) mentioned that in the mid-1980s the financial sanctions had an adverse effect 
on the South African economy and that it  did not really recover from this; and in the 
process when it was intensified it was forced to become ‘a capital exporting country’ in 
order  to  repay  debts  and  stave  off  capital  flight.  These  were  further  exacerbated  by 
misspendings,  corruption,  inefficiency,  and  complacency.  The  new  democratic  state, 
which  inherited  this  state  of  affairs,  had  to  therefore  act  proactively  by  signing  the 
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General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) as a way forward in 1994. According to 
Maasdorp  (ibid  23),  it  paid  serious  attention  to  all  external  trade  agreements  for  it 
realized that attracting FDI and encouraging IT would contribute towards the alleviation 
of  a  number  of  internal  problems  such  as  unemployment  -  that  had  been  partly  the 
reasons  for  the  high  crime  rate  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  the  increase  in 
agricultural  imports  because  of  the  changes  in  the  climatic  conditions,  and  the 
depreciation of the South African currency. The positive approach eventually resulted in 
South Africa’s economic status being described as ‘a service economy’ because of the 
presence of its significant high tech industry and it was also viewed as ‘an investment 
grade country’ by the year 2000 (ibid 26, 28). 
Despite the credit ratings accorded to South Africa, according to Stuart Jones (2002), its 
economy was still on a continuous decline. Leaving aside his negative perceptions, South 
Africa has been able to make inroads into IT and has been able to enter new markets; 
markets that have been viewed as non-traditional ones during the era of apartheid and that 
have been off-limits in terms of trade because of South Africa’s despicable, inhumane 
domestic policies.  During this era it  was the industrialized countries such as the UK, 
Germany, France and the USA that have turned a blind eye to the internal South African 
policies and pursued IT for their own ends. Since the dawning of a new era, South Africa 
was inundated with diplomatic links and trade partners. Malaysia was among the many 
favoured partners because of Malaysia’s support for the ANC against apartheid and the 
close  relationship  that  was  forged between Nelson Mandela  and  Mahathir  Mohamed 
when both were the heads of states of their respective countries. As already noted by 
Maasdorp, South Africa took great care to service the bilateral agreements that it signed 
with all of the new partners in trade, politics and other areas. 
A statement issued by the DFA and Department of Trade and Industry officials clearly 
demonstrated how they viewed the trade, political and economic ties that developed and 
currently  exist  between  the  two  states;  they  said  that  ‘trade  with  Southeast  Asia  is 
relatively evenly spread between Malaysia,  Singapore,  Thailand and Indonesia.  South 
Africa has built  its  strongest ties  in Southeast  Asia with Malaysia.  This is  evident  in 
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Malaysia being the second largest investor on a cumulative basis in South Africa since 
1994.  In  2002  bilateral  trade  amounted  to  R5.6-billion,  focusing  on  the  hospitality, 
telecommunications and energy industries. South Africa and Malaysia co-operate closely 
in forums such as the Commonwealth, and Malaysia's intensive Technical Co-operation 
Program provides numerous training opportunities for South Africans across a range of 
sectors’  (cf.  http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/sa_trade/agreements/trade_asia.htm).  This 
statement  described  the  relationship  in  a  very positive  manner,  and  this  implied  that 
South Africa will remain confident about its strong economic ties with Malaysia. 
The 1997 and 1998 Asian crisis dented the economies of the Southeast Asian states (Tran 
Van Hoa 2001) as well as the economies of countries elsewhere in the global village; but 
despite this drawback, it  provided an impetus for Malaysia  to jump back (Athukorala 
1998: 100; 2003: 115-116). And even though South Africa was one of the many countries 
that  were affected  by the crisis,  it  did  not cause South Africa to  adopt  a  pessimistic 
approach about future trade prospects with Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia. The 
economic melt-down during these years were viewed as a slight intervention in IT and 
one that stimulated new strategies to combat it in the years thereafter. Malaysia has been 
considered a close ally of South Africa in the ASEAN region, and South Africa generally 
viewed and continues to see Malaysia as a significant partner, which will respond to its 
call for aid when it comes to supporting important challenging projects such as NEPAD, 
an African based project that has been initiated by South Africa, and it is fully aware of 
the fact that many parts of the world is increasingly focusing on other growth areas. 
4.4 Narrating SA-Malaysian Trade Figures: Towards a Tentative 
      Interpretation
Mention was made in the introduction to this section on trade relations that most of the 
figures that feature in it have been lifted from the Malaysian Ministry of International 
Trade’s  website,  which provided useful data  and a brief  analysis;  however,  the same 
cannot be said for its South African counterpart. That being the case, according to the 
Malaysian Ministry of International Trade it made the following observations as regards 
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the trade relations: ‘Bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa grew robust by 
14.9%, which valued at  RM1,814.1 million (US$484.5 million)  in 2000 as compared 
with RM1,579.1 million (US$415.6 million) in 1999. The growth in total trade recorded 
in 2000 was a positive turnaround as compared to -6.8% in 1998 and -2.8% in 1999. 
Trade with South Africa accounted for 0.2 % to Malaysia's  global trade in 2000. For 
2001, bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa amounted to US 487.8 million 
as  compared  with  US$477.4  million  in  2000.  The  Trade  Balance  was  in  favour  of 
Malaysia at US$24.4 million. Since 1998, Malaysia's exports to South Africa dropped by 
-18.6% from RM1,169.9  million  (US$307.9  million)  to  RM951.4  million  (US$250.4 
million) in 2000. However, during the same period, Malaysia's imports grew higher by 
89.9% from RM454.1  million  (US$119.5  million)  in  1998  to  RM862.7  million  (US
$227.0 million) in 2000.’ It also stated that: ‘Malaysia's export to South Africa increased 
by 2.3% to US$256.1 million from US$250.4 million in 2000, whilst import from South 
Africa increased by 2.1% to US$231.7 million from US$227.0 in 1999. For the period 
Jan-May 2002, bilateral trade between Malaysia and South Africa amounted to US$178.6 
million with exports valued at US$91.7 million and imports valued at US$86.9 million. 
During the period, Malaysia registered a trade surplus of RM4.8 million. If compared to 
the corresponding period in 2001, exports to South Africa recorded a decrease of 8.4% 
and imports decreased higher by 14.1%.’  
The  figures  supplied  and the  analysis  given  provided  some clear  ideas  regarding the 
extent of the trade between these two states. It demonstrated that the trade losses suffered 
in  the 1997 and 1998 period  was made up – to  some degree – from 1999 onwards; 
according to Athukorala (2003: 117) the GDP which contracted by 7,5% in 1997 moved 
beyond where it used to be - before the crisis - in 2000. And it basically showed that trade 
bounced back and that the two countries have not abandoned their relations in the light of 
the Asian crisis. Their relations were, in fact, reaffirmed along with their commitment to 
pursue trade if the circumstances and conditions continue to be favourable to both. When 
taking into account Malaysia’s total  export in 1999 to SA was RM 321.18 bn, it was 
noted  that  it  was  at  that  time  the  31st largest  export  destination;  this  indicated  that 
Malaysia and South Africa had a long road to plod before reaching a point in which their 
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relationship could be described as a strategic one. It should be borne in mind that by 1999 
Malaysia had gradually regained its economic strength, and that it took Malaysia a while 
to reinforce the gaps and mend the economy. It was, of course, preparing and protecting 
itself from other possible economic crises in the years ahead. When Malaysia re-invested 
in South Africa, it approached its options with trepidation and a fair amount of caution so 
as not to negatively affect the country’s economic growth. It therefore avoided investing 
all its wealth in one state. A useful exercise would be to refer to South Africa’s DTI’s 
quarterly  report  (2004),  which  provides  some  statistical  analysis  as  regards  South 
Africa’s import and export partners, and which showed that Malaysia did not feature in 
the  top  ten  trading  partners  in  both  the  import  and  export  sectors.  The  latter  point 
reinforced the notion that though the relationship between South Africa had been close 
because  of  earlier  developments,  there  is  little  evidence  to  support  the  view that  the 
partnership has developed into a strategic one; the political leadership would dearly wish 
that this be the case – as noted from Badawi’s 2005 speech mentioned earlier - for it 
would not only enhance their  individual  profiles but also demonstrate  to what degree 
nation-states  from the  South  are  able  to  make  substantial  contributions  to  their  own 
economies and to those of the regions that they represent. 
The trade figures below in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively,  provide a glimpse of the 
import  and  export  status  between  the  two  states  (cf. 
http://www.matrade.gov.my/economy-trade/bilateral-archive/s-africa.htm).  It  can  be 
gauged that when official  relations began in 1993, speculations were already rife that 
commercial activity will gradually increase; this was no doubt the case. South Africa’s 
DTI  informed  its  potential  investors  to  consider  petrochemicals,  telecommunications, 
hospitality,  and property markets as important investment opportunities. It argued that 
Malaysians  were  the  second  largest  new investors  in  South  Africa  by  1996.  It  was 
estimated that the increase to 97.1% of Petronas shares in Engen had a total value of R4 
billion  (US $714 million).  Petronas divested  20% ownership in  Engen to Worldwide 
Africa Investment Holdings in support of the South African government's empowerment 
strategy in November 1999. 
Unfortunately, few were in the position to predict the Asian crisis that took place during 
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1997 and 1998; and when this occurred trade between the two states was visibly affected 
and this resulted in financial investments being pulled out and thus a decrease in trade. 
The Asian crisis was indeed a blow to the economies world wide including that of South 
Africa; its own companies had to either close doors or restructure to accommodate the 
new economic circumstances. This was the case with many South African companies that 
went into Malaysia with wishes of financial windfalls and a variety of other objectives. 
The same may be said of the Malaysian companies that entered the SA economic market. 
The Asian financial crisis caused a number of Malaysian companies to withdraw from 
their overseas commitments and consolidated at home. Besides the Petronas investment 
in South Africa’s Engen, BusinessMap indicated that Malaysian interests in South Africa 
were marked by net disinvestment in 1998. It also added that during 1997 and 1998, apart 
from the Petronas and Telekom Malaysia investments, not much original currency was 
brought into South Africa (http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2003/malay0805.htm). 
A number of South African businesses that had been actively doing business in Malaysia 
at the time were affected by the crisis; as a consequence some curtailed their staff and 
others  shut  down  offices.  The  following  South  African  companies  closed  offices  in 
Malaysia:  Grinaker  Construction  Ltd.,  BKS and Armscor.  The  major  companies  that 
remained in Malaysia were Murray & Roberts, Africon, Plestel (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. and 
Rhine Ruhr Process Equipment. By January 2000, Murray and Roberts withdrew their 
South African representatives from Malaysia while maintaining local representatives in 
Kuala Lumpur. In early 2001, Denel reopened its offices in Kuala Lumpur after closing 
them for a year. The reopening followed a US$49 million sale of 22 units of the 155mm 
G-5 artillery gun for the Royal Malaysian Army. The franchise chain Nandos introduced 
and subsequently expanded its fast food operations in Malaysia. (cf. DFA & DTI, South 
Africa & Padayachee & Vahed 2000). The table below reflects the economic activities 
over a ten year period from the beginning of 1993 until 2003. It also proved that joint 
ventures were slowly forged as was the case with SA Freight, which had signed a joint 
venture bid with Sabah Shipyard Sdn Bhd. to build a training patrol vessel for the Royal 
Malaysian Navy. The value of SA Freight was US$ 60 million for the hull of the vessel to 
be built in Durban. Between 1999 and 2002 the exports were somewhat pegged at 0.95 
per year and this changed dramatically by 2003. The 2003 figure surpassed that of 1998 
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when the export reached 1.17 as compared to 1.27. In the import sector, the downturn 
was already noted in 1998, and it was slowly inching its way back to a more reasonable 
figure of 0.85 in 2003.
Table 4.2:   Malaysian-South African trade c. 1993- 2003 (Value in RM Billion & 
June 2006 Exchange Rate: 1 RM = 1,942 ZAR)
Year Total Exports Total Imports Total Trade Balance of Trade
1993 0.02 0.01 0.04    0.01                             
1994 0.46 0.31 0.77    0.14
1995 0.68 0.51 1.19    0.17
1996 0.72 0.64 1.36    0.08
1997 0.81 0.93 1.74    -0.11
1998 1.17 0.45 1.62    0.72
1999 0.95 0.63 1.58    0.32
2000 0.95 0.86 1.81    0.09
2001 0.94 0.89 1.83    0.06
2002 0.95 0.73 1.69    0.22
2003 1.27 0.85 2.12    0.42
The graph in Figure 4.2 (and Figure 4.3) below basically complements the table above 
and offered a different overview of the manner in which the imports and exports have 
fluctuated over the ten year period. It also showed the nature of the balance of trade. The 
balance of trade, which started out at a miniscule amount of 0.01, was steadily on the rise 
and for some reason dropped by more than 50% in 1996. This was made worse when the 
market was affected by the Asian crisis and it contracted further to -0.11. But despite this, 
it swung back to a reasonable figure of 0.72 but then began to fall once again; by 2000 
and 2001 the figures that were reached were 0.09 and 0.06 respectively.  This was not 
very encouraging. By 2002 it slowly shifted back and reached 0.22 and 0.42 in 2002 and 
2003 respectively.  These positive  developments,  it  is  assumed,  will  continue  into  the 
forthcoming years, if the market remains stable and friendly to FDI and IT activities. It is 
moreover interesting to compare and observe the data that have been captured by both the 
Malaysians and the South Africans.  
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Figure 4.3: A Graphic Interpretation of Malaysian-South African Trade between 
1993 and 2003.  
The Asian financial crisis had a dramatic effect on South African exports to Malaysia; it 
decreased by R480 million from November 1997 to October 1998 (SA exports totalled 
R546  million  between  November  1997  to  October  1998).  In  the  same  period  South 
African imports  from Malaysia  rose by R495 (Imports  from Malaysia  totalled R1769 
million).  The trade balance in Malaysia's  favour,  for this  period,  amounted to R1223 
million. Before this dramatic reversal, the trade balance between the two countries had 
only slightly been in Malaysia's  favour.  The SA imports  from Malaysia  amounted to 
R1274 million (Nov 1996 to Oct 1997) whilst SA exports amounted to R1,026 million.
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Figure 4.4: A Graphic Interpretation of Trade between Malaysia and South Africa 
(circa 1992 – 2007)
The table and graphs demonstrated that, despite the Asian crisis that intervened, a steady 
overall  growth rate  continued to be on the rise. In 1994 the total  trade started out at 
1,096,957 and reached 5,654,163 in 2002.  When looking specifically  at  SA’s Export 
figures to Malaysia,  the steady growth began in 1994 but was deeply affected by the 
Asian crisis and this  resulted in low figures recorded in 1998 and 1999 respectively; 
however, when the Malaysian economy slowly recovered, SA Exports was also on the 
increase  as  from  2000.  And  as  regards  SA’s  Import  figures  from  Malaysia,  there 
remained a continuous growth between 1994 and 2002 (See Table 4.3 below). Moreover, 
when reviewing the total trade figures, it may be suggested that trade between the two 
states have not really slackened and that it continued to be on the incline; this therefore 
bodes well for both states.
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Table 4.3: Bilateral Trade (ZA Rand '000 – 1 ZAR = 0.515 RM [Source: DTI, SA])
Malaysia has over the years diversified its economy, which was bolstered by the FDI that 
helped in this regard. In the manufacturing sphere it was able to make its mark with the 
full support of the government as illustrated by Tan Eu Chye & Ariff (2001: 61-62). By 
the  1990s  the  manufacturing  industry  contributed  handsomely  towards  the  country’s 
economy.  South Africa, like many others, benefited from this industry and it has thus 
been  amongst  those  countries  that  have  been  importing  a  variety  of  products.  From 
amongst the list of products, vegetable fats & oils and telecommunication equipment reap 
in a sizeable amount in Ringgits. On the mentioned website, Malaysia also highlighted 
products such as chemicals, petroleum, metal, plastic and food ingredients as marketable 
ones for the South African market. 
When comparing the export products to those that Malaysia imports, it is quite noticeable 
to observe the types of items that South Africa produced and has exported to countries 
such as Malaysia. Since 1999 Aluminum stood out as one of the most important products 
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on the import  list;  however,  in 2001 there was a  slight  drop in the amount  that  was 
imported.  This  was  followed  by  Ferrous  Waste  &  Scraps  where  one  witnesses  a 
substantial increase since 1999. Copper appears third from among the minerals that have 
thus far been imported; in 2001 the amount reached 76.38 as compared to 20.87 in 1999. 
In Jones’ (2002: 207) assessment all of the mentioned products belong to the seven top 
products that  have generally been exported.  Among the non-minerals  items Sugar etc 
seems to be in demand;  in 1999 the amount of sugar was only 61.82 and this figure 
doubled to 121.22 by the year  2001. It  would however have been interesting to have 
mentioned some of ‘the other imports’ that have been referred to in the table that appears 
on the website;  the figures in 1999 and in 2001 are after all relatively high and need 
further explanation. In any case, this is where DTI’s figures and information came to the 
rescue (cf. http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/463.html). The DTI statistics listed a 
variety of products that are exported to and imported from Malaysia, and gave one a fair 
idea of the types of products other than ‘the priority listed ones’ that are exported and 
imported; this information is crucial for the small emerging businesses in South Africa 
that wish to develop trade ties with Malaysians. 
An interesting feature noted on the MATRADE website was the fact that the Ministry 
pro-actively posted on its  site lists  of products that  may be potential  imports.  Similar 
efforts were also made by the DTI; for example, the site stated ‘There are pockets of 
opportunities in Malaysia in the oil and gas industry (downstream)’ and thus gave the 
example of a South African company, namely Polifin (40:40:20 in a joint venture with 
Petronas  and a Dutch company),  which entered a US $40 million  plastics  venture in 
Kerteh, on Malaysia's East Coast in 1998/99.  In fact, it prefaced the list by stating the 
following: ‘A major area for potential growth and development in post-apartheid South 
Africa is the SADC which has a total population of 150 million people and a combined 
gross national product (GNP) of US$170 billion.  South Africa's economy is the most 
dominant in the region; it has 31% of the SADC's population, and 7% of Sub-Saharan 
Africa's, yet contributes 78% and 41% of the respective areas' gross national products. 
With a well-developed infrastructure and increasingly positive trade links with the rest of 
the world, it is an obvious point of entry for foreign trade and investment in the region.’ 
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South Africa’s DTI has however emphasized and highlighted the fact that its commercial 
policy toward Malaysia  is  focusing on trade  and investment  promotion.  DTI's  focus-
specific areas are agro-forestry, dimension stone/granite, film production, petrochemical 
downstream, shipping/boat building and telecommunication equipment. It also went on to 
demonstrate  that  even  though  Malaysia’s  presence  as  an  active  investor  has  been 
significantly reduced it, it has not given up on the African continent as a whole and in 
South Africa in particular. The current crisis in Zimbabwe has, in fact, forced Malaysia 
not to abandon Africa but relocate its investments of a R30 million condom factory from 
Zimbabwe to Mpumalanga in South Africa. This is once again a sign that South Africa is 
still  very much a credit rated country despite its shortcomings; and it is also gave the 
signal that Asian states such Malaysia continue to demonstrate its confidence in the stable 
South African socio-political and economic environment.
5. Closing Remarks:
International Trade has been one of the most challenging focus areas for South Africa 
since it became a democracy in 1994. The multilateral and bilateral agreements that it 
signed  with  numerous  countries  over  the  past  few  years  are  ample  evidence  to 
demonstrate that South Africa is a significant export-import destination. South Africa’s 
trade, which has been characterized as Western during the apartheid era, may now be 
described as non-western or Afro-Asian;  it  has in fact  adopted a ‘Look East’  policy, 
which included the African continent, to pursue its trade links and attract investments 
from states  that  are  economically  on a  sound footing  and that  possess  the  necessary 
investments to plough into the South African coffers. South Africa took advantage of its 
new found status as a democracy to lure as many African and Asian countries. It has 
generally  benefited  from  the  agreements  that  have  been  signed  and  many  of  its 
companies have entered into joint ventures with companies in these states. The Malaysian 
state and many of its private companies have queued to become partners in many joint 
economic ventures. Although Malaysia’s investments in South Africa might have shrunk 
because of the Asian crisis, they did not disappear. And the mere fact that the Malaysians 
were able to bounce back after the crisis and regain its position as a ferocious, fighting 
Asian  Tiger,  it  has  continued  to  trade  and invest  in  countries  such  as  South  Africa; 
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however,  this  time  round,  the  companies  that  have  been  looking  for  investment 
opportunities from Malaysia have done so in a more cautious and calculating manner. 
In  conclusion,  South Africa  undoubtedly remains  an attractive  country for  Malaysian 
investors and traders. And since South Africa-Malaysia trade relations remain on a good 
footing,  it  is  assumed  that  it  will  continue  to  grow as  long as  the  circumstances  are 
favourable to all competitive partners. Before finally bringing this section in particular 
and the chapter in general  to a close, the bilateral  relationship between Malaysia and 
South Africa forms an integral part of the growing and expanding partnership that has 
been cemented in the South via mutual diplomatic visits and the signing of agreements 
and MoUs in a variety of sectors over the few years. It, in a concrete and visible manner, 
demonstrates the strong bond that exists between the two nation states; this has, however, 
not been enough to forge ‘a strategic partnership’ in order to tangibly show members 
from the South what it really means to forge links and deepen relations. Nonetheless, 
there is little doubt that the commercial connections and trade ties complement the socio-
political dimensions of the relationship that had been outlined, discussed and analysed in 
the earlier sections of this chapter. 
The contents of this chapter should therefore be viewed as an important setting for the 
next  chapter  in  which  the socio-cultural  relations  that  exist  will  be discussed.  In  the 
socio-cultural  arena,  the  relationship  between  Malaysia  and  South  Africa  has  been 
spearheaded by refugees and cultural activists during South Africa’s apartheid era and 
has continued into the post-apartheid period with greater support and enthusiasm from the 
side of the respective governments in South Africa and Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
South Africa and Malaysia’s Cultural Activists’ Narratives:
Forging ‘Down-stairs’ Socio-Cultural Connections in the South
1. Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter  it  was  demonstrated  how  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  have 
successfully  forged a  strong and firm relationship  over  the  years  between these  two 
states. The chapter has shown that these two nation states have indeed become active and 
close socio-political and economic partners; partners that have also become locked into 
their  respective regional systems,  which they used as avenues to encourage trade and 
commercial relations at regional and continental levels respectively. 
Both states have aggressively pursued bilateral trade links over the many years in order 
that  their  respective  communities  benefit  from  them  through  investments,  business 
ventures, employment, and other ways. On the whole, there appears to be a fairly healthy 
relationship at the state-to-state level or to use Vale’s expression at the ‘upstairs’ level. 
This strong relationship has to some extent clouded state-actors’ vision as to what was 
taking and continues to take place at the ‘downstairs’ level; in other words, at the people-
to-people’s level. At this level NGOs and non-state actors (NSAs) have made contact 
with counterparts  in other  states and it  is  indeed this  area that  is  of interest  to those 
concerned  with  critical  approaches  to  understanding.  These  theorists  reflected  their 
interest  because  the  NGOs  and  NSAs  fall  into  a  category  that  has  generally  been 
marginalized and silenced. Critical theorists such as Habermas supported by a coterie of 
followers have argued that these silenced institutions and groups be included part in the 
emancipatory  project;  they,  according  to  their  grand  theory,  should  be  granted  the 
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necessary  space  within  the  broader  sphere  of  IR  to  freely  exercise  their  desire  and 
interests  to  forge  ties  across  borders  with  like-minded  groups  and  institutions;  for 
example,  the  activities  of  cultural  activists  and  groups wanting  to  make  cross-border 
connections  should  be  permitted  and  pursue  ties  that  will  be  in  the  interest  of  the 
respective communities  (cf. Josselin & Wallace 2001; Wyn Jones 2001).
Since the political leadership in both South Africa and Malaysia have been stressing on 
moving  beyond  politico-economic  ties  and  by  implication  side-stepping  sovereign 
decision making bodies, the leadership has in effect opened up an avenue through which 
cultural  activists  and their  variety of activities  may find new opportunities  to express 
themselves and bond communities together. For example, both Mahathir and Mbeki have 
been highlighting the importance of cultural connections in their speeches and the value 
these would have for  their  respective  nation-states.  Whilst  their  political  rhetoric  and 
slogans have been considered commendable,  it  seems that the political  leadership has 
been stuck and caught in their bilateral and multilateral relations with countries in the 
region and abroad that they seem to have become oblivious of the fact that NSAs such 
cultural activists have already been hard at work in establishing links and forging cultural 
ties that would be of interest and of benefit to the respective nations at large. This chapter 
thus turns its attention to these NSAs who have played and continue to play significant 
people-to-people’s ties. In this chapter there are three individuals whose roles in forging 
international  relations  between  the  two  states  in  their  respective  ways  cannot  be 
disregarded and overlooked. As far as one could determine, no serious IR academic work 
has been done in order to use these individuals as important case studies in discussing 
SA-Malaysian IR. It is therefore the intention of this chapter to do just that. 
In the first part of this chapter, the socio-historical story of a South African family that 
migrated  from  South  Africa  to  Southeast  Asia  as  voluntary  ‘political’  refugees  is 
narrated. It, however, gives specific attention to Hajjah Rabi’ah’s unique and interesting 
story that tells about her trials and tribulations as a voluntary South African ‘migrant’ or 
‘refugee’ in seeking and obtaining citizenship in the Federation of Malaysia. The second 
part relates a completely different story; this time it’s a story of a highly-motivated and a 
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self-styled  cultural  activist,  namely Mr.  Ismail  Petersen,  who has  since the  mid  20th 
century  been  actively  involved  in  charitable  work  such  as  hosting  Southeast  Asian 
seamen who docked at the Cape. Mr. Petersen’s narrative, which has not as yet been fully 
acknowledged by the state,  has been recognized by Malaysian and Indonesian NGOs 
such as the Malaysian Historical Society. The example of Mr. Petersen as a case study 
clearly demonstrates the important role that individuals, like him, have been playing. It is 
assumed that similar stories are found – of which some have been recorded - in other 
South African ethnic communities such as the Portuguese, Greek, Chinese and Indians as 
well  as in the religio-cultural  communities  such as the Hindus and Jews. And in the 
chapter’s final part the story of a Malaysian cultural activist, namely Tan Sri Professor 
Drs. Ismail Hussein, and his organization, namely GAPENA, is narrated, recorded and 
analyzed.  Tan Sri Hussein is an intellectual who dedicated much of his life to pursue 
socio-cultural relations in the era of globalization with groups in Southeast Asia as well 
as those who form part of ‘Malay’ diaspora such as South Africa’s ‘Cape Malays.’ The 
separate but inter-related stories of these three individuals/cultural activists thus help to 
cover a different and indeed a generally little explored dimension of IR studies. 
The chapter - like the previous ones - attempts to narrate, discuss and analyse by locating 
its contents within a specific theoretical framework. This framework assists to offer an 
understanding of the importance of bringing issues of identity and culture back into IR 
affairs. And by the same token it also emphasises the relevance of IR stories in not only 
enriching the IR discipline but in moving beyond the decision making body/bodies of the 
sovereign  state.  One  important  variable,  which  will  preface  this  chapter,  has  been 
employed  to  construct  a  theoretical  framework;  this  variable  is  the  concept  of 
‘community.’  Since  this  concept  acts  as  an  overarching  variable  in  which  these 
individuals are physically and geographically located,  other relevant variables such as 
NSAs will also be discussed when relating each of the stories below. Let me now discuss 
the concept of ‘community’ that would help to frame the three separate but inter-related 
stories.
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2. Conceptualizing ‘Community’ and ‘Non-State Actors’:
The term ‘community’ has been considered as an imprecise and ubiquitous one by social 
scientists such as Rabinowitz (2001: 2387-2389) and Jacobs (2001: 2383) pointed out 
that  the term is ‘open to wide interpretation’ (also cf. Milner 1972: 174-180); despite 
their  problems  in  offering  a  suitable  definition,  they  have  appropriated  Tonnes’ 
sociological  model  that  helps  to  explain  the term.  Tonnes  distinguished between two 
types of communities; the first is what he described as  gemeinschaft and the second as 
gesellschaft. In the case of the former, it  simply refers to a community that expresses 
feelings and the latter refers to associations that make up the community. Tonnes himself 
preferred to view community as the greater and more important entity than society; he 
argued that society is in essence made up of communities. 
Community is  thus the very foundation upon which society is  based or  created.  The 
community  is  ‘… usually  associated  with  an  array  of  positive  connotations  such  as 
solidarity, familiarity, unity of purpose, interest and identity’ (Rabinowitz 2001: 2387). 
Social scientists have, however, generally accepted the idea that it may be defined as a 
‘type  of  collectivity  or  social  unit’  or  a  type  of  social  relations  or  sentiments.’  By 
collectivity is meant that the group shares a defined physical space or geographical area, 
and shares common traits or has a sense of belonging; and that it maintains social ties and 
that their interaction with one another shapes them into a distinct social entity such an 
ethnic or religious community. These descriptions remind one of Ibn Khaldun, the North 
African  scholar  of  whom much  had been  said  in  Chapter  Three,  who advocated  the 
notion of ‘asabiyyah (group feeling/solidarity [cf. Rosenthal 1987: 566]). 
Nonetheless Azarya (1996) pointed out that the term ‘community’  is a ‘type of social 
unit’  or ‘a type of social  relations or sentiments,’  which shares physical  geographical 
space and common traits such as a sense of belonging that brings about interaction that 
shapes  it  further  into  a  distinct  social  entity,  namely  a  religious  community.  From 
amongst  the  different  minority  religious  communities  in  South  Africa,  the  Muslim 
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community  stands  out  as  one  of  the  more  significant  ones;  various  aspects  of  their 
significance have been dealt with in works by I.D. Du Plessis (1972), Bradlow & Cairns 
(1979), Davids (1980) and Tayob (1999). And in the case of Malaysia, the Malays – who 
are invariably accepted as Muslims according to the definition (cf. Barnard 2004; Kahn 
2006) - form the largest religious community in that country. 
In this chapter the interest is to look at representatives from these two communities. In 
general,  when  addressing  the  South  African  Muslim  community  or  the  Malaysian 
‘Malay’ community, it can be cogently argued that they fit into Rabinowitz and others’ 
constructed and explained definition. For example, the South African Muslim community 
shares a physical geographical area and is made up of a variety of socio-linguistic and 
ethnic groups. And these different groups,  inter alia, socialize with one another in the 
business arena, participate together in religious functions such as the celebration of the 
birth of the prophet, and involve themselves with one another in select sporting codes 
such as cricket. And whilst many of this community’s members are associated with their 
respective ethno-linguistic identity groups – taking into account Burgess’ (2002) critical 
thoughts - such as the ‘Cape Malays’ whose forebears hailed from parts of South Asia 
and Southeast Asia or Somali speakers who came to South Africa as refugees or Gujerati 
speakers  whose  forebears  came  as  economic  migrants  from  South  Asia,  they  see 
themselves as part and parcel of the South African Muslim community.  Arguments to 
describe and discuss the composition of the Malays in Malaysia can be constructed along 
similar lines (cf. Milner 1998; Barnard 2004; Kahn 2006).
Since  these  communities  have  been  growing  steadily  in  their  respective  states, 
representatives  in  each  of  them  have  been  active  in  NGOs  or  community  based 
organizations (CBOs) that tried to promote inter-cultural and religious relations with co-
believers either within their own communities or with diasporic communities that share 
similar  religio-cultural  traits.  Despite the debates regarding the exact  origins of South 
Africa’s  ‘Cape  Malays’,  representatives  of  these  communities  who  have  visited  and 
toured Malaysia and Indonesia have observed similarities in physical features, religious 
practices, and cultural patterns of behaviour (cf. Haron 2005: 60-61). And since this has 
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been the case, these representatives have worked via CBOs or NGOs to connect these 
communities through religio-cultural structures. This was indeed what the stories of Mr. 
Ismail Petersen and Tan Sri Ismail Hussein reveal. In fact, these CBOs and NGOs have 
empowered the communities with the knowledge that they were able to accumulate about 
their  respective  communities  and the opportunities  that  came along in the process  of 
connecting and bonding through partnerships at the people-to-people’s level. 
Both communities via these representatives have become conscious of the positive value 
that this type of relationship brought about over the past few years, and they also became 
- to some degree - aware of what it can bring to bear on their respective countries’ foreign 
policies and IR agendas. Since the position of NSAs such as these representatives has 
become an important and indeed a respectable role within in international relations, it is 
perhaps  appropriate  to  briefly  address  the  theoretical  status  of  these  representatives. 
Josselin  and  Wallace  (2001:  1)  noted  that  the  state  actors  and  NSAs  form  ‘broad 
opposing categories’ and that the latter group has learnt to exploit the space between the 
multilateral institutions in order to exercise their rights and pursue their interests in the 
socio-cultural and religious arena. These two scholars thus went on to define NSAs as 
individuals  who  are:  autonomous  from  central  government  funding  and  control  and 
emanate  from civil  society,  operate  and participate  in networks  which extend across 
borders of two or more states engaging in transnational relations that link socio-religion, 
cultural, economic and political ties (ibid 3-4). In the light of their observations, it can 
safely  be  concluded  that  both  Ismail  Petersen  and  Ismail  Hussein  have  been  acting 
autonomously without state support to pursue their socio-cultural activities within their 
respective communities as well as with groups in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia 
respectively. The transnational relationships that they have forged and have been engaged 
in over the many years are manifestations of trends across the globe throughout the era of 
globalization (cf. Kennedy & Rondometof 2002: 12). 
And their cultural contributions have forced some states to acknowledge that these NSAs 
have  made  unique  and  indeed  valuable  contributions  in  international  relations; 
contributions that have generally been ignored and overlooked in the past. As a result of 
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adopting a positive attitude towards the activities of these individuals and groups, the 
state actors have created the necessary space and opportunities for NSAs in the IR arena. 
This  recognition  and  acceptance  of  the  NSAs’  significant  position  in  the  IR  arena 
concretizes the suggestions that had been made by both Mahathir and Mbeki regarding 
the importance of cultural relations between and among communities in the South. 
Whilst this is indeed a positive move, the state actors such as the presidents and prime 
ministers of states should encourage their foreign policy practitioners and IR specialists 
to take cognisance of the significant position that NSAs hold within the IR sector. As a 
matter  of  fact,  the  respective  Departments  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  South  Africa  and 
Malaysia should create the space and perhaps a port-folio within its structures to assist 
with the promotion and support of these cultural connections through mutual cooperation 
rather than the imposition of rules and regulations from those located in the ‘upstairs 
section’  onto  those  who  are  live  in  the  ‘downstairs  section’  (to  use  Vale’s  1997 
metaphor).  If this  should come about then it  will  fulfil  one of the goals  enshrined in 
NAASP  and  that  is  to  allow  for  and  recognize  and  respect  ‘people-to-people’s 
interaction.’ Let me record and analyze the role that some NSAs played in forging cross-
ocean ties and the ‘people-to-peoples ties’.
Figure 5.1
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3. Cultural Citizenship in the Diaspora:  The Experiences of Hajjah Rabi’ah 
      & Her Relatives in the Federation of Malaya
3.1 Introduction:
Tunku  Abdul  Rahman’s  (cf.  Adam  2004),  the  Federation  of  Malaya’s  first  Prime 
Minister, was on one of the ships that sailed via the port of the Cape of Good Hope – as 
Cape Town was then known - from Britain to Southeast Asia in late 1959; this was after 
he attended a Prime Minister’s Commonwealth Meeting. At the Cape he disembarked to 
gain first hand knowledge of the nature of apartheid policies and what the Cape Malays, 
South  Africa’s  Muslim  minority  -  many  of  whom  were  residing  in  the  Cape  and 
surrounding  areas,  were  experiencing  at  that  time.  In  fact,  during  the  time  when  he 
attended the mentioned meeting in London, he received a letter from a Committee of the 
African Union,  which  spoke on behalf  of 13 organizations  and associations  in  South 
Africa; this letter outlined and explained the circumstances under which the Cape Malays 
have been living,  and this  gave him an added incentive to see for himself  what was 
happening at the Cape (cf. Berita Harian 12 January 1992). 
Soon after  his  arrival  in  the Federation,  he made a  clarion  call  to  ‘Cape Malays’  to 
consider migrating – if they so wish - to the Federation of Malaya. When he extended the 
invitation to them during 1960, little did he realize that a group of families from this 
community had planned to do just that and would take him up on it (cf. Muslim News 16 
January  1961).  During  the  same  time  he  had  been  harassing  the  South  African 
government representatives at the Prime Ministers’ Commonwealth meetings and the UN 
General  Assembly  gatherings  regarding  the  apartheid  policies  that  were  being 
implemented (cf. Chapter Three). Even though Tunku was cautious not  to ‘interfere’ in 
any of the Commonwealth members’ internal affairs because of the important principles 
of  sovereignty,  he  felt  it  morally  bound  to  raise  these  inhumane  practices  at  these 
important  sessions  where  more  pressure  could  be  applied  on  the  South  African 
government  to  desist  from  devising  and  implementing  such  policies.  The  Tunku’s 
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persistence eventually paid off when the Afro-Asian block within the UN were able to 
force South Africa to reconsider its position in the UN and other statutory bodies. As a 
consequence of the pressures, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd announced at the Prime Ministers’ 
Commonwealth meeting on the 15th of May 1961 that South Africa would withdraw at 
the  end of  May 1961 (Mohamed  Muda 1996);  this  was  not  long after  South  Africa 
changed  its  status  from a  Union  to  a  Republic.  Tunku’s  constant  opposition  to  the 
republics’  indiscriminate  and  inhumane  policies  was  widely  respected  and  he  was 
provided full support from within the Afro-Asian ranks; many of whom were signatories 
of  the  Bandung 1955 declaration,  the  same  year  during  which  the  ANC drafted  and 
signed the Freedom Charter in South Africa. 
South  Africa’s  withdrawal  at  no stage  meant  that  it  was  going  to  back  down on its 
policies; it basically did the opposite. From amongst the list of policies that stood out and 
upon which all others were based or derived was the racial  policy.  According to this 
policy the South African society was ‘legally’ divided along racial lines worked out by 
Dr. Verwoerd, the chief architect  of apartheid.  According to his plan the society was 
divided  into  whites,  coloureds,  Indians  and  Africans.  All  those  that  originated  from 
Europe  were  classified  as  whites,  and  those  with  mix  blood  were  categorised  as 
coloureds; it is within this group that the ‘Cape Malays’ were classified. Although this 
label  was  constructed  by  the  colonial  powers,  the  South  African  apartheid  saw  it 
expedient to employ it for its own socio-political objectives. In response to these policies 
the oppressed masses of non-whites (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) members of these 
groups made attempts to work together in order to oppose the government; for example, 
the affiliated members of the ANC were the Coloured People’s Congress and the South 
African Indian Congress who represented their respective constituencies. Tunku was thus 
vehemently opposed to  this  type  of  separation  and racial  disharmony that  was  being 
promoted and pursued by the South African regime. And since this was the case, he felt 
morally obliged to show his concern for the plight of the ‘Cape Malays’ in particular and 
the oppressed masses in general. 
This moral obligation stems from the fact that he was acutely aware of the racial conflicts 
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that occasionally affected his own society and the conflicts that occurred because of the 
British ‘divide and rule’ policy (cf. Hnh Hung Yong 2004). He was also fully familiar 
with the Malay diaspora such as those whose forebears were shipped off  as political 
exiles and slaves to Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) and to the Cape of Good Hope in South 
Africa  by  the  British  and  Dutch  colonialists.  And  since  the  (indigenous)  Malay 
population found themselves being almost numerically outnumbered by the Indian and 
Chinese  communities,  it  may  thus  be  assumed  that  whilst  his  clarion  call  was  a 
humanitarian one, it  was also in effect  a political  one in that the return of the Malay 
diaspora particularly those who lived in apartheid South Africa would in a small  way 
contribute towards boosting the numbers of the indigenous Malays. 
Apart from this assumption, the issue of relocation and resettlement was never going to 
be  an  easy  one  as  was  experienced  by  Hajjah  Rabi’ah  bint  Ebrahim  (hereafter  Hj. 
Rabia’ah) and her family when they landed in the Federation of Malaya. The invitation in 
essence also implied that the ‘Cape Malays’ would have had to renounce their acquired 
South African apartheid citizenship and nationality for a new one according to the rules 
and  regulations  that  were  operative  within  the  Federation  of  Malaya.  Whilst  this 
exchange would have meant that it would have granted them the opportunity to express 
and practice their religion and culture within an environment of relative freedom, it could 
also have meant one of privilege vis-à-vis those Indian and Chinese (Malays) who were 
born and reared in the Federation. And this could also have meant that they would have 
had to exchange their position from being second – class citizens in South Africa to being 
first class ones in the Federation. Nonetheless, this was indeed an interesting challenge 
bearing in mind that the issue of ‘citizenship’ was very much part of the nation-state 
project  on  the  continents  of  Asia  and  Africa  respectively.  Indeed  the  question  of 
citizenship was lying at the heart of the emergence of nation-states, and the call of Tunku 
directly  challenged  it  during  the  time  of  the  Federation’s  nation  building  process;  a 
process within which citizenship formed a crucial cog or building block. 
The contents of this section are not about the internal strife that took place within the 
Federation, but about the travails of the South African families who chose to emigrate 
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and through fate landed in Federation territory.  The section relates, albeit in brief, the 
struggle that Hj. Rabi’ah, who was one of the wives who remained behind, went through 
in order to gain citizenship in the Federation, and the innumerable bureaucratic structures 
she  had  to  bypass  before  she  could  be  granted  her  citizenship.  Before  narrating  her 
struggle, the section first attempts to define the term ‘citizenship’ and ‘diaspora’ in order 
to  provide another  frame;  this  time the frame is  constructed to  fully comprehend Hj. 
Rabi’ah’s quest for citizenship and for someone who was part of the ‘Malay diaspora’, 
and thereafter  it  locates her position within a broader socio-political  context in South 
Africa and Malaysia respectively. 
3.2 The Two Conceptual Tools: Citizenship and Diaspora
The  term  ‘citizenship’  has  basically  been  a  European  construction  which  called  for 
secular  social  membership  and  which  is  essentially  different  from  the  notion  of 
citizenship within the Muslim world as argued by Verma (2004: 56).  The latter however 
also pointed out that the process of globalization had also placed a strain on the term as 
understood  and  practiced  in  the  western  world.  There  is  little  doubt  that  process  of 
globalization  deepened the debates  pertaining  to  the term and other  related  concepts. 
According to van Gunsteren (1998: 6), the post-1989 events and developments  had a 
cascading effect upon the socio-political scene in the ‘global village’, and this, in turn, 
gave  rise  to  revisiting  a  variety  of  concepts  such  as  ‘citizenship.’  The latter  concept 
begged an array of questions pertaining to the criteria of citizenship, the globalization of 
citizenship, etcetera. For the purposes of this part of the chapter, I will confine myself to 
a limited number of aspects dealing with the concept. 
The desire for citizenship in the late 20th century has become a widespread phenomenon 
and indeed a complex one. The definition of citizenship has been and remains, according 
to Joseph (2000: 9), the task of the state via its structures. Delanty (2000: 4) offers the 
following definition: ‘a citizen is born a moral being and a legal entity,’ and these two 
variables demarcate the boundary between citizen and non-citizen. And Janoski (1998: 9) 
also  provided  a  workable  definition;  he  defined  citizenship  as  being  ‘… passive  and 
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active membership of individuals in a nation state with certain universalistic rights and 
obligations at a specified level of equality.’ 
Delanty (2000:  15)  quoted  from a 1992 work of  Marshall  who expounded upon this 
concept. Marshall stated that ‘(a) citizen is a status (that is) bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community;’ in other words a person who has been granted this status 
he/she possesses civil and political rights. He continued and stated that the rights of a 
citizen differ from what has been categorised as ‘human rights.’ The notion of citizenship 
is thus (a) particularistic, (b) shaped by the principle of nationality, and (c) based upon a 
political  understanding that a person is a member of a community and a nation-state. 
With regards to explaining the position of a citizen van Gunsteren (1998: 13) also made 
reference  to  a  1950 work of  Marshall  in  which  the  latter  also  noted  three  important 
aspects of a citizen; the citizen has (a) a say in political decision making, (b) access to 
courts of law that are staffed by cocitizens who judge according to the rules that equally 
apply  to  all  citizens,  and  (c)  a  guarantee  of  minimum  socioeconomic  conditions  of 
existence. 
Van Gunsteren (ibid 15) highlighted the fact that whilst these remain significant aspects 
of the concept, the debates about citizenship have changed since the 1970s onwards. He 
remarked that in the decades before the 1970s the emphasis was on ‘rights’ as outlined by 
Marshall (and also qtd by Janoski 1998: 3) who explained citizenship in terms of legal, 
political and social rights. It has however since then been accompanied by an emphasis 
on institutional  duties,  concerns  and loyalties.  Delaney’s  comments  are  moreover  not 
very different from what had just been stated; he furthermore made the point that the 
person  holds  a  position  that  is  ‘more  than  a  matter  of  rights,  and  also  entails  an 
identification and commitment to the community’ (Delanty 2000: 19).  Van Gunsteren 
(1998: 15) added that ‘… the point of departure for analysis is no longer unity but the 
multiple identities of minorities who have a responsibility to live together as citizens in 
one republic.’ From what has thus far been discussed, it is not difficult to observe that the 
citizen enjoys within the sovereign states certain rights; rights that have been denied to a 
non-citizen.
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Both van Gunsteren (1998: 16-21) and Janoski (1998: 17-24) made reference to three 
theoretical  models associated with citizenship;  they are liberalism,  communitarianism, 
and republicanism or social democracy that are applicable to contemporary societies. In 
contemporary  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  the  last  mentioned  is  the  most  applicable; 
however,  this  theory  will  not  be  elaborated  upon  here  because  of  certain  obvious 
constraints.  It  should  however  be added that  Benhabib  (2004)  and Neocleous  (2003) 
highlighted  the  problems  that  surrounds  the  concept  of  citizenship  vis-à-vis  the  non-
citizen/alien/stranger and that the concept is closely related to the notions of diaspora. Let 
me  briefly  address  the  concept  of  ‘diaspora’;  a  concept,  which  has  initially  been 
associated with the Jewish peoples in the diaspora, and during this period of globalization 
and transnationalism has become widespread and indeed a contested term.
Tedlock (1996: 431) stated that the notion of diaspora ‘regenerate(d) a set of distinctive 
cultural and ethnic identities’, and she added that the diasporic communities normally do 
not feel welcome and fully accepted by host communities, and they always regard their 
place  of  origin  or  birth  place  as  their  home to  which  they will  someday return.  She 
pointed out that diasporic communities differ in values and class; for example, there are 
the  expatriate  communities  in  host  countries,  who  are  usually  associated  with  the 
‘aristocratic detachment,’ the migrant communities who are viewed as upwardly mobile, 
the refugee communities who are separate from the host communities and always expect 
handouts,  and then there are the resident  aliens who always  cannot legally eke out a 
living and live in a state of poverty. 
Besides these categories Cohen (2001) posited a typology of victim, trade, labour and 
colonial diaspora, with victim diaporas serving as the protoptypical core. Cohen (2001) 
also mentioned that it is important to make a distinction between the imperial diaspora, 
which is associated with the colonial era, and the victim diaspora, which is connected 
with refugees and political asylum seekers. It may again be stated that victim diaspora are 
occasionally viewed by sovereign states where they reside or took refuge as problematic 
cases in terms of offering similar rights as those given to their citizens. Although the 
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families in this study do not fall squarely in the victim diaspora category, their move from 
South Africa  to  the  Federation  contained  elements  of  it.  They were not  displaced  or 
forced  to  leave  South  Africa,  their  birth  place,  but  chose  to  seek  shelter  elsewhere 
because of the worsening socio-political conditions within South Africa. Another issue 
that also provides another dimension to this type of diaspora is that these families yearned 
to return to the birth place of their  fore-fathers and thus reconnect  with their  religio-
cultural roots.
3.3 South African and Malaysian Citizenship: Setting the Context
The Nationalist Party came to power in the Union of South Africa in 1948 and devised its 
apartheid  policies  that  had  a  devastating  effect  upon the  social  life  of  the  oppressed 
masses in the country in the decades that followed. These events took place more-or-less 
at the same time when the citizenship laws were formulated by the British colonialists 
and the Malay nationalists, nine years before the birth of the Federation of Malaya; these 
laws were subsequently embodied within the Federation of Malaya Agreement and by 
1952 these were amended and improved (Nazaruddin Hj Mohd Jai  et  al  2003:  126). 
However, citizenship laws in the Union before 1949 fell  under the jurisdiction of the 
British Empire. This meant that the individual was a British subject and a South African 
national, and that it was only in 1926 that the South African Parliament defined the status 
of a British subject for the purposes of the South African legal system. 
These laws were changed about a year after the NP assumed power. The NP formulated 
the citizenship laws along racial lines, and it legislated the South African Citizenship Act 
of 1949; this was in effect the first phase of apartheid citizenship, according to Klaaren 
(1999). The second phase came into effect with the Bantu Homelands Act of 1970; this 
was about 9 years after South Africa became a republic and a year after the racial riots in 
the Federation. These laws were couched in such as way that it considered the whites as 
the privileged class (and this is with the support of the theological interpretations of the 
Dutch Reform Church, which was the official state church), and all the non-whites were 
treated as second class citizens. These laws thus permitted those who originated from 
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Europe to be classified as white and those of mix blood were recognized as Coloured; it 
is within this group that the NP decided to categorize the ‘Cape Malays.’  The Indian 
communities from South Asia were classified as Indians and the indigenous communities 
were viewed as Africans but were further sub-divided according to their language groups. 
The South African apartheid regime later introduced their infamous homeland policies in 
the 1970s as another way of defining who can be and who should not be a South African 
citizen.  In  response to  these  discriminatory  laws  the  ANC led  continuous  campaigns 
against the system in the 1950s; the apartheid regime could not contain these protests and 
in the end banned the ANC and other liberation movements, groups and individuals who 
voiced their opinions against the state. In some instances their citizenship was revoked 
and they were forced to seek refuge in the neighbouring states or in other parts of the 
world and become ‘victim diaspora’ in many cases. Some members of the Cape Malay 
community such as Mr. Omar Cassiem from Port Elizabeth moved to the UK to take out 
British citizenship and to, of course, get away from South Africa’s harsh, discriminatory 
system that was implemented (MN 9 September 1966). From the afore-mentioned, it is 
quite clear that the issue of citizenship became problematic and complex. 
When returning to the formulation of citizenship in the Federation of Malaya, it is noted 
that it was also not a clear-cut affair. It was made complex by the British colonialist who 
had imported Chinese and Indian labour to the region, and this exacerbated matters since 
the  latter  two  were  favoured  whilst  the  indigenous  Malays  were  marginalised. 
Rajamoorthy (1999: 88) made a telling comment when he said that the ‘fissures in Malay 
society not only hindered the evolution of a national consciousness but also served to 
buttress  the British colonial  policy of ‘divide  and rule’.’  As far  as Rajamoorthy was 
concerned, the British basically coloured the whole concept of citizenship in Malaya. In 
any event, the numbers of the immigrant labour population grew rapidly and this caused a 
concern  among  the  indigenous  Malays;  this  thus  resulted  in  the  formulation  of  the 
citizenship laws in favour of the indigenous population. Although concerns were raised 
by the offspring of the immigrant labourers who were born and grew up in the Malay 
territories, their fears were allayed through the formulation and amendments that were 
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later made particularly in 1962 when significant changes were made to citizenship laws; 
this was of fundamental importance at that time especially when the name changed to the 
Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. One of the changes was that ‘a person born in 
the Federation will not be a citizen unless one of his parents is at the time of birth either a 
citizen of, or permanently resident in it’. In the process of making these amendments the 
principle of jus soli was eroded and this also implied inter alia that ‘equal opportunities 
for employment throughout the Federation lost their virtue’ (Hickling 1978: 8-9).
The Federation’s constitution however underwent major changes soon after  the Black 
Tuesday race riots on the 13th of May 1969 (Adam 2004: 408-423). In 1970 a National 
Consultative  Council  was  established  and  it  created,  among  others,  the  document 
enshrining the Rukunegara; the latter contained the following crucial points: (a) its basic 
philosophy, (b) evolution of a democratic Malaysian nation, and (c) the need to adhere to 
the rule of law (Hickling 1978: 13). Verma (2004: 54) mentioned that after 1970 ‘a new 
multicultural ideal of citizenship based upon assimilation of communities replaced the 
earlier goal of accommodation of rights of communities.’ And she (2004: 54) critically 
commented that it was the elite alliance that revised the nature of citizenship rights, and 
in the process marginalized the politics of the idea of multiculturalism. In her opinion, the 
NEP ruled out multicultural rights of citizenship that was later promoted. And she (204: 
57) further expressed the view that ‘citizenship assumed a passive and rather negative 
form  instead  of  developing  notions  of  ‘civic  responsibility,  social  trust  and 
egalitarianism’’[she qtd Kalberg 1993]. According to Hassall (1999: 51), the constitution 
mandated affirmative programmes that privileged the bumiputra citizens over the other 
groups.  Hassall  highlighted  the  fact  that  boundaries  pertaining  to  citizenship  were 
imposed via the process of decolonization in the earlier period, and by the formation of 
multiethnic states in the later period. Sinnadurai (1978: 73-74) pointed out that for one to 
acquire citizenship in the Federation of Malaysia and in the years that  followed three 
criteria had to be fulfilled: (a) operation of the law, (b) registration, and (c) naturalization; 
for  the  latter  one  had  to  obtain  a  ‘certificate  of  naturalization’  issued  by  the  High 
Commissioner.
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From the afore-mentioned discussion, it is observed that the process of citizenship went 
through transmutations  in both states since the late  1940s.  However,  it  is  within this 
context that Hj. Rabi’ah found herself and thus struggled to become a Malaysian citizen. 
We now turn our focus to how she and her family members landed up in Southeast Asia, 
more specifically in the Federation of Malaya by the beginning of 1961.
3.4 South African Families Trekking to the Federation by Default
It  appears  to  have  been  coincidental  that  when  Tunku  Abdul  Rahman  extended  the 
invitation  to  the  Cape Malays  during  1960 that  a  few families  from this  community 
consciously  decided  -  for  socio-political  purposes  -  to  move  to  Southeast  Asia,  in 
particular to the Island of Tidore in Indonesia. The reason for making this assumption is 
based on the fact that Abu Bakr Abrahams, the leader of the group who suggested making 
the journey, was a member of the ANC whose activities were severely curtailed by the 
ban that the apartheid regime imposed upon the oppositional groups such as the ANC. 
However, according to the report of Othman Abrahams, Abu Bakr’s brother and one of 
the members of the group of 39 who eventually arrived in the Federation in early January 
1961,  he  and  his  brother  had  already  thought  about  emigrating  soon  after  the  Job 
Reservations’ Bill  was implemented in the late 1950s; this act  reserved jobs only for 
whites and this implied that even with their skills they would not be allowed or granted 
work opportunities. The apartheid regime would grant the whites first preference before 
employing anyone else.  Abu Bakr Abrahams thus felt that since he was totally opposed 
to the apartheid government and would not be able to exercise his rights in the country of 
his birth, he might as well go back to the country where his forebears hailed from; and 
this was the Island of Tidore in Indonesia. The intention was therefore quite clear from 
the  outset  that  the  Abrahams  brothers’  objective  was to  reach  Indonesia  and not  the 
Federation of Malaya.
3.4.1 The Trip from Durban to Singapore:
The  trip  thus  went  ahead  as  planned  since  the  Abrahams  brothers’  desired  to  reach 
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Indonesia, the land of their forebears. It was spearheaded by Mr. Abu Bakr Abrahams, a 
former patron of the South African Malay Association; he was accompanied by his wife 
and children  as well  as  his  younger  brother,  Othman,  and his  family.  Abu Bakr  and 
Othman, who were the sons of Imam ‘Peskies’ - an Imam at one of the mosques in Port 
Elizabeth, were, at that time, residing in Johannesburg. In addition to their families, Mr. 
Hussein Hartley and his family also joined after having been persuaded by the Abrahams’ 
brothers. The names of the families are as follows:
a) Abu Bakr’s wife was Rogaya (44) & their children were: Mohamed Hanif (22), 
Toughida (23?), Norhidaya (18),  Zaidah (15) and Khadijah (13);
b) Othman’s wife was Raziah (35) & their children were: Fazilah (10), Zaitun (8), and 
Yusuf (5); and
c) Hussein’s wife was Rabi’ah (29) & their children were: Yasmine (7), Sirajuddin (6), 
Feirouza (4), Hajira (3) and Ridwan (2). In addition to these families, there was 
Sediq Lawrence, a bachelor.
They were in all 19 and were viewed as the first batch; the second was to follow about a 
year thereafter (Strait Times 11 January 1961). 
That said, these families, in particular the brothers, then under the pretext of intending to 
perform the annual pilgrimage in Mecca - this is also how it was reported in the Berita  
Harian (11 January 1961) after the delegation led by Othman and Abu Bakr Abrahams 
met Tunku and the Malaya Federation officials - an activity which was not viewed as 
subversive by all counts, boarded the Boissevain ship, which was bound for the east and 
not the east coast of Africa en route to Jeddah via Aden as some of their friends might 
have thought. The ship left in late 1960 and travelled from Durban to Mauritius and from 
there to Singapore. 
When  it  docked  at  Port  Louis,  the  capital  of  Mauritius,  it  was  coincidental  that  Hj. 
Rabi’ah, who was the daughter of Ebrahim Ozeer Ally, was able to meet her relatives; 
these were from Mr. Ally’s maternal side. As a matter of information, her father, Ebrahim 
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Ozeer Ally, hailed from Mauritius and came with his father, Ozeer Ally, to British South 
Africa where he became an important community leader. After a few days in Mauritius it 
sailed  to  Singapore;  and  whilst  they  were  on  board  Abu  Bakr  Abrahams  sent  three 
telegrams to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the hope that some positive 
response would come before they disembarked at Singapore since the ship was moving 
on to Hong Kong and Tokyo respectively. By the time the ship docked in Singapore, they 
had received no response, and they reflected deep disappointment and became somewhat 
despondent.  They disembarked  in  Singapore  with  the  hope  of  still  finding  a  way to 
Indonesia. 
At the time when they got off the ship, they had no Singaporean contact, nor any address 
of local Muslim associations who could have extended a helping hand; they were thus 
stranded and literally lost. A sympathetic Singaporean bystander came to their aide when 
he saw their distraught faces and directed them to a nearby and reasonably cheap Chinese 
hotel. They graciously accepted the person’s advice and went off to this particular hotel 
without being aware that Chinese cuisine and culture (in Southeast Asia) differ markedly 
from theirs. When they entered the hotel and checked the conditions at the hotel, they 
were shocked when they saw the pig’s head hanging in the hotel’s kitchen; it should be 
borne in mind that the Muslim families in South Africa strictly observed the Islamic 
dietary rules that forbade Muslims to consume pig. The mere sight of the skinned pig 
hanging in the kitchen forced them to immediately leave the hotel’s premises and search 
for the nearest mosque; they then landed at the Sultan mosque. 
At this mosque they were introduced to Shaykh Haji Jofri, a pilgrim’s broker, who was 
kind  to  assist  the  families  settle  in.  Despite  the  hospitality  that  was  shown  by  the 
Singaporean Muslim, they themselves became a bit frustrated with the circumstances in 
which they found themselves. According to Hj. Rabi’ah, Abu Bakr Abrahams seemed to 
have already given up hope and questioned why they left South Africa in the first place. 
Despite these difficult and trying times, they began to make concerted efforts to get in 
touch with the Federation of Malaya  officials  and remembering Tunku’s invitation in 
which he officially invited ‘Cape Malays’  to take up residence and citizenship in the 
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Federation. Up until then, Singapore was not a member of the Federation, and they were 
thus at the mercy of the Singaporean authorities. Since the invitation was well known, the 
Federation officials  complied with their  requests and they were permitted to enter the 
Federation territory and assisted them to get to Tunku’s office so that they could have the 
chance to forward some of their familial requests. The invitation, which was not seriously 
considered  before  and during  their  journey  towards  Singapore,  became  an  important 
piece of paper and directive that would allow them to (eventually) settle on Federation 
soil. By this time, the idea of still finding passageway to Indonesia was abandoned and 
they seriously took up the invitation that was ‘handed out’ by Tunku. 
3.4.2 Their Stay in the Federation:
The contact that was initially made with Federation officials bore fruit; the Abrahams 
brothers, being the main representatives, had the privilege of being invited to Tunku’s 
official tea party; however, the tea party was not only for the two South African brothers 
but also for a special Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) delegation that came especially for the 3rd 
installation  of  Yang di-Pertuan  Agong.  At  the  tea  party,  which  was held  at  Tunku’s 
official residence, other governmental officials were also present. The tea party thus gave 
Tunku the opportunity to address the representatives of both diaspora communities in an 
open  and frank  manner.  At  the  tea  party  Tunku  was  quite  open and  frank  with  the 
Ceylonese  delegation  telling  them  that  ‘(your)  conditions  in  Ceylon  are  different 
compared to the Malay people of South Africa. In this regard, I would like to advise them 
to  adapt  themselves  to  the  government  of  Ceylon.’  He,  however,  expressed  his 
admiration  for  the  Ceylonese  Malays  who  were  highly  skilled  and,  diplomatically 
mentioned that the Federation is in need of such skilled personnel. The Tunku realized 
that  these  diasporic  communities  have  been  exposed  to  different  conditions  and  had 
opportunities  the Malays  did not have in the territory of the Federation and was thus 
indirectly hoping that these skilled Malays might consider emigrating to the Federation.
As a result of this formal meeting, Tunku, at a press conference, gave a directive in which 
he approved that these families could stay. However, this could only happen on condition 
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that  they  fend  for  themselves  and  not  in  any  way  be  a  burden  to  the  Federation’s 
administration; in other words the Federation was not going to give any financial hand 
outs to the families and they will have to earn their keep. Apparently Tunku was prepared 
to  also  give  the  families,  after  they  have  proven  to  succeed  in  obtaining  work  and 
contributing towards the social life of the host society, land that they can use to further 
improve  their  social  circumstances.  At  the  time  of  the  press  conference,  UMNO’s 
delegates were also meeting in Kuala Trengganu and they, led by Garieb Abdul-Raof – 
the  Secretary  General,  fully  backed  Tunku on  his  decision.  Mr.  Garieb  couched  the 
permission that was granted differently; he praised Tunku ‘for granting political asylum 
to three South African Malay families.’ The manner in which he expressed himself thus 
gave a slightly different meaning to the settlement in the Federation; the term ‘political 
asylum’,  it  is widely known, connoted a different story in the circumstances.  Tunku’s 
statement was repeated and circulated; it basically stated that ‘any Malay families, who 
are suppressed in South Africa,  are welcomed in this country’  and also added that ‘I 
understand that they suffered too much (Berita Harian 12 Janury 1961). And at the press 
report, Abu Bakr Abrahams boldly declared that ‘we have decided to make Malaya our 
permanent home and have confidence in the future’ (The Malay Mail 6 September 1961).
Othman Abrahams, who was the spokesperson at the time of meeting Tunku, is reported 
to have said: ‘we understand the terms stated by Tunku Abdul Rahman and it is not our 
intention to be a burden to the government or our relatives (sic) here.’ (Berita Harian 12 
January 1961; Utusan Melayu 11 January 1961). As one of the chief representatives, he 
further mentioned that they should be able to earn their wage through working as a tailor 
(Abu  Bakr),  house  contractor  (Othman)  or  perhaps  venture  into  business.  He  also 
commented upon the situation back in South Africa, describing the conditions to have 
been appalling and the Cape Malays having been viewed as ‘a threat’ and ‘traitors’. For 
some reason, Othman Abrahams was reported to have been optimistic when he naively 
predicted that ‘By God’s will, in five years time, I believe, that there will be a huge revolt 
and the South African native will lead their own country’, and he also mentioned that 
economic sanctions should be instituted by Malaya, Ghana and other countries in order to 
put pressure on the Union to change its internal policies. The report in  Utusan Melayu 
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however remarked that Mr. Abrahams did not provide much information on the revolt he 
so glibly mentioned. 
Since Othman had experience in the building trade, he was immediately offered a job to 
become a ‘building instructor’  in Kelantan  to  train  the Malay youth  for  the building 
industry; at the time when the opportunity came his way he refused since he was unable 
to communicate in Bahasa Melayu; however, the real reason for his refusal only came to 
light  a  few  months  afterwards.  Despite  Othman’s  emotional  outburst  regarding  the 
struggle in South Africa, he could not wait for decisions to be taken whether to stay or 
not. He was the first in the batch to get cold feet and decided with his family to leave the 
Federation during the month of May of 1961 for South Africa; the report in The Malay 
Mail  (6 September 1961), which is questionable, seems to have given the idea that he 
returned to South Africa after he first went to perform his pilgrimage.
When these families were permitted to stay by the highest office in the Federation, the 
Berita  Harian posed  an  interesting  question:  ‘Will  this  mark  a  new point  for  South 
African-Malaya  relations?’ It explained this stating: ‘in other words, will  most  of the 
Malay peoples in South Africa return once again to their ancestor’s land?’ The South 
African families who ‘emigrated’ did not realise what this question implied because they 
were  then  too  occupied  in  trying  to  adapt  and  settle  in;  the  question  was  extremely 
significant  to the local  communities  in that  it  implied that  the Federation was giving 
indirect permission to members of the Malay diaspora to trek back to the regions and to 
counter balance the numbers of the other ethnic communities. History demonstrated that 
the Malay diaspora remained stationed where they were and did not bother to take up this 
invitation  because  of  their  financial  circumstances,  and  Tunku  did  indicate  that  the 
Federation was not going to be financially responsible for those who decide to take up the 
offer of emigrating to it.
The  opposition  party  in  the  Federation,  PAS,  seemed  to  have  questioned  Tunku’s 
intentions in extending an invitation to these diaporic communities. It first objected to the 
issue being raised in Parliament, and also expressed the view that this was not a domestic 
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matter  but  an  international  one.  It  opined  that  this  is  a  complicated  matter  ‘as  the 
Federation of Malaya never practiced the method of ‘blood linkage’ of any race, and, 
furthermore,  the national  policy of  the Federation  of Malaya  is  not  yet  clear  (Berita  
Harian  12 January 1961).  The position of the opposition party as well as others who 
views  were  not  publicly  articulated  was  clear  evidence  as  to  how  the  issue  was 
interpreted  and  understood  within  the  Federation.  The  news  report  made  another 
important  comment  and  remarked  that  the  decision  of  the  Federation  would  have 
international  repercussions  for  Tunku’s  stand.  The  latter’s  decisions  were  concretely 
captured the Federation’s position vis-à-vis apartheid, and that the permission that was 
granted to these few Cape Malay families went beyond the legislation of the state. In 
other words, it quite simply gave support to selected groups of ‘foreigners’ who were in 
dire straits, and who have - as from that point onwards - been allowed to settle in the 
Federation as long as they did not burden state coffers, and were in the position to fend 
for  themselves.  At  the  press  conference,  mention  was  also  made  of  the  fact  that 
accommodation was given to the Abrahams’ and other families who accompanied them.
Subsequent to this meeting,  they were given their  accommodation as promised in the 
municipal flats, which was later named Razali Mansion, in Jalan Sula Besi, Sungei Besi 
district. Abu Bakr Abrahams was then given the chance to practice as a tailor, Othman as 
already  mentioned  was  given  an  opportunity  to  work  in  the  building  industry,  and 
Hussein Hartley - a machinist by profession - through the office of Tunku was able to 
work at the Malaya Tabacco Company as general worker. Apart from the vacancies that 
they were filled, the office of the Ministry of Works, Post and Telecommunications was 
also at hand to assist in finding any one of them suitable jobs. One of the persons who 
was extremely helpful during these critical times was Tun V.T. Sambanthan and his wife, 
Tok  Puan  Uma  Sambanthan.  These  South  African  families’  children  frequented  the 
Sambanthan’s home and were able to school, which was not too far from the flats, where 
they obtained their secular education and was able to Bahasa Melayu. As a matter  of 
interest, the language of instruction at the private school was in English and not in Bahasa 
as was the case in the state schools.  It appeared from The Malay Mail report that the kids 
were attending a private school, which was financially taxing on the families. They were 
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later  forced  to  take  them out  and  wait  for  openings  at  the  state  schools  where  the 
instructions were only in Bahasa Melayu and not English as was the case at the private 
school. Although this was seen as a disadvantage, it was in fact a good move since one of 
the criteria for acquiring citizenship in the Federation was learning to speak, read and 
write  in  Bahasa.  For  the  children  it  was  a  matter  of  adapting  to  new  linguistic 
circumstances  and,  of  course,  one  of  the  major  challenges  for  the  elders  of  these 
immigrant families. Whilst settling in the families were also required to have themselves 
registered with the local government so that they possess the necessary documents to stay 
within Federation territory. Being non-citizens with residency permits they were allowed 
to keep their South African passports; the issue of citizenship could not automatically be 
conferred on them for they were required to fulfil the necessary criteria stipulated earlier 
part of this chapter.
Hj. Rabi’ah was among the few elderly members who demonstrated that she was serious 
in taking up citizenship and make a contribution towards the society, which she viewed 
as her own in terms of the religion and the culture; two important ingredients that were 
embedded in ‘Cape Malay’ and Malay identities. She thus increasingly came to play an 
exemplary role as ‘a survivor’ and one who never gave up or reflected despondency in 
the  state  structures.  Prior  to  relating  her  story,  it  is  important  to  fill  in  some  brief 
biographical data. She was one of many children – six boys and three girls - in the Ozeer 
Ally family; her mother’s name was Zubayda. She was born in District Six – not far from 
the Cape Town city centre, where the family was then residing, on the 6th of October 
1931. Since her father used to travel from one city to another, where he had business 
dealings,  she found herself  growing up and schooling in one of the outlying areas of 
Johannesburg. She attended the Potgietersrust Indian Girls School, which was a convent 
school. Travelling from one city to the other and one town to another became part of her 
upbringing. It, in a way, prepared her for the years ahead.
Coming back to the group of South African families,  it  was observed that they were 
generally slowly settling in except for the Othman Abrahams clan. The latter family unit 
remained restless until they decided to pack up and return to South Africa. As for the 
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others,  they gradually adapted to the new environment,  customized themselves to the 
Malay(sian) culture and learnt the language. It was apparently easy for the children, who 
could make friends without experiencing any major problems and gradually communicate 
in Behasa Melayu, to adapt and fit in than the parents; for the fairly mature elders, this 
was indeed a rocky road to travel. They experienced difficulty in becoming fluent in the 
language and thus faced constant communication problems. In this situation, Abu Bakr 
Abrahams appeared to have given up because - in an interview recorded in  The Malay 
Mail - it was stated that he was out of a job and the children were no more at school; it 
appears that one of the main problems that he faced was becoming fluent in Bahasa. Abu 
Bakr’s enthusiasm to adapt and fit in seems to have faded, and his desire to stay on seems 
to  have  waned;  this  could  partly  be  attributed  to  his  brother’s  sudden departure  and 
absence, and partly to the fact that he was unable to succeed in his profession as a tailor. 
Apart from the linguistic challenge and professional competition that he faced, he also 
had to deal with the issue of Malay(sian) cultural one; the cultural tradition as witnessed 
in the Federation was not the same culture they were familiar with back in Johannesburg 
or Cape Town (cf. Haron 2005). 
These  were  various  hurdles  was  indeed  strenuous  for  Abu  Bakr  and  his  family  to 
overcome and get used to. Abu Bake and his family bided their time and were given a 
moral boost when a second batch of families from Port Elizabeth joined them in 1962. 
These were the families of Mr. Ebrahim Baderoun and Mr. Jalaluddin respectively. Mr. 
Baderoun came with his wife and three kids, and Mr. Jalaluddin came with his wife and 
one child. They were also accompanied by two bachelors. This batch came from the city 
of Port  Elizabeth,  presently referred to as the Mandela  Metropolitan  area.  These two 
fellows had no difficulty in fitting in; in the case of Ebrahim Baderoun, he was able to 
find work as a clerk in  the Ministry of Defence and went  on to stay for nine years. 
Jalaluddin also remained but for only about four years.
During  these  times  the  Federation  was  facing  its  own  regional  problems  and  these 
families were thus caught up in these regional squabbles of which they had no knowledge 
and nor any insight. Nonetheless, one of the internal political issues that came onto the 
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Federation’s agenda was inclusion of Singapore as an extra state of the Federation; this 
took  place  in  September  1963.  On  the  one  hand,  it  resulted  in  better  intra-regional 
relationships and led to smoother cooperation among the group of states that came under 
the wing of the Federation; and, on the other, it made the situation complicated for the 
citizens when Singapore seceded in 1965 to become an independent sovereign nation-
state (Hill & Lian 1995: 26). This was indeed the case for Hj. Rabi’ah whose personal 
circumstances had, by then, changed. 
Her husband, Hussein Hartley, who had been working at the Malay Tabacco company 
soon after they were provided with housing and moral support from the administration, 
was never happy with being in the Federation and thus scouted for an opportunity to 
return to Johannesburg. When the chance came for Hussein to leave, he politely packed 
up and returned to South Africa without his family. He, in fact, tried to persuade his wife, 
Hj. Rabi’ah, to join him but she was much more determined to remain and stay on and 
not  go  back.  According  to  the  newspaper  interview  with  her  daughter,  Ferouza,  her 
mother  felt  that  since the Federation  was a  Muslim territory she desired to  have her 
children  nurtured  within  Malay  culture,  which  is  primarily  embedded  in  the  Islamic 
tradition; as far as she was concerned, South Africa did not and could not offer that. This 
internal disagreement between husband and wife was left on the back burner until the 
husband made a more informed decision when he reached Johannesburg. Unfortunately 
for her and her kids, he did not keep in touch with them and chose not to return; the 
absence of her husband had a traumatic effect upon her life but she tried to look at the 
positive  side of  it  and slaved on to  help her  children  in  the education.  As the many 
months  passed  by with  no  correspondence  from her  husband regarding  his  stand  on 
issues, she took a proactive position by requesting for a divorce; filing for one was no 
easy matter and it was also a matter not taken lightly in Muslim households and nor was 
it  a smooth one according to Islamic law. Nevertheless, she felt  that  though it  was a 
difficult and hard decision she was forced to fend for her children in the absence of her 
husband  who  did  not  even  communicate  with  her  or  his  children  let  alone  sending 
financial assistance that would prove his love and loyalty.  In the light of her difficult 
conditions, she had the right to act in this way.  
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With the passage of time, she met up with the Singaporean, Hajji Achmat Othman, with 
whom she entered  into marriage  on the 5th of  March 1964.  Hajji  Achmat,  who was 
heading one of the branches of the Singaporean Post Offices, took charge of Hj. Rabi’ah 
and her children. He saw to their education whilst Hj. Rabi’ah helped in other ways to run 
the house (Berita Harian  12 January 1992). When the split between Singapore and the 
Federation came into effect in 1965 it also affected Hj. Rabi’ah’s situation. She was not 
allowed to stay in the Federation since she was married to a Singaporean and this also 
meant  that  she faced a dilemma.  The problem was that  she had to separate from her 
children who had the right to reside in Federation territory; but because of her marriage 
she had to follow her husband and her rights basically fell away. Four of her children 
stayed on in the Federation, and one from her first husband’s union remained with her. 
The children were relocated from Kuala Lumpur to Johor Bahru, the capital of the State 
of Johor, where they continued with their studies. And even though the children were 
residing in Johor Bahru, which was less than ten minutes away by car from Singapore, 
Hj. Rabi’ah had great difficulty in seeing them regularly.  Since then it  was an uphill 
struggle for Hj. Rabi’ah who was never away from all her children. She thus travelled 
every month to Johor to meet them; this was of course a costly affair and not easy for 
someone who had moved on in years, and particularly for a woman.  Hajji Achmat gave 
her all the necessary financial and emotional support for which, to this day, she highly 
appreciates. Out of this marriage three children were born; two died in infancy and one 
survived. The one who survived, namely Rahmat bint Achmat, went on to complete her 
doctorate  in  Arabic  studies  from the  School  of  African  and  Oriental  Studies  at  the 
University of London and, as far as we have been informed, presently lectures at the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia. 
Between 1964 and 1971 Hj. Rabi’ah undertook her monthly travels and in the process 
tried  to  get  hold  of  officials  to  assist  her  in  acquiring  her  citizenship.  She  was  a 
determined and firm lady who worked hard at achieving her goal. Since the rule was that 
the wife follows the husband; this rule became burdensome on Hj. Rabi’ah who tried to 
argue her case with various officials at different levels with the hope that someone in the 
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ranks will  lend a sympathetic ear;  unfortunately this was not to be and continued for 
many  years.  Her  supportive  husband  also  tried  to  pull  strings  with  his  contacts  and 
relatives such as Lieutenant Colonel Izaiddin Samsodien and Tan Sri Osman Cassiem, 
who was the secretary of Tan Sri  Ghazali  Shafi’,  the Federation’s  Minister  of Home 
Affairs;  but  all  of  these  came  to  naught.  Even  after  having  received  a  letter  of 
endorsement from the High Commissioner to Singapore to grant her a lengthier stay in 
Johor, she still faced an uphill battle. Some officials showed their sympathies but also 
expressed that their hands were tied because of the bureaucracy involved in having to 
bestow citizenship on her or even grant her permanent residency. 
The Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. Usman Wok, in Singapore was prepared to offer her 
Singaporean citizenship because of her marriage to her husband; she however felt that it 
would stand her in good stead to have the Malaysian citizenship because of her children 
and thus had to refuse the kind offer. The other problem that stood in her way was that 
she had to be a permanent resident of Malaysia before she could obtain the citizenship. 
Despite  the  problems  she  persisted  in  her  quest  and  even  went  to  see  the  retired 
statesman, Tunku Abdul Rahman, at his home in Penang to endorse her papers and allow 
her to pursue her objective.  He thus wrote to the Minister Tan Sri Gazali Shafi’, who, in 
turn, sent her on to the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was only 18 years after her arrival on 
Federation soil that she was granted her citizenship; this was on the 5th of July 1979.
Since then she never looked back. She did baking and sowing to keep her going; for 
example, she sowed dresses for Mrs. Curtis, whose husband was the personal executive 
of the Sultan of Selangor Darul Ehsan, the wife of Mr. W.T. Rook, who was the financial 
officer at the international company, Lever Brothers, and also for Wan Rahima, the wife 
of the Sultan of Selangor Darul Ehsan. She always had a passion for the society in which 
she lived and thus participated in socio-religious activities that would advance the quality 
of life in the circles she moved. She thus made full use of the opportunities that came her 
way; one of these was registering with the Department of Education and do courses that 
would not only personally benefit her but also the Malay society. 
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3.5 Bringing Hajjah Rabi’ah’s Story to a Close
Although the story of Hj. Rabi’ah is inextricably tied up with the other families during 
the early years when they were trying to settle in and adapt to the new environment, her 
story stands out as a woman who was prepared to face the odds and move on with her 
life. It concretely demonstrated how she was able to fend for herself and her family. What 
this short narrative revealed was that she was a highly determined woman; one who was 
and remained different from her fellow sojourners who came from South Africa. She was 
at no stage unsettled by the circumstances in which she found herself with her family. In 
fact, she showed more courage than the others and was able to adapt and restructure her 
personal life by setting priorities which she followed through. She chose to be faithful to 
her religious identity by rooting herself and her children in Malay culture; a culture that 
harmonised with her religious ideals. Since both religion and culture were embedded in 
the Federation’s identity, she was at home with these and could identify strongly with the 
ideals  espoused by the Federation’s constitution;  issues that  she came to learn as she 
struggled to acquire citizenship. 
Although the quest for Federation citizenship somehow shaped her life and thinking, it at 
no stage caused her to be despondent or give up. The section showed the complexity of 
this issue of citizenship within nation states; more importantly, it demonstrated to what 
extent this issue could and did affect the lives of individuals and families. In the case of 
Hj. Rabi’ah it affected her deeply and she struggled for almost twenty years to get the 
piece of paper that would allow her to be with her children, and one that would allow her 
to roam freely in her adopted territory. However, at the outset she was not aware of the 
problems that were associated in acquiring citizenship. Although her story might not be a 
unique  one,  it  moreover  shares  an  important  lesson  about  issues  that  are  humanely 
constructed and socially engineered. To end off, the article that narrated a portion of this 
family’s  life  through  the  interview  with  Ferouza,  the  third  eldest  child,  somewhat 
captured the life that she led all her life; it read ‘Being a nomad for 20 years’ (Berita  
Harian 12 January 1992). And it was during Hj. Rabi’ah’s nomadic ventures that Ismail 
Petersen continued with his activities as a cultural activist. 
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                4. Ismail Petersen’s Narrative: A South African cultural activist’s 
    contribution towards international relations
4.1 Introduction
Hj. Rabi’ah’s desire for citizenship in the Federation and Ismail Petersen’s services to the 
passing sailors from Southeast Asia took place throughout the Cold War era; an era in 
which the main actor in the arena of International Relations (IR), as already pointed out 
in earlier  chapters, was the state. It was  the legal actor because state sovereignty was 
paramount and inter-state relations was of crucial importance (Reynolds 1997: 15-17); 
state-to-state  relations  was  the  major  concern  of  the  governmental  representatives, 
diplomats  and  politicians.  Unfortunately,  the  contribution  of  NSAs  were  given  no 
recognition; this only changed when the Cold War came to an end and period and one in 
which the IR discipline’s status was described by Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1996: 5) to be 
in  ‘a  highly  tentative  phase  which  makes  its  all  the  time  more  challenging  and 
interesting’. It was indeed during this phase that transnational actors’ (i.e. companies and 
individuals)  activities  were  noted  and  acknowledged  as  significant  players  in  world 
affairs (cf. Mansbach 1997). The IR discipline has for all intents and purposes cast its net 
wide and it,  at  present,  includes many aspects  of human activity that  falls  within the 
economic  sector,  religious  domain,  or  cultural  sphere  (cf.  Paolini  1999:  30-31).  It  is 
indeed  in  the  cultural  arena  that  the  contributions  of  certain  individuals  have  been 
observed. 
This section thus introduces and discusses the activities of Mr. Ismail Petersen, a cultural 
activist, who may be identified as a NSA in IR. It outlines, in some detail, Mr. Petersen’s 
activities  as  a  (part-time)  Cape  Town  cultural  activist  and  someone  who  has  been 
proactive in connecting cultural communities between two regions, namely the Cape and 
Southeast Asia. Since Mr. Ismail Petersen, a tailor by profession, devoted much of his life 
establishing international cultural links, an attempt will be made in this part of the chapter 
to  demonstrate  how he,  as  a  representative  of  the  ‘Cape  Malays’  (cf.  Haron  2002a; 
2002b), was able to make an invaluable effort in connecting the Cape community and 
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their co-religionists in the Southeast Asian region. 
In this section, we narrate the life story of Ismail Petersen who operated outside the ambit 
of the sovereign state circles to make international connections for no financial gain and 
with no political ambition. Whilst, on the one hand, we learn lessons from his inputs and 
contributions over more than a half decade, we also, on the other, use his life story as a 
clear example of how IR has been changed by marginalized and isolated individuals who 
had  no  political  profile  or  clout  and  who  have  not  as  yet  been  given  any  form of 
recognition by their governments for their IR contributions. More importantly however is 
the  fact  that  his  life  story  demonstrates  ‘how  experience  informs  political  (and  IR) 
thinking through the medium of narrative because we generally encounter, discuss, and 
invoke experience  in  narrative  form’  (Stone-  Mediatore  2003:  5).  Prior  to  telling  his 
story,  a  theoretical  framework needs  to  be constructed so that  his  and that  of  Ismail 
Hussein’s (in the following section of this chapter) IR activities can be fully appreciated 
and understood. 
4.2 Employing Suitable Variables to Construct a Framework for This Story:
There are three ingredients or variables – captured Figure 5.2 below - in that have also 
played  a  significant  role  in  the identity  of  NSAs such as  Ismail  Petersen  and Ismail 
Hussein; these variables are religion, ethnicity and culture. And since IR theorists have 
realized the significance for these variables in present-day politics and IR, many have 
attempted to address them. Religion in general and religious fundamentalism in particular 
have become major issues in contemporary IR events, and this caused Scott Appleby & 
Martin Marty to embark upon an extensive study between 1991 and 1995. Other scholars 
such as Dark (2000) and Petition & Hatzopoulous (2000) also discoursed about religion 
within the context of IR. Religion was not the only term that had been defined in different 
ways; the same had been the case with culture. Social scientists such as Clifford Geertz 
have  offered their  interpretations  of  how culture  should be understood.  According to 
Hudson (1998), scholars have emphasized three interrelated definitions; culture has been 
defined as (a) organization of meaning, (b) value preferences, and (c) templates of human 
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strategies. The first is what is known via interpersonal expressions, the second what the 
individual or community desire or values, and the third is the advantageous bestowed by 
one’s culture.  All  of these aspects have thus been reflected and displayed by cultural 
activists  in  their  objectives  and  activities.  One  example  would  be  suffice:   Tan  Sri 
Professor Ismail Hussein, GAPENA’s chief representative, clearly articulated his views 
pertaining to language and culture that are significant and essential aspects of the Malay 
identity that have to be developed to the full so that the Malay society can regain their 
confidence  in  themselves.  Cultural  activists  such  as  Tan  Sri  have  thus  been  in  the 
vanguard taking certain causes that have been ignored or marginalized and placing them 
on the agenda of IR.  Scholars such as Lapidus & Kratochwil (1997) and Hudson (1998) 
provided their scholarly inputs as regards culture’s relevancy to IR and foreign policy. 
Ethnic identity,  as the third variable, has been the topic of discussion by a number of 
social scientists of late; amongst them is Stack’s contribution (1981). The latter pointed 
out that in world politics as well as in other fields that the political quality of ethnicity has 
been overlooked. He further stated that a close analysis of the transnational dynamics of 
ethnicity  points  to  the  structural  realignments  of  international  political  and  economic 
systems in the post-World War II (and also the post-Cold war) era. Taking into account 
these realignments and the fragmentation of the state system, it may be argued that the 
dynamics  of  ethnicity  and  various  politico-cultural  groups  have  used  ethnicity  as  a 
vehicle to achieve objectives that were unattainable within the state system. For example, 
in  the  case  of  GAPENA  and  similar  other  organizations  in  Malaysia,  Malayism  as 
defined  and explained  by the political  and cultural  activists  assisted  to  transform the 
attitude and perceptions of the Malays into a positive, confidence building exercise in 
order  to  uplift  and  change  the  socio-political  and  economic  conditions  of  the  Malay 
society as a whole.  Ethnicity was thus considered a significant identity used by non-state 
actors during the contemporary period. And ‘ethnicity’ was also the focus of Carment & 
James  (1995)  studies;  they  assessed  the  position  of  ethnicity  in  IR.  These  scholars’ 
writings have not only helped to understand the nature of IR as a discipline, but also 
assisted us in extracting from them ideas that are applicable to the make-up of the subject 
of this essay, namely Mr. Ismail Petersen; the three variables are significant strands in the 
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latter’s identity. In fact, these strands are the ones that propelled him to connect with the 
Southeast Asians and particularly GAPENA with whom he was in constant touch over 
the past 20 years.
Figure 5.2 
In the light of the present study, although religion might not be perceived as a crucial 
element  within  organizations  such  as  GAPENA,  one  cannot  disregard  the  fact  that 
religious identity played an important role in the formation of the Malay cultural identity; 
in other words, the religious identity was seen and is viewed as an integral part of Malay 
society (cf. Barnard 2004). Malay leadership sees religion as a vital part of their being 
and in understanding the nature of their socio-cultural politics. And since this is the case, 
suffice it to say that earlier mentioned works by Dark et al have given religion its rightful 
place in the contemporary world alongside that of culture and ethnicity respectively. With 
this framework in mind, along with the various ingredients, the role of non-state actors 
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such as cultural activists in South Africa and elsewhere should now be addressed. Mr. 
Ismail  Petersen  is  certainly  one  of  the  few surviving  South  African  Muslim cultural 
activists who have made an indelible impression in making cultural connections during 
the latter part of the 20th century.  And I turn to his story.
4.3 Creating Cultural Connections during the Apartheid Era
Mr. Petersen was born and bred in Cape Town on the 14th of 1924; his father’s name was 
Omar and his mother’s name was Zohra. He was born into a large family, and thus had 
10 siblings. When he was only 16 years his father passed away, and he was then raised by 
his mother whose influence rubbed off on him and his other siblings; she however died 
much later. Having been part of a closely knit family, he appreciated the importance of 
caring  for  familial  relations  and  upholding  social  activities  that  would  strengthen 
communal bonds. These strong familial and communal ties caused Ismail Petersen to be 
conscious of his social duties and responsibilities, and it is this consciousness that, we 
wish to argue, led him to connect with the Southeast Asians (and others) in his early life. 
As a NSA, Mr. Ismail Petersen’s religio-cultural identity played a prominent role in his 
effort  to create  cultural  connections  with his  co-religionists  from the Southeast  Asian 
region. He was therefore quite comfortable with the fact of having been referred to as a 
‘Cape Malay’; a term that has been considered derogatory by younger members of the 
South African Muslim community. Among this group is Shamil Jeppie (1991; 1996) who 
argued that the term has been invented and employed by the colonialists and apartheid 
regime to advance their own racial policies and that the Muslims should reject it at all 
costs. Whilst there is logic in the argument, it has been challenged by others who felt that 
in a new dispensation we can view it in a positive light rather than accept it  with its 
negative connotations.  The debate however rages on and we doubt whether it  will be 
resolved;  in any case,  for the purposes of this  section the term should be considered 
synonymous with the term ‘Cape Muslim’ and will be used throughout with this meaning 
in mind. During the colonial period and in the subsequent apartheid era the term was 
associated  with  anyone  who  professed  Islam and  practiced  Islamic  culture  in  South 
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Africa;  however,  those Muslims who hailed from an Indian lineage were regarded as 
Indians and not ‘Cape Malays’. 
That said, Mr. Ismail  Petersen belongs to those few individuals from within the NSA 
group that made use of all avenues to forge links with individuals and communities who 
shared similar character traits; that is being Muslim and reflecting a similar culture and 
identity. Unfortunately, he - like many - others were isolated and marginalized and as a 
result  of  this  was  not  given  any  recognition  for  the  efforts  that  he  had  made.  The 
community  that  he represented  in  an unofficial  capacity  showed scant  regard for  his 
activities and efforts, and little did they realize that he was building bridges that would 
stand them in good stead in the future. 
At the time when he was participating in these ‘extra-mural’ activities, apartheid policies 
were slowly being entrenched. The Cape Malays as well as the other disenfranchised and 
disadvantaged communities – who all formed part of the non-white community (Africans, 
Coloureds  and  Indians)  -  began  to  experience  the  wrath  of  this  inhumane  system 
particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout these years they faced all sorts of socio-
political and economic hardships, and the apartheid system literally threw them out of 
their homes and they were forced to live in areas demarcated for the respective racial 
groups.  Although these laws favoured the whites  who enjoyed the best  facilities  and 
opportunities, the Cape Malays and their fellow disenfranchised never gave up or caved 
in; they struggled and toiled and faced the challenges that lay ahead. They were thus 
discriminated  against  in  all  sectors  of  life;  not  only  socially  and politically  but  also 
culturally and religiously. 
But despite these socio-political, economic and religious stumbling blocks, he - and the 
community  -  never  allowed  these  obstacles  to  deter  him  from  making  cultural 
connections  or  achieving  his  goals.  He felt  morally  obligated  to  serve and assist  the 
passing Southeast Asian seamen. Mr. Petersen personally pursued his goals at his own 
expenses; however, there were occasions when this was not possible and he was forced to 
request for communal help to accomplish his objective. And even though he was aware 
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of  the apartheid  legal  structures,  he always  worked his  way around it;  his  a-political 
profile and his status as a socialite granted him the opportunity to relentlessly pursue IR 
goals. It is assumed that he was oblivious that he was advancing the IR cause, and of the 
fact that he was laying the foundations for the future. 
4.3.1 The Cape Cultural Traits:
Before recording his experiences, it is necessary to first give some insight as regards the 
cultural traits of the ‘Cape Malays’,  who were categorised by the apartheid regime as a 
sub-group of  the  ‘Coloured’  community  of  South  Africa.  South  African  Muslims  in 
general and the Cape Malays in particular have taken and still take their inspiration from 
the two primary sources of Islam, namely the Quran & the Sunnah. These sources thus 
formed the bases of their cultural identity,  practices and perspectives. And because of 
this, they made a unique contribution to the Cape community’s culture in almost all the 
fields; two examples would suffice in this regard: (a) when scanning the Cape cuisine list, 
we are  bound to come across what  has been labelled as ‘Cape Malay’  cuisine;  these 
recipes are among many other types that are served in prominent restaurants and hotels in 
the Cape (and beyond) and quite a few recipe books have been published to celebrate the 
Cape Malay cuisine;  and (b) a close study of the Afrikaans language reflect  that  the 
Muslims left an indelible imprint upon its development; their influence in the linguistic 
sphere has been of a permanent nature; and scholars such as Adrianus van Selms, Hans 
Kähler and Achmat  Davids (1990) made invaluable inputs in this regard (Haron 2001).
Apart from these, they were highly respected by the other religious communities, and 
also by the government for their high sense of morality and loyalty. Thus it is observed 
that  the  one  characteristic  of  the  Cape  Muslims  is  their  hospitality  towards  their 
neighbours, friends and visitors from other parts of the country (cf. Du Plessies 1972). 
They have also been described by the latter as friendly and open-minded in matters of 
religion.  Since  these  qualities  formed  the  hall-mark  of  their  make-up,  it  was  not 
surprising to have found individuals amongst them who were quite willing to extend a 
helping hand to strangers. Mr. Ismail Petersen was thus one of those whose ideas and 
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outlook were shaped by the socio-cultural and religious issues of those times. He thus 
undertook the task of assisting the sailors and visitors from Southeast Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries, and considered it his duty to serve and contribute in a small way to 
create  a  strong  bond  between  the  small  Cape  community  and  the  large  Muslim 
communities in Southeast Asia.
4.3.2 A Cultural Activist’s Helping Hand
During the late 1930s he entered his teens and frequented the Cape Town harbour not 
only to watch the massive tankers and beautiful cruise liners pass by, but to also meet 
with people of various backgrounds and from different countries. It was in 1938 - to be 
exact - that he felt the urge to extend a helping hand to some of the Southeast Asian 
sailors who passed through the port  of Cape Town. He befriended the officers at  the 
harbour who permitted him to make contact with them. This was the beginning of an 
ongoing relationship with Southeast Asians in Cape Town.
Since World War II broke out in 1939 many ships from Southeast Asia came pass and 
this led to an increase in communication with Southeast Asian naval officers and their 
crew. This also gave him the opportunity to pick-up words and sentences of the Southeast 
Asians; and since he found it refreshingly useful and beneficial, he had no difficulty in 
becoming  familiar  with  Conversational  Bahasa  Melayu/Indonesia.  There  was 
unfortunately no grammar book or any other related text available to him to have learnt 
more  about  the  language  and  to  have  delved  deeper  into  it  so  that  he  could  have 
developed his writing skills. Be that as it may, he made good progress in the language 
whenever Southeast Asian sailors visited the Cape shores.
As his involvement with them increased, they became familiar with the Cape cuisine and 
he  also  became  accustomed  to  their  food  and  drinks.  This  was  undoubtedly  an 
educational experience for him and for them. In addition to their growing familiarity with 
the customs of the Cape Townians, many of them became acutely aware of the religious 
practices which are almost similar to what they observe and practice in their countries. In 
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fact, there were occasions when he and a few of his friends conducted a religious session 
on board one of the passing ships, and once performed special ritual ‘tarawih’ prayers 
during the month  of fasting.  They were therefore very surprised that  the Cape Town 
Muslim community also performed the  Ratib ul-Haddad and the  Maulud Al-Barzanji  - 
these liturgies have been designed by theologians to help the community to improve their 
spiritual  conditions  and  are  still  popular  among  the  ‘Cape  Malays’  and  Malaysians. 
According to  Mr.  Petersen,  the performance  of  these religious  activities  did much to 
make the seamen conscious and mindful of their religious duties, and, in some cases, kept 
them away from irreligious practices that usually take place at ports. 
Continuous interaction with these passers-by and other visitors who disembarked at the 
Cape  had  caused  him  and  a  few  of  his  acquaintances  to  establish  a  much  needed 
Indonesian and Malaysian Seamens Club (IMSC) in 1945. He presided over all IMSC's 
activities since then. IMSC was also very much welcomed by the Cape Town seaport 
officials. The organization also helped to overcome all the red-tape normally put in place 
by the local governmental structures, and gave easy access to meet the officers, the crew 
and to board their ships. Mr. Petersen’s circumstances changed somewhat in 1946 and he 
then left for Johannesburg for a while where he worked as a tailor. Upon his return he 
resumed the activities of IMSC.
Subsequent to World War II many cruise and commercial liners continued to ply through 
the Cape waters, and the Cape Muslims in general and IMSC in particular continued to 
benefit  from these visits.  From amongst all  these encounters there were indeed a few 
which  were  very  memorable  and  in  a  sense  historical;  these  therefore  need  to  be 
recorded.  
4.3.3 The Cultural Activist’s Destined Links
 
In Ismail Petersen’s efforts to extend assistance towards passing visitors from Southeast 
Asia and other places from abroad, it should not be forgotten that he was also provided 
the necessary moral support from members of his family. He was in particular given all 
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support by his dear wife, Hawwah, whom he married in 1954 and settled down with her 
in Salt River, outside the Cape Town city centre. Hawah played an important supporting 
role in hosting the visitors, and all of them in turn appreciated her services a great deal.
When the Middle East conflict broke out in 1956 Egypt's Abdul-Nasr decided to close the 
Suez Canal, all the ships from Europe which were heading for the east had to take the 
strategically placed Cape route. One of these ships had on board a delegation from the 
Federation of Malaya – a Federation that was about to attain its independence in 1957. 
This delegation consisted of the former Vice-Chancellor of the National University of 
Singapore -  Professor Dr.  Hussein Al-Attas,  Tan Sri  Abdul Kader  -  one of the chief 
secretaries in the Ministry of Internal Defense & Security, and Mr. Ismail bin Panjang 
Aris who was Negri Sembilan's District Officer. On behalf of the IMSC, Mr Petersen and 
his wife entertained the delegation as best as they could and introduced them to other role 
players in the community.
Soon after their return, Mr Petersen received a very warm letter (16 April 1957) from Mr. 
Abdul-Kader. The latter informed Mr Petersen that he requested the Chief Minister, who 
chaired the Merdeka (Independence Day) Celebrations Committee, to invite him or any 
other IMSC representative to attend the Merdeka Celebrations. He was no doubt elated 
by this news, and in the meanwhile took the liberty of writing a letter (IMSC letter 21 
June  1957)  to  the  Federation  of  Malaya’s  High  Commissioner  in  London  who  was 
supposed to give the final recommendation. By then Mr Petersen had also informed the 
Cape  Times –  the  local  daily  newspaper,  which  published  a  short  article  about  the 
invitation he had received, and also about the cable he had sent to the then Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul-Rahman. And in response to Mr. Petersen’s cable of congratulations on the 
Federation of Malaya’s independence, he received Tunku Abdul-Rahman’s cable which 
read: ‘greatful for your kind message.’ 
However, not too long thereafter he received another letter dated 29th of May 1957 from 
Mr. Abdul-Kader, who had by then shifted to the Government's  Secretary's  Office,  in 
which the latter indicated that the Chief Minister experienced some problems in inviting 
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Mr Petersen because there were other ‘Cape Malays’ who also claimed that they were 
bona fide representatives of the community. One such claimant was Dr. A. Abrahams (d.
1996); the latter was the head of the Muslim Progressive Society (est. 1940) which had 
been active in social activities over the years. He, an outspoken and forthright individual, 
was not happy with Mr. Petersen being identified as the official  representative of the 
Cape  Malay  community  at  that  time;  however,  this  placed  the  Federation  of  Malay 
authorities in a dilemma and they could not afford to get embroiled in a minor issue that 
affects  a  small  community at  the Cape.  By the  time the Chief  Minister  wrote  to  the 
Federation of Malaya’s High Commissioner in London, a decision had been reached not 
to extend any invitation to anyone of the two (cf. Chief Secretary's letter no. CSO. 34/130 
6 August 1957). For Mr. Petersen, this was a sad and unforgettable moment since he had, 
by then, dedicated 17 years of his life to serve these seamen from the Southeast Asian 
region. Despite this minor set back, it did not cause him to become disillusioned since he 
undertook these activities without expecting any form of remuneration or reward. On the 
20th of August 1957 he wrote to the Chief Secretary,  Mr. W.C. Wathustan,  in Kuala 
Lumpur in order to congratulate the Federation on its Day of Independence. 
As the conditions in South Africa became worse by the end of the 1950s, and particularly 
when South Africa became a Republic in May 1961, the Malaysian government led by 
Tunku Abdul-Rahman decreed that the Cape Malays could come and settle in Malaysia. 
It was then that a few Johannesburg families led by the Hartley family decided to go and 
stay there (cf. Earlier Section in this Chapter). On the 24th of April 1962, he received an 
enquiry from Mr. Ebrahim Baderoon who needed Ismail  Petersen to recommend him 
since he also decided to settle in the Federation of Malaya. His correspondence with the 
officials of the Federation helped individuals such as these to find easy passage to their 
new place of residence.
During 1962, Mr Petersen met the Indonesian lieutenant-commander Solihin G.P., who 
was part of the Garuda and Siliwangi Battalion, and Des Alwi, who was the Indonesian 
Press attache. Solihin and his men spent about one year in the then Congo as a peace 
keeping force, and were returing home. In that same year President Soekarno decreed that 
229
                                                                          
no Indonesians should work on Dutch ships because of some territorial dispute with the 
latter's government officials; the result of this decree meant that very few Indonesians 
passed-by the Cape shores. Although their absence to the Cape Town harbour was very 
conspicuous,  Mr.  Petersen's  activities  to  assist  other  sailors  continued  throughout  the 
1960s and 1970s. During this time Mr Petersen met a number of individuals from the 
Middle  East,  particularly  Egyptians,  and  this  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  learn 
Conversational Arabic.
One incident, which needed much patience and assistance since there was no diplomatic 
mission in South Africa was when the Indonesian coaster, Sri Rezeki, ran aground on the 
6th of April  1971 along the Cape coast.  In this  incident  many of the crew lost  their 
personal belongings and he therefore tried his best to make their stay comfortable and 
pleasant until the shipping agents were able to ensure their return to Indonesia. He thus 
contacted all the Imams and placed notices on various mosques' boards to give assistance 
to these sailors in whichever way they could; the Muslim Assembly's executive director, 
for example,  responded by giving a cash donation (cf.  Muslim News Friday 30 April 
1971). And shortly after the wreck was salvaged from the Cape shores, the wreck and its 
cargo  went  on  auction.  Before  the  auction  took  place  Mr  Petersen  indicated  to  the 
auctioneer that the wreck and cargo rightly belongs to the Indonesians and not to the 
South Africans, and that the personal belongings of the crew should be returned to them. 
His attempts were fortunately not in vain since the wreck and its cargo were eventually 
sold on the 20th of April 1971 for a meagre R8,250.00 to a Mr. F.D. Duncan, a Cape 
Town businessman, who promised to give the crew's possessions back to them (cf.  The 
Argus 20 April 1971).
In 1972 he and his wife decided to perform the annual obligatory pilgrimage, that is the 
Hajj; they left by ship for the United Kingdom where they stayed a few days; thereafter 
they spent a month travelling through Europe before finding their way via Egypt to Saudi 
Arabia. During his pilgrimage to Mecca he accidentally met Haji Ismail bin Panjang Aris 
in  the  precincts  of  the  sacred  Meccan  mosque;  this  was  after  a  period  of  16  years. 
Through  his  friendship  he  was  also  introduced  to  a  number  of  other  prominent 
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Malaysians, namely Haji Ustadh Ebrahim Ahmad of the Tabung Haji – this institution 
assists potential  pilgrims to perform their  pilgrimage to Mecca, the PRO Haji Abdul-
Kader Tamin of Penang, and the Malaysian and Indonesian Medical teams. Through his 
efforts, these teams willingly assisted the South African pilgrims who fell ill during their 
pilgrimage. In fact, each year when the pilgrimage is being performed many Cape Malays 
relate their personal impressions of the Malaysians and Indonesians and their interaction 
with them (Haron 2005). These social meetings no doubt helped to strengthen the bonds 
between the Cape Muslim community and the Southeast Asians.
He continued to correspond with whomsoever he could in order to keep the channels of 
communication open, and with the hope that one day he would be able to visit  these 
Southeast  Asian  states.  With  these  thoughts  in  mind  he  sent  a  letter  in  1975 to  the 
Consulate-General of Indonesia in San Francisco (USA) to convey his greetings for Aidul 
Fitr,  and also posted information pertaining to the Indonesian seamen who have been 
passing through Cape Town. The Consul, Mr. Gunawan T. replied (Letter 14 October 
1975) to thank him for the information; and the latter tried to maintain his links with him.
When Mr. Petersen planned to perform his second pilgrimage in 1982, he decided to be 
proactive by writing to the Indonesian Embassy in Washington, and the Malaysian High 
Commission in London as well as the Singapore Controller of Immigration for visas (cf. 
IMSC Letter 28 April 1982) with the fervent hope of getting a positive response to his 
wish; and that is to be permitted to enter their states. For weeks on end he waited for 
replies but received none from the Indonesian and Malaysian diplomatic missions. He 
then decided to contact his friends who were shipping directors/ managers such as J.M.J. 
De Cooker of the InterOcean Services Co. (cf. Letter 13 May 1975) and K. Scholte of the 
Nedlloyd Agencies (cf. Letter dated 30 July 1982) to assist in whichever way they could. 
In the meanwhile, he wrote (IMSC letter 14 June 1982) to Haji Aboubaker Maidin, who 
was the president of the Singaporean Jama`at (congregation), in order to expedite matters. 
Mr Ismail  Petersen’s  attempts,  however,  were  not  in  vain.  In  July  1982 he  received 
application  forms  from  Mr.  Meiklejohn  who  was  with  the  shipping  company  Trans 
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Oceana as well as from Mr. Chan Kok Kee from the Singapore Controller of Immigration 
office (cf. Letter no. V/6183/82 – 9 July 1982). He was indeed pleased with this because 
he thought that even though he received no reply from the Indonesian and Malaysian 
diplomatic missions he will apply to the ones stationed in Singapore. At the beginning of 
August 1982 he began his journey to Saudi Arabia, and thereafter travelled to Pakistan, 
India, Thailand and Singapore.
During his short stay in Singapore he tried once again to obtain visas for Indonesia and 
Malaysia  respectively.  The Malaysian  authorities  requested that  he condemn the then 
apartheid  regime  before  they  would grant  him a visa.  He realized  that  the  apartheid 
regime became harsher it  its treatment  of the oppressed of which he was a part,  and 
particularly with those who spoke out publicly against its inhumane policies; he exercised 
his right not to do so since he was going to return to his place of birth after his trip to 
Southeast Asia and could not afford to jeopardize his position and come into conflict with 
the South African authorities. The Indonesians expected him to wait for an extra three 
weeks and to find a sponsor of $500.00. Both conditions laid down by these diplomatic 
missions forced him to abandon the idea of entering their countries. Even though he was 
highly disappointed by their respective attitudes and behaviour, he did not give up hope 
and  returned  home  after  an  absence  of  more  than  five  months.  Upon  his  return  he 
continued with his IMSC duties.
In 1984 he received a letter (14 February 1984) of appreciation from Mr. D.A. Hamid 
Lainjong,  the  chairperson  of  the  Jama`ah  Keluarga  Muslims  in  Canada,  who  is  of 
Indonesian  descent.  The  latter  thanked  him  on  behalf  of  the  crew  whose  ship  SS 
Rotterdam anchored at Cape Town for a few days.  Mr Hamid Lainjong subsequently 
wrote to Mr Petersen a heart-rendering letter in July 1993 after reading an article about 
the latter's Indonesian trip. Letters such as these kept his spirits and hopes high. In fact, 
Mr Hamid Lainjong - this is gathered from a letter (24 May 1984) which he received 
from  H.Masdar  Wahab  who  resides  in  Macassar  -  wrote  an  article  in  the  Panji  
Masyarakat, an Islamic periodical that circulated in Jakarta, in which reflected upon the 
Cape Malays, and in which he sketched the activities that Mr Petersen and the IMSC was 
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actively involved in.  
As Mr. Petersen and IMSC’s profile became known, a new opportunity arose to make 
new contacts and double-up his efforts. The contact was initiated through members of the 
International Tablighi Jama`at – a Muslim missionary movement, which had branches in 
almost all countries in the world. Members of this missionary movement seemed to have 
been able to send its missionaries to all parts of the world without any difficulty including 
South Africa, which was off limits to many countries that were members of the UN. It 
was indeed strange for Mr. Petersen to have met Indonesian and Malaysians tablighis 
who were on a religious mission to Cape Town; even though there were no diplomatic 
ties between South Africa and the Southeast Asian states, these fellows were able to enter 
without any hassles at the borders; be that as it may, it opened up another chance for Mr. 
Petersen  to  connect  with  other  important  cultural  activists  within  Malaysia.  These 
tablighis were thus instrumental in putting him into contact with Tan Sri Professor Ismail 
Hussein, the current president of GAPENA, who has been a cultural activist for much of 
his  life.  The contact  that  was struck since then between these two activists  remained 
warm and cordial to this day.
Towards the end of July 1985, Mr Petersen received an invitation (Letter 16 July 1985) 
from  Dr.B.A.  Hussainmiya;  the  latter  was  the  chairperson  of  the  World  Malay 
Symposium that was to take place in Sri Lanka and organized by the National Committee 
of Sri Lanka Malay Organizations. He responded on 26 July of that year informing the 
organisers  that  he  was  not  able  to  come  because  of  the  late  notification.  However, 
invitations  such as  these  were because  of  his  communication  with Tan Sri  Professor 
Ismail Hussein. And in 1987 (KSLC Letter 30 July) he was kindly asked by Zahidi bin 
Dato  Hj.  Zainol  Rashid  on  behalf  of  the  director  of  the  Kedah  Public  Library  Co-
operation to send material  regarding the Cape Malays,  which would form part  of the 
Malay  World  Exhibition.  In  response  he  sent  a  fair  amount  of  material,  which  they 
acknowledged  and had displayed  (KSLC Letter  no.pak  0065/1/87  (67)  17 November 
1987).
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Even though correspondence continued to and fro, it was only in the 1990s that all his 
efforts  began  to  bear  fruit.  This  came  about  because  of  the  strong  ties  which  were 
galvanised, since the mid 1980s, with Tan Sri Ismail Hussein. Before referring to this link 
up there is a need to briefly comment on the socio-political circumstances of South Africa 
at that time. When 1990 ushered in the former apartheid president of South Africa, F.W. 
De Klerk, announced a few surprising changes such as lifting the banning of the ANC 
and other liberation movements as well as the release of the Nelson Mandela in February 
1990. These developments also placed South Africa in a favourable position to forge 
trade links with many countries which previously boycotted it because of its apartheid 
policies. South Africa opened itself up to the Southeast Asian market. And since then 
commercial  activities between South Africa and the Southeast  Asian region increased 
dramatically. These activities also gave rise to the creation of cultural and educational ties 
between the two regions.
Returning to Mr. Petersen's unacknowledged diplomatic role, Professor Ismail Hussein, 
who was then director of the Institute of Malay Language and Culture at the National 
University of Malaysia, came for a short visit (cf. Letter no. UKM1.9/263/9 11 December 
1992) towards the end of 1992. Mr. Petersen arranged meetings for Prof. Hussein with 
academic  staff  members  at  the  Universities  of  the  Western  Cape  and  Cape  Town 
respectively. This brief visit thus resulted in the planning of an International Seminar on 
Malay Identity at the University of the Western Cape in April 1993. Subsequent to his 
visit and with the moral support of Ismail Petersen, a Malaysian Welcoming Committee 
(MWC) was set up to work out the technical details for the planned seminar. Professor 
Hussein also explored the idea of the introduction of Malay Studies at the University of 
the Western Cape when he was in Cape Town in 1992, and during the time of the seminar 
in  1993.  Although  Tan  Sri  Prof.  Ismail  Hussein  was  not  directly  responsible  for 
continuously pursuing this issue, he was able to influence the decision of Dewan Bahasa 
dan Pustaka, which is the Language and Literary Agency of the Ministry of Education in 
Malaysia  to  seriously  take  up  the  matter.  After  this  researcher  presented  his  paper 
entitled:  ‘Foreign  Language  Teaching  in  South  Africa:  Making  a  case  for  Bahasa 
Melayu’ at the  First World Malay Language Conference in August 1995, the Director-
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General of DBP and the Education Ministry approved the introduction of Malay Studies 
at UWC as from 1997/8; a Memorandum of Understanding was signed during the early 
part of 1997. Unfortunately, the Asian crisis affected the plans of DBDP as well as that of 
UKM and UWC respectively. And to date there has been no progress on this issue.
The international seminar, which was hosted by the MWC of which Mr Petersen was a 
member,  was indeed successful (cf.  Berita Harian 8 April 1993;  Mingguan Malays  9 
Mei 1993; Wan Hasim Wan Teh 1996). However, there is no need to relate the contents 
of  that  meeting  except  to  say  that  it  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  few  Cape  Malay 
organizations such as the Cape Malay Business Chamber, South African Malay Society 
and Forum for Malay Culture in South Africa who wished to create ties with various 
groups in Malaysia and elsewhere in the region. Moreover, at this gathering there were 
individuals  representing  commercial  companies  and  academic  institutions  such  as 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and the University of Malaya. Furthermore, the result of 
this visit caused Tan Sri Prof. Hussein to extend invitations to Mr. Petersen, Mr. Nurul 
Erfaan Rakiep, and Drs. Muhammed Haron to attend Malaysia's annual cultural event, 
popularly referred to as the Hari Sastera. In addition to participating in this important 
cultural gathering, he and his fellow travellers were granted the opportunity of meeting 
the  then  King  of  Malaysia,  the  Sultan  of  Selangor  Darul-Ehsan.  After  Mr  Petersen 
attended  the  Hari  Sastera  where  he  provided  some  of  his  personal  accounts  of  his 
encounter and contact with Southeast Asians, he was deeply touched to be accepted as an 
honorary member of the Malaysian Historical Society; this was however only confirmed 
in an MHS letter dated 5 December 1994. 
After the Hari Sastera, Mr. Petersen stayed on in Malaysia with the hope of finding his 
way to Indonesia. This came to fruition after he approached the Indonesian Consulate-
General in Kuala Lumpur (cf. Sekretariat Negara's Letter no. B-526/Sekbang/6/1993 10 
June 1993). And with the kind assistance of individuals like Mr. Taufiq Ismail (cf. Ali 
Al-Attas's Letter  29 June 1993), the outstanding Indonesian poet who is known to all 
Southeast Asians, Mr. Petersen was able to make his maiden voyage to Indonesia. His 
trip in 1993 was indeed memorable since history was in the making and since all his 
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efforts over the years came to fruition. When Mr. Nurul Erefaan Rakiep, Mr. & Mrs. 
Petersen reached Indonesia, they were treated as if they were dignitaries from the South 
African state administration. On that trip - on the 17th of August 1993 to be exact - he 
was also then informed through a letter sent by Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Al-
Attas,  that  his  ministry  bestowed  on  him the  title  of  being  the  Honorary  Consulate-
General in Cape Town for all the work he had done since 1938. As a consequence of his 
maiden  voyage  to  Southeast  Asia,  his  contacts  increased,  and  as  a  consequence,  he 
received invitations from all quarters of the region. Despite his age, he remained active 
and continues to correspond with prominent individuals who had given him assistance 
and had been kind to him. At one of the conferences that he was invited to he penned a 
poem in Bahasa Melayu on the 14th June 1997 in Cape Town and it was presented at one 
of GAPENA’s poetry reading sessions.
4.4 Bringing Petersen’s Episode to a Close
This  section  of  the  chapter  recorded  Ismail  Petersen’s  efforts  in  assisting  Southeast 
Asians who sailed via South Africa to their country of destination. It demonstrated how 
he networked in order to facilitate opportunities not only for himself but also for many 
others from his community to pursue and forge links. His efforts resulted in individuals 
and institutions  co-operating in a variety  of fields such as culture  and commerce;  he 
might not have been instrumental in the successes and failures of these ties but he was 
one who took the initiative to bring individuals and groups together. As mentioned, even 
though all of these connections were not successful, it only showed to what degree the 
contacts were forged through his selfless efforts and followed up. And as a consequence 
of his individualist contribution, there has been a tremendous amount of criss-crossing of 
borders  and the  forging  of  transnational  activities.  The  story  of  this  cultural  activist 
proved that his early efforts paid off handsomely, and that South Africa’s IR profile was 
enriched and enhanced by these people-to-people’s sacrifices and efforts; it is individuals 
such as these that brought the South African society in closer contact with their Southeast 
Asian counterparts.
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The story of Mr. Petersen as a NSA actor has been and remains a fascinating one; it is 
individuals such as these who have, in effect,  contributed in a substantial  way to one 
sector of IR. He played the role of what we may wish to describe as ‘an unacknowledged 
diplomat’ throughout these years. The efforts and contribution of individuals such as this 
should  be  seriously taken  into  account  by the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and other 
relevant departments. Despite their disadvantaged circumstances and having been wary 
of  the  apartheid  state’s  attitude  and  interest  in  the  oppressed  communities,  these 
individuals  displayed  genuine  feelings  towards  the  peoples  in  South  Africa  and thus 
worked in the latter’s interest and not that of the state. In any event, they have, in a small 
and humble way,  helped to project a positive image of South Africa during the post-
apartheid era. And his little known efforts in IR relations had undoubtedly been in the 
interest of both South Africa and Southeast Asia.
However, he has not been the only individual that has demonstrated an interest in forging 
socio-cultural ties with Southeast Asia; there have been other Cape cultural activists such 
as Mrs. Tasnim Kalam and Mr. Mogamat Hashiem Salie whose efforts should also not be 
overlooked.  Each  of  them was  in  touch  with  Tan  Sri  Professor  Ismail  Hussein,  the 
cultural  activist  from Malaysia.  Tan  Sri  Professor  Ismail  Hussein  who,  with  the  full 
backing of GAPENA, dedicated much of his life to forging socio-cultural links within the 
Southeast  Asian region and had,  since the late  1980s,  connected  with South Africa’s 
‘Cape Malays’ as a way of enhancing the bonds between the peoples of these two nation-
states. Since his story is intimately linked to that of Ismail Petersen in particular and that 
of the ‘Cape Malays’ in general, I try in the next section to provide some insight into his 
contributions to IR.
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5. GAPENA, Tan Sri Ismail Hussein & The SMA: Malaysia’s Cultural 
Activist and Institutions
5.1 Introduction
One of the foremost cultural activists in Southeast Asia during the contemporary period 
and one who has dominated the cultural scene for more than four decades in Malaysia is 
Tan Sri Emeritus Professor Drs. Dato Ismail Hussein (hereafter Tan Sri).  Tan Sri has 
been the president of the Federation of Malaysian Writers’ Association (GAPENA) since 
its inception and as a broad based cultural vehicle has been used to forge Southeast Asian 
and  Malay  cultural  relations.  Through  his  tireless  efforts  and  fulfilling  some  of 
GAPENA’s objectives during the closing decades of the 20th century, he made important 
contacts with diasporic Malay groups in and around Southeast Asia such as the Champa 
community and the Sri Lankan Malays, took the initiative of cementing connections with 
South Africa’s Cape Malays; this connection began with a visit and resulted in cultural 
exchanges at different intervals over the past decade and a half. The link therefore grew 
steadily and firmly (cf. Abdul-Latiff 2002).
This part of the chapter therefore intends to chart out the socio-historical  connections 
between GAPENA led by Tan Sri and the Cape Malays, and evaluate the impact these 
connections have had upon the latter community during the past twelve years (and more). 
Since the forging of cultural connections fall within the ambit of IR, it is only logical that 
theoretical  tools,  which  were  discussed  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  chapter,  be  re-
appropriated for the purposes of understanding GAPENA and Tan Sri’s (international) 
relations with South Africa’s ‘Cape Malays’. With the definitions and explanations of the 
three variables in mind, it grants us the opportunity to now address the role of NSAs in 
Malaysia. At this juncture of the chapter Tan Sri’s role and contribution as an outstanding 
cultural activist in linking the diasporic Cape Malay with the larger Malay society in the 
Southeast Asian region will be addressed. It will first briefly discuss GAPENA’s, a KL 
based cultural organization, role in the promotion of Malay culture before reflecting upon 
Tan Sri’s position in the Malaysian society and his ideas in advocating Malay culture in 
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Southeast Asia and beyond.
5.2 GAPENA: The Malaysian Cultural Vehicle
GAPENA (est. 1970) came into existence at the time the Malaysian government put in 
place its National Economic Policy, which subsequently brought significant changes. Its 
origins apparently lie in the failure of the National Writers Union (est. 1961 hereafter 
PENA) to  attract  writers  from different  parts  of  the  Malaysian  Peninsula.  In  fact,  it 
intended to unite all the literary associations across the country but was not successful. In 
the end the federation was agreed upon and it came to life during October 1970.
As a federation it  became the home of a variety of bodies that  drew literary figures, 
journalists, cultural activists, teachers, lawyers and a range of other interested individuals 
and  parties.  Over  the  years  it  grew rapidly  and gained  wide  support  for  its  cultural 
objectives and activities. An aspect which GAPENA was definitely proud of was that it 
attracted the individuals from diverse backgrounds, particularly those with natural talent 
(i.e.  Bakat  Alam)  who  showed  a  deep  affection  for  their  culture  and  language. 
GAPENA’s cultural  activities  supported individuals  to  write  short  stories and novels, 
encouraged  the  reciting  of  poetry,  offered  journalists  and  artists  the  opportunity  to 
demonstrate their writing and artistic skills. GAPENA was thus from the very outset at 
the vanguard of the cultural struggle. The organization has and still plays a crucial role in 
gathering talented persons from different parts of the country and the region to participate 
in seminars, workshops and conferences; at these forums they display their poetic and 
other talents.  The Federation’ success throughout the country gave them the necessary 
confidence to look beyond their borders and scout for talented individuals from amongst 
the diasporic Melayu communities.
Over  the  years  it  has  become  more  than  a  writers’  organization  and  it  gradually 
developed an interest in promoting a global Malay Culture as well as a united Malay-
Speaking World; this is clearly articulated in their in-house magazine, namely Lampiran 
Warta GAPENA (January 1996: 2).  Between 1970 and 1990 GAPENA had organized 
numerous meetings, which yielded positive results for the society. In Abdul-Latief Abu 
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Bakr’s (2002: 218 -283) biography of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein he listed all the events in 
which Tan Sri Ismail Hussein participated; and many of them were specific GAPENA 
gatherings. GAPENA was the home of politicians, academics, and a host of others. The 
first Hari Sastera gathering in Kota Baru on 2nd June 1972 was an historical event that 
proved overwhelmingly successful and attractive; it drew more about 3,000 people of all 
walks of life. The event demonstrated that modern Malay Culture is not an elitist type of 
culture only for the aristocracy,  but a culture that could be enjoyed by all; in the oft-
quoted words of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein (1977): ‘modern Malay culture is a democratic 
culture.’ 
GAPENA has thus been actively organizing socio-cultural events in and outside Malaysia 
for the last 35 years and under the leadership of Tan Sri has been able to realize a number 
of  objectives.  And even though it  has not  been able  to  achieve  some of  its  goals,  it 
continued to strive towards them. In any event one of the problems that GAPENA will 
have to deal with when Tan Sri vacates the presidency is who will fill his shoes. This has 
been a major concern because the only main charismatic driver behind GAPENA has 
been Tan Sri.
5.3 Tan Sri Ismail Hussein: The Outstanding Cultural Activist (Haron 2003; 
Ismail Kassim 1992)
GAPENA’s success and popular support may be attributed mainly to the time and effort 
Tan Sri Emeritus Professor Ismail Hussein (hereafter Tan Sri) has given to it since its 
inception. In his capacity as president, he has been the main initiator and driver of the 
events. His basic simple philosophy about culture being democratic - of the people for the 
people - transformed GAPENA into a vibrant cultural organization. Tan Sri’s charismatic 
leadership changed him into a high profile cultural activist, who has been in the forefront 
in seeing to the flowering of Melayu culture through the use of the national language, and 
one who felt strongly about creating cultural consciousness amongst the Malaysians and 
in the region. Tan Sri desired that the culture and the language be made known not only 
in all the kampongs, towns and cities in Malaysia but also in the greater Southeast Asian 
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region and particularly among the diasporic Malay Communities. Let me briefly reflect 
on his biography in order to get a better insight into this cultural activist.
Tan Sri was born in the state of Kedah in 1932. He schooled in this state until 1954 and 
thereafter left to study at the (National) University of Singapore. He subsequently joined 
the Department of Malay Studies at the University of Malaya where he also continued 
with  his  post-graduate  studies  between 1955 and 1959.  By 1961 he joined the  Rijks 
University of Leiden where he completed a Doctorandus Degree in Malay Studies in 
1964. He returned to the department at the University of Malaya and it was from that 
time that he made a substantial input to Malay studies. It was at the time when Malay 
consciousness and Malay identity was given all the support by the state structures and 
this thus placed him in a good position to advance the ‘Malay’ cause within the university 
structure; he was, in fact, Anwar Ibrahim’s lecturer at the University of Malaya. In 1987 
he was transferred to the National University of Malaysia (UKM) where he established 
the Institute for Malay Studies (IBKKM – it has since changed the name to ATMA). 
At UKM he managed to use the opportunity to  realize  his  regional  and international 
project by creating cultural  connections with the (diasporic) ‘Malay’  communities. He 
was also during this time the president of GAPENA. And it was via this NGO that he was 
able to demonstrate his influence and intellectual powers. Tan Sri stood out not only as a 
provocative  academic,  but  also  as  an  intellectual.  The  latter  was  one  of  the  key 
ingredients that forced him to remain at the helm of affairs of GAPENA. He towered 
above his colleagues and friends in this regard. Although he was no imposing figure, he 
had  what  may  be  described  as  a  ‘soft-charisma’  that  carried  him,  and  made  him 
influential. 
However, before evaluating his impact and influence on the ‘Cape Malays’ it is perhaps 
necessary to pause and define the concept ‘intellectual;’ this will then be followed by a 
look at some of Tan Sri’s socio-historical connections and a few salient ideas that have 
given  rise  to  the  mission  he has  undertaken over  the  many decades.  At  the  outset  a 
question that begs a response is: who is an intellectual? What are the ingredients and 
cause the person to stand out for his/her intellectual abilities and impact? Richard Posner 
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(2001:5) defined the term as ‘…. Academics [who are] of modest distinction fortuitously 
thrust  into the limelight,  acquiring by virtue of that  accident  sufficient  recognition to 
become sought after commentators on current events.’ He (2001:23) further elaborated 
that they write ‘ … for a general public, or at least for a broader than merely academic or 
specialist audience.’ Elsewhere in his book (2001:35), he stated that ‘a public intellectual 
expresses him[/her]self in a way that is accessible to the public, and the focus of his[/her] 
expression is  on matters  of general  public  concern of  (or inflected  by)  a  political  or 
ideological cast.’ Posner also argued that ‘they are controversialists with a tendency to 
take extreme positions.’  These ideas of Posner are complemented by those of Jeffrey 
Goldforb (1998:30) who explained that ‘intellectuals are those who use their expertise, 
their  access  to  special  knowledge,  their  capacity  to  manipulate  symbols,  for  broader 
public services.’ He (1998:40) however specifically pointed out the role of intellectuals 
as being three-fold: (a) to have an organic relationship with critical social forces which 
question the existing order of things, (b) to clarify the position of these forces, and (c) to 
give clear articulation of their true vision.
The views of Posner  and Goldforb assist  one to  locate  Tan Sri’s  position within the 
general intellectual arena. Indeed Tan Sri began his career by writing as early as 1956 in 
The Cauldron his views on Malayism; views that were considered controversial.  And 
these ideas remained relevant many years after he had written the article. And when an 
excursion of Tan Sri’s writings is taken, one cannot fail to observe that as an intellectual 
he has the general audience constantly in his mind. In fact, he always demonstrated a 
great deal of interest and confidence in the masses and at no stage tried to underestimate 
the talent that was present amongst them. He, for example, made it quite clear in 1974 
that literature was going to be created not by the professionals ‘but by Bakat Alam’ (The 
Straight  Times 31st July  1974).  And he  was  proven  to  be  correct  in  his  prediction. 
Statements such as the one referred to draw individuals to such leadership who has the 
insight and foresight.  It  is  indeed this  positive and inspirational  attitude that has also 
attracted cultural activists within the Cape Malay community towards Tan Sri.
When Tan Sri reflected upon the Malay identity he highlighted the fact that due to the 
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role of the colonizers, they (the Malays) viewed their culture as inferior to other cultures. 
This perception resulted in them adopting a negative attitude towards their own culture. It 
was attitudes such as these that Tan Sri was concerned with. He thus took the initiative of 
reversing this trend by critically commenting upon the status of literature in the Malay 
society, and by actively participating in the Malay Intellectual Congresses over the years; 
it is at these forums that he was able to share his ideas and vision.
Friends  and detractors  have  described  Tan  Sri  as  an  ardent  nationalist  and  who had 
influenced many key players with his ideas, mission and vision. All of these variables are 
embedded, since his undergraduate studies until he became a professor at the University 
of Malaya, within his psyche. Scrutinizing a few of his writings assembled in a UKM 
publication offers one a glimpse into his thinking and the way he perceived his role and 
the role of GAPENA. His writings demonstrated that he was and remained an intellectual 
pragmatist, and one who never stood at a distance from the crowds. Tan Sri is a person 
who had his feet on the ground, and his eyes set beyond the horizon. He advocated the 
idea of a Malay world and the enrichment and use of Bahasa Melayu as a significant 
vehicle  in  not  only  reviving  and  transforming  Melayu  culture,  but  in  carrying  it  to 
different parts of the world and connecting with those communities that have strands of 
Malay blood. When the first historical Malay meeting took place in Sri Lanka, he was the 
one who foresaw the importance of such a gathering, and could envisage the results of 
those links. The same maybe be said when he made contacts with the Cape Malays.
 
Tan Sri travelled extensively in order to realize his objectives and he thus spent his time 
networking within Malaysia visiting villages and towns, and showing his passion for the 
culture, and he also crossed continents to initiate links and forge the connections. Before 
he landed with a strong delegation of 55 individuals in Cape Town during April 1993, he 
had been in  close contact  with the Sri  Lankan Malays  where the ‘Simposium Dunia 
Melayu’ was held from the 3rd to the 11th August 1985 (Hussaynmia 2003). This event 
had laid the basis for cementing connections with the diasporic communities. The major 
obstacle in his path that forced him to delay and initiate ties with the Cape Malays of 
South Africa was the country’s harsh, discriminatory laws; however, despite this factor 
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he corresponded with a few individuals such as Bapak Ismail  Petersen whose role in 
cementing the connections cannot be overemphasized (cf. Haron 1996). Tan Sri Ismail 
Hussein was already clued up with the Cape Malays via the different texts that he had 
received from individuals such as Ismail Petersen, and whatever he had read about the 
community by then as well as having been in touch with members of certain families 
such as Abrahams and Isaacs families from the Cape. 
When Tan Sri  Ismail  Hussein eventually had the opportunity of landing on the Cape 
shores  in  1992,  he  met  a  number  of  representatives  from the  community  and  these 
meetings culminated in the planning of the seminar in during April 1993. The seminar 
was  thus  organized  jointly  between UKM and UWC under  the  theme ‘The evolving 
identity of the Cape Muslim’ and was given much prominence in some of the Malaysian 
newspapers that promoted and supported this type of relationship. For example, refer to 
report by Dino SS: ‘Seminar Melayu di Afrika Selatan’ in Berita Harian 8 April 1993, 
and Wahid Kasran & Yazid Othman’s ‘Misi  budaya  era baru dunia Melayu ke Cape 
Town’ in Mingguan Malays on 9th Mei 1993 (The title of the latter article was excerpted 
from Hj. Hamzah Hamdani’s report which appeared in GAPENA’s newsletter, namely 
the  Warta  GAPENA of  April  1993).  And for  the  purpose  of  organizing  the  event  a 
Malaysian Welcoming Committee (MWC) was formed. As a committee, which was in 
constant contact with Tan Sri Ismail Hussein, the issue of identity was dragged into the 
debate when GAPENA made its maiden voyage in 1993. The MWC in particular had 
endless  debates  about  the  theme  since  they  disagreed  as  to  whether  the  term  ‘Cape 
Malay’  instead  of  ‘Cape  Muslim’  should  be  used.  At  one  stage  they  proposed  a 
compromise by drafting the title in the following manner: ‘The evolving identity of the 
Cape Malay/Muslim;’ this concretely demonstrated their dilemma. In the end the term 
‘Cape Muslim’ was employed because it reflected the sentiments of the younger, vibrant 
generation  who preferred to be known by their  religious  identity  rather  than by their 
ethnic identity. 
The identity crisis was a sign that members of the community have been giving serious 
244
                                                                          
thought as to who they were within the late apartheid period and was concerned not to 
perpetuate the racial system by accepting racist labels. Nonetheless, the rejection of the 
label did not deter others from accepting it. In fact, when Datuk Najib Razak, the then 
Minister of Defense participated in the tercentenary celebrations of Islam in South Africa 
during 1994, many Cape Malays were proud to be identified with Malaysia. The mere 
presence of one of Malaysia’s cabinet ministers left an indelible impression on them, and 
they therefore showed that they had no qualms in being referred to in the new South 
Africa as Cape Malay.  As a consequence of these historical events, two organizations 
(re-)emerged in the 1990s; the first was the South African Melayu Cultural Society (est. 
1988?) that was spearheaded by Mr. Mogamat Hashiem Salie, and the second was the 
Forum for Malay Culture in South Africa that was formed by Mrs. Tasnim Kalam. 
Both organizations and the local cultural activists, who gained prominence after Tan Sri’s 
contacts with them, were and remained in close contact with him; he patronized their 
activities in the Cape and in Malaysia. For example, Tan Sri participated in Mrs. Kalam’s 
Cape conference in 1994 and brought with him a small group of Malaysian scholars. Her 
conference may be viewed as a follow up to the international seminar held in April 1993 
at  UWC;  and  its  focus  was  on  ‘Cape  Malay  Culture  vis-à-vis  Malaysian  Culture.’ 
Amongst  the  key  participants  from the  Malaysians’  side  were  Dr.  Mohd  Najib  and 
Professor Dr. Amat Johari Moain, and the South Africans were represented by, amongst 
others,  Professor  Abdul  Kader  Tayob  –  an  academic,  and  Dr.  Cassiem D’Arcy  –  a 
medical doctor and cultural activist. Even though the conference was poorly attended, it 
had its positive spin-offs in that ideas were shared and follow-ups were planned. 
Be that as it may, Tan Sri Ismail Hussein has played a very diplomatic role when it came 
to communicating and liaising with the diverse groups and many Cape cultural activists, 
particularly those who did not work together in the interest of the Cape Malay community 
as a whole. Tan Sri continuously communicated with them and acted as a bridge-builder 
so  that  the  communication  remained  intact,  and  in  order  that  numerous  projects  get 
underway to advance the cause of the community rather than a handful of individuals. He 
was generally impartial and avoided the internal community conflicts and disagreements 
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at all costs so that he could draw the best from the different groups. Nonetheless, despite 
these internal squabbles and external divisions, Tan Sri and GAPENA kept their lines of 
communication  open so that  they could monitor  the extent  of the  conflicts  but  more 
importantly  to  see  that  the  Malay  cultural  activities  were  being  given  the  necessary 
support and that their cultural project is advanced rather than hampered by petty internal, 
local differences. One mechanism that was thought to assist in steering clear of the local 
differences and drawing activists into international activities that would assist them in 
seeing  the  bigger  cultural  picture  was  the  setting  up  of  the  International  Malay 
Secretariat.
5.4 The International Malay Secretariat (New Strait Times 26 July 1995)
One of the most important  outcomes of the seminars  and symposiums that GAPENA 
organized was the setting up of the International Malay Secretariat (SMA) during April 
1996  in  Shah  Alam,  the  regional  capital  of  Selangor  Darul  Ehsan.  The  SMA  was 
enthusiastically supported by Tan Sri Mohd Taib, the then Chief Minister of Selangor, 
and  at  the  4th Malay  Intellectual  Congress  he  informed  the  participants  about  its 
establishment.  At this meeting he stated that the common problems of Malays  world-
wide will be studied and that the SMA, which was, at that stage, only in its planning 
stages. One of the resolutions was “the acceptance of the Malay culture, and literature to 
uplift the Malay race in the international world.” The idea of the secretariat was for quite 
a while embedded in the mind of Tan Sri Ismail Hussein as part of his vision for the 
future;  he  however  had  to  hold  back  its  formation  and  implementation  because  the 
structures nor the financial support were in place. It was only when Tan Sri Mohd Taib 
pledged his moral and financial support that the idea gradually unfolded and developed 
and he subsequently announced the setting up of the SMA on the 2nd of December 1995 
and  this  bore  fruit  during  April  1996;  this  was  soon  after  the  big  Malay  World 
Symposium that was held in the Philippines at the Mindanao State University under the 
theme ‘Rediscovering the roots of the Malays’ between the 31st of March and 6th April 
1996 (Lampiran Warta GAPENA September 1996: 3). The main objective was to bring 
on board representatives from the diaporic communities that would advance the cause of 
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the Melayu world in their respective areas and regions. 
Tan Sri  Taib  spelt  out  its  function  by stating  that  although the  main  purpose  of  the 
Secretariat  was  to  facilitate  an  intellectual  discourse  on Malay culture,  language  and 
philosophy among  the  Malays  the  world over,  ‘it  could  directly  help develop Malay 
networking  in  the  business  and economic  field,’  (Lampiran Warta  GAPENA  January 
1996:  1).  When  it  was  formed  the  organizing  committee  also  planned  alongside  the 
Malay World Symposium for September 1996 an International Malay Trade Exposition 
involving Malay business persons and entrepreneurs. The purpose behind the symposium 
was to project a new vibrant voice for the Malays around the world; a voice that would be 
“dynamic, strong and confident.” Another reason was to rectify the image that the Malays 
are “a lazy race.” 
The SMA was boosted by the different chairs for Malay Studies that were established in 
New Zealand, and the Netherlands as well as plans for similar structures and programs in 
countries such as South Africa. The University of the Western Cape signed an MoU with 
Dewan  Bahasa  dan  Pustaka  during  1996  with  the  intention  of  mounting  and 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses on Malay Studies. In the September 1996 issue 
of  the special  SMA newsletter,  namely  Lampiran Warta  GAPENA,  Professor  Salazar 
made some relevant remarks on ‘Malay Networking.’ He basically proposed that three 
circles  be  constructed  in  order  that  the  first  circle  represent  the  core  Malay  states 
(Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia and Philipinnes), the middle circle the Malay 
diapora and the outer circle the rest of the world. Then he further proposed exchanges 
amongst the different communities at different levels, and people to people networking. 
In  addition  to  these,  he  contributed  a  few  other  thoughts  in  advancing  the  SMA 
objectives. Unfortunately, although the SMA got off on an enthusiastic start, it faced a 
few problems along the way; the workings of the SMA were particularly affected by the 
economic meltdown that was experienced throughout the Southeast Asian region in the 
1997-1998 period. In fact, this had a dampening effect on many other cultural activities 
including the Malay Studies project in South Africa. Its establishment in South Africa 
was to, inter alia, contribute towards the dissemination of images of Southeast Asia, the 
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construction of commercial and cultural relations, and the teaching Bahasa Melayu as a 
foreign language. 
Even though the objectives of SMA as well as those of Tan Sri could not be fully realized 
because of the economic melt-down during the late 1990s as well as other factors that 
GAPENA faced during that time, it did not deter them from continuing with the contacts 
and  inviting  individuals  to  their  annual  fora.  Ismail  Petersen  and  many  others  have 
continued to participate in their activities and Tan Sri was instrumental and keeping these 
cultural activists informed about the developments in and around Malaysia as a method 
of keeping the unfulfilled ideals and incomplete objectives in mind, and also to spur them 
on not to give up but to pursue these ideals and objectives. 
5.5 Rounding off Tan Sri’s Narrative
In IR the concepts of globalization and transnationalism have caused significant impact 
that resulted in the acceptance of NSAs as important players. Many NSAs particularly 
cultural activists and cultural organizations have spread their wings across the territorial 
borders  so that  they  were  able  to  connect  and  cement  ties  with  their  fellow cultural 
activists and groups. Tan Sri and GAPENA have been in the forefront of the cultural 
struggles not only in Malaysia but in the region of Southeast Asia as well as in other parts 
of the world. They have been amongst those NSAs that have sacrificed the better part of 
their  time  and  lives  to  create  the  bonds  between  themselves  and  the  different 
communities in the Malay world. As cultural activists, they have enhanced the activities 
and  input  by  forging  ties  beyond  their  respective  communities;  these  methods  were 
viewed as ways and means of attaining their cultural goals and objectives.
Cultural activists such as Tan Sri and Ismail Petersen have succeeded in undertaking the 
cultural  struggle  to  another  important  level.  However,  this  struggle  depended  largely 
upon the make-up of the individuals  and leadership’s  character.  It  meant  that  certain 
characteristics  such  as  charisma  were  crucial  ingredients  that  individuals,  who  find 
themselves in leadership positions, had to possess in order to attain the desired objectives. 
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And in the case of Tan Sri, he indeed demonstrated that he possessed a soft charisma that 
caused individuals from different backgrounds to acknowledge his contributions and to 
take his ideas seriously.  He generally took the initiative and spurred individuals on to 
pursue  activities  that  would  advance  the  cultural  cause.  Tan  Sri  can  definitely  be 
considered  one  of  the  present-day  Southeast  Asian  cultural  activists  who  played  an 
outstanding diplomatic role as a NSA in advancing the cultural cause of the Southeast 
Asians in general and the Malaysians in particular.
6. Concluding Remarks
There is little doubt that the re-entry of identity and culture into IR during the past few 
years  has enriched the IR discipline.  More importantly,  however,  it  is  a fact  that  the 
people-to-people’s relations have demonstrated that IR scholarship cannot afford to snub 
the contributions of diasporic communities, refugees, asylum seekers, and for that matter 
the role  of  cultural  activists  in IR.  IR scholarship should take full  cognisance  of the 
contributions of a variety of NSAs, whether they are institutions, groups or individuals. 
And there is little doubt that IR will be enriched and will be more informed if it casts its 
net wider and bring into its purview the inputs of the institutions and individuals that 
have side-stepped sovereignty of nation states to achieve greater goals. 
In this chapter, the stories of three different individuals (and their organizations) have 
been narrated in order to show to what extent their stories have enriched the IR discipline. 
When scrutinising these stories very closely, a general consensus emerges and that is that 
the actions of these individuals and their organizations in one way or the other moved 
beyond sovereignty - as articulated in IR literature – to achieve IR objectives. In other 
words, the stories narrated their activities and in the process created and developed links 
transnationally.  The effect of the NSAs activities was such that the formation of their 
linkages had side-stepped the nation-state’s sovereignty and at the same time brought to 
the fore sovereignty’ limitations. In the IR discipline this was and remains a significant 
development in that it proved that traditional IR scholarship cannot afford to hold onto 
theories that have outlived their relevance. There is therefore a need to re-visit and re-
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conceptualize  theories  and  terms  so  that  new  understandings  can  emerge  and  new 
applications can be made.
This therefore brings me to the concluding chapter in which an attempt will discuss South 
Africa and Malaysia’s participation in South-South Cooperation projects through special 
South  programmes.  Since  both  states  have  their  significant  stories  regarding  their 
involvement in these projects, each of their stories will be narrated independently of the 
other. In the process of narrating their stories, an effort will be made to point out where 
and when their efforts converged. And since the political leaders in both states articulated 
particular  philosophies  and  visions,  these  will  be  compared  and  discussed  in  the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX
BRINGING THE IR NARRATIVES OF 
THESE TWO SOVEREIGN NATION-STATES TO A CLOSE
1. Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter  it  was  demonstrated  how NSAs  have  contributed  towards  a 
different understanding of the affairs of international relations. The chapter concretely 
proved that state  actors are not the only substantial  contributors towards international 
relations and it argued that there are many other marginalized groups and individuals 
whose stories need to be told.  In fact,  the narratives  of these marginalized sectors of 
society  are  gradually  being  noticed  for  having  made  a  sizeable  input  to  the  state  of 
international relations in the socio-cultural sphere.  This may be partially attributed to the 
process of globalization, which has indeed effected a change in thinking beyond the role 
of the state and a process that has also ushered in new ways of networking and operating 
in the world. 
Globalization has thus forced contemporary social scientists and other stakeholders not 
only  to  consider  the  nation-states  of  the  North  as  the  pre-eminent  players  in  the 
international system but it has also coerced the North to take cognizance of and listen to 
the voices of the marginalized voices – the NSAs and the nation-states - from the South. 
In this era of globalization the South’s nation-states, which have generally been ignored 
and, of course, marginalized by the North, have gradually found ways of working with 
fellow  nation-states  to  transform their  socio-economic  conditions  at  enormous  costs. 
Although many parts of Africa and small parts of Asia are still studded with fractured or 
weak nation-states,  a fair  number  of others  from the respective continents  have gone 
beyond  the  ‘developing’  stage  and  proved  themselves  to  be  worthy  players  in  the 
international state system. 
Malaysia, despite its shortcomings, is one example from Southeast Asia that transformed 
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itself into a tough Asian tiger and one that is a key member of ASEAN. And since South 
Africa attained its democratic status it has also come a long way in being an important 
member of SADC and a significant player in international organizations and structures. 
Since both nation-states have secured themselves important seats within the international 
state  system as sovereign nation-states and more importantly  as ‘middle powers’ that 
have been able to forge ‘close partnerships’ in their regions and beyond, they have also 
opened up important opportunities for themselves to play creative and meaningful roles 
in  changing  the  image  of  the  South  from  whence  they  themselves  emerged  as 
‘developing’ states. Their general positive performance at the domestic level as well as at 
the international level has stood them in good stead and this has catapulted them into the 
vanguard of the struggle for the transformation of the South. However, their participation 
in South affairs is strongly related to the philosophies that they adhere to and advocate 
and these philosophies,  in turn, gave rise to the formulation of important visions that 
would take them into the future. 
In  this  closing  chapter  I  therefore  intend  to  address  in  a  comparative  manner  two 
interrelated issues that would reflect upon the commonalities that exist between these two 
states’ nations and the differences that they display in response to global issues. In the 
first case I want to discuss, analyse and compare Malaysia and South Africa’s passionate 
concern with the affairs of the South. And in the second instance and related to the South-
South Cooperation project, I propose to undertake a comparative study of the two visions 
that have in different ways stimulated interesting debates over more than a decade; the 
one is ‘Asian Renaissance’ that was advocated by Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia and the 
other is ‘African Renaissance’ which was espoused by Thabo Mbeki in South Africa. The 
fundamental  concerns  of  both  visions  -  as  expressed  by  the  two mentioned  political 
leaders - dealt with in this chapter tie in well with the ‘emancipatory project.’ Both of 
them essentially argued along the lines of levelling the playing fields via South-South 
Cooperation in the international system and they made the case for a process of breaking 
out of the dependency syndrome and supporting the ‘prosper-thy-neighbour’ philosophy.
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2. Malaysians and South Africans: Promoting South–South Cooperation 
Promoting South – South Cooperation was one of the key principles enshrined in the Ten 
Principles  at  the  Bandung  Conference  in  1955.  And  when  the  African  and  Asian 
countries met again in the same city to celebrate its Golden Jubilee, they reaffirmed their 
commitment  to  this  and  others  that  were  slightly  amended  in  the  light  of  the  new 
developments. Two states that were not represented at the conference in 1955 were South 
Africa and Malaysia; in the case of the former, the South African apartheid regime was 
preoccupied  with  devising  its  inhumane  policies  and  did  not  bother  with  what  was 
happening in the emerging South; and in the case of the latter, even though this historical 
meeting  took  place  in  the  backyard  of  the  Malay  Peninsula  the  signatories  of  the 
Federation  of  the  Malaya  Agreement  was  too  busy  trying  to  achieve  their  desired 
independence from the British. However, both states were fully represented at the African 
and Asian Conference that took place during April 2005 in Bandung; this meeting was 
dubbed, according to Kornegay (2004), Bandung II.
2.1 A (Brief) Tale of the Two Bandungs
In the political  world where imbalances  continue to be perpetuated by the developed 
countries  at  the  expense  of  the  developing  ones  via  top-down  and  core-periphery 
approaches,  voices  of  opposition  are  bound to  emerge  and  defend  their  rights  to  be 
granted equal  treatment  and their  fair  share in the running of world affairs.  This has 
indeed been the case during the colonial period and during the process of decolonization. 
The very first concrete sign of opposition came from within the Afro-Asian camp took 
place during the mid 20th century.  Between the 18th and 24th of April 1955 the first 
Afro-Asian Summit was organized in Bandung, Indonesia, with the view of eradicating 
war, fighting oppression, denounce colonialism, and striving for political  freedom and 
national independence (cf. Pagaduan-Araullo 2005; Sison 2005). This gathering has since 
been dubbed Bandung I as opposed to Bandung II, which was held in April 2005.
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At  this  significant  historical  Summit  29  African  [6]  and  Asian  [23]  countries  were 
represented. Among the participants were newly independent states such as India, China 
and Egypt as well as scores of national liberation movements’ representatives that were 
still  heavily  involved  in  their  revolutionary  struggles;  for  example,  there  were  the 
Federation of Malaya representatives, who were still negotiating for their independence 
in Kuala Lumpur, and then there were members of the ANC who have up - to that point 
in time – not as yet pursued armed struggle but had been involved in wide-spread protest 
campaigns against the Apartheid regime. Towards the end of the historic gathering, the 
conference communiqué issued the Declaration of Ten Principles; they are, inter alia, (a) 
settling  of all  international  disputes via peaceful  means,  (b) promoting economic  and 
cultural  co-operation  in  the  Afro-Asian  region,  and  (c)  supporting  the  fundamental 
principles of Human Rights as set forth in the UN Charter. The Bandung Summit gave 
impetus to the formation of NAM in 1961 with the objective of not being involved in the 
East-West ideological confrontation of the Cold War. NAM, which fully endorsed the 
Ten Principles of Bandung, set itself the task of focusing on national liberation struggles, 
promoting economic growth and eradicating poverty. NAM signatories further extended 
and entrenched the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which was formulated in 
1954  by  China  and  India  as  a  guide  to  state-to-state  relations  in  particular  and 
international  relations in general.  Both the Bandung Summit  and NAM, as a political 
movement,  inspired  the  Afro-Asian  communities  to  strive  against  all  forms  of 
imperialism and colonialism, to struggle for their national independence, and to support 
the liberation movements. 
Between 22nd and 24th of April  2005 Afro-Asian Summit  was held in Bandung and 
Jakarta respectively. The Bandung II meeting was significant in that it celebrated the 50th 
Golden Jubilee anniversary of this  important  historical  event  on the 24th of April.  It 
reviewed  its  past  and  amended  some  of  the  principles  that  had  been  formulated  at 
Bandung I. The rationale for this move was to consider the new developments and new 
realities that have taken place since the end of the Cold War and the challenges that face 
everyone  during  the  21st century.  More  than  86  ministers  and  seven  sub-regional 
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organizations from the two continents attended this prestigious Asian-African Summit. 
At the Summit of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, ‘a new strategic cooperation’ plan of 
action was adopted that would cover (a) political solidarity – to bring about stability and 
prevent conflict,  (b) economic cooperation – to reduce poverty and increase trade and 
investment and (c) social relations – to improve socio-cultural understanding and foster 
people-to-people contact and promote dialogue. This plan of action would, in turn, drive 
the NAASP, which was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Asian – 
African Summit. The Bandung II declaration thus resolved ‘… that the sustainability of 
NAASP  shall  be  conducted  through  three  tiers  of  interaction:  an  intergovernmental 
forum, sub-regional organizations, and people-to-people interaction particularly business, 
academia  and  civil  society.’  These  significant  developments  paved  the  way  for  the 
establishment of organizations, institutions and structures that would work in the interest 
of  the  developing  countries;  countries  that  have  been  categorized  by  social  science 
theorists in the USA and Europe as Third World states. Even though the categorization 
was frowned upon in leftist circles, developing nation-states in the early years seem to 
have  accepted  their  fate  without  challenging  their  categorization  and the  concept  has 
lived on to this day. 
2.2 Defining the Concepts: Third World and South
What is the exact meaning of the phrase ‘Third World’, when did it originate, and why 
was it employed are questions that have been raised since it became part of everyday 
speech and popularised by the social scientists. The term was coined in the 1950s by a 
European  demographer  and  economist,  Alfred  Sauvy  who  referred  to  the  power 
monopoly of the aristocracy/clergy configuration at the expense of the commoners in the 
earlier centuries (cf. Carmen 1996: 26; Toye 1993: 27-28; Thomas-Slayter 2003: 4). The 
term, according to Carmen (1996: 26) signalled and highlighted the differences of social 
status and power in the modern configuration in the form of binaries such as First/Third, 
developed/underdeveloped  and rich/poor.  And since  it  has  been  universally  accepted, 
some  social  scientists  considered  it  a  ‘crisp  term,  easily  understood  by 
everyone’ (Carmen quoted Johan Galtung [1980]). Carmen (1996: 26) mentioned the fact 
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that though the term has become part of contemporary conversation in the absence of 
credible, unbiased and equally valid terms, there have been critical responses to its use. 
Pannikar  (quoted  by  Carmen  1996:  27)  made  scholars  aware  of  the  ‘subconscious 
colonial and ethnocentric connotations’ that accompany it. Toye (1993: 25) stressed the 
point that the Third World exists because it has been a politically constructed term; it was 
conjured up through ‘Western guilt’ and via ‘foreign aid.’  What this meant was that the 
West  was  and  remained  responsible  for  the  underdevelopment,  backwardness  and 
poverty of the continents that have been declared part of the Third World. Further in his 
assessment of the term, Toye (1993: 28-31) tried to provide a positive spin to it,  and 
Carmen (1996: 30) acknowledged that there is a glaring difference in the understanding 
and meaning of the  term, which was coined by Sauvy, in the 1990s.
Thomas-Slayter (2003: 4) related another interpretation to the term’s origin; she argued 
that the term,  which has a ‘condescending ring’ to it,  arose partly out ‘a rejection of 
capitalist and socialist causes that crystallized at the Bandung conference…’ According 
to  her,  the  leadership  under  Jawaharlal  Nehru  of  India  and  Achmad  Soekarno  of 
Indonesia declared that there was an alternative to the ideologies and lifestyles of the 
‘first  world’  and  ‘second  world’.  Even  though  she  emphasized  that  the  term  never 
implied  third  rate/class,  the  meaning  seemed  to  have  lingered  on  and  it  has  been 
associated with whatever  was perceived as negative.  The classification of Afro-Asian 
countries into Third World states thus connoted that they were and continue to be distinct 
from those handful of rich developed countries in the First World (cf. Robertson 2002: 
477-478). Another related term that gradually came into use during the Cold War period 
was  the  ‘Second  World’  and  it  referred  to  those  ‘developing’  states  that  have 
substantially improved their socio-economic and political status. By the end of the Cold 
War,  this  term as  a  category has  since  disappeared.  In  addition  to  this  development, 
Cardoso (1993: 155) and later Carmen (1996: 30) made reference to the fact that in the 
closing years of the 20th century,  social  scientists  have (conveniently)  added a ‘new’ 
category, namely the ‘Fourth World’; a term that makes a clear cut distinction between 
the Third and Fourth Worlds respectively (Castells 1993: 21-22). The latter term implies 
that there are countries from within the Third World whose socio-economic and political 
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status  has  worsened and shifted  to  a  level  below the lowest  rung.  These states  have 
lagged behind in  all  spheres and lapsed into ‘total  dereliction’  where poverty is  rife, 
famine is  rampant  and hopelessness is  the order of the day (ibid 155).   Their  socio-
economic and political  position within the world system pushed them into the ‘failed 
state’ category.
In any case, since the negative connotations have persisted in accompanying the term, 
and found it difficult to brush off, social scientists from within the developing countries 
have chosen an alternative and more neutral term. Instead of using Third World, they 
have consciously replaced it with the term ‘South’ (cf. Galtung 1993: 75-77); a word that 
apparently appears to have no negative connotations, and one that does not possess the 
historical baggage that accompanied the phrase, ‘Third World.’ Since the new concept’s 
employment,  leading  representatives  from  the  ‘South’  have  readily  used  it  in  their 
everyday discourses; and as a result the offices of Intergovernmental Organization for the 
Developing formed a special South Commission between 1987 and 1990 with a mandate 
to investigate how the South can come up with projects that can take its cause forward. 
The outcome of the commission was the creation in 1995 of ‘The South Centre.’ It was 
established to act as a think tank for and by the people of the South and managed by a 
Council,  a Board,  and a secretariat  (cf.  South Letter  no. 39 2003). The South Centre 
identified, inter alia, the following as main issues of concern: (a) global governance and 
multilateral institutions, (b) sustainable development, (c) social development issues, and 
(d) Science, technology, knowledge and development (also cf. The South Centre 1993).
In line with the concerns of the South various meetings have been held and declarations 
have been made. A report appeared in the issue of the South Letter (2003: 3-5) in which it 
provided feedback on The Jordan Valley Declaration under the theme ‘Mobilizing the 
South.’  At this meeting the delegates highlighted the positive developments in the South 
as well as the disappointments that had been encountered in many countries; they reached 
an agreement  on identifying  ‘goals for collective action’  to advance the cause of the 
South; some of these were to (a) tap the South-South cooperation potential,  (b) place 
development  at  the  apex of  the  international  political  and  economic  agenda,  and  (c) 
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refocus South-North dialogue. Forums such as the one mentioned and the South Centre 
offered ample opportunities for South leaders such as Mahathir and Mandela to share 
their views via the centre’s widely distributed publications and other related fora. 
Figure 6.1:
Numerous South-South efforts have been underway over the decades and they have been 
organized by interconnected groups such as the G-77 and NAM.  The First South Summit 
was held in Havana, Cuba, between the 10th and the 14th of April 2000. At this Summit a 
programme of action was adopted, and which, in turn, guided the High Level Conference 
on South-South Cooperation that was held in Marrakech, Morocco, from the 16th to the 
19th December 2003. Out of this auspicious gathering a special Marrakech Declaration 
was  produced;  one  that  covered  a  number  of  issues  in  which  it  reaffirmed  the 
commitment of the delegates to South-South Cooperation at all levels and on all fronts. 
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Since Malaysia and South Africa have been party to numerous such declarations, they 
have thrown their weight behind the South-South Co-operation projects, and have made 
specific contributions to South-South Co-operation in thought and deed (Shamsul 1996: 
64-65); these will thus be illustrated in the forthcoming section. It will demonstrate the 
kinds  of  issues  that  have  been  emphasized  and the  types  of  projects  that  have  been 
embarked upon by both states in order to realise the goals of the South.
2.3 Malaysia’s Long Narrative in South-South Co-operation Project:
During  the  earlier  years,  after  the  birth  of  the  Federation  of  Malaya/Malaysia,  the 
political leadership demonstrated its commitment to what had then been identified as the 
developing world (initially referred to as ‘Third World’ and renamed ‘South’). It was 
only when Dr. Mahathir succeeded as Prime Minister in July 1981 that Malaysia showed 
greater  commitment  to  the  South.  In  fact,  it  was,  in  a  sense,  through  his  dynamic 
leadership as well as a few other South politicians that the South gained more prominence 
at international fora. This was, moreover, done via his stand-off with the former colonial 
power, namely Britain, in the mid 1980s and when he also adopted a ‘Look East’ policy 
(Milne & Mauzy 1999: 123; Rajendran 1993: 91-107); during a time when the country 
experienced a down-turn in the economy (cf. Leifer 1995: 146). Mahathir was active as a 
political leader on the domestic front where he was occasionally challenged by his rivals 
in UMNO and other parties (cf. Rajendran 1993: 17-33). On the foreign affairs front he 
showed sterling leadership as Malaysia’s premier and also as a reliable spokesperson for 
the South. He stressed the need for Malaysia to modernize its infrastructure, and overhaul 
its economy through initiating and producing viable local products that could compete 
favourably with other well-known brands in the international markets. An example of one 
such product was Malaysia’s locally manufactures car, the Proton Saga (Rajendran 1993: 
95-98).  The  car,  which  has  since  it  was  manufactured  in  the  mid  1980s  entered  the 
international  market,  only reached the South African motoring  market  during August 
2005 (The Star – Motoring 18 August 2005).
Mahathir  was perceived by many in the South as the self-appointed spokesperson for 
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them. This began almost as soon after he became the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia 
on the 16th of July 1981 and continued beyond 2000 until his retirement from politics in 
2004. This was indeed a long innings and one that has been acknowledged by supporters 
and  detractors  alike  as  a  significant  reign.  As  he  was  gaining  the  confidence  of  the 
Malaysian populace and ascending the political structures, he voiced his opinion against 
all  sorts  of  oppression  in  the  South;  he was one of  key critics  of  the South African 
apartheid regime. At NAM’s 7th Heads of State conference that was held in New Delhi, 
India, on the 8th of March 1983 as well as at the UN Assembly in 1984, he did not hold 
back any punches when it came to dealing with the apartheid regime. He advocated for a 
united stand against the inhumane acts of and the injustices that the regime meted out 
against its Black communities. (cf. Hamidin 2003: 35-36).
At these important  conferences  Mahathir  signalled in  no uncertain  terms that  he was 
concerned with the plight of the people of the South, and thus committed himself and his 
country to make a difference through trade and other projects. Malaysia thus stressed at 
forums such as the Afro-Asian Marketing Convention, which was held in New Delhi, 
India, during the early part of 1983 that the developing states should strive to trade with 
one another rather than giving emphasis to trade with the developed states (ibid 56). The 
Malaysian Minister of Agriculture, who echoed the sentiments of the Malaysian premier, 
stated  that  ‘it  is  only by trading with each  other  that  those developing countries  can 
promote development to their own mutual benefit.’ In Mahathir’s address to the NAM 
delegates in New Delhi, he requested a re-evaluation of the South’s relationship with the 
North  when  he  said  that  ‘The  North-South  Dialogue  is  no  longer  the  hope  of  the 
developing countries...The North is not about to abdicate their role as the aristocrats of 
the world economies.’ 
Being  a  pragmatist,  he attempted  to  convince  the  attendees  that  significant  measures 
should be taken in order to achieve specific  developmental  goals and that developing 
countries should rely on their own resources and adopt frugal lifestyles that will in the 
end be in their own interest. Hope, he continued in his assertive manner, should not be 
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placed in the hands of the ‘unfeeling North.’ Mahathir’s lengthy discourses at these fora 
aimed at restoring faith and confidence in themselves rather than knocking on the doors 
of  the  West  for  assistance  and  acting  as  beggars.  The  seeds  for  the  ‘Prosper-Thy-
Neighbour’ policy were planted at this specific forum and were slowly nurtured during 
the succeeding years and one that became a key principle in Malaysia’s bilateral bonds 
and multilateral ties. During September 1986 the Commonwealth organized the Finance 
Ministers’  Meeting that Mahathir  attended;  at  this  gathering he reflected his concerns 
about the enormous debt owed by the developing countries, which has largely been due 
to unfair trade with the developed states as well as the restrictive economic measures 
these states have imposed upon the South (ibid 61). Malaysia was among those countries 
that morally and financially supported the formation of the South Commission that was 
referred to earlier. 
At the Second South-South Cooperation Conference that was organized and hosted by 
Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur on the 5th of May 1986 – the First one was held in Beijing, 
China,  during  1981,  Mahathir  reminded  the  delegates  of  the  suffering  and  plight  of 
millions  of  people in  the South and the  need  to  work together  through bilateral  and 
regional groupings to overcome these obstacles. And he cautioned them to be wary of the 
fact that ‘a handful of people can make or break us;’ here he was, of course, referring to 
the developed countries that have been controlling and manipulating the world economy. 
As a way forward Mahathir proposed the setting up of a Commission that was to take a 
careful study of South-South Cooperation; this proposal was overwhelming accepted by 
the  conference  delegates  and  he  was  appointed  as  the  chairperson  of  the  Steering 
Committee, which had its first meeting on the 9th of August 1986. By the time the 8th 
Meeting of the Heads of State of NAM got off the ground in Harare, Zimbabwe, during 
September  1986,  the  South  Commission  was  approved  and  the  former  Tanzanian 
president,  Mr.  Julius  Nyerere  succeeded  as  chairperson.  The  latter  thus  steered  the 
Commission into the years  that  followed and by March 1988 was able to identify its 
terms of reference, which were: (a) analysing the national development experiences in the 
South, (b) analysing the global environment, (c) encouraging South-South Cooperation 
for collective self-reliance and (d) addressing South-North relations. About 10 plenary 
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sessions were organized from 1987 until 2000 before the extensive, detailed Report titled 
Challenge to the South: the Report of the South Commission (OUP 1990) was produced 
with  a  second complimentary  volume titled  Facing  the  Challenge:  Responses  to  the 
Report of the South Commission (London 2003); the responses in the latter volume came 
from key intellectuals and decision-makers around the globe (cf. Hamidin 2003: 71-74). 
And incidentally, during 1986 Malaysia was a founding member of the Cairns Group, a 
group of about 14 medium sized agricultural exporting countries, which represented both 
the developing and developed countries and placed agriculture on the multilateral trade 
agenda; and as an organization it has developed into ‘a successful example of a bridge-
building coalition between developed and developing nations’ (Taylor 2001: 113). 
Mahathir pronounced at almost each of the meetings and gatherings methods of dealing 
with the economic imbalances that plagued the relationship between the South and the 
North. For example, at the NAM’s Belgrade conference on the 4th September 1989, he 
argued in favour of some labour-intensive industries to be relocated to the South so that 
people in this region can be employed and effectively contribute to the economies of their 
respective communities, and that measures be taken to stop the brain drain to the North 
by  the  governments  of  the  South.  According  to  Means  (1990:  183-203),  Malaysia 
achieved three important objectives in 1989; the first was defeating the opposition, the 
second introduced a formulaic revision of the NEP that came into effect in 1971, and the 
third  was  replacing  the  NEP  with  a  new  social  ethic.  Since  Malaysia  hosted  the 
Commonwealth  October  meeting  in  Kuala  Lumpur,  Mahathir  had  mended  his 
disagreements  with  the  British;  at  this  meeting  he  attacked  South  Africa’s  apartheid 
policies, called for an end to trade protectionism, requested for the endorsement of an 
environment accord and proposed a global meeting against drug trafficking. 
Throughout  the  1980s,  the  first  decade  of  Mahathir’s  tenure  as  Prime  Minister  of 
Malaysia, neoliberal macroeconomic policies were imposed on the South by the USA and 
its North allies. Organizations such as the broad-based United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that tried to speak out on behalf of the South were 
forced to either fall in line or be prepared to experience the wrath to be meted out by the 
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USA and Britain. These types of high-handed measures caused endless hardships in the 
South, and they angered leaders such as Mahathir, who continuously spoke out against 
the  North’s  hegemonic  position  in  the  globalised  world  economy  (cf.  Taylor  2001: 
125-126). And since Mahathir has come to the defence of the South, Khong (1991: 176) 
predicted that the thrust of Malaysian foreign policy in the 1990s was going to be the 
Third  World.  He,  however,  hastily  added  that  ASEAN  remained  at  the  heart  of 
Malaysia’s interest. In 1990 Malaysia hosted the first G-15 – a core group of the G-77 
(Sridharan  1998:  368)  -  Summit  of  the  South  in  order  to  (a)  seek  solution  for  the 
developing countries, (b) devise means of cooperation,  and (c) propose the following: 
trade fairs, financial mechanisms, investments, business forums, IT for technical projects, 
and population & family planning. In a subsequent meeting that it organized for the G-15 
in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir urged and encouraged the pursuance of bilateral relations and 
he proposed a ‘bilateral payment’ scheme for developing countries that would circumvent 
the USA and Europeans. And at this meeting and as an incentive, Mahathir launched the 
South Investments, Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre to assist in the creation 
of networks among South’s small and medium companies. By 1991 and 1992 Malaysia, 
according to Van der Mehden (1992: 111-118) and Case (1993: 184-193), grew in stature 
because of its buoyant economy and it, in fact, scored high grades in the opinion of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
During this period he also strengthened ties with the Commonwealth and the Muslim 
world in order to network with a wider range of countries from the developing world. 
And it was during 1992 that he introduced his Vision 2020 (Jeshurum 1993: 203-223; 
also  cf.  Derichs  2001),  a  strategic  plan  that  was  adopted  not  only  by  ASEAN  via 
Malaysia’s influence but also by a few African states such as Malawi (Vision 2020) and 
Botswana (Vision 2016).  Hashim (1993:  197-198)  observed that  although Malaysia’s 
profile  was  viewed as being high in  the eyes  of the international  community,  it  was 
somewhat of a risky affair. Nonetheless, Malaysia continued to support the South and 
expressed its dismay at the results that the Uruguay Round (UR), which occurred amidst 
tremendous  structural  changes  across  the  globe,  yielded  for  the  South.  The  UR was 
marked by compromises, concessions and horse trading that favoured the North more 
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than the South. And in response to these results, Malaysia proposed the formation of the 
East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) to decide on economic issues. It was however not 
warmly welcomed by members of APEC such as the USA; the latter chided Malaysian 
for setting up EAEC (Sridharan 1998: 361).
 
Milne & Mauzy (1999: 133) cynically commented on how Mahathir got to support the 
South project when they stated that ‘it is clear why Mahathir took an interest in ASEAN 
and in other organizations in the region. It is not so easy why he took up the cause of the 
South. Perhaps he simply wanted to exercise his political talents in a wider world.’ They 
seem to  have  based their  arguments  on the  fact  that  he was snubbed by Afro-Asian 
People’s Solidarity Conference that was held in Ghana during 1965 when he approached 
them  to  support  the  Federation  of  Malaysia’s  position  against  Indonesia  in  the 
Konfrontasi spat (circa 1963 – 1966). They overlooked the fact that the Federation was 
and remained part of the developing world for quite a while, and that Mahathir closely 
observed in his capacity as a politician with hawkish eyes and sympathetic ears, how the 
rights of the developed states have been trampled upon by the developed world. Despite 
their critical appraisal of how he became a champion for the South, they could not deny 
that he was pro-active and fighting a good fight on behalf of the South. Milne & Mauzy 
(ibid 134) extracted one example where he addressed the NAM 1995 Summit and raised 
important issues that needed immediate action but was not acted upon; the one was on 
imposing a ban on nuclear weapons, and the other was the restructuring of the UN into a 
democratic body.
By  the  turn  of  the  new  century,  Martinez  (2001:  199)  observed  that  Mahathir  was 
accepted as a key South politician that had been ‘championing (the) rights of the Third 
World,’  and  that  he  had  consistently  been  preaching  against  the  hegemonic  forces 
represented by the West. It was reported in an article titled ‘Windows on the South’ that 
Mahathir  always  tried to provide structures via which the Asians and Africans  could 
bond. He organized in October 1999 a four day meeting for about 350 African and Asian 
business  executives,  who came to  form the  Africa-Asia  Business  Forum (AABF),  to 
discuss and consider investment opportunities.  This venture was initiated by Mahathir 
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and was supported by a few partnerships; one of which was the Malaysian Government’s 
Malaysian  South-South  Corporation  Agency  (MASSCORP)  and  another  was  Japan’s 
Tokyo  International  Conference  on  African  Development  (TICAD  II)  (Cooperation 
South 1999: 150). Mahathir, having been in the vanguard, also suggested alternatives for 
and within the South to combat the USA’s hegemonic position by (a) convening new 
groups such as G-15, which subsequently became the G-22, (b) organizing the Langkawi 
International Dialogues, and (c) mooting the EAEC proposals at the 2000 Summit. These 
actions  were concrete  proof of Mahathir’s  commitment  to bring developing countries 
together in order to create opportunities to improve their economies and transform the 
socio-political  lives  of  their  respective  communities.  Whilst  there  has  been  an 
acknowledgement from within the South that these were fairly innovative structures and 
proposals, critical questions were occasionally raised regarding Mahathir’s style of doing 
things. 
Mahathir has indeed injected a commitment for South affairs and he has inspired many 
other South leaders even though he might not have been liked for the way he handled 
some of his affairs internally, particularly the Anwar Ibrahim affair. As stated before, his 
style of leadership was somewhat abrasive but he was able to get the job done and to 
some extent earned the respect of friend and foe alike. Although some might point out a 
few similarities  between Mahathir  and Mandela,  they differed in  style  and approach. 
However, despite the differences, they shared a few common concerns, and one of these 
was the transformation of the South and emancipating it from the shackles of the North. 
And it is to democratic South Africa’s role in the South that I now assess.
2.4 South Africa’s Short Story in the South-South Cooperation Project:
Apartheid South Africa’s track record for human rights concerns and South affairs has 
been  below  zero.  The  hidden  hand  of  the  North  was  always  behind  South  Africa’s 
apartheid policies because many of the TNCs that  were based in the North benefited 
financially from the status quo. South Africa was thus heavily protected by countries such 
as Britain and the USA. The respective governments turned a blind eye towards South 
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Africa’s apartheid policies. It is for this very reason why international politicians from the 
South became fed up with the intransigent position displayed by North politicians such as 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan when they were in office. Since the South African 
apartheid regime was tacitly supported, it took full advantage of the situation and showed 
no sympathy for the South and did not care about the states in its own ‘backyard;’ in this 
regard,  it  subjugated  the  whole  Southern  African  region  through its  ‘Total  Strategy’ 
policy spearheaded by its arrogant and dim-witted president, P.W. Botha in the 1980s (cf. 
Crawford 1995). Most of the Front Line states were dependent upon South Africa and 
thus were not easily drawn into the circle of states that were prepared to openly condemn 
its despicable oppressive acts against the Blacks. 
The moment South Africa was transformed into a democracy and slowly shedding its 
apartheid image under its new vibrant leadership, it was almost immediately welcomed 
into the  fold of  the international  community.  And it  also received  invitations  from a 
variety of regional and international bodies to join their ranks as a member. During the 
first  years  of  its  democracy  South  Africa,  which  coincided  with  the  era  of  (uneven) 
globalization,  had  to  contend  with  sorting  out  domestic  matters  and  also  addressing 
international concerns. Mr. Mandela’s Government of National Unity (GNU) could not 
however  enter  some  of  the  international  organizations  over-night  because  it  had  to 
familiarise itself with the new world order and gradually work its way into the existing 
regional and international structures. It, moreover, also had to transform the state that it 
inherited to a democratic one, and at the same time build a new nation with a new identity 
that would be accepted and respected by the world community. On the domestic front, it 
had  to  work out,  amongst  others,  a  new Constitution  (cf.  Deegan 1999)  and to  give 
immediate attention to the atrocities of the past via the establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation  Commission  (cf.  Villa-Vicencio  &  Verwoerd  2000;  James  & Van  de 
Vijfer 2000; Haron 2002). And on the international front, it had to radically reform its 
foreign policy, revise its policies on trade, and restructure its position to deal with the 
ongoing process of globalization and meet the standards set by the world bodies such as 
the UN. Since the South African apartheid foreign policy was principally pro-western, the 
new democratic South African government had to make radical adjustments by shifting it 
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to a more South-friendly oriented foreign policy; this it did, albeit not very successfully.  
In the light of its own circumstances and its late (re-)entry into world bodies such as the 
UN, NAM and the Commonwealth and regional organizations such as SADC, it allowed 
itself to first familiarise itself with the developments in world affairs and then adapt to the 
socio-political and economic environment (Hamill & Spence 1997: 211). South Africa’s 
pragmatic approach under Mandela was applauded for it helped the new democracy to 
settle into an environment that was active and vibrant. However, the dynamic leadership 
that was demonstrated by Mandela even before he was appointed the first president of the 
democracy signalled that an interesting era was to unfold with South Africa’s re-entry 
into world affairs.
One of the first organizations that opened its doors to South Africa with a certain degree 
of trepidation was SADC. This newly overhauled institution welcomed South Africa into 
their  fold amidst  fanfare.  However,  on the one hand, there  was a concern within the 
SADC circles that South Africa’s population of more than 40 million, growing economy, 
vibrant polity, and strong military might in the region might impact negatively rather than 
positively on regional affairs; and on the other, there was hope that with its entry it will 
strengthen SADC as a regional group and that it will be able to effectively address issues 
on the continent;  a continent  that  forms an integral  part  of the South (cf.  Akomolafe 
2003: 278-279).
Although South Africa has generally been categorised by some scholars as a developing 
state, there have been others who opined that it’s a combination of the First and Third 
Worlds in terms of its infrastructure and economy.  Be that as it  may, the GNU under 
Mandela’s  leadership  viewed  itself  as  a  strong  developing  nation,  and  it  further 
demonstrated its commitment to the affairs of the South through its support for many 
South ventures and projects. With this in view, South Africa’s profile as a champion of 
the  South  was  slowly  on  the  rise  and  was  gradually  being  respected.  At  various 
gatherings Mandela frankly expressed his views regarding the plight of many developing 
countries and the role and the responsibility the North has in helping to bring solutions to 
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poverty  alleviation  and  debt-reduction.  Mandela’s  style  in  addressing  the  North  was, 
however, different from the way Mahathir challenged the North; he was not abrasive as 
Mahathir nor did he act in an authoritarian way.
One of the first significant conferences that took place in South Africa subsequent to its 
re-entry into the UN was UNCTAD IX (cf. Hamill & Spence 1997: 225-227); this was 
held between the 24th and 28th of April 1996. As an international body formed in 1964 – 
the  same  year  when  the  G-77  came  into  being,  UNCTAD  aimed  to  make  use  of 
‘international  bureaucracy  and conference  diplomacy  to  alter  current  norms  affecting 
trade and development’  (Nye [1973] quoted by Taylor  2001: 123).  In the mid 1970s 
UNCTAD was one of the key international actors that represented the concerns of the 
South. Much of its efforts to bring about meaningful changes had generally been thwarted 
and  frustrated  by  the  North’s  arrogant  attitude  reflected  on  different  occasions;  two 
examples, according to Taylor (2001: 125), that illustrated the USA’s disdainful response 
towards efforts on behalf of the South; the one was the Brandt Commission’s proposal to 
solve the deadlock on global negotiations, and the other was Ronald Reagan’s address on 
‘Reaganomics’ to the international community at the Cancun Summit (referred to a quote 
by Augelli & Murphy [1988] in Taylor 2001: 125). 
At  the  UNCTAD IX conference,  Alec  Erwin,  South  Africa’s  Minister  of  Trade  and 
Industry and the conference’s president, played an important role in the drafting of its 
Midrand  Declaration.  The  declaration  made  a  renewed  call  for  ‘partnership  for 
development’ amidst the uneven process of globalisation and liberalisation of which the 
drafters  were very wary of (ibid 130-131). The concept of ‘partnership’ – which was 
defined in more detail  in an earlier  chapter  -  has increasingly been bandied about in 
developing forums as an important vehicle for progress and advancement,  and one in 
which  the  issues  of  common  objectives  and  joint  action  had  been  underscored.  The 
purpose of this approach was also to shift away from the begging-bowl syndrome as well 
as to avoid any confrontation with the North (ibid). Despite the emphasis on partnership 
between South and North in the interest of development at the UNCTAD IX meeting, it 
was criticised for assuming the foreign investments made by the partners from the North 
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would be a solution to the problems faced by the developing states.  
One forum that followed in the footsteps of UNCTAD was NAM, the second-largest 
grouping of 115 countries within the UN. It was a natural outcome of the Afro-Asian 
Bandung 1955 conference and was eventually established in 1961 as ‘a global voice for 
developing countries’ and one that adopted a non-aligned stance in relation to the west-
east conflict that was dominated by the USA and USSR throughout the Cold War period 
(Hamill & Spence 1997: 220-223; Cooper 2003: 12-15). Historically NAM was one of 
the few organizations that were consistent in their criticisms of the apartheid state, and 
many of NAM’s members gave moral and financial support to the liberation movements 
of South Africa since they went into exile and engaged the apartheid regime militarily 
(cf. Thomas 1996). Democratic South Africa became a full member during the latter part 
of  1994;  the  same  year  it  rejoined  the  Commonwealth  (South  African  Year  Book 
2003/2004: 337); this re-entry was an emotional one in that South Africa, which was a 
pariah state and shunned by the majority of the international community,  regained its 
significance and respectability after the (former) liberation movements were victorious 
against apartheid in establishing a democratic state (cf. Taylor 2001: 143). 
With  South  Africa’s  ascendancy  in  the  socio-political  arena  because  of  its  internal 
reforms and external behaviour towards the South vis-à-vis the North, South Africa won 
over the hearts of many in the developing world and because of its favourable actions 
was granted the opportunity of hosting the XII NAM Summit Conference of the Heads of 
State and Government. This took place in Durban between 29th of August and 3rd of 
September 1998; and at this meeting Mandela in his capacity as South Africa’s president 
was unanimously appointed its new chairperson. Under the influence of Mandela, NAM 
was repositioned to take into account the new realities such as supporting the rights for 
the Palestinians, and strengthening dialogue among the developing countries – two issues 
which Dr. Mahathir harped on at previous NAM and other fora. It was quite evident from 
the newspaper reports and political commentators that South Africa, which postured a 
reformist agenda within the framework and spirit of dialogue and cooperation, acted as a 
bridge-builder  between  the  South  and  the  North.  Mr.  Alfred  Nzo,  democratic  South 
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Africa’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘if we can serve as a bridge to bring 
the interests of the industrialised world and the Non-aligned world closer together, we 
will know that our struggle has been truly worthwhile’ (quoted in Taylor 2001: 144). 
South Africa’s position as one of key drafters of the NAM Declaration was criticized by 
NGOs for its uncritical, social rhetoric and its tacit approval of the international capitalist 
system as  is;  and they argued that  South Africa postured more  in  the interest  of the 
business communities of the North rather than the South and that it pushed a conciliatory 
agenda in favour of the North at the expense of South (ibid 145-147). Despite the new 
government’s good intentions to play a critical and an important role in gatherings such 
as this,  it  opened up itself  to criticisms from different quarters  and not being able to 
satisfy any of them. The major failure of South Africa at the NAM conference was that it 
did not engage the North on fundamental issues as expected by some South delegates and 
in the process it ‘sacrificed its potential to take moral leadership of the post-Cold War 
world in favour of becoming chief negotiator’ (an analyst in Sunday Times 12th of July 
1998 was quoted by Taylor [2001: 148]). 
Even though South Africa slowly adapted itself to the international environment by not 
trying to be seen and viewed as wholly ‘pro-west,’ it could not avoid being criticised for 
not acting more in the interest of the South, a position which South Africa purported to 
have been aligned with since its re-entry as a developing democratic state. It has however 
continued to strive in order to shed this pro-West image, and Mandela tried to stress that 
‘South-South Cooperation is of direct and central importance to our own national and 
international priorities’ (qtd in Taylor 2001: 143).  In any case, South Africa continued to 
pursue  policies  and  support  structures  that  would  fulfil  its  national  and  international 
interests. In this regard it also joined the Cairns Group – a group of 18 developed and 
developing countries – on the 2nd of February 1998. This is a joint North and South 
initiative, which acted as a lobby group – some of them being middle-ranking powers 
‘with a stake in the smooth running of the global economy’- ‘to prise open the markets of 
the  USA and  Europe’,  ‘to  push  for  greater  liberalisation  in  cross-border  agricultural 
commerce’,  and  ‘to  dismantle  protectionism’  (ibid  113,  115).  South  Africa  saw  its 
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participation in this body as crucial; by being aligned with experienced, middle-powers 
states such as Australia and Canada, it afforded South Africa as a developing democracy 
the opportunity to make a difference in world trade and, more importantly, to be involved 
in multilateral engagements to press for liberalisation (ibid 119-120).
When  Mandela  was  succeeded  by  Mbeki  in  1998,  the  country  was  given  another 
promising leader.  Mbeki,  who is a specialist  in international  relations,  has been quite 
familiar with the international scene, and he was thus able ‘to fit in like a glove’ when he 
inherited the hot seat as South Africa’s second democratically elected president. Mbeki’s 
style has generally very engaging in that he has been constantly debating issues via his 
weekly column on the ANC website (cf. www.anc.org.za). This demonstrates the extent 
to which he has been prepared to show his willingness to raise issues and be open to 
criticism for the decisions that he has taken in domestic and foreign policies. However, 
since Mbeki gave his popular ‘I am an African’ speech on 8th of May 1996, and during 
1998  advocating  the  vision  of  an  ‘African  Renaissance’  with  NEPAD as  a  strategic 
mechanism and key project  to drive the continent  into the future,  he has sparked off 
various debates regarding the notion of an African identity and the question of an African 
Renaissance. These two issues had a direct bearing on the status of the African continent, 
a continent that is only made up of developing states.
At the NAM ministerial conference that was held on the 19th of August 2004, Mbeki 
opened the conference with a paper titled ‘Strengthening South-South Relations.’ Since 
the  paper  captured  the  main  ingredients  of  Mbeki’s  thoughts  on  South-South 
Cooperation, this section will only give it some attention before shifting to the section 
that outlines and discusses his vision of an African Renaissance vis-à-vis the vision of an 
‘Asian  Renaissance’  advocated  and  expressed  by  Anwar  Ibrahim,  the  former  deputy 
Prime Minister of Malaysia. Mbeki remarked in his opening paragraph that since the 50th 
anniversary will be celebrated in 2005, he wanted to take the opportunity of reflecting 
upon significant challenges facing the developing world. He went on to identify three 
main challenges; they were (a) the tackling of poverty and underdevelopment; (b) the 
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maintaining of peace and stability;  and (c) the restructuring of the global exercise  of 
power.
Mbeki expressed the view that continuous attempts have been made to tackle poverty and 
underdevelopment, and to maintain peace and stability. He further mentioned that these 
have been done through continental  cooperation within a multilateral  context.  And he 
then made reference to different cases across the continent where endeavours were made 
to intervene and cooperate to overcome the conflicts. The lesson that has to be learnt 
from Bandung I was that relationships should be forged. On a regional level, he urged 
further contacts and cooperation between the AU and ASEAN as well as between AU 
and other regional and international organizations. In his speech he reflected optimism if 
member  states  work  toward  strengthening  the  ties  through  genuine  South-South 
cooperation;  and  used  the  WTO  negotiations  as  an  example.  And  he  stressed  that 
delegates should take cognisant of the process of globalisation, which has brought with it 
a concentration of power in the hands of a few and that has been employed unilaterally. 
And  in  the  light  of  these  developments,  concerted  efforts  should  be  made  by  the 
developing states via NAM to counter these actions. He emphasised that the challenges 
can only be dealt with in the context of multilateralism and he used Palestine, Iraq and 
Haiti  as three contemporary cases that need urgent attention.  And he was of the firm 
belief that NAM can play a pivotal role in finding solutions.
Midway in his speech he raised pertinent questions as to what gatherings such as NAM 
should do with the resolutions that have been agreed upon, and what its should do to 
provide the necessary guidance and directions to the way ahead. He used the Millennium 
Development Goals as an example, and argued that if there is no transfer of resources 
from the rich nations to the poorer ones then these goals will never be achieved. He then 
questioned as to how these resources should be released to meet the Goals, and which the 
practical  steps  should  be  taken  to  ensure  the  transfer  takes  place  and  the  Goals  are 
actually translated into reality.  He mentioned that all of these questions and issues are 
connected to those who possess the resources and the power. And with regard to this, it 
means that major institutions should be restructured so that the developing countries can 
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benefit from them equally. The UN was used as an example; it is an institution that has 
taken too long to change, he lamented. He posed all these questions and concluded that 
there are no other global institution except NAM that can address these questions and 
provide hope for many of the poor and disadvantaged around the globe.  
 
This opening address essentially tried to raise relevant questions that the delegates had to 
seek answers for in the different sessions. He attempted to inspire the representatives not 
to give in but have hope so that the people in the various communities in different parts 
of  the  world can have  confidence  in  NAM as  a  global  political  instrument  and as  a 
vehicle for hope. The passionate appeal from Mbeki might not have yielded much results, 
it did however cause the representatives to mull over the serious questions some time 
after the conference. And it further illustrated that he has become somewhat frustrated 
with  the  reformation  of  important  institutions  such  as  the  UN and seem to have the 
opinion that NAM can perhaps make a difference if everyone works together to achieve 
the agreed Goals for the South. As far as is known, despite his passionate plea at the 2004 
NAM  forum  there  were  no  concrete  results  in  terms  of  transformation  at  the  2005 
September UN Summit. Whilst African and Asian leadership might have demonstrated 
their frustration, some such as Mbeki and Badawi seem to have faith in their respective 
visions,  namely  African  Renaissance  and  Asian  Renaissance;  two  visions  that  are 
examined in the next section.
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3. South  Africa  and  Malaysia:  Different  Dreams  but  Similar  Styles  and 
Common Causes
The story that was narrated thus far demonstrated in a concrete way how the relationship 
has been transformed from having been adversaries in the early 1960s and late 1980s to 
being  partners  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s.  Despite  the  shortcomings  of  the 
leadership in both states as well  as the perennial problems that both face within their 
respective borders and in their respective regions, they have been able to demonstrate that 
being geographically distant from one another has and is not an impediment but rather a 
stimulus to be together and participate in various fora such as NAM, G-77, and IOR-
ARC, and work together in these organizations to achieve common goals whilst having 
different dreams. In terms of the common objectives that bind the two, the one that stands 
out above all is the fact that both countries have committed themselves to bringing about 
changes  in  the South.  Indeed,  South-South Cooperation  has  been given special  focus 
within their wide foreign policy portfolio. Ample evidence was given above that clearly 
demonstrated to what extent each of the two states committed themselves to the concerns 
of the South. Despite this common cause, the two states reflected that they possessed 
different dreams for their respective states and continents and this has been reflected and 
expressed,  to  some  degree,  through  similar  styles  of  political  leadership  and  public 
rhetoric.
Although many scholars such as Verma, Khoo, Milner, Eldridge, Alatas & others have 
expressed their fears regarding Mahathir’s authoritarian style of leadership, there is little 
doubt that he spearheaded the South-South Cooperation project not for his own ego but 
for the betterment and advancement of the South as a whole. The mere fact that he not 
only morally supported the project but also ploughed a sizeable amount of Malaysian 
monies into it is clear proof of his commitment. One example is the setting of LID as a 
vehicle to work towards transformation in the South. A similar degree of commitment has 
been observed under Mandela and Mbeki’s leadership in South Africa towards the South. 
Two specific examples that there have become major issues of concern during the past 
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few years were the drafting and implementation of NEPAD and African Peer Review 
Mechanism  (APRM);  these  have  been  crafted  to  act  as  significant  instruments  of 
transformation and that would bring about a needed renaissance on the continent. 
South Africa and Malaysia have been two important international nation-states that have 
on many occasions voiced their concerns on behalf of the South at gatherings where the 
North could gain and have a better understanding and insight of the former in terms of 
their needs, desires and aspirations and not continue to maintain and remain in a position 
of  eternal  exploitation  and  advance  their  developed  status  at  the  expense  of  the 
developing and underdeveloped states. These states have been arguing in the name and 
on behalf of the South to get rid of the ‘begging bowl’ mentality or the ‘us-and-them’ 
notion where social inequality continues to be the order of the day and where economic 
growth only takes place in the North at the expense of the South through socio-political 
and  economic  exploitation  and be  labeled  as  peripheral  pawns and deeply dependent 
states. Both states have concentrated their efforts in doing away with the have and have-
not  conditions  –  if  that  is  at  all  possible  –  through  the  eradication  of  poverty  and 
reversing the underdevelopment  process that  has deeply affected  the South;  however, 
even if this is not possible then efforts should still be made towards that ideal so that the 
have-nots  may  have  something  that  could  sustain  them rather  than  wallow in  abject 
poverty  and  be  forced  and  placed  in  ‘Fourth  World’  category  that  Castells  (1996) 
identified.
Both  states  with  fairly  stable  economies  have  demonstrated  their  ‘middle  power’ 
brinkmanship  not  only in  committing  themselves  to  the  projects  of  the  South but  to 
contributing concretely towards a number of other areas such as brokering peace and 
sending  their  troops  to  form part  of  a  peaceful  corps  in  conflict  prone  areas.  Since 
independence Malaysia has been involved in brokering peace in the region and has been 
sending its forces to team up with other military forces as peace troopers in Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Africa (cf. Shaikh Mohd Saifuddeen 2004: 77-78); as a consequence of these 
activities as well as its stable, growing economy and non-aligned political stance, it was 
placed in a position to act as (a) a catalyst in forming structures such as LID that are in 
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the  interest  of  the  South,  (b)  a  facilitator  in  overcoming  bilateral  disputes  with  its 
neighbours, and (c) a manager overseeing the affairs of international organizations such 
as NAM and the Islamic Organization Countries (IOC). And because of these, it fulfilled 
the  criteria  as  set  out  by  Cooper  et  al  and  thus  helped  to  reinforce  the  notion  that 
Malaysia has reached that ‘middle power’ status. 
A similar story unfolded since South Africa lost its  pariah image by April  1994, and 
through its active involvement in regional and international organizations and projects 
that clearly characterized it as an emerging and indeed ‘middle power’ position in global 
environment. Mandela was and continued to be respected – despite, whilst in office, a 
few blunders in international affairs either because of his own shortcomings and short-
sightedness in the field of diplomacy and because of incorrect advice from bureaucrats - 
as the model par excellence and someone who was approached to broker peace in East 
Timor, Burundi, Palestine and the Ivory Coast – to name but a few – during and after his 
stint  as South Africa’s first  president.  The peacemaking role,  which was inherited by 
Mbeki, was continued by the latter particularly in the Ivory Coast and Burundi, and South 
African peacekeeping forces have been sent to conflict  areas to assist  in quelling the 
troubled  spots.  Despite  South  Africa’s  diplomatic  failings  that  have  been  mentioned 
earlier,  it  has  acted  as  (a)  a  catalyst  on  the  continent  when  it  participated  in  the 
restructuring of the OAU by transforming it into the AU, (b) a facilitator in brokering 
peace in the Ivory Coast for many months since 2004, and (c) a manager in supervising 
the  SADC,  NAM  and  other  international  organization  affairs  when  it  chaired  these 
organizations for specific periods (cf. Hamill & Lee 2001). 
During the mid 1990s and beyond, both Malaysia and South Africa as ‘middle powers’, 
which were in the process of developing their socio-commercial and political relations 
into a strategic partnership, popularized their respective ‘renaissance’ visions as a tool 
and  an  instrument  to  motivate  their  national  communities  and  the  peoples  of  their 
respective regions/continents to view the new millennium as a century that will bring 
about the necessary and needed changes and one in which their respective continents and 
peoples would reap great benefit; both envisaged the new century becoming an Asian 
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and/or  an  African  century.  This  renaissance  concept,  which  basically  means  revival, 
reawakening, reinvention and reinvigoration, became a driving symbol and force behind 
the projects that were created by the respective political leaders in Malaysia and South 
Africa. It was a ‘concept of hope’ and one that was stressed and emphasized in many of 
the political speeches that were delivered since the mid 1990s, and because of the amount 
of emphasis and exposure that it  was given, the term aroused an enormous interest at 
different levels (cf. Derichs 2001). 
Whilst there have been a coterie of scholars who discussed the concept in relation to the 
media, the environment, the socio-political transformation, the economic aspects, etcetera 
(cf. Makgoba 1999), there have been others such as Zaidi (1998) who have dismissed the 
‘Asian Renaissance’ concept and argued that ‘(t)he Southeast Asian boom is not even an 
economic  renaissance…  the  contemporary  Southeast  Asian  scene  is  simply  a  good 
money-making business that is neither a recovery nor a rediscovery and certainly not a 
rebirth: this boom is the first time birth.’ In the case of Asia, Anwar Ibrahim popularized 
the term ‘Asian Renaissance’, which was apparently coined by the Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies when it convened a Commission for a New Asia in 1994 (Su-
ming Khoo 2004: 186-187), and in the case of Africa, Mbeki popularized the concept 
‘African Renaissance’, which was coined by Cheikh Diop in the 1960s. Anwar Ibrahim 
and Thabo Mbeki, in their positions as the deputy prime minister of Malaysia and deputy 
president of South Africa, were optimistic that a renaissance was indeed on the rise. The 
political leadership in both states cast their sights on to the 21st Century and thus claimed 
that the 21st Century to be an Asian/African century. 
However, since we are only at the entry point of the new century, critical questions may 
be posed as to whether this will indeed become an Asian or an African century (or both) 
and whether other factors such as climatic changes and environmental elements that have 
thus far been witnessed in different parts of the world will not act as an impediment in 
realizing  this  dream;  a  dream  of  transforming  the  century  into  an  Asian/African  or 
AfroAsian century. Whilst it might be difficult to speculate and reach a few definitive 
conclusions, there is no harm in charting out a vision for the respective continents by 
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their  political  leadership.  Let  me  pause  at  this  juncture  and carefully  peruse  the  two 
different dreams and expressions of a renaissance that have been expressed from two 
distinct quarters of the globe.
3.1 Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance
Is it an act of fate that the renaissance concept was used by Asians and Africans at the 
same time? How come Anwar Ibrahim addressed the issue of an Asian Renaissance two 
days before Thabo Mbeki was about to address an audience on a similar theme at a venue 
thousands of kilometres away? Whilst this section is not here to answer these questions, 
they are raised to show that even though leaders and communities might not have been 
physically connected to one another  that  they have had different  dreams and adopted 
more-or-less similar inspirational styles to achieve their dreams and aspirations; and since 
this was the case they expressed and shared their dreams publicly and regionally for the 
sake of inspiring, motivating and taking their societies forward into the new century.
3.2 Anwar Ibrahim’s Asian Renaissance:
The  ‘Asian  Values’  debate  and  discussions  should  be  viewed  within  the  context  of 
expressing  the  ‘Asian  Renaissance’  vision  (cf.  Shamsul  2001);  a  vision  that  was 
addressed  by  both  Mahathir  Mohamed  and  Anwar  Ibrahim.  It  was  however  Anwar 
Ibrahim and  not  Mahathir  who  brought  the  term  into  full  view  and  provided  a  fair 
exposition  and  understanding  what  it  meant.  Moreover,  Mahathir  Mohamed  who 
envisaged and constructed Vision 2020 used the renaissance concept to further his agenda 
that would particularly serve the interest of Federation’s citizens as well as the peoples of 
the  Asian  continent  in  general.  Before  commenting  on  the  vision  as  outlined  and 
explained in Anwar Ibrahim’s book, namely An Asian Renaissance, a brief summary of 
his biography will help to place him in context. Ibrahim, who was born in 1947, was 
schooled  and  educated  in  Malaysia  and  by  the  end  of  the  1960s  he  was  intimately 
involved as one of the leaders in the student movement. With the formation of Angkatan 
Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) he was automatically pushed into its leadership position, 
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and  he  articulated  its  ideals  and  guided  the  movement.  ABIM’s  dual  focus  was  on 
enhancing the Malay interest and Islamic renewal (Muttalib 1995: 16; Esposito & Voll 
2001: 178). In the 1970s he came under the influence of a few Muslim scholars such as 
Ismail al-Faruqi, Sayyid Naquib al-Attas, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Hasan at-Turabi and Delia 
Noer.  Ibrahim  thus  fused  their  ideas  on  ‘the  process  of  Islamization’  with  Malay 
nationalist  aspirations and produced an interesting blend of thought and practices that 
struck a cord with the ideas and aspirations of members  of the Muslim leadership in 
UMNO (Jamil 1995: 167). He was thus ironically drawn to the UMNO political ranks 
when Mahathir stepped into the office as Prime Minister at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Under  Mahathir’s  influence  and  with  the  latter’s  unstinting  support  Ibrahim quickly 
moved up the structures to eventually become the Deputy Prime Minister; in this position 
he also held the key portfolio  as  Minister  of Finance.  Ibrahim’s  pragmatic  and open 
approach caused him to gradually gain popular support among its diverse multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural  and  multi-religious  communities.  And  as  Ibrahim grew in  stature  as  a 
possible candidate to replace Mahathir as Prime Minister, he used the opportunity to raise 
critical issues regarding the strengthening of Malaysia’s civil society and the pursuing 
good governance that would cleanse the state from corruption at all levels; these ideas 
formed part of his quest for an Asian Renaissance. Mahathir and his strong support group 
within UMNO became weary of Ibrahim’s rhetoric and devised ways of maneuvering 
Ibrahim out of office. 
Mahathir, the skilful politician and leader who had brought Ibrahim into the UMNO fold, 
and  his  loyal  supporters,  succeeded  in  manufacturing  material  that  would  implicate 
Ibrahim on corruption charges and sodomy in 1998. And as a result of these imaginary 
accusations and imagined threat,  Mahathir temporarily curbed Ibrahim’s influence and 
automatically  deflated  his  power  structures  that  he  built  up  over  the  years.  And 
unfortunately for Ibrahim the Malaysian court was not kind to him; the court’s verdict 
found him guilty on corruption charges and effectively locked him away for 15 years in 
2000. As fate would have it, when Badawi stepped in as the new Prime Minister in 2003, 
he had Ibrahim released in 2004. And since his release, Ibrahim was able to make whistle 
stop lecture tours in different parts of the world. South Africa was one of the states that 
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he visited. In Cape Town he was hosted by the fairly influential Muslim Judicial Council 
that  had members who were affiliated to the ANC, an organization that demonstrated 
staunch support for Mahathir and UMNO, and at the beginning of 2007 he, whilst being a 
visiting professor at George Washington University in the USA, was accorded patronage 
of the Cape Town based International  Peace University of South Africa (est.  January 
2006).
Anwar Ibrahim’s ideas on Malay nationalism and Islamic renewal have thus been formed 
over decades and by the time he was firmly established in his position as the deputy 
Prime Minister  he began to  concretely articulate  his  views on an  Asian Renaissance, 
which  was  the  title  of  the  series  of  speeches  and  writings that  appeared  before  and 
particularly in 1996, in an imaginative and pragmatic way. The book may be roughly 
divided under two themes; the first was the re-emergence of Asian culture, which has 
been minimized by those who have been over-impressed by the economic success of 
some Asian nation states during the 20th century, and the second was to enter into serious 
dialogue with others in order to reach a ‘common vision’ that is shared by both East and 
West.  The main thrust  of Ibrahim’s  argument  on the promotion of dialogue is  that  it 
should  move  beyond  economic  issues,  and  if  this  can  be  achieved  then  Asia  would 
emerge as a major contributor towards modernization and globalization.
Apart from these two general observations, there are specifically two elements that have 
formed  an  integral  part  of  Anwar  Ibrahim’s  Asian  Renaissance  project;  they  are 
democracy  and civil  society.  According to  Derichs  (2001:  197),  these concepts  were 
popularized at a time when more emphasis in the western media was given to ‘religious 
fundamentalism’ in the late 1990s and to ‘terrorism’ in the early 2000s. The quest for 
these two elements, Ibrahim (1996: 49) averred, ‘… is an integral part of the continuum 
of the movement of national liberation and self-determination which began in the first 
half of the (20th) century’ (cf. Derichs 2001: 198). The notion of democracy - where 
good governance is ensured and social justice is observed - as articulated and expounded 
upon in Ibrahim’s text is somewhat different from that defined and expressed in the West; 
this type of democracy is one that is peculiar to the East and where, for example, the 
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rights of the society is stressed at the expense of the rights of the individual. 
The notion of civil society - translated as  masyarakat madani in Bahasa Melayu – has 
also formed an essential part of Ibrahim’s philosophy regarding an Asian Renaissance. 
Anwar Ibrahim (1996: 51) explained that ‘the civil society we envisage is one based on 
moral principles, where governance is by the rule of law (and) not human caprice, where 
the growth of civic organizations is nurtured not suppressed, where dissent is not stifled, 
and where the pursuit of excellence and the cultivation of good taste take the place of 
mediocrity and philistinism. For that, we have to retrieve, revive and reinvigorate, the 
spirit of liberty, individualism, humanism and tolerance’. Derichs (2001: 198) pointed out 
that the concept ‘civil society’ differs markedly between the way it is understood in the 
West  and  East  respectively.  Whilst  the  concept  in  the  West  has  its  roots  within  the 
enlightenment period, the concept in the East is embedded within the religious sphere. In 
the East the eastern religious traditions form the basis of an Asian identity, and the Asian 
way of thinking and acting. According to the Asian religious philosophy in general, the 
human being is a moral being with a transcendent dimension that has been endowed with 
inalienable rights as well as unconditional responsibilities to God, his/her fellow human 
beings and the environment (Ibrahim 1996: 51). He put it more succinctly in his 2nd of 
May 1996 speech entitled ‘Asian Renaissance and the Reconstruction of Civilization’ 
when he said that ‘(t)he Asian Man at heart is persona religious.’ In the words of Shamsul 
(2001:  252),  Ibrahim’s  intention,  which  was  guided  by  ‘moral  precepts  and  faith 
reawakened,’  was to construct  ‘an ethical  political  system with an Islamic thrust  that 
would facilitate the emergence of a responsible and accountable civil society that would 
be responsive to the government’s agenda.’ Certain characteristics such as individualism, 
selfishness, immorality etcetera that are prevalent within the West do not feature in the 
list that makes up the Asian identity. 
Derichs  (2001:  199)  highlighted  the  fact  that  whilst  Ibrahim’s  personal  identity  is 
associated with the religion of Islam, he was open and sensitive to all the other religious 
traditions on the continent and thus drew from the rich legacy of the Asian continent and 
stressed the idea of civilizational  dialogue  at  all  levels  in  many of  his  speeches.  For 
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example, in his opening address at the International Conference on Jose Rizal and the 
Asian Renaissance during the beginning of October 1995, Ibrahim illustrated how Jose 
Rizal – an individual who had benefited from the knowledge of the East and the West - 
adopted a multi-dimensional approach in solving humanities’ problems. As far as Ibrahim 
was concerned, the main challenge for the Asian society in general and the Malaysian 
society in particular lie in the approach that is adopted; this ‘holistic approach’ includes 
morality  as an essential  part  of the socio-political  structures and economic  sectors  in 
Malaysian  civil  society  (ibid  201).  Whilst  Anwar  Ibrahim was  languishing  in  prison 
during  late  1998,  he  lamented  in  his  open  ‘Prayer  from  prison’  letter  the  fact  that 
Malaysia was still a long way from boasting a robust civil society; he added that for civil 
society to  really  progress  along the  path  of  constructing  a  vibrant  one,  ‘fundamental 
social, political, and economic reform is a sine qua non.’
Anwar Ibrahim (1996: 29) stated that ‘(t)he major Asian traditions stand for a holistic 
vision of life  and society encompassing  economic,  social  and political  dimensions  as 
opposed to partialistic and fragmentary approaches to development.  If we want to lay 
claim to a unique Asian way, such a way is none other than the articulation of that vision 
in unequivocal terms. Central to this vision is the philosophy that economic development 
must proceeds coterminously with cultural enrichment. The pursuit of prosperity must not 
be at the expense of environmental degradation. The quest for growth must always be 
balanced by a profound concern for social justice and equity.  This is a master key to 
unlocking the secrets of the Asian of Renaissance.’ Ibrahim referred to and addressed 
these  issues  in  the  light  of  the  reawakening  of  Asian  ideals  and  values,  and  the 
reinvention of Asian social and political order (Derichs 2001: 198). As far as Ibrahim was 
concerned,  communities  -  with their  diverse  cultures  in  Asia  -  should aim to  lead  a 
balanced life at all levels (ibid 201); the central issue is not the origins of human rights 
‘but the balance of civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, societal and 
cultural rights on the other’ (cf. Milne & Mauzy 1999: 146). He, in fact, reiterated this 
point in his ‘Prayer from Prison’ when he critically commented on Mahathir’s economic 
program  and  stated  that  ‘there  cannot  be  an  Asian  renaissance  without  social  and 
economic justice.’ 
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Ibrahim’s  discourses  on  the  Asian  Renaissance  and  his  particular  references  to 
democracy and civil society in the mid 1990s should be viewed against the backdrop that 
the nature of Malaysian governance has fallen short of being described as a true fully-
fledged democracy. Verma (2004: 172) strongly argued that ‘Mahathir’s dominance over 
government and public policy is due to the system of populist authoritarianism’. And she 
continued her argument by stating that Mahathir’s dominance over these structures ‘… 
has made it easy (for him) to control organizations of civil society and manipulate its 
growth in the declared national and community interest.’ As far as Verma is concerned, 
Mahathir  employed  the  constitution  and  the  judicial  system to  effectively  have  firm 
control  over  all  socio-political  activities  such  as  the  parliamentary  process  and  mass 
political activity. And since this was and still is the case, Verma (2004: 176) stated that 
the relationship between the Malaysian state and its civil society has not been a healthy 
one, and that civil and political rights have inadequately protected by the state. Similar 
sentiments were expressed Eldridge (2002: 90-115) in his chapter on Malaysia’s ‘illiberal 
democracy and human rights’. In this regard, Ibrahim (1996:63) highlighted the fact that 
‘one  of  the  hallmarks  of  a  civil  society  is  the  creation  of  entrenched  constitutional 
safeguards for the protection of the people’s civil rights and liberties.’ 
Ibrahim,  in  his  capacity  as  deputy  PM,  was  acutely  aware  of  Mahathir’s  powerful 
position and stranglehold over the executive as well as the socio-political status that the 
Malaysians  faced.  He  thus  skillfully  weaved  some  of  the  ingredients  of  an  Asian 
Renaissance into his speeches and writings that offered advice to the society in general 
and the political leadership in particular. For example, he (1996: 52) adroitly made the 
point  that  ‘(f)or  humane  governance,  it  is  essential  that  power  be  vested  in  a 
democratically  constituted  authority  than  in  the  hands  of  the  individual.  Power 
personalised is power plundered from the people.’ It can safely be assumed that when he 
penned these words he had his Prime Minister and other rulers in the region in mind. This 
argument is partially supported by Elliot’s (1998/1999) journalistic assessment when she 
stated ‘Anwar actually started staking out his differences with Mahathir five years ago, 
when he became deputy prime minister… Anwar … put together a book called  Asian 
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Renaissance, a counterargument to Mahathir’s ‘Asian values’.’ And it is supposed that 
although  Mahathir  tolerated  Ibrahim’s  lateral  thinking  and  articulation  of  his  ideas 
publicly, he found them problematic if not reprehensible for taking an indirect swipe at 
the nature of Malaysian political leadership of which Ibrahim was a part; and this could 
have been part of the build up to oust him in 1998.
Ibrahim’s proposed ‘Asian Renaissance’  project  was a way forward and a method of 
breaking the political impasse with the intention of bringing an end to the type of populist 
authoritarian  rule  displayed  by  political  leaders  like  Mahathir  in  the  region.  Though 
Ibrahim’s initiatives such as his drive for a vibrant civil society and the pursuance of 
good governance – the two essential  ingredients  of the ‘Asian Renaissance’ project  - 
might not have ignited an enthusiasm among the Malaysian citizens for reform in the 
early 1990s, this changed soon after he was ousted out of his position as the deputy PM 
and imprisoned on cooked-up charges in 1998. Anwar Ibrahim’s dismissal, according to 
Derichs (2001: 211), also implied ‘a dismissal of the  civil society in favour of the hard 
targets of Vision 2020, as the morally perfect man in favour of the progressive man (New 
Malay).’ Nevertheless, the reformasi movement that Ibrahim initiated at the beginning of 
the 1990s mustered support from various sectors and visibly demonstrated its strength 
against  the  Malaysian  government  at  the  end  of  the  1990s;  this  wide  spread 
demonstration  caused the UMNO leadership  to be quite  nervous for it  was uncertain 
whether the results of the 10th general elections during November 1999 would be in its 
favour or in the interest of the opposition parties. However, when the results returned 
UMNO in particular and BN in general to power, it was a great relief for Mahathir whose 
leadership was surely tested. In response to the BN victory, Felker (2000: 49-60) titled 
his article ‘Mahathir’s Pyrrhic Deliverance.’ And since Mahathir came back into power, 
he fastened his grip over the executive and the domestic affairs; and he, at the same time, 
pursued the interest of the South (perhaps as a method of deflecting the attention of the 
international community of what took place on a domestic level). Mahathir’s diplomatic 
skills  rescued him from being abandoned by the voters,  who – instead  of voting for 
someone new - probably felt ‘secure’ with the type of authoritarian leadership that he has 
displayed  over the years.  The voters  overlooked his  shortcomings  and thus remained 
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contented  and  satisfied  with  how he  managed  the  affairs  of  the  state  internally  and 
externally. 
However, since Mahathir also made his special inputs to the ‘Asian Renaissance’ theme, 
it will be in order to make brief reference to his speeches that dealt with the theme. On 
the 11th of January he delivered a speech entitled ‘An Asian Renaissance for a New 
Asia’ to the New Asia Forum in Kuala Lumpur (cf. Makaruddin 2000: 173-180), and on 
the 15th of August 1996 he addressed the Regional Conference of the ‘Harvard Clubs of 
Asia’ in Kuala Lumpur on the same theme (cf. Makaruddin 2000: 129-137). At the latter 
gathering  he  pointed  out  that  there  were  three  challenges  in  achieving  an  Asian 
Renaissance; they were (a) domestic reform and revolution of which ‘social justice’ acts 
as  the  key,  (b)  regional  cooperation  and friendship  of  which  the  building  ‘peace’  is 
crucial, and (c) striving for a more just and a more productive new world order which 
should contain a number of pertinent elements such as justice, respect, fraternity, peace 
and prosperity  that  would  benefit  all.  In  the former  speech he demonstrated  to  what 
extent Asia’s renaissance have been on the move and gone unnoticed by the world. He 
warned  that  there  are  states  in  the  West  that  would  like  to  see  the  failure  of  this 
renaissance  so  that  the  Asians  remain  subjected  to  the  socio-political  and  economic 
hegemony of the West. Mahathir mentioned in passing the importance of democracy in 
the process of an Asian Renaissance but did not attempt to define and elaborate upon this 
concept as was the case in Ibrahim’s writings. And at no stage did he comment on the 
position  of  ‘civil  society’  as  an  important  stakeholder  in  the  transformation  of  the 
Malaysia/Asia and the eradication of poverty and the ultimate attainment of social justice; 
issues that have been raised and discussed by Ibrahim.
The Asian Renaissance debate has indeed played a crucial role in infusing a positive and 
optimistic attitude within the Asian communities in general and the Malaysian society in 
particular.  The  ‘Asian  Renaissance’  project,  which  is  an  ongoing  one,  despite  the 
obstacles that occurred with the apprehension and imprisonment of Ibrahim. It is a project 
that has brought about a degree of fraternity among the region’s nation-states and has 
reinforced ZOPFAN as a region of relative peace. It is indeed this type of fraternity and 
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peace that is also envisaged by aspiring political leaders such as Thabo Mbeki during his 
position  as  South Africa’s  deputy president.  In  this  key  political  position  and as  the 
second important  political  figure after  Mandela,  he advocated  the idea of  an African 
Renaissance vision and a process that was to replace the Afro-pessimism that has been 
pervading the continent.  
3.3 Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance:
The African Renaissance is a phrase that has been popularized in South Africa by Thabo 
Mbeki in 1997 whilst he was still the deputy president of the newly found democracy. 
Prior to Mbeki’s call, the concept was used at the Cheikh Anta Diop conference that took 
place in Dakar, Senegal, in 1996 and also addressed by earlier fora on the continent (cf. 
Maloka 2000; Horn 2000). This popular phrase was and remains  a clarion call  to all 
African peoples and nations to solve the diverse problems on the troubled continent by 
themselves  in an African way.  And when Mbeki  gave his  famous ‘I  am an African’ 
speech on the 8th of May 1996 - which more-or-less coincided with Anwar Ibrahim’s 
University Loyola Heights lecture entitled ‘Asian Renaissance and the Reconstruction of 
Civilization’ on the 6th May 1996 in Philippines’ Quezon City – the ideas were weaved 
into the general African Renaissance philosophy (Mbeki 2001: 9-14). Vale & Maseko 
(2003: 135) explained in their footnote that Mbeki’s speech ‘drew together the diverse 
strands  of  the  country’s  history,  and  outlined  a  new,  unified  framework  for  a  post-
apartheid  South  Africa.’  The  speech  spurred  scholars  and  journalists  on  to  provide 
extensive commentary on its  contents  and more importantly to be associated  with its 
spirit of reconciliation. Bearing in mind that the speech was made during the time when 
the South Africa’s national project, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (cf. 
Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd 2000), got underway and that South Africans on the whole 
were  seeking  ways  of  renewal  and  social  transformation.  In  the  light  of  these 
circumstances,  Mbeki  advocated  the idea of  an African  Renaissance during a  critical 
period in its social history. 
African  Renaissance,  however,  became a  key concept  in  the  vocabulary of  the  post-
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Apartheid African intellectuals. According to Landsberg and Kornegay (1998), it became 
a strategy that could be used to bring about a Pax Africana, a term coined by Ali Mazrui, 
and which meant that ‘… the peace of Africa is to be assured by the exertions of Africans 
themselves’. And African Renaissance, which is a version of the Pan Africana ideology 
and which Mbeki painstakingly clarified and explained at different gatherings, stimulated 
scholarly debates to unpack and understand the concept and its implications for South 
Africans in a post-Apartheid period in particular, and for African states, which faced the 
challenges  of the post-colonial  conditions,  in general.  In fact,  Landsberg & Kornegay 
(1998) went on to question whether the SADC is a renaissance strategy because of South 
Africa’s  involvement  in  the DRC disputes,  and they also asked whether  there  was a 
consistent ‘Renaissance Africa’ policy. As far as their observations were concerned, the 
Renaissance  Africa  is  ‘…  in  part  the  response  to  the  strategic  games  of  the 
Washington/Paris  sphere of influence in Africa’. They also highlighted the challenges 
that face a Renaissance Africa strategy and commented on the security dimension of this 
strategy. 
Vale & Maseko (2003: 124) adopted a more critical  position when they offered their 
insightful interpretations of the ‘African Renaissance’ idea. Their interpretation suggests 
that ‘although rooted in structuralism, and buoyed by the same modernization theory that 
inspired apartheid’s African ambitions, South Africa’s ideas of an African Renaissance is 
abstruse, puzzling, even perhaps mysterious; more promise than policy.’ That said, they 
(2003: 125) further pointed out that the African Renaissance’s ‘essential features remain 
deliberately vague’ and that South Africa’s idea of an African Renaissance possessed 
specific  ulterior  motives;  the one was to  seek ways of maximizing  its  foreign policy 
options in Africa and to gain a permanent seat in the UN’s security council (Evans 1999: 
626). These two scholars were cognizant of the variety of commentaries that reflected 
upon the concept, and thus confined their comments and explanations to basically two 
specific interpretations. 
The first, they argued (2003: 126), is the globalist interpretation that is shaped within the 
modernist  tradition  and  embraced  by  the  South  African  elites  of  all  races  ‘whose 
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understanding  of  modernisation  is  the  generation  of  wealth;’  and  the  second  is  the 
Africanist  interpretation,  which  is  post-structural,  and  it  is  connected  to  a  process  of 
‘unlocking  a  series  of  complex  social  constructions’  and  turn on ‘issues  of  identity’. 
These Africanist, according to Vale & Maseko (2003: 128), are intent on developing and 
reconstructing  a  situation  in  which  Africans  would  be  able  to  contribute  towards 
civilization; however, this can only take place via a process of reinterpretation of African 
history and culture and through a process of reshaping and making of an African identity. 
The Africanist perspective, these two scholars argued, created the necessary space for 
alternative opinions and understandings of Africa’s position in the 21st century. Maloka 
(2000) slightly revised the categories offered by Vale & Maseko: he accepted the first 
category which he associated with Mbeki and the ANC. He qualified the second category 
by prefixing ‘pan’ to ‘africanist’ so that the South African debate on African Renaissance 
can  be  located  in  a  broader  Pan-Africanist  tradition.  And  he  added  the  culturalist 
dimension that harkens back within the African Renaissance process to its African roots 
and which is inextricably tied to the concept of ubuntu as well as the question of African 
identity.  Returning  to  Vale  &  Maseko  (2003:  133),  they  posed  a  critical  question 
regarding Mbeki’s position vis-à-vis the two strands of interpretation: is he an Africanist 
or a globalist? They mentioned after scrutinizing some of Mbeki’s speeches that although 
he might be a committed Africanist as argued by Vincent Maphai, a political scientist, he 
–  as  an  ardent  modernizer  -  leaned  more  towards  a  globalist  stance  because  of  his 
adoption  of  neo-liberal  economic  policies  and  strategies.  And  Mbeki’s  choice, 
preferences and decisions were made despite internal dissent within the tripartite alliance 
(ANC, SACP & COSATU) regarding his pro neo-liberal stance.
Apart from the critical remarks and observations by these informed scholars, the African 
Renaissance  project’s  supporters,  who  are  also  strong  adherents  of  the  neo-liberal 
policies, demonstrated the need for advocating an African Renaissance. Since some of 
them have been fully informed about the East Asian example, they argued in its favour 
and considered it as a useful model that could be adopted and adapted. Two examples 
will suffice: the first paper was titled ‘The African Renaissance: A Dream’ and it was 
delivered by Mr. Vusi Mavimbela, an Mbeki advisor, at a Foundation of Global Dialogue 
288
                                                                          
forum  during  July  1997.  In  his  paper,  he  acknowledged  that  when  discussing  the 
renaissance process that full cognizance will have to be taken of the Asian Renaissance as 
well as the East Asia economic miracle before debating the ideas pertaining to an African 
Renaissance. And he emphasized the point that the raison d’etre for a renaissance on the 
African continent  is  to empower the African communities  so that  they may radically 
break from their colonial past and contribute to and benefit from all the achievements of 
human civilization.  The second paper was delivered by Dr. Tim Thabane,  the deputy 
Governor of the South Africa Reserve Bank. In his address to the African-Asian Society 
he  reflected  upon  ‘Asia’s  Economic  Recovery  and  its  implications  for  the  African 
Renaissance’ on the 5th of October 1999 in Sandton. He thus used Asia as an example 
and as a model  for economic growth on the continent.  Much of Dr. Thabane’s ideas 
concentrated on the economic aspects of the African Renaissance and he illustrated that 
the  growth  in  the  Asian  economies  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  development  of  an 
African Renaissance.
In the light of these criticisms and contributions on the theme, it provides us the chance to 
go directly to two of Mbeki’s many speeches. Whilst some addressed the concept of an 
African  Renaissance,  others  touched  on  other  related  themes.  Mbeki  addressed  the 
Association of African Central Bank Governors in Sandton, Johannesburg, on the 16th of 
August  2001  and  titled  his  speech  ‘Towards  an  African  Renaissance.’  Since  the 
symposium that was organized tackled the issue of financial institutions and the African 
integration process, he stated categorically that ‘the political and economic integration of 
the continent is central to that Renaissance.’ This reinforces the point that was made by 
Landsberg & Kornegay (1998) when they argued that politics and economics were two 
important pillars of Mbeki’s renaissance strategy. Mbeki tried to impress upon the minds 
of these governors not to be despondent when they read negative  statements  such as 
‘Africa, a hopeless continent’. He injected in them a positive spirit; one that will adopt a 
positive attitude towards the challenges that face each one of them and he did this by 
mentioning the rationale behind the African Renaissance. He said that ‘when we speak of 
an African Renaissance, we speak of an ending of poverty and underdevelopment on our 
continent and, therefore, the building of a better life for the ordinary people of Africa, 
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especially the poor, and the assertion of our pride as human beings, with a culture and 
identity that define our personality.’ He further added that ‘as Africans …. (we must) 
design and implement programmes that impact positively on poverty eradication on the 
continent  and  the  attainment  of  sustainable  development.’  If  these  yield  positive 
outcomes, then it is because of the inputs and efforts of independent African minds and 
not the ideas of consultants from the developed world. He reminded the bankers that the 
continent’s economic recovery is central and should be addressed because this and other 
economic categories such as growth, equity, development, and globalization should be 
related to the African past and future. And towards the end of his lengthy discourse, he 
stressed the fact that they, as central bank governors, have a decisive role in the future of 
the continent and ‘to restore the dignity to ourselves as Africans.’ 
On the 2nd of November 2001 he was a guest of the Malian government. In his address at 
the state banquet under the title ‘The Dream of the African Renaissance,’ he paid homage 
to the rich legacy left behind by the early generation of Malian scholars, artists, traders, 
etcetera. And mentioned that he was indeed touched and humbled by the substantial and 
profound contribution that was made these Africans at the time when much of the world 
was still in darkness. He commended Mali’s steadfast leadership under president Konare 
and  inspired  by  the  example  shown  by  Mali  despite  its  meagre  resources.  Mbeki 
emphatically stated that ‘our conviction for the realization of the dream of the African 
Renaissance, our firm belief  in the necessity of the economic recovery of the African 
continent, and our support for the restructuring of the political agenda in Africa through 
the African Union is something that we share with the majority of the African leaders... 
Through the co-operation of the people of Mali and the people of South Africa, through 
this committed African family, together we shall create a caring, people-centred African 
future  and  the  African  child  will  prosper.’  In  2002  a  Joint  South  African-Malian 
Commission  on  Co-operation  was  held  in  Pretoria,  and  one  of  the  most  significant 
outcomes was the formation of a South Africa – Malian committee that would oversee 
and work towards the rescuing and preservation of the thousands of unedited and un-
scrutinized Malian manuscripts. This formed part of the indigenous knowledge project 
-spearheaded  by  Dr.  Shamil  Jeppie  in  the  Department  of  Historical  Studies  at  the 
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University of Cape Town - that would be substantially contributing towards ‘the dream of 
the African Renaissance’ and further reinforce international relations on the continent by 
the academia. 
The various statements in these and other speeches clearly demonstrate that Mbeki has 
remained  positive  and upbeat  about  the  African  Renaissance  strategy.  This  has  been 
particularly the case after the acceptance of NEPAD as a significant vehicle that would 
drive the African nation-states into a prosperous future by (a) observing and respecting 
the standards that had been set down by the AU, (b) working towards economic growth, 
and more importantly by (c) upholding the principles of democracy and practicing good 
governance.  NEPAD was also welcomed by the communities of the South as well as 
those of the North. In the South, regional organizations such as ASEAN gave their full 
support  to NEPAD principles  and for its  implementation,  and ASEAN members  also 
indicated their  interest  to assist through financial  investments  and technical  assistance 
with the hope that these will help to give rise to reduction of poverty and unemployment 
and particularly to rapid economic  growth on the African continent  that  would bring 
about equitable growth and sustainable development. 
4. Concluding Remarks
In concluding my assessment, it may be speculated that NEPAD as a mechanism might 
perhaps bring South Africa/SADC and Malaysia/ASEAN closer together and act  as a 
stepping  stone  towards  realizing  the  respective  African  Renaissance  and  the  Asian 
Renaissance visions that the political leadership of both states have been dreaming about 
over the past  decade.  And if this  does happen, then it  is assumed that it  will  further 
enhance  the  relationship  and  partnership  between  South  Africa  and  Malaysia.  Even 
though this relationship, as argued in this thesis, had developed into a close partnership 
and one that is slowly evolving into a strategic one, the major test is in sustaining and 
deepening the partnership into the decades ahead. This is however dependent on the two 
pillars that Ibrahim pointed out in his speeches, namely good governance and a strong 
civil society. It is hoped that these pillars will continuously be respected, observed and 
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supported in both South Africa and Malaysia for the foreseeable future particularly after 
Mbeki and Badawi vacate their positions to give way to other capable ones. 
This chapter covered a few important issues and themes that have a direct bearing on the 
relationship that has been developed between South Africa and Malaysia since the early 
1990s. It has done so in order that the relationship between these two states be understood 
within the context of the process of globalization; a process in which rapid and divergent 
socio-political and economic developments have taken place during the past two decades 
and more. The section prefaced the chapter with a brief discussion of the two Bandung 
meetings and with the conceptualization of ‘Third World’ and ‘South’ respectively so 
that  the  concerns  and  issues  that  have  affected  and  continues  to  impact  on  the 
developments in the South be better comprehended. It then went on to show how these 
two nation-states became involved in the affairs  of the South under their  vibrant  and 
capable political leadership. 
In Malaysia it was Mahathir with Ibrahim on his side and in South Africa it was Mandela 
with Mbeki on his side who led the way to advance the cause of the societies in their 
respective states and in the interest of the peoples of the South. Although the philosophies 
that underpin the respective leaders’ ideas and practices have not been investigated, it 
should be borne in mind that these (Asian and African) philosophies played a crucial role 
in these political leaders’ attitudes and outlooks towards the South and the North. The 
Malaysian and the South African political leadership performed key roles in stressing the 
significance  of  South-South  Cooperation  through  their  participation  in  various 
international and regional gatherings. These leaders, however, promoted the interest of 
South-South  Cooperation  via  the  formulation  of  their  respective  visions  that  were 
discussed in this chapter. Anwar Ibrahim articulated the vision of an Asian Renaissance 
and Thabo Mbeki advocated the vision for an African Renaissance. Unfortunately, since 
the relationship between Mathathir and his deputy soured towards the end of the 1990s, 
the articulation for a clear vision of an Asian Renaissance came to an abrupt end but in 
the case of South Africa Mbeki, as the president of the country, continued to harp on and 
popularize the vision with the help of projects such as NEPAD.
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There is little doubt that the political leaders in both countries demonstrated continuous 
commitment  towards  bringing  about  tangible  and  concrete  transformation  in  their 
respective countries in particular and in the South in general. Examples were extracted 
from Mahathir’s life to illustrate how he harped on the fact  that  the North should be 
mindful  of  the  plight  of  the  South,  and  how he  suggested  concrete  ways  in  moving 
forward and in overcoming these difficulties. And the chapter rounded off a discussion 
that made reference to the examples displayed by Mandela and Mbeki respectively; it 
showed that their hearts were always with the developing countries and that they have 
remained concerned about how effective changes can be brought about and how the goals 
that have been listed at different meetings can be achieved in order to ‘level the playing 
fields’  in  the  socio-political  and  economic  arena.  In  fact,  both  Malaysia  under 
Mahathir/Badawi and South Africa under Mandela/Mbeki have been calling for radical 
reforms in the UN in order to accommodate the new realities and to give the South a 
greater voice in the UN’s Security Council; at the UN’s Summit between the 14th and 
16th September 2005, it  appears that their hard work has not been able to succeed in 
bringing about this important change. 
These two states in particular and the South in general will probably have to wait many 
more years before their real emancipation will be witnessed, and its very unlikely that the 
North will allow themselves to be pushed into subordination at this critical juncture in 
world  developments.  In  the  meanwhile,  they  will  have  to  use  their  positions  in  the 
regional structures such as SADC and ASEAN and international institutions such as UN, 
NAM and the Commonwealth to push from the bottom up for the radical reforms that 
they so much desire.  In addition,  they should also make ample  use of newly formed 
structures such as the Indian Ocean Rim to foster the necessary economic cooperation 
among  the  developing  and  least  developing  states  become  less  dependent  upon  the 
developed states (cf. Campbell 2003); if this should succeed then it might work towards 
levelling  the  playing  fields  and  slowly  addressing  the  socio-economic  and  political 
imbalances that presently exist. 
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Figure 6.2 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CODA: The Final Passage to the Tale of Two Sovereign Nation-States
In finally rounding off this thesis I offer a summary and bits of added commentary on the 
different chapters in order to demonstrate how the various socio-political, economic and 
cultural  strands  interconnect  and,  of  course,  to  bring  this  interesting  and  indeed 
fascinating narrative of two medium size, middle power, sovereign nation-states from the 
South to a close.  At the outset  the thesis reviewed in  Chapter One all  the available 
writings on South Africa – Malaysia relations and it visibly illustrated that the amount of 
material that had been written was unbelievably thin. But despite the lack of publications, 
some of the works particularly those by Muda, Southall, Padayachee & Valodia, and van 
der  Westhuizen  made  substantial  inputs  that  cover  important  dimensions  of  the 
relationship. Their coverage of these aspects was, however, not sufficient in terms of the 
issues  that  had  been  broached,  discussed  and  analyzed  in  this  thesis.  Their  studies 
undoubtedly stimulated me to work towards adding to and expanding the existing body of 
research material  by undertaking a detailed study of the socio-political  and economic 
links that existed between South Africa and Malaysia, on the one level, and the cultural 
ties that were cemented, on another level, from the 1950s onwards. 
Before  I  embarked  upon  this  important  task,  I  prefaced  the  study by  constructing  a 
theoretical framework in Chapter Two. This framework was engineered to largely assist 
in comprehending the relationship that existed between these two nation-states during the 
Cold War era, and one that was re-structured and developed to a different level in the 
post-Cold  War  period.  After  a  brief  synopsis  of  the  various  theories  I  expressed my 
dissatisfaction with traditional theories such as Realism, and naturally opted for a more 
user-friendly theory that was in vogue and one that accommodated not only one method 
of  interpretation  and understanding but  many.  In the process  of  searching for such a 
theory I stumbled across Critical Theory (CT) that was to open the path towards critical 
thinking  and  flexibility.  CT,  which  was  conceptualized  by  the  Frankfurt  School  and 
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advocated by Jurgen Habermas and a host of other scholars, proposed - when examining 
issues and relationships - the notion of emancipation as a tool to unlock and prise open 
doors that would lead to a better understanding of these issues and relationships. Though 
the application of this theory was loosely applied throughout the thesis, it resulted in an 
understanding of the relationship that had been forged between these two nation-states; in 
fact,  it  assisted  me  in  raising  critical  questions  pertaining  to  the  nature  of  their 
relationship.. It also helped to point to important variables that played a critical role in 
these issues and relationships; some of which were briefly discussed in relation to CT. 
One variable  that  was dealt  with in some detail  in  Chapter  Two was the concept  of 
‘Identity;’ a concept that impacted upon different structures in a variety of ways. At the 
state level, I observed the transformation the state underwent. Two quick examples: the 
shift  in  1994 from an  apartheid  state  to  a  democratic  one  was evidence  of  a  radical 
change in state  identity,  and in the case of  the Federation  of Malay(si)a  Singapore’s 
initial membership and subsequent withdrawal in the early 1960s also impinged upon the 
issue of state identity in the region. And at the community level ‘identity’ played a crucial 
role particularly in situations where they have been challenged by the changing socio-
political circumstances and have had to choose between accepting one national identity 
for  the  other.  The  example  of  Singapore  and  Malaysia  again  comes  to  mind:  when 
Singapore de-linked itself from the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 it caused individuals 
to decide whether to opt for a Malaysian or Singaporean identity in Southeast Asia and 
when turning to apartheid South Africa the socio-political upheavals in the mid 1980s 
forced the South African Muslim youth to either retain the constructed ‘Cape Malay’ 
identity or to replace it with a ‘Cape Muslim’ identity. The question of identity formation 
was thus crucial to the debates throughout this thesis and was an issue that formed an 
integral part of CT. 
The theoretical framework in Chapter Two cleared the way for the investigation of the 
nature  of the relationship  between South Africa and Malaysia,  two sovereign  nation-
states, in  Chapter Three. The chapter demonstrated how South Africa’s relations with 
Malaysia evolved over the many years from the 1950s until the end of the 1980s when 
the winds  of change swept  across the world to create  a  new world order  and socio-
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political set up. Prior to showing, through brief comparative vignettes, how these two 
states developed and dealt with their respective internal and external affairs, the chapter 
discoursed in some detail about the conjoined term ‘nation-state;’ the term that consisted 
of two important  concepts have been unpacked in order to comprehend the nature of 
contemporary nation-states After defining and explaining these terms, the thesis zoomed 
in on Malaysia’s foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa and its discriminatory 
policies;  it  particularly  examined  the  policies  that  were adopted  and implemented  by 
Tunku  (1957-1961)  and  Mahathir  (1981-1990).  Whilst  the  thesis  proved  that  Tunku 
adopted a soft approach towards apartheid South Africa, it went on to demonstrate that 
Mahathir assumed a no-nonsense hard approach; an approach that he followed through 
until  the socio-political  changes  eventually  took place at  the  beginning of 1990.  The 
socio-political developments in both nation-states as well as the unwavering stand that 
Malaysia implemented towards South Africa provided an important background to the 
way the relationship was transformed and changed from 1990 onwards.
The  reconnection,  which  was  initiated  in  1990  and  fully  realized  in  1993,  between 
Malaysia  and  South  Africa  is  ample  proof  that  the  Malaysians  were  quite  keen  to 
establish diplomatic connections so that they could direct their investments into South 
African  projects.  The  ties  that  were established  were  spurred  on  by,  inter  alia,  their 
buoyant economy and their stable political conditions with the intention of developing 
and transforming their friendly bilateral relationship into a close partnership that would 
be mutually beneficial to both states as well as the regions they both represent. The mere 
fact that Malaysia committed itself to assisting the ANC morally and financially in the 
1980s  was  enough evidence  to  suggest  that  they  were  fully  prepared  to  back  South 
Africa’s transformation in the 1990s. Their sizeable investments that gradually trickled 
into  various  South  African  structures  such  as  housing,  communication  system,  hotel 
industry and many others were tangible proof of Malaysia’s pledge. South Africa also 
reciprocated by sending in its business troops to Malaysia. Despite the economic melt 
down in Southeast  Asia in 1997/1998 that  temporarily  affected  the economies  of the 
region and in other parts of the world, some of the businesses that were able to weather 
the economic storms generally gained from their investments and partnerships. 
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It  was  demonstrated  particularly  in  Chapter  Four that  there  has  been  continuous 
communication and cooperation at the government to government levels between South 
Africa and Malaysia; the numerous official visits as well as many other non-official visits 
by non-state actors further strengthened the bonds and enhanced the relationship in the 
socio-cultural, political and economic spheres. All of these demonstrated that the initiated 
and  sustained  socio-political  and  economic  activities  have  played  a  crucial  role  in 
establishing ‘a close partnership’ at the governmental and non-governmental levels. Since 
both nation-states were classified by IR scholars as (emerging) ‘middle powers’, it forced 
me to unpack the concept in relation to the notion of ‘partnership’ in order to, on the one 
hand, fully grasp what was meant by the term, and, on the other, how it applied to the 
relationship that evolved between South Africa and Malaysia. The chapter thus depended 
upon some of the previous works that addressed the issue,  and it  was able to extract 
examples that demonstrated why they were labeled as ‘middle powers’ and how come 
they were able  to  maintain  those positions  within the international  state  system even 
amidst the formidable challenges that they faced on occasions.  
Malaysia,  whose economy suffered in the 1997/1998 economic crises and spoiled the 
investments its investors made in South Africa between 1992 and 1996, bounced back 
under Mahathir’s erstwhile leadership. The financial crisis, which had a negative impact 
upon the Malaysian economy,  caused the Malaysians under Mahathir  to respond in a 
proactive way and thus miraculously re-build the economy within a short period of time. 
Despite the internal conflicts such as Anwar Ibrahim’s dismissal that occurred at the time, 
Mahathir steered the country out of the crisis and this was once again another example of 
his tough leadership and indeed Malaysia’s resilience in fighting the challenges that came 
its way. Malaysia thus showed South Africa and all other African countries that even 
though the odds were stacked against it due to internal and external factors, it was able to 
challenge these head on and rise above them. For the South Africans, Malaysia continued 
to be a good example in the Southeast Asian region despite the intervening negative the 
socio-political and economic developments that occurred during the past few years. 
298
                                                                          
In this chapter it was argued that even though the Southeast Asian economic crisis had a 
rippling effect and caused jitters amongst South African businesses that had investments 
in  Malaysia  trade  ties  were  not  broken  at  any  stage  during  the  crisis.  I  went  on  to 
demonstrate  via  an  assessment  of  the  trade  figures  that  both  nation-states  remained 
committed  to  pursuing commercial  connections  despite  the adverse conditions  at  that 
time.  In  fact,  the  figures  showed  that  Malaysia  regained  its  position  by  2000  and 
continued with its investments; however, this time round it was more cautious because it 
wanted  to  avert  and  avoid  any situation  that  would  negatively  impact  upon its  own 
economy  and  that  of  its  partner.  In  the  meanwhile,  diplomatic  ties  flourished  since 
Mbeki’s visit to Malaysia in 2003 and after Badawi reciprocated in 2005.  In fact, their 
visits  and  speeches  have  taken  account  of  the  cultural  connections  that  have  been 
ongoing. Their acknowledgement of this sector bolstered my argument to include and 
discuss the cultural connections that exist between the two communities as a crucial part 
of international  relations  and as a significant  part  of South Africa’s  relationship with 
Malaysia during the contemporary period.
Chapter Five therefore devoted itself completely to the role that  had been played by 
three non-state activists or I should rather say two cultural activists and one voluntary 
refugee. In outlining and discussing the contributions of these three individuals (and their 
organizations in the case of the two cultural activists), I illustrated how their efforts have 
provided  a  different  dimension  to  international  relations.  Discussing  their  respective 
contributions  lead me  to  deal  with a  numbers  of  variables  such as  ethnicity,  culture, 
religion and citizenship that were easily slotted in under the concept of ‘Identity.’ The 
case  of  Hj.  Rabi’ah,  the  voluntary  refugee,  who  joined  the  diapora  strengthened  the 
notion that citizenship has been and remains a problematic issue, and it also proved that a 
person’s religio-ethnic identity does not provide one with an automatic ticket of entry and 
acceptance into another country that shares common religious and ethnic strands. And in 
addition, it also brought under the microscope the question of diasporic communities at 
large.  Hj.  Rabi’ah’s  trials  and  tribulations  continue  to  be  an  interesting  example  for 
scholars of IR. 
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The second case study in  this  chapter  focused on Ismail  Petersen’s  struggle  to  serve 
strangers and forge connections with no ulterior motives. Peterson’s commendable efforts 
demonstrated  that  despite  his  disadvantageous  position  within  a  racially  structured 
society he was still able to pursue his personal goals. I contended that Mr. Petersen was 
oblivious of the fact that he was effectively contributing to international relations whilst 
he was attempting to fulfill his social and religious obligations towards passers-by from 
far-flung Southeast Asian states. Mr. Petersen’s rich experiences differed markedly from 
that of Tan Sri Professor Ismail  Hussein, my third subject,  who was conscious of his 
inputs to international relations. Having been a former university professor and an ardent 
cultural  activist  from Malaysia,  he was ambitious  in  pursuing his  project  of not only 
espousing the Malay language and culture nationally but also internationally. I showed 
that as an intellectual, a view supported by Opello and Rosow (2004: 194-196), that he 
played a key role in crystallizing the Malaysian society’s aspiration in a very crisp and 
neat  way;  a  way that  Malaysian  politicians  found difficult  to  do.  In  fact,  the  Malay 
intellectual – like other intellectuals in other states such as South Africa - was the driving 
force  behind  the  nationalistic  ideals  that  were  embedded  in  the  Malay  language  and 
culture. Tan Sri, who was firmly entrenched within the Malaysian academia, wisely used 
the available resources to advance his objectives. 
Since the academic environment was not sufficient for achieving his objectives, he went 
on to establish GAPENA as a suitable vehicle that would take them beyond Malaysia’s 
national  boundaries.  As  a  consequence,  Tan  Sri  connected  not  only  with  regional 
communities that shared his ideals  but also with diasporic communities such as those 
residing  in  Sri  Lanka,  Madagascar  and South  Africa.  GAPENA played  an  important 
supporting role in all  his  ventures and it  helped to chart  a significant  niche for itself 
within the Malay cultural world. I described Tan Sri as a cultural activist par excellence 
because of the enormous amount of networks that he established in the region. And I 
further argued that even though he did not write a vast number of works, he was able to 
inspire and stimulate a variety of cultural activities such as poetry readings and Malay 
dancing that underpinned Malay culture not only in Malaysia but also in the region. In 
fact,  he was able  to  arouse and instill  an interest  in  these areas  among many of  the 
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diasporic  communities  who  had  been  in  constant  contact  with  him.  And  these 
connections, in a sense, reinvigorated the debates surrounding the question of ‘identity’ 
as was the case when the first international seminar was held at the University of the 
Western Cape between South African and Malaysian scholars. Tan Sri’s story, along with 
the other two cases mentioned earlier in the chapter, stressed the point that the activities 
of non-state actors such as cultural  activists  have important lessons for foreign policy 
cum decision makers. For those critical of realism writing the stories of cultural activists 
into the grand narrative along with that of the state goes a long way in rectifying the 
social histories of the marginalized communities. As a matter of fact, the actions of these 
non-state actors not only brought into question the limitations of sovereignty but also the 
types of challenges that it had to face in the new constructed global village. 
The actions of these cultural activists in particular and acts performed by the nation-states 
in general have led me to look at other aspects of these two nation-states. In Chapter Six 
I was compelled to look at two important issues that are partly rooted in the respective 
philosophies of Asia and Africa and partly in the imbalances of power that exist in the 
international system. It is in the nature of Africans and Asians to act collectively when it 
faces  a  variety  of  challenges  and  to  push  aside  individualist  trends  of  dealing  with 
problems;  this  individualist  trend  may  be  viewed  as  a  spin-off  or  an  outcome  of 
liberalism  and  a  common  characteristic  of  the  modern  European  lifestyle.  Since  the 
West/North holds all the powerful positions in the international state system, nation-states 
from the South have desired to reach similar positions. Unfortunately for the South, the 
international system was constructed by the North to serve its interests and not those of 
the  South.  The  South  has  remained  in  a  disadvantageous  position  in  relation  to  the 
West/North for whenever a nation-state from the South fulfilled all the criteria laid down 
by the North,  then the latter  tried to place other  obstacles  in its  way that  blocks the 
nation-state’s entry to the elite group of states; thus it has been somewhat impossible for 
the progressive and advanced ‘developing’ state to find a seat in the prestigious club 
controlled and managed by the North. Labels such as ‘Third World’ – a concept that 
defined and subsequently replaced with ‘South’ - were invented not to inspire confidence 
but to instill an inferiority complex in the minds of all the inhabitants residing in that 
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world; a world that has also been described as one that was in the perpetual process of 
‘development’ and an issue that had been critically commented upon by critical theorists 
such as Cox and Habermas. 
As a result of the stark imbalances in the world system and the negative labels that have 
been bandied about by the North, nation-states such as Malaysia and South Africa, which 
have achieved ‘middle power’ status and accomplished stable socio-economic polities, 
have struggled hard over the past decade - and a bit more in the case of Malaysia - to 
level the playing fields by committing themselves to the cause of the South; an act that 
has found favour with those expressing critical theoretical perspectives. Apart from the 
ties that had been forged and the activities that are taking place since their reconnection, 
Malaysia  and South Africa considered their  commitment  to South-South Co-operation 
project of paramount importance and a significant avenue via which they could serve the 
communities of their fellow strugglers from South. The chapter illustrated in detail how 
Malaysia sacrificed much of its time and wealth in this direction and this was further 
complimented by democratic South Africa’s story during the past decade. 
Both nation-states  were greatly inspired and motivated,  however,  when their  political 
leadership  charted  out  visions  for  the  future;  visions  that  were  embedded  in  their 
respective  continental  philosophies  that  were  firmly  located  in  ‘Asian  values’  and 
‘African values.’. The call for an Asian Renaissance by Anwar Ibrahim and an African 
Renaissance by Thabo Mbeki were – to paraphrase Kornegay, Landsberg & McDonald’s 
(2001: 112) concluding remarks - not mere ‘slogans of hope’ in search of continental 
solutions, but as global perspectives that encompass Asia’s and Africa’s ambitions within 
the world in the 21st century. These visions have been the driving forces behind their zeal 
to bring about profound changes within their respective nation-states and their regions as 
well as their respective continents. 
And both states have ambitiously sought to strive towards higher goals via their close 
partnership  and  their  participation  in  regional  and  international  organizations.  Their 
respective ambitions, which were mentioned earlier in the thesis, found further support in 
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the Joint Commission that was set up between South Africa and Malaysia. When it got 
off  the  ground  mid  2005  after  a  few  years  of  planning  and  negotiations,  it  further 
suggested that both states have been deadly serious in enhancing their relationship and 
establishing a permanent, strong (and hopefully a strategic) partnership. These exciting 
developments and the new energies that have thus far been ploughed into the projects in 
order to strengthen their blossoming relationship bode well for the future ties between 
these two sovereign nation-states. I assume that if both states develop a relationship that 
will realize ‘prosper-thy-neighbour’ ethos and create a friendly atmosphere within their 
respective regions, then that will be a good start for the regions as well as the continents. 
Although I am somewhat pessimistic about the future, I hold onto the view that it will 
still take a while for the political leadership to reach that realization and this means that 
the regions represented by SADC and ASEAN will still  have a long way to go. And 
related to this and other related policies and issues, the political leadership of both states 
should  think  hard  when  it  comes  to  re-formulating  thoughts  about  their  respective 
communities  in  the  light  of  regionalization  and  globalization.  In  other  words,  the 
Malaysian and South African political leadership should set their sights and minds on 
empowering their communities in their respective states as well as those in the region; 
they should in effect try to think beyond their borders that had been created by the former 
colonial  powers  and  should  not  imprison  themselves  by the  (artificial)  borders.  This 
attitude and approach will go a long way in bringing about emancipation in the form of 
tangible and concrete changes in their states and their regions. If a positive attitude and 
approach are adopted and cultivated,  then it  should also cause the leadership of both 
states to look beyond the nation-state as the final frontier, and take into account how their 
communities were connected and related in the distant past (Acharya 2000; Vale 2003); a 
time before the colonial powers came onto the scene and created borders and identities 
that  have  become  physical  barriers  and  indeed  obstacles  among  nation-states  on  the 
continents of Asia and Africa and their different regions. Since this thesis captured the 
relationship  between  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  in  the  socio-political  and  economic 
arena, it acts as an important basis for further research between South Africa and other 
sovereign nation-states in ASEAN, Asia and elsewhere in the South.
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An attempt was made to use and employ CT as useful analytical tool and framework in 
which alternative solutions could be sought for the variety of problems that nation-states 
such as South Africa and Malaysia faced and also for all the others from the South. The 
theory  was  further  supported  by  the  introduction  of  the  concept  of  ‘identity’  to 
demonstrate  how alternative  identities  were  wrought  by  the  changing  conditions  and 
circumstances.  And it  was  given  further  impetus  when I  brought  into  the  discussion 
numerous other concepts that critical theorists also grappled with; for example, I dealt 
with the notions of ‘nation-state,’  ‘middle power,’ ‘partnership,’ ‘South/Third World,’ 
‘diaspora’ and ‘non-state actors.’ 
On this note, I wish to close the thesis by stating that a Herculean effort was made to 
clearly illustrate the type of relationship that existed between these two sovereign nation-
states  during the Cold War era,  and how their  relationship  transformed into one that 
exemplifies a fairly healthy, fraternal relationship during the post-Cold War period. I am, 
however, curious to know what the next decade will bring forth as these two nation-states 
continue to plough ahead into the 21st century: will they remain committed to the South? 
Will they be able to weather the socio-political and economic storms that lay ahead? Will 
their  new political  leadership work with one another  the  way Mandela  and Mahathir 
cooperated?  These  and  other  questions  I  will  leave  for  the  researcher  who has  been 
stimulated by my findings and outcomes. 
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APPENDICES
Chronology of Salient Socio-Political & Economic Events in 
South Africa and Malaysia: 
Circa 1990 – 2005
The chronology hereunder is a selected list of socio-political and economic events, which 
took place between 1990 and 2005; its main purpose is to offer a bird’s eye view of what 
had transpired over the decade and a half and particularly during South Africa’s ten years 
of democracy. 
The  chronology  bears  testimony  to  the  fact  that  South  Africa  and  Malaysia  have 
developed a very cordial relationship throughout these years, and they continued to enjoy 
a  healthy  relationship  in  all  spheres  and  entered  into  what  has  been  described  as  ‘a 
strategic  partnership;’  this  has  been  most  notably  so  in  the  respective  political  and 
economic arenas. This relationship has emerged out of the passionate support Malaysia 
has given to the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, in their struggle against 
apartheid;  and this  was  further  bolstered  when Mandela  was released  from prison in 
February 1990. Before Nelson Mandela became the president of South Africa in 1994, he 
paid tribute to then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, for his unstinting 
support. And since then, the two developed a strong bond of friendship.
Their friendship and desire for meaningful transformation in the world political system as 
individuals  and as world statesmen laid  the grounds for a common realization of the 
importance of South-South co-operation. Their ties have paved the way for visits at the 
ministerial  and  other  levels.  Ministers,  parliamentarians  and  other  high  standing 
dignitaries from both countries have exchanged visits. Delegations from the Provinces of 
Gauteng, the Northern Province, Northwest and the Northern Cape, led by their Premiers, 
have gone to Malaysia to forge ties in different sectors. The Malaysian cabinet and other 
important  dignitaries  reciprocated  by  leading  delegations  and  groups  to  explore  and 
cement the existing bonds. And at a people-to-people’s level, socio-cultural and religious 
connections were also made as another way of cementing this relationship. 
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Herewith below are some of the events:
1990 
2nd February South Africa’s President  F. W. De Klerk announced in Parliament  that 
Nelson Mandela will  be released and that  the banning imposed on many of the anti-
apartheid liberation movements will be lifted. On the 11th February Nelson Mandela was 
released from prison.
11th October Dr. Mahathir’s government was voted back into power.
1991 
Malaysia lifted people-to-people sanctions against South Africa (in accordance with the 
Harare Declaration at the Commonwealth Heads of State Meeting in Zimbabwe) at the 
end of 1991.
On 26 February Dr. Mahathir  announced his  Vision 2020 and the concept of  Bangsa 
Malaysia; this working paper he delivered at the Malaysian Business Council.
On 17th June the National Development Policy replaced the National Economic Policy 
that was introduced in 1971.
In early July the ANC elected a new National Executive with Mandela as its president
1992 
Malaysia indicated that she wished to establish a Liaison Office in South Africa in order 
to facilitate  direct  contact  with the South Africa.  This Office would form part  of the 
Malaysian Airline System (MAS) office in Johannesburg. 
In October 1992 the first Malaysian Airlines flight arrived at Johannesburg.
Since the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare in 1991 had ruled out 
the official establishment of relations with South Africa, the Malaysian Liaison Office 
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would  function  until  a  South  African  interim Government  was  in  place;  the  Liaison 
Office was established towards the end of 1992.
On the  10th of  December  Anwar  Ibrahim defeats  Gafar  Baba  in  contest  for  Deputy 
President of UMNO.
1993 
Air service agreement between South Africa and Malaysia signed on 5th January.
The GAPENA delegation under the leadership of Professor Drs. Ismail  Hussein from 
UKM visited Cape Town in April, a year prior to the democratic elections, and they were 
hosted by the University of the Western Cape with the intention of setting up a Malay 
Studies program and to sign an MOU between UKM and UWC; the visit was approved 
by the Malaysian government.
The process of lifting trade sanctions began when the Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation (MISC) was given authority to accept South African cargo from 1 July.
In a 1993 statement, the then Foreign Minister, Datuk Abdullah Badawi, mentioned that 
Malaysia intended to lift all remaining diplomatic, trade and economic sanctions against 
South Africa with effect from 25 September. Full diplomatic relations were established 
on 8th November.
1994 
The South African Embassy in  Kuala  Lumpur  was opened on the 17th January,  and 
subsequent  to  South  Africa's  re-admittance  to  the  Commonwealth,  the  Embassy  was 
renamed the South African High Commission.
South African Malay Chamber of Business undertook an official ‘Mission to Malaysia’ 
trip between the 3rd and 11th February. The Mission leader was Mr. Riedewaan Isaacs, 
the chief executive officer, and he was accompanied by Mr. Abdul Gamiet Flacks, the 
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managing director, and Mr. Mohamed Hoosain Bux, an executive member.
In  March  Malaysia  awarded  the  Tun  Abdul  Razak  International  Award  to  President 
Nelson Mandela. Mr Mandela received this award for his efforts in the forefront of the 
struggle  to  dismantle  apartheid.   President  Mandela's  daughter,  Ms  Zinzi  Mandela, 
accepted the award on behalf of the President at a ceremony in Kuala Lumpur on 10th 
August.
During April first democratic elections in South Africa took place, and on the 9th May 
Nelson  Mandela  was  elected  and  subsequently  installed  as  first  president  of  South 
Africa’s Government of National Unity.
In  April  the  Malaysian  Prime  Minister,  Dr  Mahathir,  was  one  of  the  first  foreign 
statesmen  to  pay  a  private  one-day  visit  to  South  Africa  to  congratulate  President 
Mandela. The Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Datuk Abdullah Badawi, attended 
the inauguration of President Mandela on 10th May and held a short private discussion 
with President Mandela.
In September the Second Afro-Asian International Conference on Power Development 
was held; this coincided with Malaysia celebrating 100 years of electricity.
Between 12th and 16th December the Asia-Africa Forum held its meeting in Bandung.
Since  1994,  Malaysia  has  assisted  more  than  three  hundred  South  Africans  in  their 
studies that range from short but focused courses to full scholarships for degrees like 
engineering and information technology. A number of South African universities signed 
MOU's with their Malaysian counterparts and co-operation was encouraged. The concept 
of  South  Africa  as  an  affordable  education  destination  for  international  Malaysian 
students was being promoted.
1995 
Mr. Joe Modise, South Africa’s Minister of Defence, visited Malaysia during January.
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Dr. Mahathir and Barisan Nasional returned to power after general elections.
In March South Africa was one of the founding members  of the Indian Ocean Rim- 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOC-ARC – formerly known as IOR Initiative) to 
further ties and trade in the region. 
During  July  Malaysia  hosted  the  Langkawi  International  Dialogue  (LID)  –  a  Smart 
Partnership, which dedicated itself to South-South Cooperation.
Ms M Mohale was appointed as South Africa's first High Commissioner to Malaysia, and 
she presented her credentials to the King of Malaysia on 25 July.
Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, the Malaysian Prime Minister, paid an official  visit to South 
Africa in August, and Malaysia joins IOR-ARC in August.
Cape Al-Attas Dhikr Jama’at Group participate in Celebration of the Prophet’s (s) birth 
under auspices of Pusat Islam in Kuala Lumpur on 18th of August.
Yahaya  Ahmed,  a  Malaysian  entrepreneur  &  then  chairperson  of  Proton,  led  a  250 
business  delegation  to  South  Africa  and  negotiated  setting  up  a  Proton  plant  in  the 
Eastern Cape. (Mr. Ahmed died in a helicopter crash during his visit).
In December   South Africa signed a business arrangement with Malaysia, allowing for 
the  manufacture,  under  license  in  Malaysia,  of  the  South  African  designed  attack 
helicopter, the Rooivalk.
1996  
The Department of Foreign Affairs issued a paper on ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 
Discussion Document.’ 
26th March Asian Tigers and African Lions Business Conference, Johannesburg.
First South Africa – Malaysia Forum
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6th May Deputy President Thabo Mbeki delivers his ‘I am an African’ speech to the 
South African Constitutional Court.
In June Petronas purchased a 30% stake in Engen.
Betweeen 28th and 30th July LID had its third meeting.
The Asia-African Forum met in Bangkok.
During November  a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation  has been 
signed between Malaysia and South Africa. Malaysian Defence Minister D.S.H. Albar 
confirmed in Pretoria that talks on the purchase and production of helicopters have been 
held.
1997 
Asian financial crisis hits Malaysia and other states and by October the ringgit lost 40% 
of its value.
In 1997 the ANC issued a ‘Developing a strategic perspective on South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy’ document for discussion and debate.
President Mandela’s – leading a delegation of 105 persons – three day visit in March 
witnessed the official launch of the Malaysia South Africa Business Council (MSABC) in 
Kuala Lumpur; Dr. Mahathir also attended this function. Mandela signed the 47th (trade) 
agreement between South Africa and Malaysia. 
Second South Africa – Malaysia Forum meeting.
4th to 5th May the First Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID) took place in 
Gaborone.
Dr Mahathir received the Order of the Cape of Good Hope from President Mandela in 
Cape Town,on 7th  May. 
310
                                                                          
South Africa and Malaysia signed a Trade Agreement as well as a Shipping Agreement in 
1997. A Double Taxation Treaty was negotiated and subsequently signed. In addition, 
Malaysia has approached South Africa on the possibility of concluding an Agreement on 
the  Promotion  and  Protection  of  Investments,  as  well  as  an  Economic,  Technical, 
Scientific and Cultural Co-operation Agreement.
1998 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki delivered his African Renaissance speech.
In May the Second SAID took place in Windhoek, Namibia.
12th NAM Summit of Heads of State and Government in Durban from 29th August to 
3rd September.
On the 3rd September UMNO Supreme Council expelled Anwar Ibrahim from the party 
after Dr. Mahathir sacked him as his deputy. 
The  visit  of  Deputy  President  Thabo  Mbeki  to  Malaysia,  during  the  Commonwealth 
Games in September 1998, further bolstered the relations.
During  1998  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  presented  its  ‘Thematic  Review: 
Strategic  Plans’ paper for discussion and debate,  and in October the White  Paper  on 
‘South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions’ was accepted.
South  Africa  acted  as  host  and  took  over  the  chair  of  the  Non-Aligned  Movement 
meeting.
1999 
The South African Government appointed Honorary Consuls in the States of Penang and 
Sarawak (in June) in an effort  to further establish a presence outside the commercial 
heartland of Selangor (within which the capital of Kuala Lumpur is located).
Deputy  President  Jacob  Zuma  attended  the  Fourth  Langkawi  International  Dialogue 
(LID)  in  Malaysia  in  August  to  participate  in  the  Malaysian  initiated  LID  Smart 
Partnership concept and this has taken a Southern African-leg with the establishment of a 
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Southern African International Dialogue.
During November BN and Mahathir came back to power.
In May the Third SAID took place in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
In October the Asia-Africa Business Forum met in Kuala Lumpur
"From Transition to Transformation" was the theme of the delegation from the Northern 
Province Investment Initiatives (NPII) program sent to Malaysia to promote trade and 
investment. On November 15th, a day to meet the delegates was co-hosted by the South 
African  High  Commission  (SAHC),  the  Malaysia-South  Africa  Business  Council 
(MSABC), the Asian Strategy Leadership Institute (ASLI) and the National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Malaysia (NCCIM) at the Hotel Istana in Kuala Lumpur
2000 
The South African Chapter of the African Renaissance was formed during April.
Between 15th and 22nd April Mr. Zingile Dingani, Minister for Finance, Expenditure & 
Economic Affairs in the Free State Province & Delegation visited Malaysia.
20th April Mrs. Phumizile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Minister of Minerals & Energy addresses 
business forum on ‘Investment opportunities in Mineral Industry.’
Between 23rd and 24th May the Asia-Africa Forum – Joining Hands for Strengthening 
Partnerships was held in Kuala Lumpur.
South Africa handed over the chair of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
which was held since 1996.
SAID was held in Maputo between 20th and 23rd of August.
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6th September  Popo Molefe,  premier  of the North West  Province and his  delegation 
makes a presentation in Kuala Lumpur to attract investments and trade to that province.
In October South Africa appoints Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza as the new South African High 
Commissioner to Malaysia.
2001 
On the 23rd June Cape Malay Charitable Concert organized by the Selangor Council of 
Welfare & Social Development in Shah Alam.
A joint Ministerial Commission was proposed during a meeting that Minister Dlamini-
Zuma had with her Malaysian counterpart in September.
President  Thabo  Mbeki  handed  over  the  chair  of  NAM,  which  held  its  meeting  in 
Malaysia, to Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.
SAID was held in Kampala on 20th August.
2002 
Between the 17th and 19th February Afro-Asian Dialogue Conference in Johannesburg
Dr Abraham Nkomo, South Africa's third High Commissioner to Malaysia, presented his 
credentials to the King of Malaysia on 22 March.
Malaysia Airlines - as from 1st of May – reduced its number of flights to South Africa; 
instead of the initial four flights per week it reduced it to three.
A draft  document  of the Joint  Malaysian Commission was presented to South Africa 
during  the  first  quarter  of  2002.  MOUs  on  Co-operation  in  the  field  of  Sport  and 
Recreation and Public Service Training between South Africa and Malaysia were also 
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considered.
Dr. Mahathir celebrates 20th anniversary in office as PM on 16th July.
Inaugural  summit  of  the  African  Union in  July,  and the launching  of  NEPAD (New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development).
Deputy President Jacob Zuma attended the Fifth Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) 
in Malaysia  in  November  2002  to  participate  in  the  Malaysian  initiated  LID  Smart 
Partnership concept and this has taken a Southern African-leg with the establishment of a 
Southern African International Dialogue.
2003 
XIIIth NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur during February
On the  invitation  of  the  Malaysian  World  Peace  Federation,  Deputy  President  Jacob 
Zuma traveled to Malaysia to participate in the Kuala Lumpur World Peace Conference 
from Saturday - Sunday, 9-10th August 2003. He participated in a Statesmen Roundtable 
entitled, "Reaping the peace dividend: discuss, disarm and distribute," on Saturday, 9th 
August 2003. Other participants in this session are Malaysia's Minister of Defense, Mohd 
Najib Tun Razak.
SAID was held in Mbabane, Swaziland, in August.
The first week of September President Thabo Mbeki led a delegation of 70 persons on a 3 
day visit to Malaysia for (a) bilateral talks, (b) sign agreement on economic, scientific, 
technical and cultural co-operation, & (c) an MoU on setting up a joint commission.
31st October Dr. Mahathir resigned as PM of Malaysia and the following day had Datuk 
Abdullah Badawi installed as PM.
2004 
On the 21st March marked yet another Malaysian election, which was comfortably won 
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by BN that was led by Datuk Badawi.
During April ‘A National Integrity Plan’ was launched as a way of rooting out corruption 
in Malaysia’s civil service.
Between the 29th and 31st July LID members held a meeting.
From the 17th to 19th August NAM Ministerial Meeting in Durban.
2005
Asian-African Summit in Jakarta on 22nd and 23rd of April.
Prime Minister Badawi’s official visit to Tswane/Pretoria on the 26th and the 27th of July
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1. Map of South Africa
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     
Source:  http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/sf/map.html 
Basic Statistical Data about South Africa:
AREA, POPULATION & DENSITY
AREA (per square km)                                                                     1,219,080
POPULATION (census results)
9 OCTOBER 1996                                                                             40,583,573
9 OCTOBER 2001
MALE                                                                                                 21,434,033
FEMALE                                                                                            23,385,737
                                                                                                   -------------------------
                                                                            Total:                       44,819,770
POPULATION (official statistics mid-year)
2002                                                                                               45,454,211
2003                                                                                               46,429,823
2004                                                                                               46,586,607
DENSITY (per square km at mid 2004)                                                         37.4
Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 2005 - Europa Publications, 2004 & Census 2001: Census in brief. 2nd 
edition. Statistics South Africa. 2003.
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2. MAP of MALAYSIA
Source: http://education.yahoo.com/reference/factbook/my/map.html 
Basic Statistical Data about Malaysia:
AREA, POPULATION & DENSITY
AREA (per square km)   
PENINSULA MALAYSIA                                                            131,686
SABAH (including LABUAN)                                                        73,711
SARAWAK                                                                                    124,450
                                                                                                      --------------
                                                                                                        329, 847
POPULATION (census results)
14 August 1990                                                                             18,379,655
4-20 July 2000
MALE                                                                                           11,853,432
FEMALE                                                                                      11,421,258
                                                                                                   ------------------
                                                                            Total:                 23,274,690
POPULATION (official statistics mid-year)
2002                                                                         24,530,000
2003                                                                         25,050,000
DENSITY (per square km at mid 2003)                                    75,9
Source: The Far East & Australasia, 2005 - Europa Publications, 2004.
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